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Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.

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Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.. / Bhattacharjee, Arnab; Holly, Sean.

2012. 1-48 Paper presented at 44th Annual Money Macro and Finance Conference, Dublin, Ireland.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Harvard

Bhattacharjee, A & Holly, S 2012, 'Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.' Paper presented at 44th Annual Money Macro and Finance Conference, Dublin, Ireland, 6/09/12 - 8/09/12, pp. 1-48.

APA

Bhattacharjee, A., & Holly, S. (2012). Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.. 1-48. Paper presented at 44th Annual Money Macro and Finance Conference, Dublin, Ireland.

Vancouver

Bhattacharjee A, Holly S. Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.. 2012. Paper presented at 44th Annual Money Macro and Finance Conference, Dublin, Ireland.

Author

Bhattacharjee, Arnab; Holly, Sean / Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees..

2012. 1-48 Paper presented at 44th Annual Money Macro and Finance Conference, Dublin, Ireland.

Research output: Contribution to conferencePaper

Bibtex - Download

@conference{d3916a88bd6a4a1b9fcb859990a1cc4e,
title = "Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.",
author = "Arnab Bhattacharjee and Sean Holly",
year = "2012",
pages = "1-48",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - CONF

T1 - Influence and Interactions in Monetary Policy Committees.

A1 - Bhattacharjee,Arnab

A1 - Holly,Sean

AU - Bhattacharjee,Arnab

AU - Holly,Sean

PY - 2012/4/29

Y1 - 2012/4/29

N2 - Over the last two decades central bank independence has become<br/>the default for the conduct of monetary policy. In turn the decision-<br/>making process, within a central bank, has become - by design - much<br/>more transparent. The governance of this process is generally embed-<br/>ded in some type of committee. In turn, the use of committees to<br/>make decisions about interest rates, and other aspects of monetary<br/>policy, has increased the amount of information –again deliberately –<br/>made available about this decision-making itself. This in turn has gen-<br/>erated a large literature on how committees make decisions, how they<br/>interact among themselves, and whether or not the outcome re‡ects<br/>the consensus, a majority decision, or perhaps the domination of one<br/>or more members of the committee in the decision-making process.<br/>This paper o¤ers further insight into how decisions are made within a<br/>committee and and proposes a method by which we can detect hidden<br/>interactions among members of a committee, once we’ve conditioned<br/>on the factors that in‡uence individual committee member’s decisions<br/>on interest rates. Using our method we are able to identify directions<br/>of in‡uence. In other words, a committee member can in‡uence an-<br/>other committee member, but not necessarily be in‡uenced in return<br/>by that member. In other words, that can be considerable asymmetry<br/>in the in‡uence committee members have, and how they are in‡uenced<br/>in turn by others.

AB - Over the last two decades central bank independence has become<br/>the default for the conduct of monetary policy. In turn the decision-<br/>making process, within a central bank, has become - by design - much<br/>more transparent. The governance of this process is generally embed-<br/>ded in some type of committee. In turn, the use of committees to<br/>make decisions about interest rates, and other aspects of monetary<br/>policy, has increased the amount of information –again deliberately –<br/>made available about this decision-making itself. This in turn has gen-<br/>erated a large literature on how committees make decisions, how they<br/>interact among themselves, and whether or not the outcome re‡ects<br/>the consensus, a majority decision, or perhaps the domination of one<br/>or more members of the committee in the decision-making process.<br/>This paper o¤ers further insight into how decisions are made within a<br/>committee and and proposes a method by which we can detect hidden<br/>interactions among members of a committee, once we’ve conditioned<br/>on the factors that in‡uence individual committee member’s decisions<br/>on interest rates. Using our method we are able to identify directions<br/>of in‡uence. In other words, a committee member can in‡uence an-<br/>other committee member, but not necessarily be in‡uenced in return<br/>by that member. In other words, that can be considerable asymmetry<br/>in the in‡uence committee members have, and how they are in‡uenced<br/>in turn by others.

KW - committee decision making

KW - SOCIAL NETWORKS

KW - cross-section and spatial interaction

KW - Generalised method of moments

KW - Censored Regression Model

KW - Expectation-Maximisation Algorithm

KW - Monetary Policy Committee

UR - https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=MMF2012&paper_id=105

M1 - Paper

SP - 1

EP - 48

ER -

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