A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu-Fu Chen, Gylfi Zoega

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    We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers’ effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)98-101
    Number of pages4
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Early online date7 Jul 2015
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2015


    • Wages
    • shirking
    • finite horizons
    • retirement

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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