A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu-Fu Chen; Gylfi Zoega

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

A non-perpetual shirking model

Yu-Fu Chen, Gylfi Zoega

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Abstract

We provide a finite-horizon counterpart to the Shapiro and Stiglitz model of unemployment to show how workers’ effort falls as they approach the end of an employment spell. The model provides a reason for wages rising more rapidly than productivity.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	98-101
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	134
Early online date	7 Jul 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021
Publication status	Published - Sept 2015

Keywords

Wages
shirking
finite horizons
retirement

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

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10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

Economics_Letters_2015_JulyAccepted author manuscript, 315 KB

Chen, Yu-Fu
- Economics - Senior Lecturer (Teaching and Research)
Person: Academic

Cite this

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title = "A non-perpetual shirking model",

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KW - Wages

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KW - finite horizons

KW - retirement

U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.06.021

M3 - Article

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SP - 98

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

A non-perpetual shirking model

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

UN SDGs

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Chen, Yu-Fu

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