Activism, separation of powers and development

Ajit Mishra, T. C. A. Anant

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a model of constitutional (mechanism) design with separation of powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks. In this context, we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-making into the domain of other institution’s tasks. When members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as well as non-benevolent, such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving collusion-proofness and raises welfare. Hence the value of such activism can be potentially very high in the context of developing economies. But as the fraction of non-benevolent member increases, such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare. It is argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap because of the high levels of corruption and bribery.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalJournal of Development Economics
    Volume81
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2006

    Keywords

    • Separation of powers
    • Activism
    • Corruption
    • Incentives

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  • Research Output

    • 2 Citations
    • 1 Discussion paper

    Activism, separation of powers and development

    Mishra, A. & Anant, T. C. A., 2005, University of Dundee, (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; no. 179).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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