Activism, separation of powers and development

Ajit Mishra; T. C. A. Anant

doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.005

Activism, separation of powers and development

Ajit Mishra
, T. C. A. Anant

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a model of constitutional (mechanism) design with separation of powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks. In this context, we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-making into the domain of other institution’s tasks. When members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as well as non-benevolent, such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving collusion-proofness and raises welfare. Hence the value of such activism can be potentially very high in the context of developing economies. But as the fraction of non-benevolent member increases, such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare. It is argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap because of the high levels of corruption and bribery.

Original language	English
Journal	Journal of Development Economics
Volume	81
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.005
Publication status	Published - Dec 2006

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

Separation of powers
Activism
Corruption
Incentives

Access to Document

10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.005

4 Citations
1 Discussion paper

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 179: Activism, separation of powers and development
Mishra, A. & Anant, T. C. A., 2005, University of Dundee, (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; no. 179).
Research output: Working paper/Preprint › Discussion paper

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Cite this

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title = "Activism, separation of powers and development",

abstract = "We consider a model of constitutional (mechanism) design with separation of powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks. In this context, we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-making into the domain of other institution{\textquoteright}s tasks. When members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as well as non-benevolent, such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving collusion-proofness and raises welfare. Hence the value of such activism can be potentially very high in the context of developing economies. But as the fraction of non-benevolent member increases, such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare. It is argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap because of the high levels of corruption and bribery.",

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AB - We consider a model of constitutional (mechanism) design with separation of powers where different institutions are assigned different tasks. In this context, we define activism as an institution extending its mechanism of decision-making into the domain of other institution’s tasks. When members of the institutions are likely to be benevolent as well as non-benevolent, such activism in a limited form reduces the cost of achieving collusion-proofness and raises welfare. Hence the value of such activism can be potentially very high in the context of developing economies. But as the fraction of non-benevolent member increases, such activism turns excessive and reduces welfare. It is argued that developing economies are likely to get caught in the excessive activism trap because of the high levels of corruption and bribery.

KW - Separation of powers

KW - Activism

KW - Corruption

KW - Incentives

U2 - 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.005

DO - 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.06.005

M3 - Article

VL - 81

JO - Journal of Development Economics

JF - Journal of Development Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Activism, separation of powers and development

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

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Research output

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 179: Activism, separation of powers and development

Cite this