Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

    Abstract

    In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predic- tions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2010

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.242
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Fingerprint

    Affirmative action
    Contests
    Factors
    Policy options
    Prediction
    Discrimination

    Keywords

    • Asymmetric contest
    • Sequential-move contest
    • Affirmative action
    • Discrimination

    Cite this

    Kwiatkowski, A. (2010). Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 242). University of Dundee.
    Kwiatkowski, Andrzej. / Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument. University of Dundee, 2010. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; 242).
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    Kwiatkowski, A 2010 'Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument' Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics, no. 242, University of Dundee.

    Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument. / Kwiatkowski, Andrzej.

    University of Dundee, 2010. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 242).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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    AB - In this paper we analyse a simple two-person sequential-move contest game with heterogeneous players. Assuming that the heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination, we study the effects of implementation of affirmative action policy, which tackles this heterogeneity by compensating discriminated players, and compare them with the situation in which the heterogeneity is ignored and the contestants are treated equally. In our analysis we consider different orders of moves. We show that the order of moves of contestants is a very important factor in determination of the effects of the implementation of the affirmative action policy. We also prove that in such cases a significant role is played by the level of the heterogeneity of individuals. In particular, in contrast to the present-in-the-literature predic- tions, we demonstrate that as a consequence of the interplay of these two factors, the response to the implementation of the affirmative action policy option may be the decrease in the total equilibrium effort level of the contestants in comparison to the unbiased contest game.

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    Kwiatkowski A. Affirmative action policy and effort levels: sequential-move contest game argument. University of Dundee. 2010. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; 242).