Argument Revision as a means of supporting dishonesty

Mark Snaith (Lead / Corresponding author), Chris Reed

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter


    In this paper, we demonstrate how our previous work on Argument Revision can be used to assist a participant in a dialogue to be dishonest. We first provide answers to the questions of why a participant would choose to lie, and what constitutes a lie in terms of structured argumentation. We then go on to show how Argument Revision can be used not only in selecting a "minimal" lie, but also in maintaining that lie in order to avoid detection.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationTrends in Belief Revision and Argumentation Dynamics
    EditorsEduardo Fermé, Dov Gabbay, Guillermo Simari
    Place of PublicationLondon, UK
    PublisherCollege Publications
    Number of pages17
    ISBN (Print)9781848900653
    Publication statusPublished - 2013

    Publication series

    NameLogic and Cognitive Systems
    PublisherCollege Publications


    • Argumentation
    • Argument Revision
    • Belief Revision

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