Before rights and responsibilities: an African ethos of citizenship

Oche Onazi

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

    Abstract

    The concept of citizenship lies at the heart of many problems in contemporary Africa. The dichotomy between indigenes and settlers, the focus of this chapter, is one such difficulty. It has provoked some of the most violent conflicts in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and very recently, Cote d’Ivoire. The chapter demonstrates how African jurisprudence – particularly with its emphasis on human ontology – can contribute to a concept of citizenship capable of responding to this and other problems. The chapter uses the indigene and settler dichotomy as a methodological device to question what citizenship means today, and also, whether it yields to a proper understanding of the kind of moral values fundamental to societal co-existence. Going much further than this, the chapter argues that situating citizenship in an African jurisprudential context can encourage the most fundamental moral values central to what it means to live an ethical life as a citizen. The implication is that, when African jurisprudence is applied to citizenship, it does not place citizens at a threshold above aliens, foreigner’s, legal or illegal immigrants. African jurisprudence specifically shows that our moral obligations to each other precede, as the title of the chapter suggests, citizenship rights and responsibilities.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationAfrican legal theory and contemporary problems
    Subtitle of host publicationcritical essays
    EditorsOche Onazi
    Place of PublicationNetherlands
    PublisherSpringer Netherlands
    Pages153-172
    Number of pages20
    Edition2014
    ISBN (Electronic)9789400775374
    ISBN (Print)9789400775367
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2014

    Publication series

    NameIus Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice
    PublisherSpringer
    Volume29

    Fingerprint

    Ethos
    Citizenship
    Africa
    Responsibility
    Jurisprudence
    Settler
    Moral Values
    Dichotomy
    Indigene
    Fundamental
    Foreigners
    South Africa
    Zimbabwe
    Burundi
    Coexistence
    Immigrants
    Uganda
    Congo
    Rwanda
    Kenya

    Cite this

    Onazi, O. (2014). Before rights and responsibilities: an African ethos of citizenship. In O. Onazi (Ed.), African legal theory and contemporary problems: critical essays (2014 ed., pp. 153-172). (Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice; Vol. 29). Netherlands: Springer Netherlands. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4
    Onazi, Oche. / Before rights and responsibilities : an African ethos of citizenship. African legal theory and contemporary problems: critical essays . editor / Oche Onazi. 2014. ed. Netherlands : Springer Netherlands, 2014. pp. 153-172 (Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice).
    @inbook{90932cf5a1fd441692057055b1b78e0d,
    title = "Before rights and responsibilities: an African ethos of citizenship",
    abstract = "The concept of citizenship lies at the heart of many problems in contemporary Africa. The dichotomy between indigenes and settlers, the focus of this chapter, is one such difficulty. It has provoked some of the most violent conflicts in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and very recently, Cote d’Ivoire. The chapter demonstrates how African jurisprudence – particularly with its emphasis on human ontology – can contribute to a concept of citizenship capable of responding to this and other problems. The chapter uses the indigene and settler dichotomy as a methodological device to question what citizenship means today, and also, whether it yields to a proper understanding of the kind of moral values fundamental to societal co-existence. Going much further than this, the chapter argues that situating citizenship in an African jurisprudential context can encourage the most fundamental moral values central to what it means to live an ethical life as a citizen. The implication is that, when African jurisprudence is applied to citizenship, it does not place citizens at a threshold above aliens, foreigner’s, legal or illegal immigrants. African jurisprudence specifically shows that our moral obligations to each other precede, as the title of the chapter suggests, citizenship rights and responsibilities.",
    author = "Oche Onazi",
    year = "2014",
    doi = "10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4",
    language = "English",
    isbn = "9789400775367",
    series = "Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice",
    publisher = "Springer Netherlands",
    pages = "153--172",
    editor = "Oche Onazi",
    booktitle = "African legal theory and contemporary problems",
    address = "Netherlands",
    edition = "2014",

    }

    Onazi, O 2014, Before rights and responsibilities: an African ethos of citizenship. in O Onazi (ed.), African legal theory and contemporary problems: critical essays . 2014 edn, Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice, vol. 29, Springer Netherlands, Netherlands, pp. 153-172. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4

    Before rights and responsibilities : an African ethos of citizenship. / Onazi, Oche.

    African legal theory and contemporary problems: critical essays . ed. / Oche Onazi. 2014. ed. Netherlands : Springer Netherlands, 2014. p. 153-172 (Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice; Vol. 29).

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter (peer-reviewed)

    TY - CHAP

    T1 - Before rights and responsibilities

    T2 - an African ethos of citizenship

    AU - Onazi, Oche

    PY - 2014

    Y1 - 2014

    N2 - The concept of citizenship lies at the heart of many problems in contemporary Africa. The dichotomy between indigenes and settlers, the focus of this chapter, is one such difficulty. It has provoked some of the most violent conflicts in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and very recently, Cote d’Ivoire. The chapter demonstrates how African jurisprudence – particularly with its emphasis on human ontology – can contribute to a concept of citizenship capable of responding to this and other problems. The chapter uses the indigene and settler dichotomy as a methodological device to question what citizenship means today, and also, whether it yields to a proper understanding of the kind of moral values fundamental to societal co-existence. Going much further than this, the chapter argues that situating citizenship in an African jurisprudential context can encourage the most fundamental moral values central to what it means to live an ethical life as a citizen. The implication is that, when African jurisprudence is applied to citizenship, it does not place citizens at a threshold above aliens, foreigner’s, legal or illegal immigrants. African jurisprudence specifically shows that our moral obligations to each other precede, as the title of the chapter suggests, citizenship rights and responsibilities.

    AB - The concept of citizenship lies at the heart of many problems in contemporary Africa. The dichotomy between indigenes and settlers, the focus of this chapter, is one such difficulty. It has provoked some of the most violent conflicts in Nigeria, Kenya, South Africa, Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and very recently, Cote d’Ivoire. The chapter demonstrates how African jurisprudence – particularly with its emphasis on human ontology – can contribute to a concept of citizenship capable of responding to this and other problems. The chapter uses the indigene and settler dichotomy as a methodological device to question what citizenship means today, and also, whether it yields to a proper understanding of the kind of moral values fundamental to societal co-existence. Going much further than this, the chapter argues that situating citizenship in an African jurisprudential context can encourage the most fundamental moral values central to what it means to live an ethical life as a citizen. The implication is that, when African jurisprudence is applied to citizenship, it does not place citizens at a threshold above aliens, foreigner’s, legal or illegal immigrants. African jurisprudence specifically shows that our moral obligations to each other precede, as the title of the chapter suggests, citizenship rights and responsibilities.

    U2 - 10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4

    DO - 10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4

    M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)

    SN - 9789400775367

    T3 - Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice

    SP - 153

    EP - 172

    BT - African legal theory and contemporary problems

    A2 - Onazi, Oche

    PB - Springer Netherlands

    CY - Netherlands

    ER -

    Onazi O. Before rights and responsibilities: an African ethos of citizenship. In Onazi O, editor, African legal theory and contemporary problems: critical essays . 2014 ed. Netherlands: Springer Netherlands. 2014. p. 153-172. (Ius Gentium: comparative perspectives on law and justice). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7537-4