Building Local Integrity Systems in Southern Europe: The case of urban local corruption in Spain

Monica Garcia Quesada; Fernando Jiménez-Sánchez; Manuel Villoria

doi:10.1177/0020852313501125

Building Local Integrity Systems in Southern Europe: The case of urban local corruption in Spain

Monica Garcia Quesada
, Fernando Jiménez-Sánchez
, Manuel Villoria

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

41 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

From 1997 to 2007, Spain suffered from major cases of political corruption associated with local urban development. To analyse their causes, this article examines the institutional mechanisms designed to monitor and control the performance of local policy-makers and to ensure they operated independently from private influence. It also analyses their actual effectiveness with reference to particular cases of local corruption unveiled during that decade. The Spanish case shows that local representatives had a large amount of power in distributing financial gains within the municipality, but faced little pressure to account for their actions. It argues that insufficient control mechanisms on the activities of local representatives from 1997 to 2007 can adequately explain the intensity and spread of local corruption in Spain.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	618-637
Number of pages	20
Journal	International Review of Administrative Sciences
Volume	79
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/0020852313501125
Publication status	Published - Dec 2013

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Building Local Integrity Systems in Southern Europe: The case of urban local corruption in Spain

Abstract

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