Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: An empirical study

Martin Chalkley, Duncan McVicar

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1155-1167
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Health Economics
    Volume27
    Issue number5
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Sep 2008

    Keywords

    • health services
    • British NHS
    • physician agency
    • financial incentives
    • MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL
    • LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS
    • PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT
    • COAL MARKETS
    • CARE MARKET
    • QUALITY
    • REIMBURSEMENT
    • PRODUCTIVITY
    • PERFORMANCE
    • INCENTIVES

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