Abstract
The common key intuition that freedom is to do what you want to do is very attractive to compatibilistic accounts of freedom. And as a matter of fact this key intuition has been adopted by most compatibilists from Hobbes till now. Unfortunately, it suffers from serious problems. However, thanks to the real self account of freedom - which is a recent compatibilistic theory developed by Harry G. Frankfurt and refined and extended by various philosophers, most notably (perhaps) by Gary Watson - the key intuition is revived. Or what? In this paper I argue (A) that the real self account's rescue of the key intuition does not succeed because (i) Frankfurt's and Watson's versions of the real self account of freedom are flawed and because (ii) the real self account as such is flawed as well. Furthermore I will argue (B) that the key intuition is not to be rescued by any means whatsoever.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 92-104 |
Number of pages | 13 |
Journal | SATS |
Volume | 5 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Nov 2004 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy