Do debtor-favored contracts necessarily benefit the debtor?

Ajit Mishra

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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    Abstract

    We consider a case of security design, where the optimal contract depends on the nature of the future renegotiations game. It is shown that giving the bargaining power to the debtor in the renegotiations game may not always work in his interest.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2000

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.111
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Keywords

    • Debt
    • Renegotiations
    • Bargaining power

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  • Cite this

    Mishra, A. (2000). Do debtor-favored contracts necessarily benefit the debtor? (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 111). University of Dundee.