@techreport{19c2a9a80d3c493d84381e7de2cc3ab3,
title = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 161: Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption",
abstract = "The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.",
keywords = "Corruption, Norms, Incentives, Evolution",
author = "Ajit Mishra",
year = "2004",
language = "English",
series = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics",
publisher = "University of Dundee",
number = "161",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Dundee",
}