@techreport{b074bf36b9514b838ba2d9d6a0009cf3,
title = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 216: Choice of contracts in the British National Health Service: an empirical study",
abstract = "Following major reforms of the British National Health Service (NHS) in 1990, the roles of purchasing and providing health services were separated, with the relationship between purchasers and providers governed by contracts. Using a mixed multinomial logit analysis, we show how this policy shift led to a selection of contracts that is consistent with the predictions of a simple model, based on contract theory, in which the characteristics of the health services being purchased and of the contracting parties influence the choice of contract form. The paper thus provides evidence in support of the practical relevance of theory in understanding health care market reform.",
keywords = "Health services, British NHS, Physician agency, Financial incentives",
author = "Martin Chalkley and Duncan McVicar",
note = "This paper was also published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 27 (5), pp. 1155-1167 dc.description.sponsorship: ESRC L114251005 R000236723 ",
year = "2008",
language = "English",
series = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics",
publisher = "University of Dundee",
number = "216",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Dundee",
}