@techreport{f197eb51f32045f8a841a706e9100635,
title = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 266: Slowing down",
abstract = "We extend the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz to account for the observation that workers{\textquoteright} effort has a tendency to fall when they approach the end of their employment contract. In particular, we find that the efficiency wage increases when the end of term approaches for a given rate of unemployment. We draw implications for the behavior of workers who are approaching retirement, temporary employment contracts, and the advance notice of impending job loss.",
keywords = "wage setting, shirking, finite horizons",
author = "Yu-Fu Chen and Gylfi Zoega",
year = "2012",
month = jun,
language = "English",
series = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics",
publisher = "University of Dundee",
number = "266",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "University of Dundee",
}
