Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 266: Slowing down

Yu-Fu Chen; Gylfi Zoega

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 266: Slowing down

Yu-Fu Chen
, Gylfi Zoega (Lead / Corresponding author)

Research output: Working paper/Preprint › Discussion paper

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Abstract

We extend the efficiency wage model of Shapiro and Stiglitz to account for the observation that workers’ effort has a tendency to fall when they approach the end of their employment contract. In particular, we find that the efficiency wage increases when the end of term approaches for a given rate of unemployment. We draw implications for the behavior of workers who are approaching retirement, temporary employment contracts, and the advance notice of impending job loss.

Original language	English
Publisher	University of Dundee
Number of pages	13
Publication status	Published - Jun 2012

Publication series

Name	Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics
Publisher	University of Dundee
No.	266
ISSN (Print)	1473-236X

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 8 Decent Work and Economic Growth

Keywords

wage setting
shirking
finite horizons

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DDPE_266

Cite this

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KW - shirking

KW - finite horizons

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Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 266: Slowing down

Abstract

Publication series

UN SDGs

Keywords

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Cite this