Dynamical Patterns of Coexisting Strategies in a Hybrid Discrete-continuum Spatial Evolutionary Game Model

A. E F Burgess, P. G. Schofield, S. F. Hubbard, M. A J Chaplain, T. Lorenzi (Lead / Corresponding author)

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We present a novel hybrid modelling framework that takes into account two aspects which have been largely neglected in previous models of spatial evolutionary games: random motion and chemotaxis. A stochastic individual-based model is used to describe the player dynamics, whereas the evolution of the chemoattractant is governed by a reaction-diffusion equation. The two models are coupled by deriving individual movement rules via the discretisa-tion of a taxis-diffusion equation which describes the evolution of the local number of players. In this framework, individuals occupying the same position can engage in a two-player game, and are awarded a payoff, in terms of reproductive fitness, according to their strategy. As an example, we let individuals play the Hawk-Dove game. Numerical simulations illustrate how random motion and chemotactic response can bring about self-generated dynamical patterns that create favourable conditions for the coexistence of hawks and doves in situations in which the two strategies cannot coexist otherwise. In this sense, our work offers a new perspective of research on spatial evolutionary games, and provides a general formalism to study the dynamics of spatially-structured populations in biological and social contexts where individual motion is likely to affect natural selection of behavioural traits.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)49-64
Number of pages16
JournalMathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena
Volume11
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 7 Dec 2016

Fingerprint

Evolutionary Game
Continuum
Motion
Game
Individual-based Model
Hybrid Modeling
Structured Populations
Natural Selection
Chemotaxis
Reaction-diffusion Equations
Coexistence
Diffusion equation
Fitness
Stochastic Model
Likely
Model
Numerical Simulation
Computer simulation
Strategy
Framework

Keywords

  • Chemotaxis
  • Hawk-Dove game
  • Hybrid models
  • Random motion
  • Spatial evolutionary games
  • Spatial patterns

Cite this

Burgess, A. E F ; Schofield, P. G. ; Hubbard, S. F. ; Chaplain, M. A J ; Lorenzi, T. / Dynamical Patterns of Coexisting Strategies in a Hybrid Discrete-continuum Spatial Evolutionary Game Model. In: Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena. 2016 ; Vol. 11, No. 5. pp. 49-64.
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Dynamical Patterns of Coexisting Strategies in a Hybrid Discrete-continuum Spatial Evolutionary Game Model. / Burgess, A. E F; Schofield, P. G.; Hubbard, S. F.; Chaplain, M. A J; Lorenzi, T. (Lead / Corresponding author).

In: Mathematical Modelling of Natural Phenomena, Vol. 11, No. 5, 07.12.2016, p. 49-64.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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