Emergency measures and partition in Ireland, 1920-3

In 1920-2, the British government threatened to re-constitute Southern Ireland a crown colony (Government of Ireland Act (1920)), and later to initiate a war of re-conquest if Irish republicans did not accept terms formulated in the Articles of Agreement (‘Anglo-Irish treaty’ 1921). While the crown colony was never formally realized something very similar emerged through the emergency powers adopted north and south of the border in 1922-3. While inside Northern Ireland draconian emergency laws were drafted, in Southern Ireland non-statutory martial-law was introduced by the pro-treaty army at the commencement of the civil war. Later codified in the Army (Emergency Powers) Resolution in September 1922. North and south, combined, these emergency measures eventually crushed the republican rebellion in 1923. Civil-military relations in Southern Ireland consisting of a pro-treaty commander-in-chief leading an army autonomous from parliament functioning under martial-law closely resembled the operation of some crown colonies in the empire. Wherein crown appointed governors used martial-law to thwart rebellions. This paper examines the use of emergency powers and martial-law to achieve a settlement which primarily met British imperial, domestic, and military-strategic objectives in Ireland. Notably, the retention of Southern Ireland (later Free State) inside the empire, along with those naval ports vital to the protection of the Western Approaches. Partition secured a land-base in Northern Ireland from where an annexation of the south could be launched in time of military necessity or threat of invasion. The British government’s triumph in 1922 was to persuade and coerce Irish leaders into securing British policy objectives without having to declare Ireland a crown colony or placing Ireland north or south under martial-law. More-or-less, Irish leaders did this themselves in what should be seen as an imperial settlement employing colonial tools.