Evolutionary game analysis on local governments and airlines behavioral strategies in China under carbon trading

Kaibo Yuan, Mengyuan Zhu, Zhaoyang Chen, Shuijin Li, Yu Wang

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The reduction of carbon emissions by airlines has become a crucial objective in achieving carbon neutrality. However, due to the existing benefits game between airlines and local governments, reducing carbon emissions in the air transport industry is a complex process. Previous research on reducing carbon emissions in the Chinese air transport industry has been divided on which approach to take. This study investigates the potential contribution of a carbon trading mechanism towards carbon emission reduction. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is employed to analyze the complex interactions between local governments and airlines, with the public will being introduced as a constraint in the proposed model. Secondly, the impact of the carbon trading mechanism on the dynamic evolution process and stakeholders is analyzed. Furthermore, the stability of the proposed evolutionary game model is verified through empirical analysis. The results show that the carbon trading mechanism plays a significant positive role in promoting both parties objectives, indicating that it is a feasible method for reducing emissions in China's air transport industry.

Original languageEnglish
Article number03013
Number of pages8
JournalE3S Web of Conferences
Publication statusPublished - 1 Aug 2023
Event2023 International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management - Cape Town, South Africa
Duration: 3 Aug 20234 Aug 2023


  • Air transportation
  • Game theory
  • Sustainable development

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Environmental Science
  • General Energy
  • General Earth and Planetary Sciences


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