Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law: critical notes on Pierre Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’

Luca Siliquini-Cinelli

doi:10.1017/S1744552320000439

Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law: critical notes on Pierre Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’

Luca Siliquini-Cinelli (Lead / Corresponding author)

Dundee Law School

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)

287 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's ‘positivist’ and Whitman's ‘cultural’ comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’ cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	443-458
Number of pages	16
Journal	International Journal of Law in Context
Volume	16
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744552320000439
Publication status	Published - 4 Feb 2021

Keywords

comparative law
experience
knowledge

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Law

Access to Document

10.1017/S1744552320000439Licence: CC BY

Final Published VersionFinal published version, 268 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

@article{aa0e92cfa5b94313963cc69fad410788,

title = "Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law: critical notes on Pierre Legrand's {\textquoteleft}sensitive epistemology{\textquoteright}",

abstract = "This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's {\textquoteleft}positivist{\textquoteright} and Whitman's {\textquoteleft}cultural{\textquoteright} comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's {\textquoteleft}sensitive epistemology{\textquoteright} cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.",

keywords = "comparative law, experience, knowledge",

author = "Luca Siliquini-Cinelli",

note = "Copyright: {\textcopyright} The Author(s) 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press.",

year = "2021",

month = feb,

day = "4",

doi = "10.1017/S1744552320000439",

language = "English",

volume = "16",

pages = "443--458",

journal = "International Journal of Law in Context",

issn = "1744-5523",

publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law

T2 - critical notes on Pierre Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’

AU - Siliquini-Cinelli, Luca

PY - 2021/2/4

Y1 - 2021/2/4

N2 - This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's ‘positivist’ and Whitman's ‘cultural’ comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’ cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.

AB - This paper expounds some critical reflections on Pierre Legrand's recent account of James Gordley's and James Whitman's comparative methodologies. Pushing his unconventional writing style to the limits and labelling Gordley's ‘positivist’ and Whitman's ‘cultural’ comparative law, Legrand's piece appears to be taking the first step towards a new, more sensitive phase for the comparative study of law and legal cultures. The paper argues that, contrary to what might be first thought, Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’ cannot act as a gateway to cultural otherness. This is because it is wholly in line with the constructivist objectification of life that characterises the study and practice of law both within and outside the comparative-law dimension.

KW - comparative law

KW - experience

KW - knowledge

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85100538207

U2 - 10.1017/S1744552320000439

DO - 10.1017/S1744552320000439

M3 - Article

SN - 1744-5523

VL - 16

SP - 443

EP - 458

JO - International Journal of Law in Context

JF - International Journal of Law in Context

IS - 4

ER -

Experience vs. knowledge in comparative law: critical notes on Pierre Legrand's ‘sensitive epistemology’

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this