Explanation as Contextual

TY - GEN

T1 - Explanation as Contextual

AU - Young, R. A.

PY - 2001

Y1 - 2001

N2 - There is a view that all explanation is contextual. An explanation answers questions that are relevant in a context and that are open to solution in that context. In another context, there might be no such questions, or they might not be open to solution. Van Fraassen has used a contextual account of explanation to argue in favour of what he calls 'constructive empiricism' and against what he calls 'scientific realism'. On his account, both empiricists and realists search for theories that are empirically adequate. These will explain the relevant observable phenomena, but differ on the unobservable phenomena, for example quantum states. For the realist, science aims to provide a literally true account of the unobservables. For the empiricist, science aims at no more than empirical adequacy. One argument in the realist armoury is the following. The best philosophical explanation of how the best scientific explanation does explain the observables requires that it is true about the unobservables. An empiricist response to this is that all explanation is contextual, so there is no globally best scientific explanation. The present paper explores the empiricist line by reference to formal learning theory and a logic of questions. Van Fraassen's contextual theory of explanation does not employ learning theory. The present paper is a step towards a more developed theory, differing form van Fraassen in some respects.

AB - There is a view that all explanation is contextual. An explanation answers questions that are relevant in a context and that are open to solution in that context. In another context, there might be no such questions, or they might not be open to solution. Van Fraassen has used a contextual account of explanation to argue in favour of what he calls 'constructive empiricism' and against what he calls 'scientific realism'. On his account, both empiricists and realists search for theories that are empirically adequate. These will explain the relevant observable phenomena, but differ on the unobservable phenomena, for example quantum states. For the realist, science aims to provide a literally true account of the unobservables. For the empiricist, science aims at no more than empirical adequacy. One argument in the realist armoury is the following. The best philosophical explanation of how the best scientific explanation does explain the observables requires that it is true about the unobservables. An empiricist response to this is that all explanation is contextual, so there is no globally best scientific explanation. The present paper explores the empiricist line by reference to formal learning theory and a logic of questions. Van Fraassen's contextual theory of explanation does not employ learning theory. The present paper is a step towards a more developed theory, differing form van Fraassen in some respects.

U2 - 10.1007/3-540-44607-9_29

DO - 10.1007/3-540-44607-9_29

M3 - Conference contribution

SN - 3540423796

SN - 9783540423799

T3 - Lecture notes in computer science

SP - 381

EP - 394

BT - Modeling and Using Context

A2 - Akman, Varol

A2 - Bouquet, Paolo

A2 - Thomason, Richmond

A2 - Young, Roger A.

PB - Springer

T2 - Third International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Modeling and Using Context

Y2 - 27 July 2001 through 30 July 2001

ER -