Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement

Ajit Mishra

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    24 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper considers a model of enforcement with corruptible supervisor in an agency framework. We examine how the supervisor’s choice of effort and honesty would be influenced by various incentive schemes (penalty and reward) and the organizational structure. We consider both vertical hierarchies (corrupt supervisor monitoring another) and horizontal structures where several supervisors monitor the agent and compete for the reward or the bribe income. The latter structure tend to induce less corruption but need not welfare dominate the vertical hierarchies. The organizational structure matters most when there are constraints on rewards and penalties.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)165-178
    JournalJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization
    Volume47
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2002

    Fingerprint

    Enforcement
    Collusion
    Supervisors
    Incentives
    Reward
    Penalty
    Organizational structure
    Incentive schemes
    Income
    Corruption
    Bribes
    Monitoring
    Honesty

    Keywords

    • Corruption
    • Hierarchies
    • Monitoring
    • Competition

    Cite this

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    Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement. / Mishra, Ajit.

    In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2, 02.2002, p. 165-178.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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