Abstract
Sanctions imposed by a country against another country are considered as a foreign policy tool. Many studies have investigated different aspects of sanctions including the efficacy of sanctions to alter the target country’s behaviour. However, the effects of a potential fight-back strategy adopted by a target country have been discussed rarely. In this paper, the outcomes of a possible fight-back strategy are simulated using game theoretical analysis. To find the matching state of game theory and sanction regimes, we have conducted a critical and systematic review of 12 sanctions, from 1950 to 2012. The results show that the capability of a target country to implement fight-back strategies provides the opportunity to change the sender’s expected outcomes. It also makes the occurrence of future sanctions less probable or even less feasible.
Original language | English |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 264-279 |
Number of pages | 16 |
Journal | Journal of International Studies |
Volume | 13 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |
Keywords
- Fight-back strategy
- Game theory
- Iran sanctions
- Rival country
- Sanctions
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Economics and Econometrics