How the possibility of a fight-back strategy affects the consequences of a sanctions regime

Mohammad Sadegh Karimi, Abbas Maleki (Lead / Corresponding author), Asieh Haieri Yazdi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Sanctions imposed by a country against another country are considered as a foreign policy tool. Many studies have investigated different aspects of sanctions including the efficacy of sanctions to alter the target country’s behaviour. However, the effects of a potential fight-back strategy adopted by a target country have been discussed rarely. In this paper, the outcomes of a possible fight-back strategy are simulated using game theoretical analysis. To find the matching state of game theory and sanction regimes, we have conducted a critical and systematic review of 12 sanctions, from 1950 to 2012. The results show that the capability of a target country to implement fight-back strategies provides the opportunity to change the sender’s expected outcomes. It also makes the occurrence of future sanctions less probable or even less feasible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)264-279
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of International Studies
Volume13
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2020

Keywords

  • Fight-back strategy
  • Game theory
  • Iran sanctions
  • Rival country
  • Sanctions

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