Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption

Ajit Mishra

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

    536 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.161
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Fingerprint

    Incentives
    Persistence
    Corruption
    Incentive systems
    Evolutionary game theory

    Keywords

    • Corruption
    • Norms
    • Incentives
    • Evolution

    Cite this

    Mishra, A. (2004). Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 161). University of Dundee.
    Mishra, Ajit. / Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption. University of Dundee, 2004. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; 161).
    @techreport{19c2a9a80d3c493d84381e7de2cc3ab3,
    title = "Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption",
    abstract = "The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.",
    keywords = "Corruption, Norms, Incentives, Evolution",
    author = "Ajit Mishra",
    year = "2004",
    language = "English",
    series = "Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics",
    publisher = "University of Dundee",
    number = "161",
    type = "WorkingPaper",
    institution = "University of Dundee",

    }

    Mishra, A 2004 'Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption' Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics, no. 161, University of Dundee.

    Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption. / Mishra, Ajit.

    University of Dundee, 2004. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 161).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

    TY - UNPB

    T1 - Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption

    AU - Mishra, Ajit

    PY - 2004

    Y1 - 2004

    N2 - The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.

    AB - The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.

    KW - Corruption

    KW - Norms

    KW - Incentives

    KW - Evolution

    M3 - Discussion paper

    T3 - Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics

    BT - Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption

    PB - University of Dundee

    ER -

    Mishra A. Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption. University of Dundee. 2004. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; 161).