Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption

Ajit Mishra

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    Abstract

    The paper argues that purely incentive based approaches can only lead to an incomplete understanding of persistence of corruption. It is difficult to treat corruption purely as an incentive problem because corruption endogenises and undermines the incentive system itself. These need to be supplemented by considerations of values and norms. Using ideas from evolutionary (game) theories, we discuss how corruption can be immune to interventions and it can sustain itself against different behavioural norms.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.161
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

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    Keywords

    • Corruption
    • Norms
    • Incentives
    • Evolution

    Cite this

    Mishra, A. (2004). Incentives, norms and the persistence of corruption. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 161). University of Dundee.