Lobbying for protection under uncertainty: a real option approach

Yu-Fu Chen, I-Hui Cheng

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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    Abstract

    In this paper we explore the effect of protection lobbying by solving a firm’s dynamic optimisation problem where there is uncertainty about future demand, the success of lobbying and non-zero entry/exit costs. We find out that the firms in declining industries tend to lobbying in economic downturn to prevent shutting down factories. On the contrary, the firms in growing industries tend to lobby for preventing other firms from entering the market. The degree of this effect depends on the ratio of exit costs to entry costs. It is shown that the higher the ratio, the stronger the effect is.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2003

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.155
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Keywords

    • Protection
    • Lobbying
    • Uncertainty
    • Employment
    • Real options

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  • Research Output

    Lobbying for protection under uncertainty: a real option approach

    Chen, Y-F. & Cheng, I-H., 2005, In : Applied Economics. 37, 2, p. 229-238

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 4 Citations (Scopus)

    Cite this

    Chen, Y-F., & Cheng, I-H. (2003). Lobbying for protection under uncertainty: a real option approach. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 155). University of Dundee.