TY - CHAP
T1 - Managing religion and difference
T2 - ancient constitutionalism in the Theravāda Buddhist tradition and the transformative impact of the modernist and post-colonial turn
AU - de Silva-Wijeyeratne, Roshan
N1 - Copyright:
© The Editor and Contributors Severally 2020. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
PY - 2020/11/10
Y1 - 2020/11/10
N2 - The Buddha was born at a historical juncture when monarchy and the political order were disintegrating, and the Pāli Canon (Cakkavatti Sihanāda Sutta being exemplary of this) suggests that the Buddha did not expect a world sans war. In the Vedic legal world in which the Buddha found himself, the ruler’s (kshatriya’s) power to rule (kshatra) involved protection of his subjects against outside aggression. This gave the ruler privileges vis-à-vis his subjects, such as the power to monitor what they did, to punish them if necessary and to tax them. These were the ingredients of rājadharma, the judicial power of the king, well known from later texts such as Kautilīya’s Arthāsastra. The performative logic or telos of Buddhist kingship is fundamentally ontological; but in the encounter with (colonial) modernity, the logic of Buddhist kingship is reimagined as motivated by epistemological concerns (about what the world ought to look like). What I suggest here is that “Buddhist Constitutionalism” in its colonial but particularly post-colonial rendering (e.g., in Sri Lanka and Burma) must be understood as motivated by similarly epistemological concerns - concerns that appear to be fundamentally alien to classical Buddhist kingship.
AB - The Buddha was born at a historical juncture when monarchy and the political order were disintegrating, and the Pāli Canon (Cakkavatti Sihanāda Sutta being exemplary of this) suggests that the Buddha did not expect a world sans war. In the Vedic legal world in which the Buddha found himself, the ruler’s (kshatriya’s) power to rule (kshatra) involved protection of his subjects against outside aggression. This gave the ruler privileges vis-à-vis his subjects, such as the power to monitor what they did, to punish them if necessary and to tax them. These were the ingredients of rājadharma, the judicial power of the king, well known from later texts such as Kautilīya’s Arthāsastra. The performative logic or telos of Buddhist kingship is fundamentally ontological; but in the encounter with (colonial) modernity, the logic of Buddhist kingship is reimagined as motivated by epistemological concerns (about what the world ought to look like). What I suggest here is that “Buddhist Constitutionalism” in its colonial but particularly post-colonial rendering (e.g., in Sri Lanka and Burma) must be understood as motivated by similarly epistemological concerns - concerns that appear to be fundamentally alien to classical Buddhist kingship.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85137438863&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.4337/9781786439291.00017
DO - 10.4337/9781786439291.00017
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
AN - SCOPUS:85137438863
SN - 9781786439284
SP - 184
EP - 207
BT - Constitutions and Religion
A2 - Mancini, Susanna
PB - Edward Elgar Publishing
CY - Cheltenham
ER -