Relational contracting and teambuilding: Assessing potential contractual and noncontractual incentives

M. Motiar Rahman, Mohan M. Kumaraswamy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    90 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Integration in construction projects implies alignment of both structural arrangements and operational mechanisms, in order to effectively coordinate and streamline the combined efforts of various interacting parties, for improved project outcomes. Appropriate use of relational contracting (RC) principles may help achieve such integration. As such, the aims of the reported study are to examine the relative usefulness of various potential strategies and factors, to provide suitable contractual and noncontractual incentives, for building a RC culture, and nurturing effective teamwork in construction. Results from statistical analyses of 83 questionnaire responses from Hong Kong are presented. These results attribute various degrees of importance to different factors and strategies, both for RC and teamworking. The outcomes also suggest the need for a highly interactive and consolidated approach, both for propagating RC and building integrated project teams. It is observed that trust and trust based operational and contractual arrangements can effectively provide the required incentives, for implementing various RC-based working arrangements in construction. These should extend to assessing "relational" attributes during team selection, under cliental initiative and top management support. Outcomes of this study are expected to benefit both industry practitioners and researchers, in exploring, designing, and implementing suitable RC-based working arrangements.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)48-63
    Number of pages16
    JournalJournal of Management in Engineering
    Volume24
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jan 2008

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