Rewriting the Constitution:

A Critique of 'Postphenomenology''

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    5 Citations (Scopus)
    102 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract


    This paper builds a three part argument in favour of a more transcendentally focused form of 'postphenomenology' than is currently practised in philosophy of technology. It does so by problematising two key terms, 'constitution' and 'postphenomenology', then by arguing in favour of a 'transcendental empiricist' approach that draws on the work of Foucault, Derrida, and, in particular, Deleuze.

    Part one examines 'constitution', as it moves from the context of Husserl's phenomenology to Ihde and Verbeek's 'postphenomenology'. I argue that the term tends towards different senses in these contexts, and that this renders its sense more problematic than the work of Ihde and Verbeek makes it appear. Part two examines 'postphenomenology'. I argue that putatively 'poststructuralist' thinkers such as Derrida, Foucault and Deleuze may be better characterised as 'postphenomenologists', and that approaching them in this way may allow better access to their work from a philosophy of technology perspective. Part three argues for a 'transcendental empiricist' approach to philosophy of technology. In doing so, it argues for a rewriting of contemporary philosophy of technology's political constitution: since an 'empirical turn' in the 1990s, I argue, philosophy of technology has been too narrowly focused on 'empirical' issues of fact, and not focused enough on 'transcendental' issues concerning conditions for these facts.


    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)533-551
    Number of pages19
    JournalPhilosophy and Technology
    Volume28
    Issue number4
    Early online date26 Aug 2014
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 2015

    Fingerprint

    Philosophy of Technology
    Constitution
    Postphenomenology
    Transcendental
    Jacques Derrida
    Gilles Deleuze
    Empiricist
    Edmund Husserl
    Thinkers
    Phenomenology
    Contemporary philosophy
    1990s
    Render

    Keywords

    • Postphenomenology
    • Transcendental Turn
    • Ihde, Don
    • Transcendental Empiricism
    • Verbeek, Peter-Paul
    • Deleuze, Gilles, 1925-1995

    Cite this

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    Rewriting the Constitution: A Critique of 'Postphenomenology''. / Smith, Dominic.

    In: Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 28, No. 4, 12.2015, p. 533-551.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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