Right and Duty in Hegel: Restrictions of Freedom?

Two mutually linked ends stand at the forefront of this article: firstly, and mainly, this ought to be a contribution to the contentual sharpening of the understanding of freedom with Hegelian arguments. In particular, it is a matter of determining in a precise way the relationship between freedom and arbitrariness. Can one speak philosophically of a justified restriction (Einschränkung) of freedom? What is to be done, secondly, is to concisely indicate Hegel’s concept of freedom and right, the belonging together of right and duty. What remains crucial here is that this right of reason and the duty inseparably linked to it represent no limitation of freedom. The doctrine of right is an immanent doctrine of duty. There is no right without duty and vice versa. Hegel: A human being has rights insofar as he has duties, and duties insofar as he rights. The duty is a restriction not on freedom, but only on arbitrariness. Duty is the winning of affirmative freedom. Right and duty restrict the arbitrariness as abstract, formal freedom.