Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay

Monojit Chatterji; Colin J. Tilley

doi:doi:10.1093/oep/54.4.669

Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay

Monojit Chatterji
, Colin J. Tilley

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

66 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The annual cost of absenteeism from the workplace in the UK has been estimated to be over 1% of GDP. The traditional approach to a discussion of absence has been for the firm to passively accept both wages and sick pay and allow workers to choose their absence behaviour. Most empirical research has been based on this approach. However, if absence is costly why should firms pay extra-statutory sick pay? One reason may be the phenomena of presenteeism (ill workers attending work). This may adversely affect productivity. This paper shows that allowing for presenteeism has important implications for both the design of optimal wage-sick pay contracts and for the interpretation of empirical studies. Specifically, we show that firms will offer a level of sick pay greater than the statutory minimum.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	669
Number of pages	687
Journal	Oxford Economic Papers
Volume	54
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/doi:10.1093/oep/54.4.669
Publication status	Published - 2002

Keywords

Health
Productivity
Wages
Sick pay
Absenteeism
Presenteeism

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doi:10.1093/oep/54.4.669

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 117: Sickness, absenteeism, “presenteeism” and sick pay
Chatterji, M. & Tilley, C. J., 2000, University of Dundee, (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; no. 117).
Research output: Working paper/Preprint › Discussion paper

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KW - Productivity

KW - Wages

KW - Sick pay

KW - Absenteeism

KW - Presenteeism

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JO - Oxford Economic Papers

JF - Oxford Economic Papers

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Sickness, absenteeism, presenteeism, and sick pay

Abstract

Keywords

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Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 117: Sickness, absenteeism, “presenteeism” and sick pay

Cite this