TY - JOUR
T1 - Spectrum redistribution for cognitive radios using discriminatory spectrum double auction
AU - Lu, Luxi
AU - Jiang, Wei
AU - Bai, Lin
AU - Chen, Chen
AU - He, Jianhua
AU - Xiang, Haige
AU - Luo, Wu
PY - 2013/6/10
Y1 - 2013/6/10
N2 - With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework.
AB - With the reformation of spectrum policy and the development of cognitive radio, secondary users will be allowed to access spectrums licensed to primary users. Spectrum auctions can facilitate this secondary spectrum access in a market-driven way. To design an efficient auction framework, we first study the supply and demand pressures and the competitive equilibrium of the secondary spectrum market, considering the spectrum reusability. In well-designed auctions, competition among participants should lead to the competitive equilibrium according to the traditional economic point of view. Then, a discriminatory price spectrum double auction framework is proposed for this market. In this framework, rational participants compete with each other by using bidding prices, and their profits are guaranteed to be non-negative. A near-optimal heuristic algorithm is also proposed to solve the auction clearing problem of the proposed framework efficiently. Experimental results verify the efficiency of the proposed auction clearing algorithm and demonstrate that competition among secondary users and primary users can lead to the competitive equilibrium during auction iterations using the proposed auction framework.
KW - cognitive radio
KW - discriminatory double auction
KW - dynamic spectrum allocation
KW - spectrum auction
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84876710697&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1002/wcm.1141
DO - 10.1002/wcm.1141
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84876710697
VL - 13
SP - 774
EP - 789
JO - Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
JF - Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing
SN - 1530-8669
IS - 8
ER -