TY - JOUR
T1 - Tacit collusion in the frequently repeated multi-unit uniform price auction for wholesale electricity in England and Wales
AU - Macatangay, R.E.A.
N1 - Copyright 2008 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - Tacit collusion between National Power and PowerGen, the dominant generators in England and Wales for most of the 1990s, was widely speculated but was not definitively proven. In the event of a legal determination, the best available evidence is a test of suspicious patterns of bidding behavior. The methodology has two stages: the first is to show that the suspects behave "differently" from the rest, which are assumed competitive; the second stage is to ask whether or not strategies of suspects affect one another. Results: the impact of suspects on the aggregate bid function can not be explained away by costs and common market events, and a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on strategies of the suspects reveals bid inter-dependence and co-ordination on demand trends. A quarter of the dynamic indicators support an inference of tacit collusion. The existence of multiple equilibria in supergames, however, prevents a conclusive statement.
AB - Tacit collusion between National Power and PowerGen, the dominant generators in England and Wales for most of the 1990s, was widely speculated but was not definitively proven. In the event of a legal determination, the best available evidence is a test of suspicious patterns of bidding behavior. The methodology has two stages: the first is to show that the suspects behave "differently" from the rest, which are assumed competitive; the second stage is to ask whether or not strategies of suspects affect one another. Results: the impact of suspects on the aggregate bid function can not be explained away by costs and common market events, and a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) on strategies of the suspects reveals bid inter-dependence and co-ordination on demand trends. A quarter of the dynamic indicators support an inference of tacit collusion. The existence of multiple equilibria in supergames, however, prevents a conclusive statement.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=19144371067&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1023/A:1014730803412
DO - 10.1023/A:1014730803412
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:19144371067
SN - 0929-1261
VL - 13
SP - 257
EP - 273
JO - European Journal of Law and Economics
JF - European Journal of Law and Economics
IS - 3
ER -