Temporary social dumping, union legislation and FDI: a note on the strategic use of standards

Dermot Leahy, Catia Montagna

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    2 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This paper analyses the welfare implications for a developing country of using union legalisation as a policy instrument to attract inward foreign direct investment. While its presence may discourage a foreign multinational (MNE) from locating in the host country,unionisation is an important rent-extracting instrument for the host country. We show that if the MNE benefits from dynamic effects, the host country government may have an incentive to adopt temporary social dumping: banning the union in the short run to extract higher rents in the future. However, if the government can use a fiscal instrument in conjunction withunion legalisation, the former can circumvent the need to engage in social dumping.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)243
    Number of pages259
    JournalJournal of International Trade & Economic Development
    Volume9
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2000

    Fingerprint

    social union
    legislation
    legalization
    rent
    foreign direct investment
    incentive
    developing world
    direct investment
    Developing countries
    foreign investment
    welfare
    developing country
    dumping

    Keywords

    • Multinationals
    • Social dumping
    • Labour standards

    Cite this

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    Temporary social dumping, union legislation and FDI: a note on the strategic use of standards. / Leahy, Dermot; Montagna, Catia.

    In: Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2000, p. 243.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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