The existence and nature of physician agency: evidence of stinting from the British NHS

Martin Chalkley, Colin Tilley

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

    106 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    The ability of physicians to make take-it-or-leave-it offers of treatment implies that even fully informed consumers of health care may receive treatments that they would not themselves choose. This paper examines both the extent and direction of this distortion away from patient choice the physician agency effect using a large patient-level claims-based data set for dental treatments under the British National Health Service. We nd that an increase in competition between dentists results in an increase in treatment effort when those dentists are remunerated on a fee-for-service basis, which is suggestive of stinting physician agency resulting in under-treatment relative to what patients would choose and that this effect is increases in the extent to which patients are insulated form the cost of their treatment.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.162
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Keywords

    • Physician agency
    • Incentives
    • Insurance
    • Stinting

    Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'The existence and nature of physician agency: evidence of stinting from the British NHS'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Research Output

    The existence and nature of physician agency: evidence of stinting from the British National Health Service

    Chalkley, M. & Tilley, C., 2005, In : Journal of Economics and Management Strategy. 14, 3, p. 647 664 p.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 6 Citations (Scopus)

    Cite this

    Chalkley, M., & Tilley, C. (2004). The existence and nature of physician agency: evidence of stinting from the British NHS. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 162). University of Dundee.