The rule of law under permanent pressure and the compensatory role of external accountability: A comparative study of independent police complaints bodies

TY - JOUR

T1 - The rule of law under permanent pressure and the compensatory role of external accountability

T2 - A comparative study of independent police complaints bodies

AU - Aden, Hartmut

AU - Lennon, Genevieve

AU - Mouhanna, Christian

AU - Roach, Kent

AU - Johansen, Anja

AU - Uranaka, Chikao

N1 - Publisher Copyright: © The Author(s) 2025.

PY - 2025/8/21

Y1 - 2025/8/21

N2 - Even in well-developed rule of law systems such as Canada, Germany, France, Japan or the UK, where public administration is bound to the law and citizens have the option to challenge public action or decisions before the courts, misconduct such as the excessive use of powers occurs in the public sector. This is particularly the case in the areas of core state powers, such as policing, where such misconduct constitutes a permanent challenge for the rule of law. Therefore, many countries have established independent accountability bodies such as ombudsman institutions, the French Défenseur des Droits, the Independent Office for Police Conduct for England and Wales, various Beauftragte in Germany or police complaints bodies in Canada. The paper analyses the relationship between the rule of law and the work of these oversight bodies. From a comparative perspective, it asks to what degree conceptual differences between the rule of law, the État de Droit and the Rechtsstaat influence the role of external accountability bodies, specifically in the case of policing. Building upon empirical data stemming from a research project that has been jointly carried out by several of the authors, it demonstrates that the ‘grey check’ (Brodeur) that politics tend to attribute to police agencies with legal bases that open a broad margin of police discretion may lead, from the perspective of the rule of law, to problematic deficits that external accountability bodies may partly compensate.

AB - Even in well-developed rule of law systems such as Canada, Germany, France, Japan or the UK, where public administration is bound to the law and citizens have the option to challenge public action or decisions before the courts, misconduct such as the excessive use of powers occurs in the public sector. This is particularly the case in the areas of core state powers, such as policing, where such misconduct constitutes a permanent challenge for the rule of law. Therefore, many countries have established independent accountability bodies such as ombudsman institutions, the French Défenseur des Droits, the Independent Office for Police Conduct for England and Wales, various Beauftragte in Germany or police complaints bodies in Canada. The paper analyses the relationship between the rule of law and the work of these oversight bodies. From a comparative perspective, it asks to what degree conceptual differences between the rule of law, the État de Droit and the Rechtsstaat influence the role of external accountability bodies, specifically in the case of policing. Building upon empirical data stemming from a research project that has been jointly carried out by several of the authors, it demonstrates that the ‘grey check’ (Brodeur) that politics tend to attribute to police agencies with legal bases that open a broad margin of police discretion may lead, from the perspective of the rule of law, to problematic deficits that external accountability bodies may partly compensate.

KW - Accountability

KW - Chèque en gris

KW - Law enforcement

KW - Police complaints

KW - Rule of law

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/105013742425

U2 - 10.1007/s12286-025-00649-8

DO - 10.1007/s12286-025-00649-8

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:105013742425

SN - 1865-2646

VL - 19

SP - 339

EP - 360

JO - Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

JF - Zeitschrift fur Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft

IS - 2

ER -