Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service

Martin Chalkley, Colin Tilley

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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    Abstract

    Dental service providers in the British National Health Service (NHS) operate under a number of remuneration arrangements that give rise to different incentives. We present a theoretical model of the effect of different remuneration structures on treatment intensity and test this model on data on treatments carried out in Scotland. After controlling for differences in patient need and dentist specific preferences, we find that self-employed dentists treat patients who are exempt from payment more intensively than their employed counterparts. The results imply that changes in remuneration can have a large effect on the distribution of treatments. More generally our results provide support for economic models that view financial incentives as important determinants of physician behaviour
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    Publication statusPublished - 2002

    Publication series

    NameDundee Discussion Papers in Economics
    PublisherUniversity of Dundee
    No.135
    ISSN (Print)1473-236X

    Keywords

    • Health services
    • British NHS
    • Physician agency
    • Treatment intensity
    • Financial incentives

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  • Research Output

    Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service

    Chalkley, M. & Tilley, C., 2006, In : Health Economics. 15, 9, p. 933 946 p.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

  • 25 Citations (Scopus)

    Cite this

    Chalkley, M., & Tilley, C. (2002). Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 135). University of Dundee.