Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service

Martin Chalkley, Colin Tilley

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    25 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Dental service providers in the British National Health Service (NHS) operate under a number of remuneration arrangements that give rise to different incentives. We present a theoretical model of the effect of different remuneration structures on treatment intensity and test this model on data on treatments carried out in Scotland. After controlling for differences in patient need and dentist specific preferences, we find that self-employed dentists treat patients who are exempt from payment more intensively than their employed counterparts. The results imply that changes in remuneration can have a large effect on the distribution of treatments. More generally our results provide support for economic models that view financial incentives as important determinants of physician behaviour.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)933
    Number of pages946
    JournalHealth Economics
    Volume15
    Issue number9
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2006

    Keywords

    • Health services
    • British NHS
    • Physician agency
    • Treatment intensity
    • Financial incentives

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  • Research Output

    • 25 Citations
    • 1 Discussion paper

    Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service

    Chalkley, M. & Tilley, C., 2002, University of Dundee, (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; no. 135).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

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