Untraceability of RFID Protocols

Ton van Deursen, Sjouke Mauw, Saša Radomirović

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

49 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We give an intuitive formal definition of untraceability in the standard Dolev-Yao intruder model, inspired by existing definitions of anonymity. We show how to verify whether communication protocols satisfy the untraceability property and apply our methods to known RFID protocols. We show a previously unknown attack on a published RFID protocol and use our framework to prove that the protocol is not untraceable.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationInformation Security Theory and Practices
Subtitle of host publicationSmart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks - Second IFIP WG 11.2 International Workshop, WISTP 2008 Seville, Spain, May 13-16, 2008. Proceedings
EditorsJose A. Onieva, Damien Sauveron, Serge Chaumette, Dieter Gollmann, Konstantinos Markantonakis
Place of PublicationBerlin
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Pages1-15
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9783540799658
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2008
Event2nd Workshop in Information Security Theory and Practices : "Smart Devices, Convergence and Next Generation Networks" - Hotel Hesperi, Seville, Spain
Duration: 13 May 200816 May 2008
http://wistp2008.wistp.org/ (Link to Workshop website)

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume5019
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Workshop

Workshop2nd Workshop in Information Security Theory and Practices
Abbreviated titleWISTP 2008
CountrySpain
CitySeville
Period13/05/0816/05/08
Internet address

Keywords

  • Formal verification
  • RFID protocols
  • Untraceability

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