Abstract
This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 258-263 |
Number of pages | 6 |
Journal | Applied Economics Letters |
Volume | 24 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 14 May 2016 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2017 |
Keywords
- Corruption
- bibery
- healthcare
- China