Who gets caught for corruption when corruption is pervasive? Evidence from China’s anti-bribery blacklist

Liming Zhou, Zhangfeng Jin, Zheng Wang (Lead / Corresponding author)

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    Abstract

    This article empirically investigates why in a corruption-pervasive country only a minority of the firms get caught for bribery while the majority get away with it. By matching manufacturing firms to a blacklist of bribers in the healthcare sector of a province in China, we show that the government-led blacklisting is selective: while economically more visible firms are slightly more likely to be blacklisted, state-controlled firms are the most protected compared to their private and foreign competitors. Our finding points to the fact that a government can use regulations to impose its preferences when the rule of law is weak and the rule of government is strong.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)258-263
    Number of pages6
    JournalApplied Economics Letters
    Volume24
    Issue number4
    Early online date14 May 2016
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017

    Keywords

    • Corruption
    • bibery
    • healthcare
    • China

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