Work hours, social value of leisure and globalisation

J.D. Hansen, Hassan Molana, Catia Montagna, J.U.M. Nielsen

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We examine how openness interacts with the coordination of consumption-leisure decisions in determining the equilibrium working hours and wage rate when there are leisure externalities (e.g., due to social interactions). The latter are modelled by allowing a worker's marginal utility of leisure to be increasing in the leisure time taken by other workers. Coordination takes the form of internalising the leisure externality and other relevant constraints (e.g., labour demand). The extent of openness is measured by the degree of capital mobility. We find that: coordination lowers equilibrium work hours and raises the wage rate; there is a U-shaped (inverse-U-shaped) relationship between work hours (wages) and the degree of coordination; coordination is welfare improving; and, the gap between the coordinated and uncoordinated work hours (and the corresponding wage rates) is affected by the extent and nature of openness.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)317-326
    Number of pages10
    JournalJournal of Socio-Economics
    Volume41
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jun 2012

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    Leisure
    Globalization
    Social values
    Work hours
    Wage rate
    Openness
    Externalities
    Workers
    Social interaction
    Labour demand
    Capital mobility
    Working hours
    Leisure time
    Marginal utility
    Wages

    Cite this

    Hansen, J.D. ; Molana, Hassan ; Montagna, Catia ; Nielsen, J.U.M. / Work hours, social value of leisure and globalisation. In: Journal of Socio-Economics. 2012 ; Vol. 41, No. 3. pp. 317-326.
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    Work hours, social value of leisure and globalisation. / Hansen, J.D.; Molana, Hassan; Montagna, Catia; Nielsen, J.U.M.

    In: Journal of Socio-Economics, Vol. 41, No. 3, 06.2012, p. 317-326.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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