Lyotard on Postmodern Music

Abstract

This paper delineates the idea of postmodern music as it is found in the writings of Jean-François Lyotard. Lyotard’s concept of the postmodern in general has informed debates about what “postmodern music” might be, but his own writings on music have not been given their due weight in such debates. While he never defines such a concept explicitly in his writings, it may be extrapolated from them. In the essay “Music and Postmodernity” he draws an analogy between the liberation of “Man” in socio-political modernity and the liberation of sonic material in musical modernity. While Lyotard does not quite make this explicit, the implication (I will argue) is that for him an event, analogous to the well-known “end of metanarratives” which signals the transition to postmodernity, is evident in the history of music. Just as the development of the Enlightenment project has resulted in a breakdown of the narratives of the emancipation of Man, so too the successful liberation of sound in musical modernity has led to the explosion of a coherent narrative of musical “progress,” instituting something like a musical postmodernity. Instead of any idea of general eclecticism following from this, however, Lyotard is clear about the stakes of postmodern music (as of all art): those stakes concern the aesthetic of the sublime,
and mean searching for “the inaudible” in the audible, through any and all means of experimentation on sonorous matter. The upshot is that while Lyotard endorses a kind of heterogeneity in his approach to postmodern music, he denies the loss of all critical stakes which is often thought to attend such a position.

**Keywords:** Jean-François Lyotard, postmodern music, poststructuralism, sublime, timbre.

Our ears are deaf to what sound can do. We must give back to the act of listening the power to open itself to the inaudible.

- Lyotard

As in other areas, the term “postmodern” has been used in musicology to mean a variety of different things: the music of a particular historical period, the end of experimentation and return to traditional forms of composition, a pastiche of old styles, a breakdown of the distinction between “elite” and “popular” musics, a concern with the politics of marginalized identities, and so on. One of the mostly widely accredited authorities on the meaning of the postmodern is the French philosopher Jean-François Lyotard, whose characterization of the postmodern as the “incredulity towards metanarratives” has often been invoked in discussions around postmodern music. Lyotard was something of an amateur musicologist, and devoted
at least six essays solely to music, in addition to numerous scattered remarks on the topic throughout his prolific writings. However, remarkably, only Lyotard’s general theory of the postmodern, principally as found in his book *The Postmodern Condition* – and not his own writings on music – have significantly informed debates around the meaning of postmodern music.

My aim here is to rectify this by clarifying what “postmodern music” would mean for Lyotard. The need for doing this is perhaps what also explains why his idea of postmodern music has not been more widely acknowledged. This is precisely because he never uses the term “postmodern music,” or makes explicit or entirely clear what such a term might mean within his philosophical perspective. The question is clearly raised in his essay “Music and Postmodernity,” but even there an explicit answer is not forthcoming. However, as I shall argue here, it is possible to reconstruct what postmodern music would mean for Lyotard by “joining the dots” between a number of his essays on music and general aesthetics. As we shall see – and Lyotard also fails to make this explicitly clear in any single essay, but it may be extrapolated – the meaning that postmodern music has in the terms of his philosophy would be intimately linked with an aesthetic of the sublime. The paper thus offers an interpretation of what Lyotard himself almost, but not quite, offers explicitly, in the hope that it will contribute to and inform wider debates in musicology and the philosophical aesthetics of music.
Let me begin with two brief methodological points which guide my reading of Lyotard’s aesthetics (his writings on music included). First, while Lyotard is frequently characterized as a post-structuralist philosopher, when it comes to aesthetics it is better to think of him as a “post-phenomenologist.” By this I do not refer to the North American school of phenomenology represented by philosophers such as Don Ihde, in association which which that term has also been used. Rather, I mean it to designate the way that Lyotard takes up themes and concerns from the phenomenological tradition, but develops them beyond the scope of that tradition, like other roughly contemporaneous French philosophers who might also be described as post-phenomenologists, such as Jacques Derrida, Jean-Luc Nancy, or Jacques Marion. Lyotard’s aesthetic concerns inscribe an arc which, rich and diverse as they are, begin and end with a critical encounter with Merleau-Ponty, especially the celebrated essay “Eye and Mind.” More significantly, what Lyotard consistently identified as being at stake in the arts – something “unpresentable” – may be approached via phenomenology, but not elaborated by it, since, by definition, it does not appear phenomenally. In this sense Lyotard’s aesthetics pushes phenomenology to the point where it ceases to be phenomenology. Yet in a way this is simply the exercise and elaboration of a paradox inherent in phenomenology from the start: since Husserl phenomenology was never really content to describe appearances, but sought, through a kind of transcendental reasoning, to identify the conditions of possibility for such appearing (consciousness in Husserl, Being in Heidegger, “the flesh” in Merleau-Ponty, God in later French phenomenologists like Henry and Marion, etc.). Typically, the conditions of the given are posited as not themselves being given. Thus Lyotard distinguishes, in a work of art, the given presentation (that which appears, which
makes itself known to perception and thought), and the *unpresentable*, the elusive condition for what is presented being art (rather than an object of knowledge, etc.) and giving rise to an aesthetic response. In music, as we shall see, this means – and I quote Lyotard – that “what is at stake in musical pieces that merit the name of opuses [is] the enigma of letting appear, of letting be heard”7, and that “[w]hat is audible in the opus is musical only in as much as it evokes the inaudible.”8

Second, my reading is guided by what I would like to call “Lyotard’s doubt.” This is inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s well-known essay “Cézanne’s Doubt,” and Lyotard’s elaboration of this theme in his essay “Freud According to Cézanne.”9 *Grosso modo:* Cézanne’s continually shifting style (through at least four “periods”) may be explained by his doubt that there is any style which can adequately render the visual in painting.10 By analogy, Lyotard’s frequently shifting philosophical approaches (and Lyotard’s work too seems to have it’s “periods,” most obviously, with respect to his aesthetics, the earlier Freudian “libidinal” period and the later Kantian “sublime” period) may be understood as motivated by his doubt that any philosophy can adequately render the kinds of issues he seeks to think (as concerns us here, music or art more generally). This methodological point helps us to understand an aspect of Lyotard’s work which is otherwise in danger of causing confusion and frustration. Not only do his philosophical approaches shift throughout his career (to continue the previous example, from Freud to Kant as primary reference), but the *value* accorded to terms shifts as well. In each period (I am simplifying here), some terms indicate the side of presentation, while others indicate the unpresentable. What can seem disconcerting is that as Lyotard’s thought develops, terms previously indicating the unpresentable move over to the side of presentation, while new terms are then tried
for the unpresentable. (For example, after Discourse, Figure, “figure” moves to the side of discourse or structure, and while desire is the term exploited for its indeterminacy in the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1980s it is rendered in terms of “intrigue,” in opposition to unpresentable “presence.”11) What this indicates is simply that, according to Lyotard, no term can adequately render “the unpresentable” - as soon as it is described and thought, it becomes too “presented,” and something less familiar must then be tried. With these preliminary methodological points in mind, let me turn to the elaboration of Lyotard’s philosophical reflections on postmodern music.

Lyotard inscribes the stakes of a musical aesthetics into the problematic of modernity and postmodernity in the essay “The Inaudible: Music and Postmodernity,” written in 1991. The argument proceeds by way of an analogy. Lyotard reiterates his well-known thesis on postmodernity as the “end of grand narratives,” then asks whether we may consider something analogous to this event to have occurred in music. Lyotard defines the modern, in the sense of historical periodization, as the period marked by the credibility of a philosophy of history (called a “grand narrative” or “metanarrative”) which posits the progressive emancipation of humanity as its goal. In this sense, the postmodern marks the loss of credence given to this idea of historical progress. According to Lyotard, the legitimation of projects has largely ceased to appeal to the progress of human freedom, and in the contemporary developed world appeals primarily to the increased performance of “the system” (that
is, its increased efficiency). This increase in efficiency is the only good now recognized, and the multiple ideologies of “progress” have been supplanted by an ideology of “development.” “The postmodern condition,” Lyotard writes, “is that of human beings when they are caught in this process, which simultaneously develops their powers and demands their enslavement.”

Lyotard draws an analogy with music by suggesting that “[t]he history of western music may be thought of globally as the emancipation of sound.” He takes his bearings here from Theodor W. Adorno’s Philosophy of New Music, where the latter writes that “with the liberation of the material, the possibility of mastering it has increased.” Lyotard’s suggestion is that all the experiments and innovations in the history of Western music have acted to question the necessity of the rules which have governed the way that sounds are selected, manipulated, and composed in order to be considered music within that tradition. Such rules include the principles of pitch, timbre, rhythm, melody, harmony, and so on. Progressive experimentation would have revealed that such rules are conventional and contingent, and that the only necessity of music is its material, that is, sound, or sonorous matter, “the vibration of the air with its components, frequency, duration, amplitude, colour and attack.” In this way, Lyotard suggests that scientific research into sound, carried out by the disciplines of acoustics and psychophysics, converge with new technological means of treating sound, such as synthesizers, and the rule-breaking experiments of composers and musicians, to liberate sound from the conventions of musical tradition and multiply its possibilities.
While Lyotard does not explicitly specify such, it is easy to see that this story would be a *modern* way of understanding music; the grand narrative of “Western art music” as the emancipation of sound. We can see this idea filled out by Derek Scott’s descriptions of the way that musical modernism frequently subscribed to a teleological narrative of development. He explains that “[m]odernists have continually seen works as ‘pointing forwards’ to others, thus reinforcing a sense of self-determining progress in the arts.”\(^{17}\) And, he specifies, “the dominant grand narrative for musical modernism was that of the evolution and dissolution of tonality.”\(^{18}\) What he has in mind here, of course, is the atonalism of Arnold Schönberg and his followers.

Lyotard’s question, then, is whether we can speculate that there would be something analogous to the *postmodern* in music, an event which would have called into question the credibility of this grand narrative of the liberation of sound. He states that the question is a little naïve, and this is perhaps why he does not quite give it an explicit answer. Yet the answer he implies is not too difficult to reconstruct, and this is what I will do in what follows. In doing so, we will see how Lyotard’s reflections on the questions of musical modernity and postmodernity necessarily intersect with his reflections on the aesthetic of the sublime.

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Lyotard stakes out a claim for the predominant value of the aesthetic of the sublime in relation to the avant-garde arts in a series of essays published in the 1980s, and this
aesthetic is clearly linked to – and acts to clarify – what he understands by “the modern” and “the postmodern” in the arts. His essays devoted to music from this period⁹ make little direct reference to the sublime, but music is included in the schematics of a general aesthetics of the sublime he outlines elsewhere.¹⁰ Lyotard argues that with the avant-gardes, the aesthetic of the beautiful can no longer be understood as illuminating the stakes of art. Instead, such stakes have “something to do with” the aesthetic of the sublime. Some of the main lines of reasoning he provides are as follows.

First, he argues that avant-garde art departs from the aesthetic of the beautiful because the beautiful assumes a common taste shared by the public, which (in principle) realizes itself in the feeling of pleasure universally produced in those who experience the work. The sublime, by contrast, assumes no such “common sense” of taste. The publics of avant-garde art, and modern art more generally, “are prey to unforeseeable feelings: they are shocked, admiring, scornful, indifferent.”¹¹ What is at stake is no longer producing a shared feeling of pleasure in the members of the public, but surprising them.¹²

Second, Lyotard argues that the sublime is the appropriate aesthetic connected to indeterminacy, the recognition that rule-following (what was called “poetics,” following Aristotle) alone is not sufficient for the production or appreciation of aesthetic effects. These first two points are linked. Lyotard writes:

> The predominance of the idea of techne placed works under a multiple regulation, that of the model taught in the studios, Schools and Academies, that of the taste shared by the aristocratic public, that of a purposiveness of art, which was to illustrate the glory
of a name, divine or human, to which was linked the perfection of some cardinal virtue or other. The idea of the sublime disrupts this harmony.23

Third, Lyotard argues, the task of the avant-gardes after the technical means of representing reality was perfected (Lyotard specifies photography and film, but this would presumably also include phonographic recording in the domain of sound) is to present something other than what can be represented (according to the traditional “rules” of representation): the “unpresentable.” He associates this with the Idea in Kant (a concept without an object which can be presented as an example), which comes into play in the aesthetic of the sublime. “The absolute” as such is just such an idea for Kant. The task of the avant-gardes is to “present the unpresentable”: in painting, the invisible in the visible; in music, the inaudible in the audible. Lyotard insists that “[t]he sublime, and not the beautiful, is the sentiment called forth by these [avant-garde] works.”24

Lyotard associates this movement away from realistic representation with avant-garde movements, in particular minimalism and abstraction. Artworks which come under these headings move away from a primary concern with form and towards a concern with matter. This accords with the sublime because Kant’s description of the beautiful emphasizes the predominance of form (form is what can be shared, and allows aesthetic taste) while the sublime involves a crisis in the imagination’s ability to present forms. The experience of the sublime involves a kind of “formlessness.” Lyotard writes:

As the idea of a natural fit between matter and form declines (a decline already implied in Kant’s analysis of the sublime …) the aim for the arts, especially of painting and
music, can only be that of approaching matter. Which means approaching presence without recourse to the means of presentation.  

Kant, of course, did not think that a work of art itself could be sublime, but only represent sublime objects (storms, mountains, and so on). In extending his re-interpretation of this aesthetic, Lyotard develops the notion of an immanent sublime in which the Absolute or infinite is associated with matter in the work itself. In the work there is an “absolute” insofar as there is an indeterminate aspect of the work, not given by relations between elements. (Remember that “absolute” means or implies “without relation.”) In order to understand this appeal to an “absolute” as an absence of relations between elements, it is instructive to recall that Lyotard’s trajectory in aesthetics began with a critical rejection of structuralist aesthetics, which understands everything in terms of such relations. According to Lyotard, this absolute, this “matter,” is given by color in painting and timbre and nuance in music. As he emphasizes in his writings on the painter Barnett Newman, the sublime is here, now: it is the work itself, in its materiality. This immanence of the sublime is what Lyotard emphasizes as the mark of postmodern art in his most well-known aesthetic distinction between the modern and the postmodern, made in the essay “Answering the Question: What is the Postmodern?”: the modern is sublime but nostalgic; it presents the fact that there is an absent, transcendent absolute. But the postmodern gives an immanent absolute, it presents the unpresentable, in the work itself.

This unpresentable is difficult for the mind to think, and Lyotard deliberately uses paradoxical terms to indicate it. In his writings on music, “the inaudible” is signaled obliquely, by appeal to references that are literary (Kleist, Quignard) and even
spiritual (Swedenborg). Yet this “unpresentable” is not quite so mysterious as it might sometimes seem: it is nothing mystical, as Lyotard insists, but rather indicates what it is in art that moves us; something which cannot be identified in or reduced to “ordinary perception” (or indeed, to our knowledge of what the artwork is, or represents, or our understanding of the rules or principles governing its composition and effects). This is why Lyotard insists on using terms such as “invisible” (derived from Merleau-Ponty) and “inaudible” (suggested by Varèse). In short, the unpresentable is affect, that which moves the body and makes it feel, not a recognizable emotion, but unknown or unspecifiable feelings. Moreover, as we have noted, the unpresentable is a state of matter, and not anything immaterial or spiritual in a metaphysically transcendent sense. Lyotard writes: “The inaudible and the invisible do not belong to a supra-sensible substratum that escapes entirely the normal condition of space-time-matter. …the inaudible is a gesture in the space-time-matter of sound, and it gestures toward a ‘presence’ that is not presentable.”

For Lyotard, then, the meaning of the postmodern in the arts is linked to a modality of the aesthetic of the sublime, which insists on the immanence of the absolute in the matter of the work. Although not explicitly stated, it is not difficult to draw out the theme of the sublime in Lyotard’s essays on music from this period (the 1980s). We have seen that for him, the sublime is recognizable in arts which move away from form, towards matter. Lyotard elaborates this through a focus on 1) the way that music seeks to escape temporal form, and 2) timbre as the matter of music. First, in a
general way Lyotard celebrates musics which defy what he associates with narrative form. These latter have a beginning, middle, and end, and they express and evoke recognizable moods, emotions, and feelings. As examples of these types of music, Lyotard indicates “the musical poem, the symphony, the sonata, the lied.” More specifically, he argues that what is at stake in music, what gives rise to aesthetic feeling and makes it an art, is a “pure, punctual presence” that escapes from the repetitions which constitute the audible by giving it consistency and form. Lyotard approaches this idea and tries to argue for it in a number of ways (ways which include the references to Kleist, Quignard, and Swedenborg mentioned above), but let us summarize the point via his more strictly philosophical, Kantian approach.

For Kant, space and time are the two basic forms of intuition, in which objects must be presented in order to be perceptible. Music does not require space in order to be perceived; but it is it is par excellence the art of time. Kant understands “the given” (what we perceive through the senses) as a manifold: for him, the term “matter” designates this “pure diversity” before any ordering; before form. In order to perceive objects, the mind must engage in an activity of synthesis, which gathers together the manifold and imposes on it a form. In this way it can be presented as a sensible object, and offered to the understanding for categorization. Time is a form which allows the presentation, the appearing, of the perceptible, through retention and repetition. In order for something to appear even for an instant in perception, there must be at the bare minimum a “microsynthesis” of the manifold, a grasping and comparing of different microscopic elements, which requires a repetition because “past” elements must be repeated in order for such a comparison, such a synthesis, to take place. In short, Lyotard posits that what gives the aesthetic feeling of the sublime in music may
be theorized as escaping from repetition and from the form of time, and understood as “a pinch of manifold” so small that it is imperceptible to consciousness, unexperienceable, taking place below the threshold of perception. Sound, in this immediate present, would escape from the form of time, and be something monstrous, unformed, unpresentable. To use a term common to Lyotard, this would be the sonic event.

Lyotard further associates this bare pinch of manifold with matter understood as timbre, the tonal quality of a sound which differs, for example, when the same note is played on different instruments. Timbre seems to be due to aspects of sound difficult to analyze, some of which are so brief in duration as to be below the threshold of our conscious perception, such as “the ways in which different partials grow in amplitude during the starting transient.” For Lyotard, timbre is exploited as a “site” of the inaudible event by virtue of its indeterminacy. In short, the thought is that there is in timbre something irreducible to the known parameters of perception and rational analysis, and this something is the “je ne sais qua” which is responsible for our aesthetic feeling of music. Lyotard writes:

> It is clear too that from Debussy to Boulez, Cage or Nono, via Webern or Varèse, the attention of modern musicians has been turned towards this secret passibility to sound-timbre. And it is also this that makes jazz and electronic music important. For with gongs and in general all percussion instruments, with synthesizers, musicians have access to an infinite continuum of sound-nuances.

This focus on the inaudible in music, understood as the unpresentable given in the present instant and the matter of timbre, is what marks Lyotard’s attachment of the
aesthetic of the sublime to his concerns with music, and also what allows us to characterize his philosophy of music as post-phenomenological: in music, the inaudible is what gives the given (the audible), but is not itself given. In the later essay “Music, Mutic” (1993), using vocabulary typical of this later period, Lyotard describes music as a gesture made in space-time-sound, which makes a sign of the inaudible. 38

Before we can conclude with a clear summary of what postmodern music would mean for Lyotard – a meaning we have seen is linked with the aesthetic of the sublime – we must note that a significant complication is introduced into Lyotard’s understanding of the sublime around the same time as the “Music and Postmodernity” essay was written. This complication is one which has only recently been made readily and clearly available with the 2009 publication in French and English of his book *Karel Appel: A Gesture of Colour* (previously only available in a German translation). Here he writes as follows.

It is foolish to pretend, or even to suppose, that each of these aesthetics, that of the beautiful and that of the sublime, rules a distinct period in the history of the arts or could be recognisable by a manner or an appropriate school. Take for example the avant-gardes. The art historian and the art critic distinguish there two major movements, one towards abstraction, the other towards the minimal.
One could believe (this happened to me) that in both cases it is a question of attempting to forestall the trap of figuration and of bearing witness to that which escapes all presentation. An attempt at “negative presentation”, as it were, that is obedient to an aesthetics of “too little to see”, that would turn its back on the free profusion, on the “rich matter” of forms. One would thus recognise the sublime in certain manners. […] That is a hasty application of the results of critical analysis to the description of works. Minimalism and abstraction are names which designate, more or less, manners indeed observable in the history of art. But the critical issues that interest us do not coincide at all with these manners. […] Above all, the sublime does not become attached to manner, it is without manner, as Longinus already suggested. […] There is no sublime technique because technique deals with the shaping of matter in presentation and the sublime is only the feeling that the absolute makes a sign in the work, whatever its form. This “presence” signs itself as much […] in a rondo of Mozart and in a quartet for strings by Beethoven or Scelsi. 39

The upshot of this is that the late Lyotard, in a certain sense, retracts his claim that over the last two hundred years, and with the 20th century avant-gardes in particular, art must be understood in relation to the aesthetic of the sublime, understandable as a movement away from form and towards matter, recognizable in stylistic movements such as minimalism and abstraction.

A corollary displacement occurs with Lyotard’s treatment of music in his last essay dedicated to it, “Music, Mutic,” published in 1993. Here, we see that while he continues to focus on matter as indeterminacy, opposed to form, timbre has now passed over to the side of form, of the presentation, of the audible. (Recall here my introductory comments on Lyotard’s methodological “doubt.”) He writes:
There is a sonorous matter that is not what the musician calls the material. The latter is understood as the timbre of the sound. Matter is not heard [... sonorous matter [...] clandestinely inhabits the audible material, the timbre.40

The above points complicate our attempt to understand Lyotard’s ideas about postmodern music in important ways, because he now suggests that the aesthetic feelings of the beautiful and the sublime cannot be distinguished in relation to the work41 – there is no sublime style, and timbre is placed on the side of form, not matter. In this period of Lyotard’s aesthetics – the 1990s – he insists that there is no history of art properly speaking, only a history of the cultural reception of artworks, understood and classified according to their forms. There is no history of what gives a cultural product an artistic value, which for him is it’s capacity to affect us: there is no history of the beautiful or the sublime, such that we would be able to say that, for example, a work by Matisse is more beautiful than one by Rembrandt because beauty has progressed.42

Having completed this brief survey of some pertinent aspects of Lyotard’s philosophy of music, we may return to the question of whether there is an event analogous to the postmodern in the history of Western music. Lyotard says this is a naïve question, and we may readily see why: insofar as he wants to insist in his late aesthetics that there is no history of art, so there is no history of the artistic effect in music. The stylistic
changes which determine periods of music – baroque, classical, romantic, modern – to name just the broadest and best-known – take place on the level of culture, and of the presentation of the work. What would be called “the postmodern” or “postmodernity,” in music as in other fields, must break with such a cultural history.

However, there are some ways in which there is a plausible analogy between the postmodern event and music. We can see this elaborated in the essay “Obedience,” collected in The Inhuman. The liberation of sound, considered as material – something useful, and masterable, in order to produce specific aesthetic effects - might be thought to have revealed that sound is more (or perhaps less) than material; it is matter. Matter in this sense is what Lyotard called “immaterial” at the exhibition of that name (Les Immateriaux) for which he was principal director at the Pompidou Centre in 1985. Here he presented the hypothesis of a kind of negative dialectic with respect to modernity, understood as the attempt to liberate humanity through the technological control of materials. The very technoscientific researches which attempted to increase this mastery, he contended, have undermined it, as it has broken down the distinction between subject and object which supported this project and the concept of the material, revealing an indeterminacy he names ‘immaterial matter.’

Varèse’s poem electronique was played at the Philips pavilion, designed by Le Corbusier, in Brussels in 1958. Lyotard calls this the first exhibition of immaterials. What he calls sonorous matter is immaterial matter, insofar as it involves this indeterminacy. The “liberation of sound” has not revealed something masterable, a key to calculating determinable musical effects, but a vast heterogenous continuum of indeterminate, possible effects. The liberation of sound has revealed something
indeterminate and unmasterable, just as the modern attempt to liberate “Man” has revealed that there is no such coherent subject of history.

Despite Lyotard’s later qualifications, postmodern music would still be bound up with an aesthetic of the sublime. In his later works, there are important aspects of the aesthetic of the sublime which he wants to generalize to all aesthetics. This generalization is the explicit task of the 1993 essay “Anima Minima,” where he writes:

> The present description extends the import of the specific analysis of the sublime sentiment to all aesthetic sentiments. Being artists, writers, sometimes philosophers, contemporaries apply themselves to detecting within sensation the “presence” of what escapes sensation: something neutral, something gray, something blank “inhabits” the nuances of a sound, a chromaticism, or a voice.45

What Lyotard ultimately wants with the aesthetic of the sublime, then, seems to be what I have called the “post-phenomenological” aspect of his aesthetic – the “unpresentable presence” not only irreducible to conceptual determination, but also to formed perception. He continues to identify this unpresentable presence with an immaterial matter, even as the capacity to identify it in works which highlight timbre or color is now denied. The problem with Lyotard’s emphasis on timbre in music the ‘80s is simply that it identifies “presence” too strongly with the presentation, and restricts it too much to a particular style or period – the later aesthetics further open the question of where “the inaudible” might be indicated through sound.
It thus remains the case the Lyotard is still concerned to elaborate and defend the sublime as an aesthetic which best describes the stakes of the kind of art he is interested in, that is, experimental arts which might be called “avant-garde,” not because they belong to a period or a style, but because they push the boundaries of the received rules of presentation, through whatever manner or style, in their search for the unpresentable. Thus these later considerations are not retractions of the sublime as an aesthetic or experimentation in the arts, but rather of a too-easy historical periodization of such experimentation, which would recognize the sublime in a particular manner or style. “Musical postmodernity,” then, would not be a period, but a state, mood, approach, realization, perspective, or aesthetic, whereby one does not give credence to the notion that the cultural unfolding of periods or styles progressively liberates sound, but searches for the inaudible through any and all styles and parameters of experimentation. There is today a vast multiplicity of experimental techniques pursued to approach the inaudible. Lyotard gives just two examples to illustrate the range of these heterogenous possibilities of experimentation; two composers, who seem to him to approach the inaudible from opposite directions: Cage, through “letting sound be,” and Boulez, through an “over-articulation” of sound. If there is a recognition of the legitimacy of multiple, heterogenous, and perhaps incommensurable regions of sound able to testify to the inaudible, we have entered, in music, something like the political postmodernity which Lyotard conceives as the multiplication of little narratives once the grand narratives of the emancipation of man, which claimed to subsume them, have broken down.
While he argues for multiplicity and heterogeneity in music, however, this does not mean that Lyotard should be thought to have subscribed to the kind of postmodernism which denies any legitimate distinction between high art and populism, such that Boulez would appear to have equal artistic value to Taylor Swift. Lyotard does deny that the “liberation of sound” takes place along the path of a single approach, such as the atonalism of Schönberg and his followers. However, he must be thought, in a specific sense, to continue to privilege the avant-garde as an “elite.” Indeed, in an interview arranged as an exchange with Boulez, he asserts that “[e]litism, for my part, was never anything of which to be afraid.” In Lyotard’s specific sense, such an elitism is simply a lack of concern with popular accessibility. But neither does Lyotard draw such a distinction along cultural lines, and he is happy to include Frank Zappa, Jimi Hendrix, Ravi Shankar, free jazz, and other musics and musicians who have found a popular cultural reception among those he would include in such an elite. Rather, the line of distinction would be the capacity to testify to or gesture towards the inaudible, something which can ultimately only be a matter of aesthetic judgment, but which remains at least associated with the creation of new forms or experimentation with new materials – that is, the appearance of something new on the side of presentation. Indeed, it is precisely the aesthetic of the sublime – understood as the search for “the inaudible” – which gives a specific character to Lyotard’s understanding of postmodern music and saves it from the generalized eclecticism without criteria that is often thought to follow from the breakdown of metanarratives (in whatever field).

In the final section of the essay “The Inaudible: Music and Postmodernity,” Lyotard repeats the appeal to heterogeneity and warning against the danger of cultural monism
which closes his essay “Answering the Question: What is the Postmodern?” Here, he uses the image of Babel, suggesting that the postmodern scene in music means the multiplicity of stylistic experimentations, which would accord with the multiplication of idioms after the tower’s destruction by God. He suggests that some want metaphorically to rebuild the tower, by basing musics around recognizable and agreed-upon features, such as harmony and rhythm. Such rules, he suggests, are a kind of equal measure which are the sonic equivalent to money, in so far as they equalize differences and impose a monolithic value under capitalism. Yet the Lord, he insists, was wise to destroy the tower of Babel, and Lyotard asserts the value of multiple experimentations in music which push the limits of the audible so that it approaches the inaudible. His argument then is analogous to the one he makes against so-called trans-avant-gardism – the return to painting in the early ‘80s – that he makes in “Answering the Question.” It is a plea for a continued effort in experimentation, for continued stakes in musical invention, against desires to return to the recognizable and comfortable.

We can now summarize the specific and nuanced sense in which, I indicated, we can understand postmodern music according to Lyotard. Postmodernity in music must be understood as an approach which rejects the linear development which characterized modernism (and which applies only on the cultural level), and embraces a plurality of experimental approaches and procedures. Postmodern music would be a search for the inaudible, for the art in music, rather than an attempt to make cultural forms progress. Insofar as it can be periodized, a musical postmodernity would refer only to a condition in which such an approach predominates. Moreover, as we have seen, for Lyotard postmodern music is characterized by a sublime aesthetic. Such an aesthetic
must be understood not in terms of recognizable stylistic features, but as indicating that aspect which Lyotard isolates and generalizes to all aesthetics: the un-presentable in presentation, the matter in form, the inaudible in the audible.

References


Notes


3 For example, Pasler suggests that a certain type of postmodern music ‘often addresses the ‘master narratives’ of tonality, narrative structure, Western hegemony and male dominance.’ (op. cit., 214)


8 Ibid.


Lyotard writes: ‘Cézanne’s pictorial journey moves in the originary element of an uncertainty, of a suspicion in relation to what is presented as “natural law” in the schools of painting … this suspicion, this deficiency, is given first and everywhere underlies this work of displacement, whether theoretical or plastic, that it undertakes. This means that it is vain to search in the failure of the composition, plastic for Cézanne, for the (dialectical) reason for the subsequent invention. Every composition is a failure and a success; they only succeed each other in a surface history, and are contemporaries in the substratum where Cézanne’s desire, immobile, generates disconnected figures, divided spaces, contrary points of view.’ (“Freud According to Cézanne,” 32)


15 Lyotard, “The Inaudible,” 205.


19 “Obedience” and “God and the Puppet” (both in *The Inhuman*).


24 Lyotard, “Presentation, Representation, Unpresentable” in *The Inhuman*, 126.

25 Lyotard, “After the Sublime, the State of Aesthetics” in *The Inhuman*, 139.

26 Lyotard’s major work in this regard is *Discourse, Figure*, trans. Antony Hudek and Mary Lyton (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).


28 See Lyotard, “Answering the Question, What is the Postmodern?” in *The Postmodern Explained to Children*.

29 Heinrich von Kleist is referenced in “God and the Puppet,” Pascal Quignard in “Music, Mutic,” and Emanuel Swedenborg in “Obedience.”
This Kantian approach is explored particularly in the essay “God and the Puppet” in *The Inhuman*.

Lyotard writes: “For music, the great question becomes: how to divide up what is called sonorous space? Which is, in reality, an immense reflection on time. I am struck by seeing that each time some philosophers have undertaken to work on time, they have taken their examples from music.” “La réflexion créatrice” in *Éclats/Boulez*, ed. C. Samuel (Paris: Éditions du Centre Pompidou, 1986), 16. [My translation.]


Lyotard, “After the Sublime,” 141.


He writes: ‘The transcendence – whether beautiful or sublime it matters little, the difference not being discernible in relation to the work – of the work of art is found right there in the evocation of this precariousness forever enveloped in sensation.’ (“Music, Mutic,” 233)
42 See the chapter “Long Indictment of the History of Art” in Karel Appel and, with specific relation to music, the opening passages of “Music, Mutic.”


44 “Obedience,” 173.

45 “Anima Minima” in Postmodern Fables, trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 244.

46 “The Inaudible,” “Obedience,” and “Music, Mutic.”


49 See for example the essays “Several Silences” in Driftworks, ed. Roger McKeon (New York: Semiotext(e), 1984) and “After the Sublime, the Sate of Aesthetics” in The Inhuman.

50 Lyotard, “The Inaudible,” 221-23.

51 While Lyotard does not name them here, it is possible that what he has in mind is the post-Cage generation of American composers, the most famous representatives of which are Philip Glass and Steve Reich. While they certainly experimented on some parameters of music (notably time and repetition), they are also more melodically and
harmonically conventional than many of the previous generations of the musical avant-garde.