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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Britain and Upper Silesia 1919 - 1922

Lesniewski, Peter

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Britain and Upper Silesia 1919 - 1922

Peter Lesniewski

2000

University of Dundee
Britain and Upper Silesia 1919 – 1922

Peter Adam Leśniewski

Doctor of Philosophy
University of Dundee
April 2000
# Table of Contents

| Declaration                        | Page  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maps and Plates</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tables and Charts</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illustrations</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviations and Glossary</td>
<td>ix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

1. **The Peace Conference, the Decision to Hold a Plebiscite and the First Polish Insurrection.**
   - Summary
   - Notes
   - Page 77
   - Page 83

2. **The Inter-Allied Commission, Development of French Ascendancy and the Second Insurrection.**
   - Summary
   - Notes
   - Page 160
   - Page 164

3. **The Reorganised Commission, The ‘Outvoting’ Regulations and the Plebiscite.**
   - Summary
   - Notes
   - Page 263
   - Page 268

4. **Political and Military Responses to the Third Insurrection.**
   - Summary
   - Notes
   - Page 363
   - Page 372

5. **Referral to the League of Nations, The Decision and Hand-Over**
   - Summary
   - Notes
   - Page 467
   - Page 474
## Addenda

### Annex

1. **Analysis Of Outvoting Effect On Each Voting Unit — Data And Statistics.**
2. **Selective List Of German — Polish Place Names.**
3. **List Of British Officials With The Inter-Allied Administrative And Plebiscite Commission In Upper Silesia, August 1920.**
4. **List Of Officers And SNCO’s Recruited For The Inter-Allied Commission During November 1920.**
5. **Protest Against Upper Silesia’s Partition, Sent to Lord Curzon by the Radicals and Socialists**
This is the work of its author Peter Adam Leśniewski. Unless otherwise stated, all references have been consulted by the author. The work of which this thesis is a record has been done by its author. This thesis has not been previously accepted for a higher degree.

Peter Adam Leśniewski: 25 April 2000
Summary

This thesis provides the first complete dedicated narrative on Britain’s political and military involvement in Upper Silesia between 1919 and 1922. It establishes the background to the Paris Peace Conference’s decision to conduct a plebiscite in this important industrial region on the new Polish-German frontier. It also demonstrates how the region’s long-standing ethnic tensions, combined with Polish national aspirations and class consciousness, led to three insurrections in Upper Silesia between August 1919 and May 1921. British military leaders utilised the prevailing fears about the post-war industrial unrest in Britain to reduce their military commitments in Europe. The thesis explains how this action resulted in a French ascendancy on the inter-Allied Commission administering Upper Silesia and the military forces policing it. The initial absence of the British troops also affected the attitude and effectiveness of the British contingent serving with the inter-Allied Commission. The internal conflicts within the Commission are dealt with, as are the differing attitudes of the French, British and Italian Commissioners towards the highly partisan, and often violent, Polish and German plebiscite campaigns.

Using mainly unpublished official documents and private papers, this work describes the attitude and conduct of the British officials serving in Upper Silesia. It identifies each of the British military units eventually sent to Upper Silesia and records the British soldiers’ confrontations with German and Polish Upper Silesian para-militarists during the final insurrection in May – July 1921. Attempting to settle the controversial questions about the ‘outvoters’, the thesis provides an individual analysis of the result in each one of the 1,545 voting constituencies. And, apart from demolishing the myth perpetuated in English-
language historiography that Germany somehow or other 'won' the plebiscite, the thesis examines Upper Silesia’s significance from an international perspective - particularly its effect on British relations with Poland and Germany, relations within the Entente, and the involvement of the League of Nations - an action resulting in Upper Silesia’s partition in 1922.
## Maps and Plates

### Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Upper Silesia and the Partitioned Areas of Poland</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Upper Silesian Plebiscite Area 1920-1922</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Upper Silesian Insurrection August 1919 [Based on T.Jedruszczak Polityka Polski w sprawie Gornego Slaska 1918-1922 (Warsaw 1958)]</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>The Commissioners’ Recommendations of 24 April 1921</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Military Division of Responsibility</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Italian Foreign Minister’s Proposals 24 May 1921</td>
<td>406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>French and British Proposals at Paris Conference 8 – 13 August 1921</td>
<td>422</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>International Line after League of Nations Judgement until 2nd World War</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Plates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conjunction of the Three Empires near Mysłowice.</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Site of Inter-Allied Commission Opole.</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Amphitheatre Góra Św. Anny built during the Nazi era on the site of the Freikorps victory over Polish Silesian Insurgents, May 1921.</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Freikorps Memorial Góra Św. Anny</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Monastery on top of Góra Św. Anny</td>
<td>347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Entrance to Schloss Turawa</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>The Stables at Schloss Turawa</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Tables and Charts

## Tables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas.</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Revised Schedule of Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas.</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Provisional List of Voters February 22nd 1921.</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Finalised List of Registered Voters in Towns 20th March 1920.</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Finalised List of Registered Voters 20th March 1921.</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 20th March 1920.</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20th March 1921.</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 20th March 1921 (Industrial Areas &amp; Coalfields Only)</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20th March 1921 (Industrial Areas &amp; Coalfields Only)</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Charts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Coal Production During and After Insurrection</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Distribution of Coal During and After Insurrection</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Illustrations

Except where otherwise indicated, the following cartoons are from a selection of contemporary satirical Polish Upper Silesian Journals such as, edited, and published by Wilhelm Szewczyk in Powstania Śląski 1919, 1920, 1921 (Katowice 1961).

1. The Prussian Stork 64
2. Proof of German Superiority 64
3. Mixed Commission Officials 64
4. The Three Commissioners (Heather Soutar, Dundee 1998) 117
5. The Problem (Punch, August 18, 1920) 150
6. Polish Plebiscite Poster 207
7. German Plebiscite Poster 207
8. ‘Outvoter’ Released from Prison 215
9. Father Ulitzka 215
10. The Bitters of Victory (Punch, March 30, 1921) 252
10a. Sir Harold Stuart (Heather Soutar, Dundee 1999) 298
11. The Godmothers and the Enfant Terrible (Punch, May 25, 1921) 299
12. Orgesch Organizer 302
13. German and Silesian 302
14. Impatient Polish Silesian 302
15. The Pole Stars (Punch Almanac 1922) 323
16. Poland Strikes at Germany 323
17. The Silesian Goose; (Punch, October 19, 1921) 451
18. Grandmother Europe 458
19. Irishman to Silesian 458
20. Kocynder Reader 468
## Abbreviations and Glossary

(for archive abbreviations see bibliography)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alto Commissario Ecclesiastic</td>
<td>The Ecclesiastical Commissioner for the Plebiscite areas in Upper Silesia, Kwidzyn and Olsztyn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAOR</td>
<td>British Army on the Rhine.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltikum</td>
<td>General von der Glotz German volunteers expelled from Russia’s ex-Baltic provinces in 1919.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bloc National</td>
<td>French nationalist block in the post-war Chamber of Deputies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bojowa-Polska</td>
<td>Polish armed bands. The original name came from the armed squads formed in 1905 by Piłsudski prior to the formation of the PPS revolutionary wing in 1906.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bund der Oberschlesier</td>
<td>Upper Silesian League for (depending on the prevailing political circumstances) an independent state or an autonomous province within Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgermeister</td>
<td>Mayor or Provost.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgerwehr</td>
<td>Citizen guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIGS</td>
<td>Chief of the Imperial General Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comintern</td>
<td>Communist International.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Dago’</td>
<td>A contemptuous term for a person of Latin extraction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsch Böhmen</td>
<td>Germans in Czechoslovakia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutscher Schutz bund für Das Grez- und Auslands-Deutschum.</td>
<td>League for the Defence of Germany on the Border and Abroad. Ostensibly a privately funded organisation, the Schutz bund fronted the Government’s Reichzentrale für Heimatdienst and raised public awareness of the Upper Silesia issue. Often referred to as simply the Schutz bund.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Chink’</td>
<td>A contemptuous term for a person of Chinese extraction.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Abbreviations and Glossary

DMI Director of Military Intelligence.

DMO Director of Military Operations.

Erfüllung The label given to Wirth's declared policy of fulfilling the Peace Treaty's provisions.

Freikorps Extreme German nationalist volunteer para-military units used by the first Weimar Governments to end the German revolution, put down socialist revolts throughout Germany, and crush separatism in Upper Silesia and then the Rhineland.

Freikorpsführer Leaders of the Freikorps units.

Freikorpskämpfer Member of a Freikorps unit.

Geimendewacht Communal Police.

Gm. Górny (Upper).

Grenzläufer Workers crossing border from Poland to work in Upper Silesia.

Grenzschutz Border defence force.

Gutsbezirke The manorial estates registered as the numerically smallest voting units in the plebiscite.

Heimatstreur Persons born in the country but living outside it.

H-K-T Society German nationalist, imperialist pressure group in the Prussian provinces before 1914.

Kaiserreich Term used to describe Imperial Germany 1871-1918.

Kapp Putsch Extreme political militarists' unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the German Government in March 1920.

KNP Komitet Narodowy Polski (Polish National Committee)

Kreis Small administrative district in Germany.

Kulturkampf The term used to describe Bismarck's attempt to forge a Prussian-German nationalism across the German Reich after 1871.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Laisser faire</strong></th>
<th>Government policy of non-intervention, especially over economic matters.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landkreis</strong></td>
<td>Rural district.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landrat</strong></td>
<td>Kreis administrator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landtag</strong></td>
<td>German provincial parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narodowa Demokracja</strong></td>
<td>The Polish National Democrat Movement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NRL</strong></td>
<td>Naczelna Rada Ludowa (Supreme National Council).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oberland</strong></td>
<td>Notorious Freikorps unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oberpräsident</strong></td>
<td>Provincial governor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oberburgermeister</strong></td>
<td>First mayor of a city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Orgesch</strong></td>
<td>Organisation Escherich. Local civil guards organised by Dr. Escherich into a reserve militia for the German Army. By 1921 almost all of the different types of civil guards had been incorporated into the Orgesch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outvoters</strong></td>
<td>Non-resident voters, born in Upper Silesia and entitled to vote in the plebiscite. Overwhelmingly German voters, they amounted to 16% of the total electorate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Papal Nuncio</strong></td>
<td>The Pope's representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PID</strong></td>
<td>Political Information Department (Foreign Office).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Politische Leitung</strong></td>
<td>The Committee of Twelve formed to represent German Silesian interests on the outbreak of the third insurrection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polska Obrona Górnolonska</strong></td>
<td>Defenders of Polish Upper Silesia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POW</strong></td>
<td>Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (Polish Military Organisation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PPS</strong></td>
<td>Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (Polish Socialist Party).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rathaus</strong></td>
<td>Town hall.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Abbreviations and Glossary
Regierungsbezirke  An administrative district.
Regierungspräsident  District governor.
Reichswehr  The name of the German Army between 1920 and 1934, when it became the Wehrmacht.
Schutzbund  see Deutscher Schutzbund.
Schutzpolizei  Protection police.
Sejm  Poland’s parliament.
Selbstschutz  German self-defence militia.
Sicherheitspolizei  Paramilitary security police.
Staatskommissar  State Commissioner.
Str.  Stary (Old).
Strumtruppen  Storm troopers.
Św.  Święty (Sacred).
Stosstruppen  Shock troops.
Vereinigte Verbände  United Associations (parts of the Schlesische Auschuss not incorporated in the German Plebiscite Commissariat).
Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft  Political Information Management Company. A front for a Government campaign organising tours and making material on the history, politics, economic problems and the need for an eastern frontier revision, available to foreign authors.
‘Zentralle’  Organisation established in Wrocław to direct Germany’s covert financial, political and military activities in Upper Silesia. Funded by the Reichszentrale für Heimatdienst which channeled Foreign Ministry money to it.
Zw.D  Zwiazec Demokratcji (Poland’s Democratic Union Party).

Abbreviations and Glossary
Introduction

In his 1928 publication *The Aftermath*, Winston Churchill dealt with the world crisis which developed after the World War had ended on the Western Front in November 1918. He devoted just two paragraphs to the disposal of Upper Silesia – an important industrial region held by Germany but claimed by the resurrected Polish state. After an interpretation of the events at the 1919 Peace Conference leading to the decision to consult Upper Silesia’s population, Churchill described the outcome as follows.

A plebiscite was eventually held in 1920 under the authority of British and French troops. While these were occupying the disputed zones and preparing for the voting, a violent incursion of Poles under one Korfanty, a former deputy of the Reichstag, was organised with the object of preventing the election... A sort of civil war broke out in which the British troops sympathised with the Germans and the French with the Poles.... However, law and good sense prevailed. The plebiscite was duly taken and a German majority of 6 to 4 declared itself.¹

The words may be clear but the statement is inaccurate in almost every respect. Since the plebiscite (held in March 1921), British historiography has perpetuated similarly inaccurate versions of the events that occurred. These mistakes have now permeated into other media. For example, speaking over emotive 1922 cinematic footage of Silesian refugees, the narrator of a recently transmitted BBC Television documentary series which has enjoyed world-wide distribution, informed viewers that:

Though they’d won the plebiscite, German speakers on part of the new Polish-German border were driven from their homes and the Poles took the territory anyway. To German eyes the Poles had seized what was rightfully German. The sense that they’d been robbed only added to German grievances.²
These are serious charges. Firstly, they are untrue: secondly, they affect the manner in which the general public perceives inter-war Poland: thirdly, they imply that the Second Polish Republic acquired part of Upper Silesia illegitimately, the corollary being that Germany's decision to invade Poland in 1939 and what followed was perhaps partly justified by Upper Silesia's partition. For, by then, as well as demanding the return of Gdansk (Danzig) and the 'Polish Corridor', Hitler was also claiming that 90% of Upper Silesians had voted for Germany in the 1921 plebiscite.

Seeking a means to satisfy the German public that their attack on Poland was justified, knowing their sensitivity to Upper Silesian issues (reinforced by 20 years of relentless Weimar and Third Reich propaganda), the Nazis chose to fabricate an incident on the Polish Silesian border at Gliwice (Gleiwitz) to launch the Second World War. In an interesting twist to history, 15 years after publishing *The Aftermath*, developments in that war led to Churchill's own involvement, along with Stalin and Roosevelt, in yet another partitioning of Central Europe. This time, however, there was no talk of plebiscites or self-determination and, in 1945, Poland's western boundary was shifted further west than even the most ardent Polish nationalist had dared to dream in 1918.

Frederick the Great acquired Prussia's Silesian provinces from the Habsburg Empire by force of arms in 1742. Both Silesia and the adjacent Duchy of Cieszyn (Teschen) had fallen into Habsburg hands in 1526 when the Bohemian estates elected Ferdinand I as their King. The Polish monarchy had renounced its overlordship of both territories in favour of Bohemia in 1335. By the time Prussia annexed Silesia; Lower Silesia had already been colonised by German-speakers. Frederick prized Lower Silesia, but he had no great regard for Upper Silesia, which he described as 'a ruined country, incapable of defence, whose inhabitants would never be loyal' - a comment acknowledging the significant ethnic differences between the two regions.

Introduction
However, the acquisition of Silesia was the making of Prussia. First, the income from Lower Silesia’s rich farmland augmented the meagre amounts of taxation derived from the sandy, forested lands of Brandenburg and East Prussia. Secondly, unforeseen by Frederick, Upper Silesia’s rich mineral resources were rapidly developed during the 19th century to provide the ‘iron’ for Bismarck’s ‘blood and iron’ policies, on which the Reich was forged.6

After the final partition of Poland in 1795, Prussia shared the great Silesian coalfield with Austria and Russia. There was similarly sustained industrial investment in and around Cieszyn (which the Habsburgs had retained in 1742). But in Dombrowa (in the Russian area of partition) after much initial development, for strategic reasons, further investment was progressively withheld. By 1914 the Russian mines and plant were old-fashioned and inefficient. It should also be noted that by the start of the twentieth century, the Ruhr had overtaken Silesia as Germany’s principal manufacturing region. The industrialists in Upper Silesia began looking east for new markets and in 1915, when the war against Russia turned in Germany’s favour, they were leading advocates for the annexation of Russian Poland.7

During Prussia’s stewardship of Upper Silesia, the land colonisation continued. By 1900 ethnic-German farmers occupied almost all of the Prince Hohenlohe’s land on the West Bank of the Oder - the meandering river whose course dominates the whole of Silesia. However, on the Oder’s east bank, almost all the rural and industrial land still remained firmly under the control of the Prince of Pless, the Donnersmarck dynasty, and other wealthy land-owning industrialists who could be counted among the wealthiest and most influential magnates of Europe.8 By 1910, Upper Silesia’s population was almost two million.9 The ethnic-German population, a high proportion of which was transient, was concentrated in the urban areas. These ethnic-Germans,
Map 1  Upper Silesia and the Partitioned Areas of Poland

Introduction
Photo 1: Conjunction of the Three Empires near Mysłowice
and also the ethnic-Germans who had migrated to the area on a permanent basis, were supplemented by Upper Silesians assimilated into the predominant German culture of the landowners, civil servants, administrators, and imported engineers and technicians. Like the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, assimilated German Silesians retained their Roman Catholic faith – which continued to mark them out from ethnic-Germans who were invariably Protestants. Because the Catholic Church retained its dominance in Upper Silesia, its clergy’s freedom to participate in the plebiscite campaign became a contentious political issue, casting the Vatican in the uncomfortable role of arbitrator.

Polish-speaking Upper Silesians predominated in the rural estates, villages and the communes located in and around the ‘industrial triangle’ and the south-east - see Map 2 (p.37). First industrialised when still under feudal bondage, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians were the miners, the lowest grade of industrial workers, and the workforce on the great estates. Two to three generations on, conscious of their exploitation by the German capitalists: reacting to the intensified German nationalism of the post-Bismarck era: many of these Upper Silesian miners and industrial workers started identifying their ‘Polishness’ rather than their ‘class’, as differentiating them from their ‘Prussian oppressors’. Encouraged by the success of the Polish movement in Poznania (Posen) and West Prussia (Polish provinces seized during the 18th century partitions), Upper Silesia’s indigenous Polish-speakers replicated these political and cultural organisations and formed parallel labour organisations to those established by German workers. The privations of war accelerated this trend. When the Kaiserreich crumbled in 1918, the Polish nationalists immediately demanded that Upper Silesia be incorporated in the new Poland, now rising phoenix-like from the ashes of the Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German Empires. This thesis examines the role Great Britain played in the Polish Silesians’ struggle to take their place in the Polish Republic.

Introduction
Over the past twenty years, there have been five English-language publications addressing various aspects of this topic. There have also been several other interesting articles published on related themes. All of these have been by scholars working in the United States. After 1945, probably because of the class-perspective inherent in the Polish-speaking Silesian worker's struggle, in Upper Silesia itself almost an entire publishing industry was built on events surrounding the plebiscite. Unfortunately, to date, none of the more reputable Polish accounts have been translated into English. That said, historians in the English-speaking world distrust works produced under the now-defunct socialist regimes. Conversely, during the Cold War, the Polish historians were trained not to trust any work undertaken by expatriate Poles or Americans. W.J. Rose's 1936 publication *The Drama of Upper Silesia* is the only English-language political history held in any great regard. Of the inter-war English-language works, by far the best factual account of the plebiscite campaign is Sara Wambaugh's *Plebiscites Since the World War*, published in 1933. The many British articles on Upper Silesia which were published around the time of the plebiscite deliberately reflect the British Government's point of view. The only published British inter-war military history of the plebiscite is a weak chapter in General J. E. Edmonds' *The Occupation of the Rhineland 1918-1929*. This was to be the final volume of the British official history of the First World War, but only 100 copies were printed on its completion in 1943.

Regarding British involvement in Upper Silesia. Apart from Patricia Gajda, who examined British Government policy towards the new Polish-German frontier, and co-authors Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, who have analysed Polish foreign policy over the same period (1919-1925), all other English-language works rely solely on the published British foreign policy documents. This thesis not only uses these documents plus the same extensive resources used by Gajda, Komarnicki
and Cienciala, it also cites British military documentation and many personal papers that were unavailable to them. Unlike this thesis, neither Gajda nor Cienciala and Komarnicki dealt exclusively with events in Upper Silesia. Nevertheless, this thesis has gained from both publications. The same can be said for Stewart Stehlin's work on relations between Germany and the Vatican, and of Richard Blanke's *Orphans of Versailles*. Of all recently published works, however, the thesis has derived greatest benefit from T. Hunt Tooley’s meticulously researched *National Identity and Weimar Germany*. Tooley’s authoritative German sources and his analysis, coupled with the many unpublished British documents introduced by this thesis, gives this work a much broader perspective around its core subject than any previous English-language work on the subject.

Apart from a brief chapter by Leśniewski in Peter Stachura’s *Poland Between The Wars*, there is no English-language narrative describing Britain’s involvement in Upper Silesia from the Armistice through to the hand-over of the territory in July 1922. This thesis goes some way towards rectifying this anomaly. In addition to documenting, analysing and explaining Britain’s role, the attitudes struck by British politicians, their officials, the press and the public towards the Polish Upper Silesians, the following work also narrates the progress of the plebiscite campaign and describes the tensions, often leading to crisis, that it generated within the Entente. Not least of these points of friction was Britain’s last minute withdrawal of its troops from the inter-Allied military force sent to Upper Silesia in January 1920. This left the force under-strength and greatly affected its response to challenges to the authority of the inter-Allied Commission sent to organise the plebiscite and administer the territory.

The sudden withdrawal of the British troops was due to the British Army’s difficulties in fulfilling its extensive post-war commitments. Apart from resuming its
normal Imperial duties, it had to contend with new and extensive territorial mandates in the Middle East, nationalism in Egypt and India, trouble in Ireland, a perceived revolutionary threat in mainland Britain, as well as the many plebiscite and garrison duties the Peace Conference had imposed on it. Its budget was under pressure and, initially, it had difficulty in finding recruits. This transition from war to peace was handled by the Secretary of State for War, Winston Churchill, the Army Council and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson. The manner in which they resisted the repeated demands for assistance in Upper Silesia is studied. The thesis also details the political background to the British forces' arrival prior to the plebiscite in March 1921: their work during the plebiscite: and their role in helping to terminate the third Polish insurrection, which broke out a few weeks later.

Whilst there were many other sources of Anglo-French friction (such as their differences over relations with Russia and divergent policies regarding Turkey and Greece), Upper Silesia was both literally and metaphorically at the centre of European economic and political affairs. Apart from Poland and Germany, many other countries had an interest in the plebiscite's outcome. This wider interest was enhanced when the League of Nations became involved in August 1921. But where previous studies have portrayed a deadlocked Supreme Council off-loading its Upper Silesian problem on to the League, this thesis demonstrates that League officials had lobbied the British and Italian governments for the referral. The focus of contemporary political observers, however, was on the corrosive effect that Upper Silesia was having on Anglo-French relations. As well as encapsulating irreconcilable differences over post-war relations with Germany, several of the outstanding issues that awaited settlement between the Entente and Berlin (such as reparations and disarmament) also impinged on the Upper Silesian question. This provided the German Cabinet with repeated opportunities to
exacerbate the friction existing between the British and the French – an avenue the
German Foreign Office exploited to the full.

Apart from the wider objectives outlined above; this thesis has two narrower,
specific objectives concerning the plebiscite itself. The first is the establishment and
promotion of a correct interpretation of the plebiscite vote. The second is a resolution
of the long-standing argument over how many non-residential voters, or ‘outvoters’,
participated in the plebiscite and their effect on its outcome. These objectives relate to
points made about British historiography at the start of this introduction. Admittedly,
Churchill’s mistake over the plebiscite date and his confusion over the sequence of
events surrounding it were extreme examples. But his and the BBC’s major error, the
assumption that Germany had won the plebiscite because the Germans had obtained
more votes than Poland, is commonplace in English-language histories discussing the
period. But this misapprehension should not be wholly ascribed to a laxity amongst
historians unfamiliar with the topic. Its roots extend back to the manner in which the
British and German governments chose to announce the plebiscite results in 1921.

The plebiscite was a means of establishing which of Upper Silesia’s communities
wanted to join Poland, and which of its communities favoured the status quo. A vote
was taken in 1,545 individual communities. After the voting, instead of presenting the
result by communes won or lost and their vitally important location, the British and
German leaders deliberately presented the result as a single constituency vote. This
was complicated by the arguments about the effect that between 150,000 to 191,000
overwhelmingly German, non-resident ‘outvoters’ had on the plebiscite. The Poles
claimed that the Germans had used these outvoters to win key marginal communes
‘targeted’ inside the industrial district. To establish the truth of this allegation and to
try to discover just how much influence the outvoters really had on the plebiscite’s

Introduction
outcome, the voting returns in each one of the 1,545 voting areas have been analysed and assessed – an exercise which has yielded surprising results. All the original statistics and data that were used can be found in the Addendum, Annex 1.

Finally, it is necessary to make two stylistic points regarding the following five chapters. For brevity, the term ‘Allies’ has almost always been used in preference to the correct but much longer ‘Allied and Associated Powers’. Secondly, place names have been given in Polish. On its first usage, a place name’s related Germanic name (the name used at this time) is included after the Polish place name. A list of all of the German-Polish place names used is included in the Addendum, Annex 2.
Introduction - Notes


2. BBC/WGBH Co-Production *Peoples Century 1900-1999*, Part 4 'Lost Peace', © BBC MCMXCV. The historical consultants were John Roberts and William H. McNeill.


8. J.G. Pounds *The Upper Silesia Industrial Region* (Indiana 1958) pp.11-12. This work gives an account of the geology of Upper Silesia and describes its industrial development.

9. Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since The War* Vol.1 (Washington 1933) p.211. The 1910 Prussian census recorded the population in the territory forming the 1921 plebiscite area as 1,921,000. Of this, a total of 1,248,000 were recorded as being Polish and 673,000 as German.

10. William John Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* (London 1936) p.27 and p.66. The peasants in Prussia were set free by von Stein in 1806. However, serfdom remained in place in Upper Silesia until 1848. The landlords who, along with the state, owned most of the mines and furnaces at this time, only lost the right to control the courts in 1850.


12. Some of the more recent Polish works whose translation would widen and enhance understanding of the events are Wacław Ryżewski's *Trzecie powstanie Śląskie* (Warsaw 1977): Mieczysław Wroza's *Powstanie dzia³ania zbranje w 1921* (Opole 1981): Jan Przewlocki's *Między- Sojusznicza Komisja Rządząca i Plebiscytowa Na Górnym Śląsku w Latach 1920-1922* (Katowice 1976): Jan Wyglenda (who was the insurgent leader 'Traugutt' who later lived in London)
Plebiscyt i powstania Śląskie (Opole 1966); and Aleksander Kwiatek's Spór o Kierunek Działań Narodowych Na Gornym Śląsku 1918-1921 (Opole 1991).


16. Peter Lesniewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-1921', Peter Stachura (ed.) Poland Between The Wars. This, of course, was based on the research that was being conducted for this thesis.
Chapter 1

The Peace Conference and
The First Polish Insurrection

President Woodrow Wilson’s ‘Fourteen Points’ were the key to the unlocking of Upper Silesia from Prussia and the German Reich. Wilson’s address to a joint session of Congress on 8 January 1918 amplified several points which Lloyd George had made three days earlier in a speech to a Trade Union Conference in London. Both leaders endorsed a peace based on national self-determination. Wilson’s thirteenth point particularly specified that

An independent Polish state should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.¹

The implication of a post-war settlement based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points was not lost on Germany’s political leaders. Gustav Stresemann, destined to become the Weimar regime’s most influential Foreign Minister, noted that they made the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, Upper Silesia, Posen and parts of East Prussia a possibility. He added that ‘the loss of the iron-works in Alsace-Lorraine and the coal mines in Upper Silesia would strike at the very vitals of our economic system’.² The basis for the claim for all Polish-populated areas in Eastern Germany made by the Paris-based Komitet Narodowy Polski (KNP), led by Roman Dmowski, was the Prussian census of 1910. Because it appeared irrefutable, the Polish claim went unquestioned by the Allied and Associated Powers. This endorsement was reinforced by the strength of Great Britain’s scepticism over Polish territorial claims elsewhere. In compiling the
census, the Prussians had ascribed nationality on the basis of religion and language spoken in the home. The statistical picture that had emerged was that of an overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Polish-speaking, Upper Silesia. But since German unification in 1870, the pressure on Polish-speakers to assimilate into the wider German culture, applied through avenues such as education, employment, military service and religion, had modified this picture somewhat. It was also true that in early 1918, loss of territory was the last thing being contemplated in Germany. On the contrary, most Germans were expecting victory to deliver large-scale territorial annexations in both Eastern and Western Europe and to provide them with many more overseas colonies.

On 3 March, Russia had signed the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. This had imposed conditions so extreme as to be without precedent. It signalled to France, Italy and Great Britain just what they could expect in the event of a Central Power victory. But despite the transfer of German divisions to the western front and Germany’s initial success in a final German offensive against the Entente, the advance soon faltered. Reinforced by thousands of fresh American troops arriving in France daily, the Allies reversed the German tide. The German Army began to disintegrate. Fearing total defeat and national humiliation, Ludendorff, the Chief of Staff, called on Hindenburg, Head of all the German Armies and the Minister for War, to demand an immediate armistice. At a special meeting at the Reichstag on 30 September 1918, the leaders of Germany’s political parties received the High Command’s news in a stunned silence. They and the German people had been lulled into believing all was well. Stresemann asked bitterly why the German people had been kept so persistently ignorant of the true state of affairs. Hurriedly reviewing Wilson’s Fourteen Points, they found the items relating to Poland acceptable only as a basis
for discussion. On 3 October, Prince Max, the new Chancellor, asked Ludendorff and Hindenburg for their opinions. From their reaction he concluded that neither had read Wilson’s statement. Hindenburg stated that, if necessary, the High Command were prepared to concede Alsace-Lorraine, ‘but that the surrender of German territory in the east was out of the question’.

In Allied political circles, especially in America, feelings were clearly against a negotiated peace. With this support behind him, Wilson proved unyielding and on 12 October the Germans were forced to accept the Fourteen Points. Just three days later, the leader of the Polish Upper Silesians, Wojciech Korfanty presented the national claims of the ‘Prussian Poles’ to the Reichstag. Henceforth, he declared, all Poles living in the Polish districts of Prussia would consider themselves citizens of a Polish state. The Polish deputies withdrew from the Reichstag and amidst the revolutionary fervour engulfing Germany, the Polish leaders organised a Provisional Diet of 1,500 delegates. The largest contingent came from Upper Silesia, the Prussian province with the greatest Polish population. Meeting in Poznań (Posen) between 3 to 6 December 1918, the Diet elected an eighty strong Naczelna Rada Ludowa (NRL) or ‘Supreme National Council’ with a small permanent executive. In Poznań and the other Polish districts in West Prussia, conflicts between the Poles and the newly established Soldiers’ and Workers’ Councils were avoided because Poles had generally won majorities in them. In fact, the Councils’ Praesidium in Poznań (The Soldiers’ and Workers’ Rada), consisted of two Poles and a German. By January 1919 all of these Councils had disintegrated.

This pattern of development had not been repeated in Upper Silesia where, rather than uniting the majority of the population against Germany, assimilation policies (such as Bismarck’s Kulturkampf, and those influenced by the populist (völkisch) nationalism which emerged during the 1890’s), had caused stratification of Upper Silesia’s social
culture and created a nationalist schism in its politics. Over 25 years, a tradition of separate national organisations developed. When Soldiers’ and Workers’ Councils were formed in Silesia, the Polish-speaking Silesians, who formed the vast bulk of the manual workforce, were excluded. Instead, they formed their own Polish Workers’ Councils - further enhancing that nationalist divide.

This chapter describes the socio-economic and political conditions existing in Upper Silesia at the end of the Great War. It outlines the British foreign policymaking process and explains why, after having decided to support Upper Silesia’s inclusion in a reconstituted Poland, the British leaders threw that decision over in favour of the German demands for a plebiscite. Although Polish relations with the Great Powers have already been analysed in depth by Kay Lundgreen-Nielson’s definitive work *The Polish Problem at the Paris Peace Conference*, nevertheless, the chapter focuses on several key decisions taken during these discussions which had an important bearing on the outcome of the plebiscite. Where appropriate, military and political developments occurring in both Germany and Poland are included. The chapter concludes by outlining the events in Upper Silesia which led to the First Polish Insurrection, the dangerous international political situation that it created, and describes the Allies’ belated response to it.

After the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, the German Government’s attempt to force national unification on the different nationalities and religions incorporated within the new Reich, accentuated long-standing differences between Poles and Germans. Reacting to German nationalism, Poles in the Prussian provinces cultivated their national identity. But the type of Polish nationalism that developed in Upper Silesia was of a quite different order to that which emerged amongst the Poles in the neighbouring agricultural province of Poznania. When the Prussians had seized Poznania and West Prussia during the 1793 – 1795 Polish partitions, it had absorbed a complete national homogeneous social grouping.
Polish landowners, land-owning peasants and a Polish intelligentsia. The Upper Silesia that Prussia had acquired from Austria fifty years earlier had been a backward, feudal society. During the region’s industrial expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries, the German landowners transformed the lives of their Upper Silesian serfs and peasants by forcing them into the mines they had opened to supply the raw materials for the foundries and blast furnaces - most of which they also owned. The industrialisation of most Upper Silesians not only engendered class-consciousness but provided them with an awareness of their existence as a nationality distinct from that of the German owners. This class-consciousness and patriotism eventually merged to find expression in a struggle which, the Germans claimed, other Polish nationalists were not slow to exploit. There were no indigenous landowners in Upper Silesia and the price that any Upper Silesian had to pay for even the slightest socio-economic advancement, was near total assimilation into the predominant German culture. The small Polish-speaking Silesian middle class that developed by the end of the 19th century was restricted mainly to law and journalism - professions given to politics. It was from their ranks, the lower echelons of the Catholic clergy and from the labour movement, that Upper Silesia’s Polish leaders emerged.

Despite growing solidarity amongst workers elsewhere in Europe, relations between the industrialised Polish Upper Silesians (who were generally employed in the mines) and the many assimilated German Upper Silesians (employed in the foundries and factories), were characterised by nationalist antipathy. It was strong enough to prevent the German Social Democratic Party (the largest working-class party in Europe), from making any real headway in Upper Silesia. Their failure was also partly due to the firm grip that the Catholic Centre Party had retained on all Upper Silesians workers before 1903 - when it had joined the German Government. The first Polish political party to emerge in Upper Silesia was the Prussian arm of the Polska Partia Socjalistyczna (PPS) founded in 1893.
It played an important role in encouraging the formation of separate Polish trade unions in Upper Silesia and forging links with Poles living in the Russian and Austrian areas of partitioned-Poland. In contrast, the agricultural region of Poznań was the stronghold of the Narodowa Demokracja (National Democrats) – the bitter opponents of the Polish socialist parties. Socialism was weak amongst both Poles and Germans in Poznania. But the National Democrats had nurtured Polish consciousness in Upper Silesia, therefore the socialists there accepted Poznań’s leadership in the joint struggle against the Germans.  

Before the Armistice was signed in the Forest of Compiegne on 11 November 1918, the Allies and Associated Powers had already recognised the National Democrat-controlled KNP as Poland’s official representatives. However, in the de facto free-Poland, comprising the unified ex-Russian and ex-Austrian partitions, one of the PPS’s founders, General Piłsudski, had become the temporary Chief of State and the Commander in Chief of Poland’s military forces. When Jędrzej Moraczewski succeeded in forming a socialist-led provisional Polish Government on 18 November 1918, this was recognised by the political parties throughout these ‘liberated’ areas of Poland, but not by the KNP in Paris or by Poles in Poznań and West Prussia. Poland therefore had two governments, one in Paris and another in Warsaw, neither recognising the other. And because the Armistice had left sovereignty over Upper Silesia and Prussia’s other Polish provinces in German hands until the outcome of the Peace Conference, when the Poles there elected the NRL (see above) in Poznań, this had created yet another centre of Polish political authority. 

In many ways Polish Upper Silesians were politically as well as geographically closer to the new independent Poland than they were to the National Democrat leadership in Poznan. But with the Allies assuming responsibility for establishing Poland’s frontier with Germany, including Upper Silesia, Piłsudski realised that there was little that Poland could usefully do until these decisions had been taken. On the other hand, Poland’s
eastern borders were undefined and the lands in turmoil. Possessing very few military resources, Polish volunteers had been forced to engage the Ukrainians in East Galicia and were fighting bands of Bolsheviks who were encroaching on the Polish populations in Belorussia and Lithuania. In the Duchy of Cieszen (in the ex-Austrian area of the Silesian coalfield), the government in Prague would soon overturn a local border agreement and spark a Polish-Czechoslovak conflict. These problems and the necessity to gain the recognition of the Allied Powers by achieving a workable relationship with his National Democrat rivals in Paris were pressing issues for Piłsudski to deal with. That said, he well knew that Germany would do everything in its power to retain Upper Silesia. Although political control over the Upper Silesian Poles ultimately rested in Poznań with the NRL, to meet any future military contingency, he encouraged the expansion of the Polska Organizacja Wojskowa (POW) across Upper Silesia. After an unpromising experience during the first Silesian Insurrection in August 1919, the Upper Silesian POW emerged as a formidable fighting force.17

As we have noted, Upper Silesia belonged to a few powerful landowners. They ran their huge estates at a profit, benefited from the mineral rights beneath them and owned much of the related industry. They were amongst the richest people in Europe and were well practised in influencing German domestic and foreign policy. That the monarchy had been toppled and that both Germany and Prussia were governed by two Rat der Volksbeauftragten (Councils of Peoples’ Commissars) composed of moderate and extreme socialists, did not diminish the Upper Silesian landed aristocracy’s influence. They found that the Commissars were also determined to minimise Germany’s territorial losses. But the severity of the Armistice terms, the speed with which the German Army re-established its superiority in the east, and the resilience of Prussia’s established order, were additional factors which helped boost the Upper Silesian landowners’ and
industrialists’ resolve to hold on to what they had. As for the Prussian military caste, to relinquish territory that Frederick the Great had acquired by conquest was deemed to be something utterly unthinkable. But apart from an inherent disparagement of everything Polish, the one extra factor which was of great psychological significance to Germany’s general commitment to retain Upper Silesia was that, unlike Poznania and West Prussia, it had not been part of partitioned Poland. British policymakers appreciated the likely strength of the German resistance. Circulating a paper to the Cabinet on the restoration of Poland in October 1918, Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, indicated just how difficult it would be to take the Silesian coalfields away from Germany. Agreeing that the region had been ‘ethnographically Polish from time immemorial’, nevertheless, he pointed out that since it ‘was of the utmost economic value to Germany’ they were unlikely to let it go very easily.18

What mattered most to Germany and its Central European neighbours were Upper Silesia’s coalmines. In addition to supplying the local furnaces, foundries and manufacturing plants, Upper Silesia had supplied around 23% of Germany’s pre-war coal requirements. All remaining production had been exported to neighbouring countries.19 Balfour suggested that it would take a ‘crushing defeat’ to tear Upper Silesia from their grasp.20 The Armistice spared the Germans from that scale of defeat. Thereafter, through that first winter of peace, the maintenance of Upper Silesian coal production became vital in holding Germany together in the face of Spartacist threats and separatist pressures. And later, as the Paris Peace Conference progressed, British and American economic experts become concerned that any loss of coal production there threatened the speed of Europe’s economic recovery. This ensured that threats to coal production and Germany’s pleading over the region’s future sovereignty vis-a-vis Allied demands for reparations, were taken seriously by Britain at least.

Chapter 1
Throughout Europe, the Armistice was accompanied by massive reductions in coal output. Apart from the retreating German Army’s deliberate destruction of coal mines on the Western Front and the war-time deterioration of the mines and mining equipment which had occurred everywhere, the main reason for the post-Armistice slump in coal output was a spate of industrial disputes in Britain and France. However, in the Ruhr, Upper Silesia and elsewhere in Germany, coal production had fallen throughout 1918. This had been due to the Allied blockade and its effect on the coal miners’ physical capacity. During 1918, Upper Silesian miners had been subsisting on about one third of the calories necessary per day. Although Upper Silesian miners’ wages had doubled since 1914, the price of food available at government-controlled prices had tripled. By 1918, the black market had undermined the regulated economy to such an extent that it had become the only source for many essential provisions – but at vastly increased cost. People were disillusioned and hungry, and respect for authority had deteriorated as the shortages had worsened. Officials responded to increasing urban unrest by tightening controls on the producers. Where they could, German peasants and farmers resisted by diverting even more of their produce to the black market. Apart from some food-relief operations in March 1919 which had been pressed for by Allied military officers sent to Germany after the Armistice, the Allied ‘hard liners’ took no immediate steps to lift the blockade. It was maintained until Germany ratified the Peace Treaty on 12 July 1919.

In Upper Silesia, strikes over the food shortages and the general living and working conditions had been breaking out since 1917. To many Silesians, promises about the abundant food supplies that would be freely available to them as members of the new, predominantly agricultural, independent Poland, must have been enticing. In a rare English-language description of events in Upper Silesia during this period, T. Hunt Tooley has described how in the light of the imminent Armistice and Wilson’s Fourteen
Points, the Prussian leadership suddenly became concerned about the low morale of the Upper Silesian population, especially the workers. As the war progressed and their enthusiasm waned, hard-pressed Upper Silesian workers had started to define themselves more precisely as hard-pressed ‘Polish’ workers. The civil authorities tried countering this growing tide of national awareness amongst Polish Silesian workers, by maintaining extensive surveillance and arresting anyone suspected of ‘agitation’. German managers also had the power of life and death over the workers. The war gave them the privilege of releasing workers to the army or recalling them from the trenches at will. One German historian has concluded that instead of nationalist motives, the hate Polish workers directed towards German managers during the plebiscite period might be more appropriately ascribed to the personal antipathy they had aroused during the war.  

Even before the Armistice was signed, the region’s industrial leaders and its administrators already anticipated some form of referendum on Upper Silesia’s future. They decided to run a campaign to convince both the local population and the Allies that, rather than Upper Silesia being a colonial adjunct to Prussia, it was in fact a fully-fledged, much-valued German province. Money was no object to the campaign. A central office was opened in Berlin followed by a campaign headquarters in Opole – the administrative centre of the area. Within a few weeks it had established itself across the region. But those attracted to the campaign were the old Pan-German colonisers and the ‘Hakatist’ nationalists, active with their own divisive messages since before the turn of the century. Along with Silesia’s aristocratic landowners who also joined the campaign, membership therefore reflected the nationalist, authoritarian views of the ethnic-Germans. And as monarchists, most of the campaigners only reluctantly acknowledged the legitimacy of the National Government in Berlin. Tooley implies that it was perhaps a mistake to involve such conservative and reactionary opinion because it robbed the campaign ‘of
influence over 60 percent of the people’ in Upper Silesia. But apart from the fact that these were bound to be the very people attracted to such a campaign, if his figures are correct, then they illustrate that one third of Upper Silesia’s population was already committed to an extreme pro-German viewpoint. Other German-supporting Upper Silesians, alarmed at ‘the Polish danger’, took a different route by supporting a growing demand for Upper Silesia’s independence. The people following this ‘separatist’ path were mainly the assimilated German Upper Silesians forming the majority of ‘Germans’ in Upper Silesia. Though assimilated, they retained their Catholic faith and had, therefore, continued experiencing some discrimination from the predominantly Protestant ethnic-Germans. Fearing that the socialist-dominated governments in Berlin might introduce anti-clerical measures, at this very early point in the developing saga of Upper Silesia, the Catholic Church and the Centre Party were also supporting the independence campaign – which was seen as essentially a temporary manoeuvre to avoid annexation by Poland.23

With the Armistice signed, the Polish Silesian miners’ strike grew in strength, and spread to many other mines. Examining the situation in late November 1918, the German Government concluded that Upper Silesian coal was of such vital importance that it was essential that the authorities maintain order there. Previously, it had taken the threat of military force or the use of military force to end the war-time strikes in Upper Silesia, but both the German and Prussian governments had few disciplined troops at their disposal. When the Majority Socialists suggested a paramilitary Heimatwehr (Homeland Defence Force) be recruited to force the miners back to work and secure the Polish border, the Independent Socialists in the government raised the twin spectres of reaction and counter-revolution and turned it down. In a bid to maintain administrative cohesion and continuity within Silesia’s civil administration, the Prussian Government disregarded Centre Party and their own socialist supporters’ demands for reform there, and left its ‘political’ office

Chapter 1
holders in place. Previously, these senior posts, such as *Oberpräsident* (provincial governor), the *Regierungspräsident* (district administrators), down to the *Kreis* administrators (*Landrat*), had been given out to Prussian officials subject to the monarchy’s approval. Officials filling these posts were, therefore, closely associated with the old regime’s authoritarian and discriminatory policies. With no pressure on them to change, local officials continued practising these methods and were wholly involved in the industrialists’ and landowners’ campaign to save Upper Silesia. The first violent post-Armistice clampdown on the Silesian workers occurred when the civil authorities took pre-emptive action after full-scale fighting broke out between Poles and Germans in Poznan and West Prussia. The catalyst was an unexpected, unscheduled visit by the world-famous Polish patriot, Ignacy Paderewski, to Poznań on 26 December 1918.

Paderewski had arrived in Poznań in the company of three members of a British fact-finding mission *en route* to Warsaw. Though unofficial, it was the very first Allied mission to arrive in Poland at the end of the war. It was clear to London that there had to be some form of conciliation between the KNP (who had already sent a representative to Warsaw) and Piłsudski. During the war British and American politicians and officials had found the KNP a convenient body to deal with on most Polish matters (especially in raising a Polish Army) but only the French had accorded it ‘Government-in Exile’ status. However, the re-establishment of the Polish Republic and emergence of Piłsudski had cut the ground from under the KNP’s feet. Some KNP members were portraying Piłsudski as a pro-German collaborator, hanging on to power by throwing in his lot with the Bolsheviks. However, the Foreign Office had reason to distrust information supplied by Dmowski and the KNP and decided to send a small mission to Poland to establish the facts.
Led by Lieutenant Colonel H.H. Wade, British Military Attaché in Copenhagen, the mission was instigated by Esme Howard who as British Minister in Sweden had kept a watching brief on Poland. He was in London preparing to attend the peace conference in Paris and he nominated Wade to lead the Mission. Two naval officers were detailed to accompany Wade. His orders were ‘to proceed to Poznań and there await the arrival of Messrs Kimens and Kenney’, two experienced Foreign Office officials travelling via Berne. Wade and his party were to be picked up in Copenhagen by the destroyer HMS Concord and taken to Gdansk (Danzig). But shortly before the Concord was due to depart from London, at Balfour’s request, it was delayed until Paderewski and his wife could join it to sail, in Paderewski’s words, ‘to unite Polish hearts’.  

A world famous concert pianist, Paderewski was probably the only Polish patriot known to members of Britain’s governing circle. He had spent the war fund-raising and publicising the Polish cause in the United States. Though not a National Democrat, his wartime work led to a close association with Roman Dmowski. On receiving news of the Armistice he left America and sailed directly to France, meeting Dmowski in Paris. After spending a few days discussing the Polish situation, Paderewski then travelled to London where he met Balfour, a friend of long-standing. The available evidence indicates that Paderewski hoped to gain a passage to Gdansk to visit Pilsudski in Warsaw. At this time, it was the Royal Navy who conducted all the Allied movements around the Baltic. He probably discussed his proposals with the British Foreign Secretary who told him about Wade’s fact-finding mission. Since conciliation between the Poles was also a British aim, Balfour arranged for Paderewski to travel with Wade to Gdansk. At Spa, the British members of the Allied Armistice Commission advised the Germans that Paderewski would be travelling directly to Warsaw from Gdansk. All previous work on this subject has assumed that Paderewski’s original itinerary was to be via Poznań – a very indirect
route for someone in a hurry. When HMS Concord docked at Gdansk on Christmas Day, Korfanty and several other prominent National Democrats from Poznań were there to meet Paderewski. Despite German objections, Wade insisted on Paderewski’s party accompanying him to Poznań. On such decisions history turns.

Arriving in Poznań on the evening of 26 December, Wade’s party found the town decorated with Polish and Allied flags. Crowds of Poles lining their route from the station to their hotel received them ‘with extraordinary enthusiasm’. Unlike Upper Silesia, where the ‘old-guard’ administrators and officials had remained, in Poznania and in parts of West Prussia, the Poles by now controlled most areas of local administration. Realising that the Poles were a majority across all classes there and that they, as a government, had few other options available, Berlin avoided taking measures against them – much to the disgust of recently formed Volksräte (German National Committees) and local leaders of pre-war nationalist organisations such as the Deutscher Ostmarkenverein (German Eastern Marches Association). These organisations joined to launch a campaign to retain Poznania and West Prussia as part of Germany. Encouraged by the arrival of a volunteer Grenzschutz (Border Defence Force) sent to secure the Polish frontier, on 27 December, about 200 armed German civilians tore down all the Allied flags flying in Poznań and besieged Paderewski’s hotel. They attempted to destroy Poznań’s NRL headquarters and rob a Polish bank. As light faded they started firing at random – Paderewski’s room was hit by four bullets. The following day the Polish militia occupied the whole town. As the fighting quickly spread throughout Poznania and parts of West Prussia Korfanty, who was now the NRL’s Minister for War, helped to forge the different Polish paramilitary units into the Poznań Army. The Allies finally forced a cease-fire on both parties in February 1919, leaving most of Poznania and parts of West Prussia in Polish hands.
Whilst Poles were making rapid military progress in Poznania and West Prussia, fearing a similar rising in Upper Silesia, the authorities cleared the way for an immediate clampdown on the striking miners and any related Polish nationalist activity. The check on government-sponsored counter-revolutionary measures had been removed by the three Independent Socialists resigning from the National Government on 27 December 1918 (the day the fighting broke out in Poznań). Three more Majority Socialists replaced the Independents. One was Gustav Noske who was appointed Minister of Defence. Noske was especially forceful about supporting the recruitment of paramilitary volunteer units. On reminding his colleagues that areas taken by the Poles in the east would deprive Germany of coal and food, they quickly agreed to the local recruitment of a Grenzschutz force in Upper Silesia, measures to revitalise the regular Army, and gave retrospective approval to the volunteer paramilitary Freikorps units already formed by the Army's High Command.

After the Freikorps units had snuffed-out the Spartacist threat in Berlin (10 – 17 January 1919), they and all other available disciplined Army units were sent to secure Germany's eastern frontiers. The Army’s General Headquarters also moved from Cassell to Kolobrzeg (Kolberg) on the Baltic coast. Special military commands were established and troops from the west were augmented by local enlistment. Many younger members of the pool of dispossessed and discontented ‘Baltic Germans’, who had retreated into the region from Russia’s Baltic provinces, now joined the new Freikorps formations. These units were particularly attractive to discharged junior officers and young Germans filled with heroic tales about the self-sacrificing Sturmtruppen battalions - whose spirit these Freikorps units claimed to emulate. Orders were issued from Berlin to use all available military and paramilitary forces to end the Upper Silesian strike movement. Martial law was imposed throughout the industrial area, including the Pszczyna (Pless) and Rybnik.
districts, public meetings were banned and military courts were established to sentence the offenders. It was also announced that any activity aiming at the secession of Upper Silesia from Germany would be treated as high treason. For both Polish and German industrial workers as well as the Polish peasants in the area, these proclamations and the choice of Otto Horsing as Staatkommissar (State Commissioner) to implement these measures, signalled the start of an unprecedented repression. In response, the Upper Silesian arm of the NRL, which was headed by a committee of four prominent Poles, including Korfanty, extended their activities across Upper Silesia. They called for a boycott of Germany’s National Assembly elections due to be held on 19 January, and sent representatives to Paris to lobby the Peace Conference delegates about the inclusion of Upper Silesia in the new Polish State.

When the Peace Conference eventually began, the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, his successor, George Curzon, and the Permanent Under-Secretary, Charles Hardinge, headed the Foreign Office’s hierarchical structure. There were also two highly influential Assistant Under-Secretaries, William Tyrrell and Eyre Crowe - the latter closely involved with developments over Upper Silesia. Prior to the implementation of the Peace Treaty in January 1920, matters pertaining to Upper Silesia were dealt with by the Peace Conference. After this, they were handled in London by the Foreign Office’s Central office headed by S.P. Waterlow. Though the functions of the Foreign Office had been expanded during the war, in terms of influence, by 1919 it was a much-diminished institution. The pre-war criticism of the Foreign Office’s role and the competence of its officials had intensified during the war. By the Armistice, demands of critics such as the Union of Democratic Control [of foreign policy] were common currency amongst League of Nations supporters and organised labour. However, by this time, the Foreign Office’s
influence over British foreign policy had been usurped by the organisational demands of total warfare. 42

This decline in influence had occurred with the appointment of Lloyd George’s Coalition Government in December 1916. Seeking a speedy decision-making process, Lloyd George had adopted a presidential style of government by appointing a small War Cabinet comprising ministers without departmental responsibilities. 43 Thus the Foreign Secretary was excluded and his department lost its role as the Cabinet’s leading foreign policy advisor. Compounding this, Lloyd George gathered a team of personal advisors together who not only recommended policies to the Prime Minister but also executed them on his behalf - sometimes over the heads of the responsible departmental ministers. His chief foreign policy advisor was Philip Kerr, the former editor of the quarterly review, ‘Round Table’. 44 Known as Lloyd George’s ‘Garden Suburb’ because they worked in temporary accommodation erected in the garden of 10 Downing Street, these advisors reported to the Prime Minister through the Cabinet Secretariat. 45 This department had evolved under Lloyd George’s predecessor and its function was to centralise prime ministerial control over the administration. It was headed by Maurice Hankey – a gifted administrator but a person never slow in advancing his own foreign policy initiatives to the Prime Minister.

Capping the changes had been the appointment of Balfour as Foreign Secretary. Testimonies to Balfour’s charisma abound, but his contemporaries often alluded to his lack of application. And, whilst his relationship with Lloyd George appears to have been one of mutual respect, it is generally accepted that the partnership only worked because Balfour allowed Lloyd George a free hand with foreign affairs. This was a practice Lloyd George subsequently continued – much to the annoyance of Balfour’s successor. In his biography of Curzon, Leonard Moseley records that the new Foreign Secretary believed
that Balfour had been ‘the worst and most dangerous of the British Foreign Ministers’ for having allowed himself ‘to be displaced in Paris and pushed aside’. Lloyd George’s aversion to diplomats and experts, the Balfour-Lloyd George relationship, and a belief in his own infallibility, goes some way towards explaining his domination of the Peace Conference. It also helps to explain his many foreign policy failures in his remaining three years of power after it. Reviewing British foreign policy shortly after Lloyd George had resigned in 1922, one well-informed commentator observed that in his time as Prime Minister, Lloyd George had taken the country from a position of acknowledged world leadership in 1919 to near complete isolation. This had been brought about by the deep and widespread distrust of Great Britain engendered amongst other countries:

Of that distrust Mr Lloyd George had become the occasion and the chief object abroad, because foreign countries, to whom at that juncture British foreign policy mattered so immensely, were quick to perceive that it was essentially Mr. Lloyd George’s policy, and for its perplexing and alarming instability they learned, not without reason, to fasten responsibility upon him personally rather than upon the minister nominally in charge of the British Foreign Office.

One country which suffered greatly from Lloyd George’s ‘perplexing instability’ was Poland. Once they arrived in Paris, the ease with which the British Prime Minister could be persuaded to throw-over a policy, saw the early British support for a ‘Greater Poland’ scrapped. Lloyd George’s personal raft of anti-Polish prejudices bolstered by the German campaign to undermine the Polish claims to Upper Silesia, helped British advocates of a ‘Small Poland’ convince him that the German and Russian hostility towards Poland would be minimised by ensuring a homogenous Polish population.

The ‘Small Poland’ group within the British Delegation was headed by James Headlam Morley, Assistant Director of the Foreign Office’s new Political Information
Department (PID). The PID consisted of academic experts, temporarily recruited to co-ordinate and analyse the mass of political intelligence that had flowed into the Foreign Office during the war. Many of these temporary officials had studied in Germany and some made an important contribution towards shaping British post-war attitudes towards Poland. Headlam Morley had been a permanent official with the Education Department whose interest in European history earned him a reputation as an expert on Germany. While the Foreign Office’s most senior officials continued to be marginalised at the Peace Conference, Headlam Morley’s determination to influence British policy led him to strike up a good working relationship with Philip Kerr. As the Conference progressed and the decision-making process gradually degenerated into a series of conversations between Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson, the British Prime Minister increasingly relied on Hankey and Kerr for foreign policy advice with Headlam Morley as his advisor on German territorial questions. Kerr had no inhibitions about accepting the PID experts’ backdoor advice, especially where their views reinforced his own. In fact, by filtering the PID experts’ views and feeding them and his own to the Prime Minister, Headlam Morley ensured that nobody influenced the outcome of the Peace Conference for Poland more than he did. He laid the political ground work for the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, pushed for ‘free-city’ status for Gdansk and helped to initiate and draft the much-resented minorities treaty, designed to protect Poland’s Jewish minority populations.

Kerr had a particular affinity with the views of the PID’s Central European expert, Lewis Namier. This was despite Namier’s inability to provide an objective assessment in any report dealing with Polish affairs. For example, on first exchanging a series of letters with Kerr in 1917, Namier stressed the danger of British Government contacts with ‘Dmowski and his whole Polish Black Hundred Crew’. A recently naturalised British citizen, Ludwik Niemirowski was the son of prosperous Polonised Jewish land owning
parents, living in Poland, on the Russian-Austrian line of partition. After study in Europe and America and making a mark as a student in Oxford, Namier was recommended by friends working in wartime intelligence agencies as an advisor on Polish affairs. Though he had a formidable intellect he was perhaps not suited for this role. He was suspicious of Polish ambitions regarding the re-establishment of their state, yet he supported Ukrainian independence and was an avid Zionist. His convictions caused problems. Paul Latawski claims that Namier’s repeated clashes with Dmowski did lasting damage to Anglo-Polish relations. He was not included in the British Delegation to Paris in case the French objected to his presence. Nevertheless, Headlam Morley, who knew all Namier’s faults, believed him to be the ablest of all the PID experts. Just a few days after he arrived in Paris, Headlam Morley wrote to Kerr:

I agreed before I came across that Namier should correspond with me about the Polish question. As you know he is not altogether persona grata, and it is I think increasingly difficult for him to get a hearing; on the other hand I am sure that his knowledge and his point of view deserves attention. I am, at his request, sending you privately and unofficially, some of the letters and papers which I have received from him.

He continued to do so, sometimes editing out Namier’s most outrageous anti-Polish remarks. Later, Headlam Morley arranged for Namier to travel to Paris to help draft the minorities treaty. What Headlam Morley probably did not know was that, in addition to bypassing his superiors in London to communicate directly with him, Namier sometimes bypassed Headlam Morley as well and sent material directly to Kerr. Namier’s views on Poland were well-received by some of the other officials - the Russian and East European experts in particular. With Kerr and the Prime Minister increasingly turning to Headlam Morley for their ‘Small Poland’ ideas and arguments, Namier’s distrust of the Poles
permeated and then came to dominate Britain’s policies towards Poland. During the Peace Conference, one of Namier’s early targets was Paderewski and the reconciliation achieved between the KNP in Paris and Warsaw.

Paderewski had arrived in Warsaw on 1 January. Two weeks later he agreed to form a coalition government. Because of his acceptability at international level, he also acted as Poland’s Foreign Minister, with Dmowski and the KNP continuing to represent the Poles at the Peace Conference. Constituent Assembly elections were held in Poland on 26 January but no party gained an overall majority. Paderewski’s appointment was welcomed and Allied recognition of the Polish Government quickly followed. But the Wade-Paderewski escapade in Poznań had not been well received in London. In fact, Wade had escaped immediate recall only because London believed that the popular acclaim surrounding his arrival in Warsaw had given him a political significance favourable to Britain. Wade’s initial despatches attracted favourable comment by some Foreign Office officials. But once the military intelligence officers began pouring cold water over his assessment of Poland’s precarious military position, until his removal in March 1919, he was cruelly portrayed as a dupe of the Poles and his (highly accurate) information was generally disregarded.62

This fate was also visited on Esme Howard who arrived in Warsaw on 12 February as the British representative with the Peace Conference’s inter-Allied Commission investigating the conditions in Poland. On the day that the Commission had left Paris, writing to Namier, Headlam Morley noted that since arriving in Paris, Howard had been coming under Polish influence.63 Howard’s despatches from Warsaw not only confirmed Wade’s reports but one of his first letters to Balfour warned him that the Poles in Upper Silesia ‘are desirous of taking the government into their hands...especially in view of the depredations committed by German voluntary bands’.64 When the Commission arrived in

Chapter 1
Poznań on 1 March, Howard noted that the German military forces deployed around the area appeared to be preparing to attack Poland. The Commission’s French President also reported to Paris that the German High Command understood that the Allies were in a hurry to disarm and would therefore not send troops to Poland. He believed that the German High Command intended provoking a wider Polish rising in the East, thus giving the Germans a pretext to resume military operations and evade decisions taken in Paris regarding Prussia’s Polish provinces. Howard himself predicted that this provocation would take the form of arbitrary arrests and requisitioning in Upper Silesia and parts of West Prussia. Before leaving Poznań the Commission therefore urged Korfianty to do all he could to stop the Polish inhabitants of these districts rising to the German bait.

The members of the British Delegation in Paris treated Howard’s warnings with great scepticism. Headlam Morley told Namier that ‘the members of the Mission have all become pure Poles’. In fairness to the sceptics, although the inter-Allied Commission comprised experienced diplomats, they were being ushered around the region by Polish diplomats and almost all of their reports were derived solely from Polish sources. Crowe nevertheless agreed that the Germans had ‘no ground for apprehending that either British or American, or even French troops would resume hostilities’; and he predicted that ‘the longer the settlement is delayed, the greater will be the danger that Germany will not sign’. The Polish Delegation in Paris had also been acutely conscious of the detrimental effect that any Upper Silesian rising would have on their image at the Peace Conference. The Polish Army’s advance against the Ukrainians in Galicia and the fighting that had broken out between Poles and Czechs in Cieszyn, had caused the Conference to issue a warning on 24 January that henceforth, any acquisition of territory by force would prejudice that country’s other claims.
By March 1919, despite an Allied-imposed ‘cease-fire’, Poznanian Poles were defending themselves from German bombardments and infiltrators and were unable to redirect resources to Upper Silesia. In Warsaw, meanwhile, the Polish Government was well aware that an uprising in Upper Silesia could lead to war with Germany – something for which they were both militarily and politically unprepared. In response to the Polish leadership’s pressure to not give the Germans cause to act further, Upper Silesia’s Polish nationalists resisted the temptation of a ‘Poznań type solution’. In this, the preponderant influence was Korfanty. He was well-supported by the Polish Trade Unions whose leaders tried, where possible, to quash agitation and prevent strikes. Learning that an armed insurrection was due to take place on 22 April, Korfanty persuaded its organisers, an Upper Silesian branch of the POW, to abandon it. As the leader of the Poles, however, Korfanty’s actions at this time, later cost him credibility amongst the more forceful Polish elements in Upper Silesia. W.J. Rose records that some groups would blame Korfanty’s faith in diplomacy for the suffering which Upper Silesia experienced between 1919 and 1921. This was because this period of relative calm in early 1919 permitted the German Army to re-establish itself in the region and eventually deploy nearly 350,000 troops along the Polish border. As a result of the Polish Silesians’ self-discipline, the external political pressure, Korfanty’s policing, and the gradual deployment of German forces in the area, by April 1919 Upper Silesia had momentarily ceased being a territorial problem worth mentioning to Paris.

But persuading the Polish Silesians to await the Peace Conference’s decision entailed reassuring them that there would be a speedy fulfilment of Upper Silesia’s unification with Poland. Such reassurances could only come from the progress being made in Paris, where a sub-committee of the Conference’s Polish Commission had started to draw up the new Polish-German frontier. Unlike anywhere else on Germany’s
Map 2 Upper Silesian Plebiscite Area 1920-1922

Chapter 1
eastern frontiers, unanimity had prevailed amongst the Allies on the amount of Upper Silesian territory to be transferred to Poland. This was based on a proposed 'British line' following the existing administrative lines east of the river Oder and taking in some territory on its west bank. H.J. Paton, the British Delegation’s ethnographic expert, attended the sub-committee’s first meeting on 3 March. He later explained that the sub-committee started their work on Germany’s new eastern frontier with the line through Upper Silesia. The line had already been agreed with the American experts. But the experts became over-generous to Poland. Spurred on by the French representative, General Henri Le Rond, who wanted to establish a strategic frontier some distance away from the industrial area (all of which they had awarded to Poland), the new border edged further and further into Germany. Having identified areas with clear Polish majorities, the experts rounded these upwards by accommodating natural features such as rivers and lakes, and then, bit by bit, they started incorporating adjacent transport infrastructure and any territory deemed strategically essential to Poland – all this from areas with populations which were wholly German. Though there was no official Polish participation in the sub-committee’s decision, the Polish Delegation must have acquiesced to the proposal to transfer this additional territory. This was a mistake. The injustice of it further fired the Germans’ resistance within Upper Silesia and provided much emotive and statistical ammunition, all of which they used to good advantage, ultimately undermining the outcome for Poland.

Whilst the German militarists in the east were preparing to salvage their Polish provinces by armed resistance, the German Foreign Office had began pursuing the same objective by diplomatic means. Unscathed by the war’s outcome and the revolution, the German Foreign Office and its propaganda network were working non-stop in an attempt to lessen the political and material impact of Germany’s military defeat. Expecting
negotiations to take place at some point during the peace process, it established a special section to prepare its Peace Conference delegates on all of the subjects that might arise in Paris. Three documents were prepared on Upper Silesia. One stated Germany’s historic claim, another its economic claim, and yet another claimed to provide evidence of Polish attempts to annex the region since the Peace Conference had got underway. The Paxkonference documents were for internal use, but they are interesting because not only do they underpin the philosophy behind the German counter-proposals but also reveal the fundamentally different expectations of the Germans from the Allies on how the peace would be concluded. One memorandum set out the general principles based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points by which all Allied claims were to be judged. Addressing Wilson’s Thirteenth Point, an independent Polish state, instructions to plenipotentiaries advised them to assert that:

It would be unjustifiable to include West Prussia and Upper Silesia, because in that case East Prussia would be severed from the Reich, and because the possession of Upper Silesia, which produces 22 per cent of Germany’s coal, is indispensable to the life of Germany.

Even Poznania’s transfer should not be accepted without a fight. A memorandum on this suggested several pre-conditions; each bearing a remarkable resemblance to the tests later applied in Upper Silesia. These included holding a plebiscite after the peace had been concluded, voting by communes and permitting ex-residents to return to vote. As the Conference progressed and differences between the Allies became public, they kindled further German hopes for an easing of the peace terms. Remarking on Allied divergences over Gdansk and West Prussia, one German diplomat observed that delimiting Poland’s frontiers was one of the most contested issues before the Peace Conference. He did not know how far the Allies had responded to Polish claims to Upper Silesia, but he gained
the impression that should an attempt be made to separate it from Germany, it would be dropped if it encountered German resistance. This is exactly what occurred within the British Delegation when Germany indicated that it would resist the Draft Peace Terms handed over on 7 May.

With the cessation of hostilities there had been a move amongst British experts in the PID towards adopting a more sympathetic approach towards Germany. It was fuelled by a belief that the Allies should regard Germany as having turned over a new leaf and that they should support its Republican government in its fight against the Spartacists. One sought-after measure was the lifting of the blockade and the despatch of food relief. But, at this point, these were sentiments that were not yet widely supported by the British public. Following the post-Armistice general election in Britain, the Conservatives, who took a hard line on how Republican Germany should to be handled, dominated the winning Lloyd George coalition. This meant that gestures of support towards a socialist government in Berlin were out of the question - sentiments echoed by the Conservatives’ counterparts in the General Staff. Although the PID experts and others seeking a more compassionate line towards Germany were initially disappointed over this, nevertheless, accounts of food shortages and chaotic conditions within Germany soon caused the Allied Military Intelligence Services to send a number of officers to survey conditions inside Germany, including Upper Silesia. Though aspects of their reports were greatly flawed, they were used by moderates such as Headlam Morley to argue for much more circumspect treatment for Germany, and to challenge existing policies such as the need for a ‘Greater Poland’. It was probably his warnings based on these reports which alerted Lloyd George to the real possibility of creating a revanchist German State.

The primary objective of the missions into Germany was to investigate economic conditions and food shortages, but the officers also carefully recorded material on the
military and political situation inside Germany. Although the missions gave the Allies an opportunity to gather political intelligence, because they were conducted under the auspices of the German Foreign Office and the military authorities, they provided its unreconstructed bureaucracy and the militarists with a conduit leading directly to the Peace Conference. Therefore, whilst at best the missions could gather some political intelligence, more often than not these reports simply relayed crude propaganda designed to exploit Allied differences, back to Paris.

The first report from Upper Silesia came from two members of a United States mission who spent 24 hours there in mid-February. They found conditions there to be worse than anywhere in Germany. The faces of the workers are haggard. The women and children are pitiably emaciated. Although snow was lying on the ground…twenty five per cent of the women and children were on the streets barefoot.

In his preliminary report for the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Major Knyvett, who headed a three-man mission to Silesia between 23 and 31 March, also found that the population was underfed, under-clothed, badly housed and subjected to ‘continuous Bolshevistic propaganda’. In his full report, Knyvett noted ‘the lack of morale among the mining and industrial workmen’. A civilian administrator explained that despite the commencement of Allied food relief deliveries to Germany, the National Government would not forward any to them because the region was now relatively quiet compared to the other provinces in Germany.

Contrasting with the picture of latent anarchy, starvation and fears of a Polish invasion that he had painted about many other aspects of civilian life there, Knyvett’s assessment of the German military authorities in Silesia (VI Army Corps) was much more positive. Convinced of the military authorities’ goodwill towards the Entente, he
claimed that they were anxious that an Allied Military Commission be sent to Wrocław (Breslau) ‘to join hands with them in their anti-Bolshevik efforts’. And with regard to the antagonism which existed between the local administration and Berlin, he reported that the former believed that ‘Berlin was utterly out of touch with the immediate local conditions’. He also noted how the military officers used every opportunity to attack the Berlin ‘socialists’ and their inability to govern the country. A later observation by J.H. Morgan that ‘while the Republicans were in office, the Nationalists were in power’, may have had far more applicability in Silesia than Berlin.

Apart from their military missions, there was no Allied diplomatic representation in Germany until the Peace Treaty’s implementation on 10 January 1920. To overcome their isolation, Germans utilised Allied embassies and legations in neighbouring states to route their views to the Peace Conference. In early March, Prince Henry of Pless, one of Upper Silesia’s richest land-owning industrialists, contacted Cecil Gosling, the British Minister in Prague, wanting to know the British Government’s likely reaction to ‘a movement among socialists and working classes of Silesia to declare their independence of Germany’. Pless claimed that this would save the region from Bolshevism and increase coal production. It had been the Czech President, T.G. Masaryk, who had referred him to Gosling. In a separate interview, Masaryk told Gosling that the Czechs favoured the idea but he went on to emphasise that the Czechoslovak Government ‘should not take any active part in the movement because it would arouse the resentment of the Poles who formed the majority of the population in the Eastern Kreise’. A joint Czechoslovak-Polish Committee meeting in Paris on 1 April, rather naturally decided to discourage the idea.

Many other unsolicited documents arrived in Paris from ‘German Sources’. For example, some documents contested the findings of the 1910 Prussian census, others
argued that possession of the Silesian coal field was vital to enable Germany resist Bolshevism. As Knyvett’s reports confirm, at this time all sides in the region generally labelled their opponents ‘Bolshevistic’. The only Polish threat Germans were admitting to in Upper Silesia was an external one. This was demonstrated by a German academics’ petition sent from Wrocław University and the city’s Technical College. Generally, these unsolicited communications arrived via DMI officers attached to the British Delegation. General von Hammerstein, the leader of the German representatives at Spa, handed this one to General Haking, the Armistice Commission’s senior British officer. The Armistice Commission at Spa was yet another route by which German views were transmitted to Paris. The academics’ petition rehearsed many arguments used in the German response to the Draft Peace Terms. It explained that Upper Silesians were ignorant of Poland’s history and its language. Apart from German, the language in which all school lessons had been conducted there since 1871, they only spoke Wasserpolnisch (Water Polish). They described this as a dialect comprising Polish and German words. It was non-literary and undocumented; therefore it could not signify ‘nationality’. They further argued that it was only through undisturbed union with Germany that ‘Silesia’s treasures’ could remain available for all its peoples. Polish nationalism was ascribed to Upper Silesia’s rapid industrialisation. This, explained the petitioners, had attracted ‘outsiders’ to the region. These ‘outsiders’ had inculcated a minority of native Silesians with Pan-Polish ideas. They appealed to the Allies to keep Silesia undivided and part of Germany and Prussia. 

The Armistice Commission, the Foreign Office’s diplomatic services, the PID, the DMI and the War Office’s military missions sent into Germany are a few examples of the means by which the British Delegation in Paris gathered information on Upper Silesia. It was also supplied by British military missions located in Paris itself and by the officials at the Paris Embassy. The American and French delegations circulated information and
the Poles also made submissions. Parisian social life provided another important source of intelligence. Informal meetings at lunchtime between lobbyists and delegation officials were routine, as was the incessant round of dinner parties and other such functions where politicians, delegates and officials were entertained by those hoping to advance particular interests. Depending upon the prevailing circumstances and the particular prejudices of each official or delegate, the influence of the sources varied. For example, American, French, and Polish inputs were generally wasted on the British advocates of a ‘Small Poland’, whilst British advocates of a ‘Greater Poland’ usually found themselves arguing against pro-German reports submitted by the military missions. Lloyd George eventually modified the Delegation’s original decision to award Upper Silesia directly to Poland. It must therefore be conceded that the most influential sources were the military missions and intelligence agencies whose views were fed to him via Kerr and Headlam Morley.

Of course, Upper Silesia’s future was not being decided in a vacuum. Many broader factors were helping to shape British policy towards the new Germany. By the end of March, Lloyd George’s ‘Fontainebleau Memorandum’ urged the Allies to make peace on terms acceptable to Germany. The Prime Minister’s bout of moderation was helped by his military staff’s new worry that, should Bolshevism spread throughout Europe, its senior officers feared that the British Army was in no condition to confront it. With British strategic demands satisfied, compromise and support for Germany was deemed to be the answer. But France was also resolute over her demands in the west. This left the German-Polish border the only territory available to Lloyd George where he could make gestures to the Germans. Lloyd George’s rejection of the Conference’s Polish Commission’s recommendation to return Poland’s ancient port of Gdansk had signalled his firm conversion to a ‘Small Poland’ philosophy. Instead, he had adopted Headlam Morley’s proposal to re-establish Gdansk as a Hanseatic-style ‘Free City’. This change of
policy at the top coupled with the effect of the British intelligence reports and the flood of German propaganda urging moderation, destroyed the previous unanimity over Poland generally existing within the British Delegation on Poland.

The first real intimation that a plebiscite might be necessary in Upper Silesia was provided by Captain Thornley Gibson. On his return from a tour of the German regions, he reported that Upper Silesia’s industrial magnates had persuaded Germany’s politicians to resist Upper Silesia’s inclusion in Poland. However, he went on to suggest that the Germans might find a referendum acceptable. This was because ‘it was by no means certain that such a plebiscite would result in favour of the Poles’.94 There could be no doubt that the Germans had the means to resist annexation. Apart from the German VI Army Corps with its 70,000 regular troops in Silesia, Knyvett had estimated the number of paramilitary volunteers in Upper Silesia to be around 35,000.95 Alarmed by this news, Paton, who was the Delegation’s ethnographic expert, recommended that measures be taken to calm the area before the peace terms were announced. Headlam Morley agreed. He was ‘sure that the Germans would make a great fuss, and press the necessity of having a plebiscite’. But the Delegation’s senior military expert on Poland, Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Kisch, described any idea of conducting a plebiscite as ‘appeasement’.

Certainly Germany will not be happy at losing Industry possessing such great economic value. Surely, however, such cases should be decided on their merits and not on ‘the fuss’ (vide Mr. Headlam Morley’s Minute) which the Germans are likely to make...If the German Government knows that even the prospect of a ‘fuss’ is likely to modify the decision of the Conference, we can count on their fermenting trouble in other regions besides Upper Silesia.96

No action was therefore recommended. The annexation of Upper Silesia to Poland remained a provision of the Draft Peace Terms presented to the German Delegation at
Versailles on 6 May. The terms were greeted by an outburst of German indignation and resentment. Berlin declared the terms to be unacceptable unless revised. But replying for the Conference, Clemenceau indicated that the Allies would only accept 'practical suggestions' improving the drafting of the treaty's chief provisions.

A further German note on the territorial questions conceded that some of the Treaty's provisions had met Wilson's principle of self-determination. But (ironically in view of Germany's own war aims and the Brest-Litovsk Treaty) it went on to complain about Germany's populations and territories being 'bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if mere chattels and pawns in a game'.

Recording the German public's reaction, a British official in Cologne found that even the most moderate of the middle classes 'considered the terms utterly impossible'. On the other hand, he felt the official reaction to the Draft Peace Terms had been 'a series of carefully engineered manoeuvres' and the similarity that he found in the German press reports was 'much more apparent than usual'. The British Delegation's more moderate members felt that the individual provisions were justifiable. Nevertheless, Germany's outright rejection of the draft terms and its condemnation by a large swathe of articulate British and American opinion had discomforted them. Even the British officials and delegates who had favoured a 'Greater Poland' were shaken by reports that the Germans might not sign the Peace Treaty. In the political climate developing in Britain, a prolonged occupation of Germany or, at worst, a resumption of hostilities, were options the government could not very easily contemplate. Compromise at Poland's expense was the easier option and with his many prejudices about Poland shared by several of the Liberals and near universal in the Labour Party, from Lloyd George's standpoint such a sacrifice would prove popular. Indeed, it might even be seen as a principled gesture towards liberalism and go some way towards restoring his reputation amongst past support that he might need once again.
The reasons for these anti-Polish sentiments in Britain are not difficult to find. The British public and politicians had a profound ignorance of Europe beyond Berlin. Added to this, the partitioning powers had spent 150 years justifying the partitions by denigrating everything Polish. Clichés about Poland abounded. Poles were prejudiced, unjustifiably proud romantics with no administrative abilities. They were also dangerous revolutionaries. The Polish populations were described as inherently backward and ruled by aristocratic landlords. They were impetuous, acting like children. These and many other stereotypical Polish 'faults' and perceived characteristics, can all be found in Lloyd George’s Peace Conference utterances. After Poland had been partitioned, throughout the 19th century and especially at times of heightened Russian-British confrontation, British liberals would express support for Polish independence. Now, British parliamentary support for Poland was mainly limited to a few Conservatives in the House of Lords. Like the Labour Party (which had just renewed its links with the German Social Democrats and feared that revolutionaries or reactionaries might overthrow the new democracy), many of the Conservative MPs were fearful that enforcing the Peace Terms as currently drafted might spark a Spartacist revival in Germany.¹⁰⁰

Apart from these prejudices and the political considerations accompanying them, in what has remained a legacy of that period, these negative views of the Poles and the possible consequences of supporting Poland against either the Germans or the Russians, were supplemented by vicious anti-Polish propaganda campaigns in both Britain and the United States. As we have seen, the Conference’s failure to address the problem of Russia’s border-states was one of several factors that had forced Piłsudski to engage the Bolsheviks on Poland’s eastern front. This led to charges of militarism and imperialism by Poland’s enemies. But the most enduring damage done to Poland’s reputation during this critical period was widespread press coverage alleging that Warsaw had encouraged
the bouts of rampant anti-Semitism allegedly sweeping the country. These were denied
by British officers on the spot and later refuted by Allied Commissions sent to Poland to
investigate.\textsuperscript{101} But fighting their own battle with Jewish Orthodoxy over the questions of
secularism and Jewish nationalism, western-oriented Zionists exaggerated and exploited
the slightest incident of anti-Semitism reported from Poland – describing them as Polish
pogroms.\textsuperscript{102} The debate was complicated by the equation of Jews with Bolshevism,
something many others apart from the Poles, readily asserted. This, and the British labour
movement’s campaign against military intervention in Russia (bracketing the Poles along
with the White Russians as the primary exponents), culminated in the launch of a ‘Hands
off Russia’ campaign on 22 June 1919 – five days prior to a hugely supported ‘Jewish
National Day of Mourning against the Massacre of Jews in Poland’ when between 50,000
to 100,000 protesters marched to a rally in Hyde Park, London.\textsuperscript{103}

In Paris, final confirmation of the need for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia arrived for
the British Delegation’s moderates in the form of a brief report from Dr. Winthrope Bell
who had visited the region between 1 and 10 May.\textsuperscript{104} Along with American and British
journalists, he witnessed a series of rallies (held with the encouragement of the Prussian
administration), protesting against Upper Silesia’s inclusion in Poland. Bell reported that
20,000 of Opole’s 36,000 inhabitants took part in a rally held there on 9 May. Rallies
were also held in Katowice and other cities and towns.\textsuperscript{105} Bell admitted that his report
was entirely focussed on obtaining a plebiscite for Upper Silesia. He believed universal
public usage of the German language by Silesians with Polish names confirmed a wish
for continued German rule. Instead of questioning why the situation existed, he criticised
the basis of the Allied decision to annex Upper Silesia to Poland, arguing that it was a
mistake to base this on the racial descent of the majority of the population. He wrote that
the numbers of bearers of Polish names whom I found opposed to the idea of union with Poland leads me to believe that there is perhaps no region of those affected by the Peace, where a plebiscite is more necessary to determine the real relative strengths of the two parties.\textsuperscript{106}

He claimed he had taken the question up with both sets of supporters and found that while the Germans wanted the vote to be taken \textit{en bloc}, and the Poles wanted the removal of all German managers beforehand, neither side actually feared the result of a plebiscite.\textsuperscript{107}

Winthrope Bell’s report was given a wide circulation. British Delegation members seeking an easing of the German terms seized on it to argue the need to grant a plebiscite. However, one member, Francis Bourdillon, who later served in Upper Silesia, labelled the report ‘German propaganda’ and claimed that it was ‘grossly misleading’. Rejecting the statistics and conclusions, he noted that the district was currently under martial law and that to express a desire for annexation to Poland was a treasonable offence punishable by death. He pointed out that possessing a Polish name in Eastern Europe was not an indication of Polish national sympathy: many Poles had German names. He also accepted the Polish Delegation’s contention that out of the German element in the district, as many as twenty per cent (181,000), had no permanent connection with Upper Silesia. These Germans were located in the larger towns and normally comprised the garrisons, teachers, officials and other types of government employees, including the majority of the railway staff. Regarding employment, Bourdillon also pointed out that

\begin{quote}

The managers, clerks, foremen and bailiffs of the great industrial and land owning magnates... are all Germans and they virtually exclude the Poles from any position other than manual labour... The state services and the railways have equally been barred to Poles, and education in Polish has been prohibited even
\end{quote}
gratis and in private. The opportunities of the Poles have thus been very limited.\textsuperscript{108}

This, he explained, was how Prussia treated minorities. Yet, where they were permitted to rise, many Poles had succeeded in breaking German monopolies in journalism, medicine, law and commerce. Of the population the Polish Commission were assigning to Poland, Bourdillon claimed that around 1,250,000 were Poles and 300,00-400,000 were Germans. He concluded by pointing out that despite several centuries of separation from Poland, the Upper Silesians had retained their Polish national characteristics.\textsuperscript{109}

F.H. Kisch and Esme Howard endorsed Bourdillon’s criticism of Winthrope Bell’s report but it was too late. The increasingly influential Headlam Morley had decided that the peace terms related to Upper Silesia were unjustifiable.\textsuperscript{110} He was not alone in thinking this. Aided by the Conference’s leaders’ exasperation with Poland over Cieszyn, East Galicia, and Lithuania, and the bad publicity entailed in Poland’s difficulties with the Zionists, the German campaign to force the Allies to rethink the Upper Silesian award was successful. Even before Paris had received Germany’s official reply to the Draft Peace Terms, most of the experts and officials within the British Delegation in Paris had convinced themselves that an Upper Silesian plebiscite should be offered.

Had they thought otherwise, there can be little doubt their political masters would have over-ruled them anyway. On 22 May, Jan Smuts, the South African Prime Minister (one of several British Empire representatives in Paris), wrote to Lloyd George reiterating what were essentially German arguments. Poland’s enlargement and the Rhineland’s long military occupation were ‘the two cardinal errors in policy of this Treaty’. In resurrecting Poland the Allies were simply ‘reversing the verdict of history’. He recommended leaving the whole of Upper Silesia to Germany.\textsuperscript{111} Lord Robert Cecil, another of the British ministers with the Delegation also expressed his misgivings to Lloyd George. He
believed awarding Upper Silesia to Poland ‘was not really defensible’: Wilson’s Fourteen Points ‘would have to be stretched a good deal to include the territories assigned to Poland’. H.A.L. Fisher, one of Lloyd George’s Liberal ministers, also warned him that if the Peace Terms could only be enforced by renewing the war, ‘there would be a violent revulsion of feeling against the Government’. From Spa, similar fears were expressed by General Haking about this and the use of British forces in Upper Silesia. The Germans had convinced Haking that their army had been reduced to such impotency that it would now be ‘incapable of forcing the Silesians to hand over the richest part of their province to the Poles, whom they hated’; if the Poles should ‘seize the property they have so cheaply won… the Allies will be called upon to restore order’. Expanding on his thesis, Haking claimed that European instability would soon force the Great Powers into taking military action. Rather than crush Germany, the Allies should be calling upon her to help restore order in Europe. With the Germans balancing French power and supplying the military action in Europe, Britain would be able ‘to concentrate on safeguarding her own affairs’.

The German reply was received in Paris on 29 May (twenty-four hours after its publication in the German press). Apart from the reasons that the Germans had already advanced for their retention of Upper Silesia, it was their economic argument that caught Lloyd George’s eye. They claimed that Upper Silesia’s coalmines supplied all of East Germany’s industry as well as parts of Southern Germany and Bohemia. Compared with Upper Silesia’s annual coal output of 43.5 million metric tons, pre-war Poland’s output was a mere 6.8 million tons. Allied interests would therefore be served by leaving Upper Silesia with Germany because it was only by using these resources that Germany could ‘meet her liabilities resulting from the war’. The response concluded with a blunt and
prophetic warning. The German Government gave notice that if the region was torn from their country, then

wounds would be inflicted on her, which would never heal, and from this first hour of separation the recovery of the lost territory will be the burning desire of every German. This will greatly endanger the peace of Europe and of the world.115

Discussing the German counter-proposals at dinner that evening, Lloyd George agreed that the two main obstacles to a peace settlement were reparations and Upper Silesia. Reminded that ‘it might be difficult to go back on the Poles’, he replied:

Nevertheless, the question of reparations is bound up with this. If the Poles won’t give the Germans the product of the mines at reasonable terms, the Germans say they cannot pay the indemnity. Therefore the Allies may be cutting off their nose to spite their faces if they hand the mines to the Poles without regard to the question of the indemnity [reparations].116

Bonar Law, the leader of the Coalition’s Conservatives, also had difficulty justifying the award of Upper Silesia to the Poles. He believed that this would hamper German industry, making it impossible for them to pay real reparations and difficult to demand German coal exports as part of that indemnity.117 On 31 May, Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris, wrote to Balfour stating that Lloyd George had agreed with him that despite the strong French support for Poland, it would be impossible for them not to grant the Germans a plebiscite.118 This was not news to Balfour. At a meeting earlier that day Lloyd George, Balfour and the British Delegation had resolved that an Upper Silesian plebiscite should be held. Their problem was to get the other powers to agree to it.119

Lloyd George had already raised the Upper Silesia question at a Council of Four meeting on 30 May. After skilfully associating the Council’s previous criticism of Polish defiance over East Galicia with this issue, he had tried out several German arguments that

Chapter 1
he had selected from their response. At this point neither Wilson nor Clemenceau would be drawn into premature discussion. It was only when Lloyd George had attacked the work of the Polish Commission that Wilson put up a brief defence.\textsuperscript{120} The Americans and French had ignored the German response and their counter-proposals, and awaited the British reaction. Characteristically, Wilson believed that terms sincerely arrived at ought not to be eased simply to get them signed. This apparent last-minute appeasement of Germany over a point where British interest appeared to be unaffected, irritated him profoundly.\textsuperscript{121} Kerr wrote, 'we are at the crisis of the Peace Conference'.\textsuperscript{122}

On 2 June Lloyd George returned to the subject in the Council of Four. By then the British Prime Minister had his Cabinet’s and the British Empire representatives’ endorsement to revise the Polish provisions. He announced to the Council that Britain would not continue the war or march on Germany unless some of the Peace Terms were amended. Declaring that public opinion in England ‘wanted Peace and did not care so very much about the details’, he said that his government believed Germany’s case was strongest regarding their eastern frontiers. Clemenceau pointed out that although the British believed concessions would bring Peace, the French knew the Germans better; ‘the more concessions made, the more the Germans would demand’. He reminded the Council that Poland’s re-establishment was not only meant to redress one of the greatest wrongs in history but it was also meant ‘to create a barrier between Germany and Russia’.\textsuperscript{123} This Council of Four meeting and all subsequent ones where Upper Silesia was mentioned, would prove to be the most acrimonious of the Peace Conference.

The American Delegation assembled the following morning to discuss the British demands for revision. Though against a plebiscite in principle, nevertheless, its Polish expert, R.H. Lord, thought that it could favour Poland. But this was highly conditional. The plebiscite could not be held while German troops and officials occupied the territory.
Lord then drew the meeting’s attention to the present ‘veritable reign of terror in Upper Silesia’ where

Such a state exists there that they have been arresting every prominent Polish leader, they have been placing people on trial charged with being guilty of high treason for the crime of making speeches in favour of union with Poland, or collecting money in favour of national causes.\footnote{124}

Under present conditions it was impossible to hold a fair plebiscite and Lord wondered if the Allies were prepared to occupy the region with their troops. He pointed out that it was extremely difficult for the people there to vote as they pleased: ‘I can think of few countries where the countryman finds it so dangerous to express his opinions at the polls’. When Herbert Hoover (the Conference’s Director General of Relief) raised the question of expediency, Wilson said that he did not favour changes solely on this basis. It made him ‘a little tired’ when people told him that they were afraid the Germans would not sign, especially when ‘their fear is based upon things that they insisted upon at the time’. Asked if this meant the French, Wilson replied:

Not as much as the British. Here is a British group made up of every kind of British opinion, from Winston Churchill to Fisher. From the unreasonable to the reasonable, all the way around, they are unanimous, if you please, in their funk.\footnote{125}

The Council of Four’s debate was resumed later that day, 3 June. This was their most important meeting regarding Upper Silesia’s future. Wilson stated that the American experts believed it impossible ‘to obtain a truly free and genuine vote from a population which has so long been in a state of vassalage’. Lloyd George disagreed. His sources, he said, confirmed that while Silesia was the most vital question for Germany, the British experts were convinced that a plebiscite would result in Poland’s favour. He agreed that the German administrators should be removed and he suggested that since ‘it was better
to send an American or an English Division to Upper Silesia than an Army to Berlin’, the Allies should also occupy the territory. There then followed a heated exchange about the alleged violation of the Fourteen Points, but eventually Lloyd George’s perseverance paid off and an outline agreement was reached.

The Germans would be offered a plebiscite under the surveillance of an inter-Allied Commission. This Commission would have a division of Allied troops at its disposal to police the area if this became necessary. German troops would have to withdraw but Lloyd George suggested that resistance would be unlikely if they were told that it would be American troops that would replace them. No Polish soldiers would be admitted to the area. At Wilson’s request, should the plebiscite go against the Germans, provisions were to be inserted to prevent expropriation of German assets without fair compensation, and coal supplies would be guaranteed to them at the same cost as to the Polish consumers. For Lloyd George this was complete victory. He had even half-committed Wilson into sending a division of American soldiers. But the plebiscite was never intended as an Allied solution to the specific problem of Upper Silesia. For Lloyd George and the British Government the question had only ever been about what would happen should the Germans refuse to sign the Treaty? If the Germans held out, Lloyd George believed that it would have been impossible to have renewed the war or maintained an extensive occupation of Germany just to force them to hand Upper Silesia over to Poland. In other words, the plebiscite in Upper Silesia was simply a political device to overcome the practical difficulties that would have arisen had Germany refused to sign the Peace Treaty. The other members of the Council of Four felt that there was no need for a plebiscite. Germany would have signed. They had only agreed to it in order to prevent a split between the Allies – something which would have benefited the Germans even more.
It fell to Paderewski to say why Poland objected to a plebiscite when he addressed the Council of Four on 5 June. Should this be held, he declared, as things stood Poland stood little chance of winning the agricultural areas. The German state-appointed clergy were hostile to Polish nationalism. Like the clergy, the German landlords also exerted a direct influence over Polish peasants and estate workers. That said, he believed Poland could win the important industrial districts. Poland needed the region’s mines, plant and other resources to build a viable Polish industrial sector. Therefore, with no other choice on offer, Paderewski was forced to accept Lloyd George’s plebiscite. However, this, he stressed, was on condition that the vote was counted by individual communes.

Counting the votes of over 1,500 communes individually was, the Poles believed, the only means they had to ensure that a fair line of partition would be established across Upper Silesia. Should the vote be counted as a single constituency, Paderewski made it plain that, because of Germany’s preponderant influence over Polish-speaking peasants in the north and their direct control over the areas west of the Oder, the Germans would win the plebiscite. After assuring Paderewski on this point, Lloyd George quietly instructed Headlam Morley to ensure that the vote was taken en bloc. Commenting on this back-door instructions later, Headlam Morely pointed out that if he had attempted to comply with Lloyd George’s request, the French, Americans, and Italians would have ensured a Polish plebiscite victory by demanding a much smaller plebiscite area.

The plebiscite had been referred to the new ‘Eastern Frontiers Committee’. It had been appointed to outline the plebiscite regulations, amend the related parts of the Peace Treaty dealing with Upper Silesia, and make minor adjustments to parts of the Polish-German border. Three members of the original Polish Commission, Le Rond, Lord, and Marquis della Torretta were appointed to the Committee along with Headlam Morley. The British official’s appointment did not prevent Lord forwarding Le Rond’s, Torretta’s,
and his own negative reflections on the proposed plebiscite to Wilson. When the Committee first met on 6 June, Headlam Morley found his position rather isolated. All agreed that due to its disturbed state, Upper Silesia would require a much longer Allied presence than any of the other plebiscite areas. Believing that a delay favoured the Poles, Le Rond suggested a period of three years. Headlam Morely suggested six months. This was reserved for the Council of Four to decide. After this meeting, Headlam Morley wrote to Kerr asking Lloyd George to give him a free hand to negotiate what he believed was the Prime Minister’s over-riding objective, to ‘deprive the Germans of any possible reason for maintaining that the decision was unfair to them’. When their work was completed, the near-unanimity of the Committee’s recommendations understated the hard negotiating that had taken place, not only over the plebiscite, but also over the changes Lloyd George had demanded along the Poznań and West Prussian frontier.

On their assembly on 11 June to present their recommendations to the Supreme Council, Lloyd George refused to see them at first, citing the bias of some of the Committee towards Poland as his reason. Clemenceau took this opportunity to reaffirm his opposition to the plebiscite and to remind the Council that France had only accepted it to avoid difficulties. Lloyd George said that the plebiscite had to be held to avoid conflict in the region: ‘In the eyes of the Germans, the Poles are an inferior and despised people’. To place them under Polish domination would create a dangerous source of irritation and trouble. Asking Lloyd George to remember his words, Clemenceau predicted that the Germans would cause trouble ‘whether or not there was a plebiscite’. The Committee’s recommendations were presented by Le Rond, later appointed President of the inter-Allied Commission in Upper Silesia. Putting the Committee majority’s case for an occupation of between one and two years, he argued that nobody in Upper Silesia could freely express an opinion there.
Since the Armistice, the Germans have done everything possible to keep Polish opinion in check. The Polish press has been suppressed. Polish priests have been sent to other dioceses. The Germans of Upper Silesia have been organised into a kind of militia, which includes not only residents but also Germans from other provinces.\textsuperscript{133}

Time was needed to ‘change a regime so strongly established and allow the inhabitants to emerge from their prostration’. The Polish Silesians were currently being subjected to a campaign to persuade them that separation from Germany would be a disaster for them. Before Headlam Morley intervened to state his minority view, Lloyd George suddenly accepted the longer period of occupation.\textsuperscript{134} By way of explanation to Headlam Morley, who was seated beside him, Lloyd George whispered that he understood the Germans now wished for the longer plebiscite period anyway.\textsuperscript{135}

Le Rond and the other members then withdrew, leaving the Council to discuss their other recommendations. The inter-Allied Commission sent to administer the area and conduct the plebiscite would be granted full executive authority, with only taxation and legislative powers withheld. Japan was relieved of any involvement, and the four remaining powers agreed to participate in the military occupation. German troops would evacuate the plebiscite area two weeks after the Peace Treaty was signed (this was later amended to two weeks after ratification). Transit rights for Allied troops travelling to Upper Silesia were established and the Council agreed that it would carry the initial financial cost of the Commission - recovering them from Upper Silesia later.\textsuperscript{136} The decision to hold a plebiscite also affected Moravian and German communities living close to the former Austrian border. The southern area of Raciborcz (Ratibor) and the southern part Głubczyce (Leobschutz) had already been allocated to Czechoslovakia. In the case of the Głubczyce district, however, its transfer had been agreed simply to avoid
placing 100,000 hostile Germans in Poland – Czechoslovakia being regarded as the lesser of two evils. Now, sensing that the decision to hold a plebiscite by communes provided Głubczyce’s population with an opportunity to determine their own future, Wilson raised the question of their participation in the plebiscite. The following day, 12 June, Crowe appeared before the Council of Four to answer.

Crowe proposed that the southern area of Raciborcz around Hlučín (Hultschin) should remain allocated to the Czechs. However, the southern part of the Głubczyce district should be reunited with the north and included in the plebiscite area. He said

It is what seems to me most fair. If Upper Silesia remains German, Głubczyce must share its fate; if Upper Silesia is Polish, Głubczyce will be isolated and can only go to the Czechoslovak state.

In other words, after the plebiscite, when the Supreme Council decided the partition line across Upper Silesia, a vote for Germany would mean just that, but in the unlikely event of any of Głubczyce’s communes voting for Poland, this would be interpreted as a desire for inclusion in Czechoslovakia. The Council of Four’s decision was unfortunate for the Poles. Poland had not claimed any part of Głubczyce, had no interest in the result there and did not run a campaign. Nevertheless, as we will see, because it suited their political objectives, rather than present the plebiscite’s outcome by communes won or lost, Britain and Germany presented the results en bloc. All of the 65,387 votes cast in Głubczyce for Germany (against 295 for Poland/ Czechoslovakia) were included in the columns of total votes cast. Even if the Council of Four had not eliminated Polish interest in the northern part of the Głubczyce district, their action in including the southern part in the plebiscite area would still have added 31,120 votes to Germany’s total (against 104 votes for Poland/Czechoslovakia). A similar exercise was conducted in the northern reaches of the territory. A small portion of the Namysłów (Namslau) district located outside the
original plebiscite area was added to the district of Kluczbork (Kreuzburg). Although this area only provided another 3,018 German votes (against 87 for Poland), this plus the Głubczyce district’s total, including several thousand non-resident ‘outvoters’, amounted to 9.6 per cent of Germany’s total plebiscite vote.\textsuperscript{140} The German vote might have been even greater. In November Berlin asked the Peace Conference to reconsider including the Hlučín region within the plebiscite area.\textsuperscript{141} There is no record of a reply.

On 14 June Paderewski and Dmowski again appeared before the Council of Four. Responding to confirmation that a ‘plebiscite by communes’ would be held, Paderewski emphasised that the decision to hold a plebiscite would cause bitter disappointment in Poland. He feared that all sorts of impossible and unreasonable promises would be made, and that ‘chaotic conditions’ would be provoked within the plebiscite area. Paderewski concluded by saying that ‘the Polish Delegation could only accept the decision with profound respect but with deep sorrow’. Both Wilson and Lloyd George hastened to state that they were convinced that the industrial regions would elect to become Polish. Dmowski was also confident of the result. Wilson confirmed that the inter-Allied Commission administering the region would employ equal numbers of Germans and Poles. Paderewski hoped that in order to quieten things down the plebiscite might be held within three to six months of the Peace Treaty being signed. This was agreed and when the two Polish delegates withdrew, the Council amended the previously agreed period of Allied occupation to read ‘from six to eighteen months’.\textsuperscript{142} Leaving the meeting, Paul Mantoux, one of the Conference’s interpreters, compared the plebiscites with the time-bombs and booby-traps that the Germans had left behind in the western territories when forced to withdraw.\textsuperscript{143}

The Council of Four’s agreement to an Upper Silesian Plebiscite formed a large part of the Peace Conference’s reply to Germany’s objections to the Draft Peace Terms.
The Peace Treaty was finally presented to them on 16 May with Article 88 and its annex devoted exclusively to Upper Silesia.\textsuperscript{144} They were given a week to accept. Should Germany refuse to sign the Peace Treaty, the Allied Powers had approved a contingency plan for its occupation. It proved superfluous, though at times it seemed possible that it might have to be implemented. During this weeklong crisis the Allies also demanded an early German evacuation from Russia's Baltic provinces (thus dashing the militarists' hopes there), and the German fleet was scuttled at Scapa Flow. The last word on whether or not to accept rested with the military High Command. Speaking for them, Hindenberg, made it clear that there were no alternatives

\textit{In the event of a resumption of hostilities we can re-conquer the province of Posen \[Pozn'ania\] and defend our frontiers in the east. In the west, however, we can scarcely count upon being able to withstand a serious offensive on the part of the enemy in view of the numerical superiority of the Entente and their ability to outflank us on both wings.}\textsuperscript{145}

Rather than accept responsibility for the peace, the Government resigned. On 22 June, by a majority of 99, the German Assembly authorised a new Cabinet composed of Majority Socialists (SPD) and the Centre, to sign the Peace Treaty. In the Versailles Palace's Hall of Mirrors, on 28 June 1919, the new Foreign Minister, Herman Müller, and the Minister for Justice, Johannes Bell, signed the Treaty of Versailles. That same day the German newspaper \textit{Vorwärts} declared:

\textit{The Treaty is only valid so long as the Entente has superior force. We consider it a scrap of paper and will not rest until it is torn up. When that day comes, we must be armed and prepared to assume the position due to us among nations.}\textsuperscript{146}
However, as Hindenberg had indicated, along the Polish frontier, particularly in Upper Silesia, it was the Germans who had the superior forces, and here this combative attitude had already been given a free rein.

Both Lord and Le Rond had drawn the Council of Four’s attention to the violent German repression occurring within Upper Silesia. As we have seen, in the autumn of 1918, all of Upper Silesia had shared in the apparent overthrow of Germany’s governing political and social order. But their freedom had been short-lived. To prevent a similar insurrection to the one which had broken out in Poznań, in January 1919 the President of the Opole Regierungsbezirk (Upper Silesia’s administrative district) had announced that any activities aimed at Upper Silesia’s secession from Germany would be considered as high treason. Otto Horsing had been appointed as the State Commissioner with a brief from Berlin to end the strikes paralysing coal production. As noted above, at the Allies’ instigation and because of pressure from Polish leaders in Poznan, Warsaw, and Paris, Korfanty and the other leaders of the Polish nationalists in Upper Silesia worked to prevent a violent reaction to Horsing’s methods. They were successful until a series of strikes and Polish counter-demonstrations against officially organised pro-German demonstrations (witnessed by Winthrope Bell), were followed by even more strikes and escalating violence, leading to the outbreak of the first Upper Silesian insurrection in August 1919. Throughout this period there had been no serious attempt to oust Germany from Upper Silesia but Polish Silesian self-restraint had enabled the authorities re-impose close military control of the region. Once re-established, the military forces, most notably the Freikorps units, attempted to incite the Polish Silesians into an armed revolt - hoping that by doing so it would provoke Warsaw into a cross-border intervention and discredit the Polish claim. The Poles were not yet drawn, but this did not prevent mounting tension in the region.
By August 1919, apart from the police and smaller security organisations such as the forest guards, the Silesian authorities had thousands of locally recruited volunteers in the region's Grenzschutz and Landschutz (civil guards). Anna Cienciala has noted that it was the Freikorps who had initially rescued the German cause there earlier that year. At this time the Freikorps in Upper Silesia were nominally under the command of the IV Army Corps headquarters at Wroclaw. The most prominent formations in Upper Silesia during 1919 were the von Aulock, Hasse, Tullmann, Eulenburg, and the Hessisch-Thuringen-Waldecksche Corps. Present also was one of the von Loewenfeld's Marine Freikorps and the most notorious of all, Ehrhardt's Baltic Freikorps, whose members wore the swastika on their helmets. Regular Army officers distrusted Horsing because of his Social Democratic background and his government appointment. However, as long as he suppressed the Polish nationalists and the strikers, he enjoyed the paramilitary forces' full and enthusiastic support. When Spartacist rioting broke out in Gliwice on 28 April, the management closed the mines in nearby Katowice, spreading the strike to the Polish Silesian miners. From 30 April, the locked-out miners demanded that the mines be reopened and that the Freikorps units and the Reichswehr troops be withdrawn. On Poland's National Day, May 3, the strike escalated into Polish demonstrations demanding Upper Silesia's separation from Germany. German counter-demonstrations and physical attacks on Polish supporters followed in the wake of this strike which was ended on 14 May. The Upper Silesian branches of the NRL were abolished on 16 May and many of its leaders fled across the Polish frontier to avoid arrest. This action accelerated the build-up of the administrative and command structure of a Polish émigré paramilitary force at Sosnowiec.

Along the Poznań and West Prussian demarcation line Allied observers were now reporting continual German artillery fire and cross-border incursions. A German attack
1. The Prussian stork tempts the Silesian frogs into the water. (1919 insurrection)

2. The greatest proof of German superiority is that they are working on the surface and the Poles are in the mines.

was expected on Poznań almost daily. Meanwhile, German news agencies were reporting to the world that it was the Poles who were preparing to attack Germany. The British were kept well-informed about the Armistice violations. The new British Minister in Warsaw, Sir Percy Wyndham, relayed British officers’ reports from the area to the Delegation in Paris. However, his appeals for steps to be taken to stop these ‘German offensives’ fell on deaf ears and, like Wade and Howard before them, Wyndham’s and the British officers’ objectivity was called into question. Wyndham’s own diplomatic contacts in Warsaw had warned him that a rising of Polish populations in districts still held by Germany was a real possibility. From Korfanty he learned that news about the proposed plebiscite was also causing the Polish Silesians to question Allied integrity.

Another intervention by Korfanty, on 22 June, stopped Polish partisans rising in the Pszczyna district. That night, however, heavy German artillery mounted a cross-border attack on railway lines around Czestochowa. This was reported in the Rhineland Army’s daily newspaper, The Cologne Post. The report added that German aircraft had machine-gunned several Polish towns including Alexandrow and Konin; three German battalions had entered a Polish border town (Herby) after a German aircraft had been shot down; and a German infantry attack on Wieraszow had been repulsed by Polish troops but the town had been left in flames. The report concluded with the news that throughout Upper Silesia the Polish population was being subjected to ‘sanguinary reprisals’. The day before the Peace Treaty was signed, Paderewski reported to the Council of Four that over 12,000 Silesian Poles had been arrested. By then, however, the German Cabinet had informed the Allies that ‘it declined all responsibilities on its eastern frontier’.

There could be no doubt that the Polish Silesians were being persecuted and that the number of political prisoners were increasing daily. There was also evidence of an extensive German propaganda campaign being directed at the population. Reports

Chapter 1
reached Paris from Warsaw that the Prussian Ministry of Defence was urging that all available resources, including the use of aircraft to leaflet the population, be employed to encourage support for Germany. But like all Polish intelligence material sent to the British then and over the following months (retrospectively, very accurate data), it was labelled 'Polish propaganda' and disregarded. The brutality of the paramilitary forces, however, negated any success the propaganda might have enjoyed. The German brutality is still remembered in Upper Silesia today. In a memorandum forwarded to the Foreign Office after the first insurrection had broken out, the Polish Government claimed that the Germans had taken advantage of the delay in the Peace Treaty's ratification to cause the Polish Silesians to doubt the new Polish state's viability. While Poland and the Allies looked on, they had deliberately created social unrest by transferring moveable equipment out of the territory, demobilising whole industries and leaving great masses of workmen unemployed. The Germans had hoped that this would make their propaganda 'more efficient amongst the uneducated classes'. In support of this theory, they had arrested and deported educated Polish Silesians – Germany admitted a list of 262 persons debarred from returning. But when the propaganda and arrests had failed, they had then employed 'vexatious measures and brutal treatment to provoke the working classes to disorder, in order to have a pretext for crushing them by force'.

Wyndham added to this graphic account of the German authorities' behaviour prior to the insurrection. Finding that the Poles had not been provoked into a rising by the loss of their leaders, the German authorities had then started to arrest and detain workers as well. Several thousand fled across the border into Poland. Some were killed or wounded resisting arrest. Others hid in disused mineshafts, supported by their families. To force the families to reveal their hiding places, the German volunteers were reported to have tortured the fugitives' wives and children mercilessly. This put the Polish
Government in a difficult position. For humanitarian reasons the Polish public expected them to assist the Polish Silesians. The pressure to intervene was dramatically increased on Saturday 16 August, when the sound of artillery and machine gun fire heralded the start of the first Upper Silesian insurrection.\textsuperscript{162}

Apart from the intensive persecution of Polish nationalism, this first insurrection was also the culmination of the series of strikes in July and August. Initially, the strikes were of an economic nature. The Polish miners were demanding an increase in wages to compensate for the ever-rising cost of food.\textsuperscript{163} A new dimension was added when the striking miners were joined by miners and workers laid-off from mines and factories which their owners had declared non-viable and closed. A demand for their reopening and their workers’ reinstatement was added to the wage demands and to protests against the continuation of martial law and political arrests. The strike intensified when, despite Horsing’s attempts at a meeting on 15 August to dissuade them, the German power and railway workers joined the strike. They too were seeking compensation for the rising food prices. The food shortages were not unique to Upper Silesia. Food riots had also occurred in Lower Silesia and, on 8 August, at Chemnitz in Saxony, 70 soldiers and ten civilians were reported to have been killed during rioting there.\textsuperscript{164}

The striking workers in Upper Silesia, who now numbered over 200,000, added financial bonuses and the opening of the frontier to Polish food, to their list of demands. As the general strike intensified, rumours spread that the adult male populations of whole villages were being rounded up and marched off for reconstruction work in France.\textsuperscript{165} The spark igniting the flame of insurrection was finally struck when the large crowds in Katowice protesting at high food prices, were fired on by German troops. Rioting ensued with many shop windows smashed and premises plundered. The Times reported that the threatened deportations of unemployed Polish workers had begun.\textsuperscript{166} That same day at

Chapter 1
nearby Mysłowice (Myslowitz), Polish miners queuing to collect outstanding wages were ordered by Grenzschutz volunteers to form themselves into groups of ten. Fearing deportation they refused and ten people were killed and many wounded when soldiers fired on a section of the crowd. In Bierun Str. (Alt. Berun) in the Pszczyna district, workers began disarming Grenzschutz volunteers while the German Army, now renamed the Reichswehr, rushed reinforcements into the industrial area from Wrocław and other military depots in the surrounding districts.

The news swept through the industrial area. Exasperated by the relentless German persecution that they had been experiencing, within hours Poles in Katowice, Tarnowski Gory, Bytom and the smaller towns and villages around them, rose in spontaneous revolt. British documentation on the fighting is diverse and diffuse, but while the fighting was by its very nature fragmentary, it was clearly widespread – occurring first in the eastern districts then spreading out through the districts of Pszczyna and Rybnik. Horsing ordered all workmen to return to their jobs and announced that any insurgents caught with arms would be shot without trial. Army technicians and German strikers placed under military guard immediately resumed work and brought the transportation and power systems back to life. There were even reports that Spartacists, who had made little impression on the Catholic, Polish Silesian workers, had linked up with the German volunteers to suppress them. Amidst the confusion, some POW units were also self-activated. Although poorly equipped at first, several thousand rifles were captured and turned on the German volunteers. Around nine thousand Upper Silesian émigrés who had recently fled into Poland to escape German persecution, joined the insurgents. Hastily formed into military units, these armed émigrés re-crossed Upper Silesia’s southern frontier to support the rebels. German aircraft and troops later attacked the émigrés’ bases and terrorised towns and villages on the Polish side of the frontier. In turn the German
Map 3 Upper Silesian Insurrection August 1919
[based on T. Jedruszczak Polityka Polski w sprawie Gornego Słaska 1918-1922 (Warsaw 1958)]
troops and volunteers were attacked from the rear by Polish villagers on the Silesian side of the frontier. Citing his German sources, Gregory Campbell has noted the authorities blamed Spartacist agitation for inciting the rebellion. This was the line that was taken by Horsing's press bureau and it was widely quoted in the German national newspapers. But the British left-wing *Daily Herald*'s Berlin correspondent was more balanced. He attributed the crisis to a combination of nationalist and labour issues – believing that the 'the class struggle which is raging in the coalfields' was being unnecessarily complicated by German and Polish sovereignty claims. The paper also highlighted the *Freiheit*, a German socialist paper's view that

The unrest is simply one of the fruits of Horsing's policy of violence. Unless now at the eleventh hour, Horsing is recalled, Upper Silesia will be lost to Germany; the Poles, who are in a great majority there, only long for freedom from Noske and Horsing.

In Germany itself, the prolonged strikes and now the insurrection were causing shortages of gas and electric power. But of much more political significance, Germany was failing to deliver the quantity of coal France had demanded to help compensate for the deliberate wrecking of its coalmines in 1918.

The first official communication concerning the insurrection to arrive in Paris came from Herbert Hoover. He had been visiting the headquarters of the Allied Coal Commission at nearby Ostrava, when the fighting broke out. Hoover stressed Central Europe's dependency on Upper Silesian coal. Believing that only an Allied military occupation would restore coal production there, he recommended the immediate despatch of a special inter-Allied Commission to take control of the area until the inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission arrived. Discussing Hoover's telegram on 18 August, the Heads of Delegations to the Paris Peace Conference (under whose control it continued after the

Chapter 1
Versailles Treaty was signed), discovered that until all the Allied governments had also ratified the Treaty, they required the German Government's permission to enter Upper Silesia. Nevertheless, the Heads of Delegations agreed that because the coalmines were a vital asset, they would be justified in anticipating the Peace Treaty's implementation in Upper Silesia 'by a few weeks'. It was decided that the Germans should first be asked to protect the mines and restore order. Meanwhile, the inter-Allied military force currently on standby on the Rhine for service in Upper Silesia, would be prepared for an early move there. But before these instructions had been despatched, telegrams indicating the seriousness and extent of the fighting began to flood into Paris.

In the eastern and southern parts of the proposed plebiscite area, the local Polish inhabitants backed by the armed émigrés who had re-crossed the frontier, now occupied several strategic points. With almost 70,000-armed personnel available, the Reichswehr and the volunteers were retaliating with great force. Indeed, from Katowice, The Times correspondent declared that the 'cruel methods' employed by the German military was 'the ugliest feature of the whole catastrophe'. To recover Rozdzien (Rosdzin), which after its capture the Germans admitted had been defended mainly by youths, 'artillery, trench mortars, gas, machine guns, and even an armoured train were used'. Since the insurgents preferred death rather than surrender, the German troops took very few prisoners. Instead, when clearing recovered towns and villages, they arrested anyone they could lay their hands on. In compliance with Horsing's edict, executions were conducted wholesale but many unarmed Poles were also shot and some were killed by other methods. Refugees poured over the border into Poland. The Times correspondent reported that by 18 August, over 2,000 women and children had collected at the hamlet of Bobrowniki (opposite Katowice). Many were cut and bleeding on the face and body from the blows that they had received before fleeing. They had waded breast-high across the Przemsza river whilst
German soldiers on the far bank shot at them.\textsuperscript{180} Polish sources estimate that at least 22,000 Polish Silesians sought refuge in Poland.\textsuperscript{181}

In Warsaw, Wyndham feared that the Polish Government might find it impossible to resist the popular demand for intervention if the \textit{Reichswehr} troops crossed the Polish border. He felt that these tensions would be eased if Paderewski could claim that Allied pressure was being applied to the German authorities.\textsuperscript{182} In Paris, Balfour cautioned the Council against granting Germany a license to conduct repressive measures in their name. On 19 August, the Heads of Delegations decided that they would now seek Germany’s permission to send an inter-Allied Commission to Upper Silesia. They hoped that this would obviate the need to place their Allied troops under the German Government’s command.\textsuperscript{183} On his return to Paris, Hoover had stressed that the critical fuel shortage could be alleviated only by increased production across the whole Silesian coalfield.\textsuperscript{184} On 21 August he informed a Heads of Delegations’ meeting that although the German Government wanted order restored in Upper Silesia, it was very difficult to judge what power Berlin exercised over the various military bodies. They did not appear to be fully in control of the German volunteers and were replacing them with \textit{Reichswehr} troops.\textsuperscript{185} Balfour’s suggestion that Hoover represent the Allies’ views to Berlin was accepted. But before the meeting had broken up, news arrived that due to the publicity the volunteers in Upper Silesia were attracting, the German Government had invited the Allied military representatives in Berlin to despatch a military commission of investigation.\textsuperscript{186}

While the discussions had been underway in Paris and the Allied officers in Berlin were negotiating the powers of their investigative commission, the British Legation’s staff in Warsaw were doing all that they could to discourage the Polish Government from bending to public pressure on Upper Silesia. As a result of the influx of the \textit{Reichswehr}’s reinforcements, by 21 August fighting in Upper Silesia was, in the main, confined to a
pocket around Tarnowski Gory and the border areas of Katowice, Pszczyna and Rybnik districts. A British military representative in Warsaw reported that ‘the Germans are putting down the insurrection in the German manner – ruthlessly’. German assurances to the Polish Government that executions had been stopped proved worthless. The Poles supplied verifiable examples, such as the execution of seven Polish soldiers captured on the frontier on 21 August and shot on the orders of Katowice’s military commander. At Szoppinitz fourteen Polish prisoners were executed on a battalion commander’s orders. At Janow hand grenades were tied around prisoners’ necks and exploded – one of the Freikorps volunteers’ favourite method of execution. Estimates of the Polish dead vary between 477 and 2,500. To record the full breadth and horror of what they were witnessing and to avoid the charge of sensationalising their reports, on 24 August The Times and Morning Star correspondents collaborated to compile one lengthy joint report. It should be noted that the tactics and the practices of the Freikorps and other reactionary-militarist ‘security organisations’ described here, were later meted out just as ruthlessly to German workers in, for example, Berlin, Saxony, and the Ruhr.

In response to these and the many other similar reports of mass executions and atrocities, national political organisations held rallies all over Poland. Addressing a rally of National Democrats in Warsaw, a Silesian Pole told them ‘if Poland did not undertake the defence of her suffering children they would lose faith in her’. The meeting resolved that the Polish districts of Upper Silesia should be occupied by Polish troops. At a huge rally organised by the Socialists and held in Warsaw’s Theatre Square on 21 August, there were more demands for the government to take action – including supplying the insurgents with arms. Afterwards, a small delegation including Feliks Perl, the veteran socialist and editor of the Robotnik, called at the British Legation where Wyndham received them. Perl reminded Wyndham that since the Allies ‘had taken upon themselves
the settlement of the war, it must be carried out in a manner that would not lead to more war’. Wyndham, however, was becoming increasingly concerned that the political parties were manipulating the outcry the Polish Silesians’ suffering had aroused in an attempt to embarrass and upset the Polish Government. With the public and political rank and file both overwhelmingly in favour of intervention, resisting their demands might cause the Paderewski government to fall. Weighing up this prospect, however, Wyndham was able to report to Balfour that Pilsudski, the man who really counted on military matters, was more relaxed and more optimistic about the situation than anyone else.

The governmental crisis was averted when Paderewski called a meeting of party leaders on 23 August. After listening to a report from a member of the committee whom they had sent to Sosnowiec to investigate, the meeting gave its unanimous backing to the Prime Minister’s strict adherence to the Peace Treaty. Apart from sporadic resistance in some remote villages, the fighting in Upper Silesia was over the following day. On 25 August Berlin broadcast a statement claiming that order had been re-established in Upper Silesia and that a complete resumption of work was expected the next day. Lumby, The Times Warsaw correspondent, wrote that while Horsing might claim that the strike had been broken, this had occurred only because, ‘faced with a choice of working or being deported, the strikers had sullenly chosen the former’. Returning to Warsaw after a few days absence, the Commander of the British Military Mission there found that the Peace Conference’s handling of Upper Silesia had evoked deepening distrust of the Entente.

On 26 August, an Allied military investigative commission led by Lieutenant Colonel Tidbury, arrived in Gliwice. It was quickly apparent that the terms of reference that Berlin had imposed on them were too limited to address the amount of prejudice and hatred that they had found in Upper Silesia. Fortunately, Paris had proceeded with its request to Germany for permission to send a special inter-Allied Commission to Silesia.
Although the German Government made it clear that there could be no early occupation by inter-Allied military forces, they agreed that the three senior Allied generals in Berlin (Dupont, Bencivenga, and Malcolm), could form this special inter-Allied Commission for the Peace Conference.\textsuperscript{198} On the Commission’s arrival in Katowice on 2 September, it was joined by its American member, Colonel Goodyear from the Coal Commission at Ostrava. He had been acting as the Peace Conference’s intermediary in the area since 19 August.\textsuperscript{199} How much the presence of this Commission and Colonel Tidbury’s team helped calm the situation remains an open question, but Goodyear believed that they both helped in the restoration of order. Nonetheless, he warned Paris that whilst the industrial districts appeared outwardly calm, unrest and dissatisfaction lurked beneath the surface. In his own final report to Paris, Goodyear urged that the Allies be induced to act promptly on the Commission’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{200} However, with order re-established and Upper Silesian coal being produced once again, the attention of the Peace Conference focussed on new problems. When a telegram from General Dupont, President of the special inter-Allied Commission, was read out to a Heads of Delegations meeting, the sole response was provided by Balfour who reiterated that they could do nothing until the governments had ratified the Peace Treaty.\textsuperscript{201}

Within a few days of arriving in Katowice the Commission produced two reports. In their report to Paris the commissioners declared that they could not establish where responsibility for the outbreak of the insurrection lay. They recommended that a strong Allied Commission backed by a military presence be established in Upper Silesia and that more pressure be applied to the Polish Government to stop the POW organising itself there.\textsuperscript{202} Returning to Berlin on 9 September, Dupont also handed the German Foreign Office a memorandum summarising the Commission’s findings and recommendations. These were
(a) The immediate cessation of the brutality committed by the troops.
(b) Permission for all fugitives to return and their employment on their return.
(c) Careful revision of a list of 262 persons who, the local authorities declared must be prevented from returning to Upper Silesia.
(d) These measures to be followed in due course by an amnesty for all persons not accused of offences against common law.²⁰³

In a separate individual report to the DMI, General Malcolm observed that the special inter-Allied Commission's greatest difficulty had been finding impartial evidence. He also acknowledged that the combination of national, industrial and religious differences in Upper Silesia had been rendered even more acute by the prospect of a plebiscite. The Germans had undoubtedly been practising a brutal repression but he blamed the Poles for the political agitation. His conclusion was that as long as either Polish or German agents were attempting to influence the plebiscite's outcome, then continued discontent had to be expected in Upper Silesia.²⁰⁴

Whilst the confrontation in Upper Silesia eased, British and French delegates in Paris came close to undermining the uneasy peace that had been established. Discussing yet another failure of the German Government to evacuate their troops from the Baltic provinces, Lloyd George suggested their possible replacement by Polish troops. This was supported by Foch and, to a lesser extent, by Clemenceau.²⁰⁵ This prospect alarmed the United States plenipotentiary. He warned Clemenceau that confrontation between Polish and German troops in the Baltic would renew the Upper Silesian conflict.²⁰⁶ Expanding on this at the next Delegates' meeting, he claimed that; 'It was extremely necessary to maintain the situation in Upper Silesia in a calm state in order not to increase the actual difficulties of the coal shortage'. He concluded by pointing out that, since none of the powers was presently prepared to render financial aid to Poland, they should not risk
starting a war between Poland and Germany. Clemenceau agreed. Lloyd George maintained his enthusiasm for a few more days, relenting only when it was agreed to coerce Germany into compliance by threatening economic and financial sanctions and prolonged retention of their prisoners of war.

This proposal to use Polish troops in the Baltic was a fairly typical example of the British Prime Minister's impulsive and erratic interventions into foreign affairs. As with the imperatives which motivated his advocacy for an Upper Silesian plebiscite - we again find Lloyd George attempting to solve an immediate problem (getting the Germans out of the Baltic provinces) at the risk of another crisis (renewed conflict in Upper Silesia).

Summary

Prior to the Peace Conference, British policy towards Poland can be summarised as a mixture of optimistic assurances and stern cautions. His Majesty's Government stood by its pledge to secure full recognition of Poland's aspirations at the Peace Conference - which included the incorporation of Upper Silesia. Britain and the other Allied powers would do all in their power to secure Poland from German attack and assist them to resist the Bolsheviks, provided 'the Polish people showed their fitness for independence'. This, of course, would be demonstrated by obedient compliance with any instruction the Great Powers handed down. Unfortunately, the people taking power in Poland in November 1918, were not well-versed in these unspoken diplomatic assumptions. It was not long before the British in particular, came to regard Poland as always slightly wayward.

In accepting the Fourteen Points, Germany's politicians, if not its General Staff, realised the implications that they held for Prussia's Polish territories. However, the speed with which Germany's middle and upper classes regained their confidence after a traumatic military defeat and revolution, caused many of those interested in Upper Silesia to believe that they could still save the province. Germans hoped that the Paris Peace
Conference would be the prelude to a negotiated peace. When this proved not to be the case, their outrage was heartfelt and uniform. But before this point had been reached, Upper Silesia’s ethnic and assimilated Germans, its land-owning industrialists, the civil administration, the Army, and even the German-controlled Catholic Church, had joined in several different initiatives to defeat the territory’s annexation to Poland. Their initiatives complemented Berlin’s and the German Foreign Office’s manoeuvres to persuade the Allied Powers to hold a plebiscite.

As the Peace Conference got underway and events in Central and Eastern Europe ran their course, Poland’s interests increasingly conflicted with British interests. This occurred almost immediately over Russia. Whilst the Poles did not want to be threatened by a Bolshevik Russia, this outcome did not appear to be much different to them from the ‘liberal Russia’ which the British hoped that their support for the White Russians would help to create. This helps to explain Britain’s early concerns about Pilsudski’s attempts to secure Poland’s eastern border. Lloyd George wanted a ‘liberal Russia’ to take control of the Tsarist’s ‘border states’ including the Baltic provinces and the old eastern provinces of pre-partitioned Poland that Pilsudski was moving into. However, the greatest clash of interests occurred over the fixing of Poland’s western frontiers - especially the annexation of Upper Silesia from Germany. When Germany refused to sign the Draft Peace Terms, a range of domestic political considerations in Britain dictated that Lloyd George had to persuade the Allies to arrive at some form of compromise with Germany. Apart from Lloyd George’s determination to obtain reparations for Britain, everything that Britain wanted from Germany had been included within the Armistice terms. America and Italy had no vital claim on Germany, the Czechs already occupied most of their German territories, and France had surrendered its claim for the Rhineland. Only the resurrected Polish state’s claims on Germany were available for barter. With its enormous industrial
capacity and its untapped potential, retaining Upper Silesia was a territorial and economic goal that united all Germans, whatever their political persuasion. Berlin made it plain that a plebiscite there was the absolute minimum price for them accepting the Peace Treaty.

Apart from the motives and the manner of the plebiscite’s inception, for Polish Silesians the consequences of this decision were compounded by the Allied failure to protect them. Alsace-Lorraine was handed directly to France in 1918, but the Armistice terms only required Germany to evacuate the parts of Poland outside Germany prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. Although the Poznań rebellion and the Allied intervention which quickly followed, altered the situation there, the German ascendancy in Upper Silesia continued even after the signing of the Peace Treaty on 28 June. Hugh Gibson, the United States Minister in Warsaw, commented that the roots of the first insurrection were developed throughout the time that the Upper Silesian authorities remained unchecked. Despite many warnings about German intentions, the Allies hoped that their exhortations would prevent strikes and maintain coal production until an inter-Allied Commission took over Upper Silesia’s administration – an event always anticipated ‘within two to three weeks’. Once the insurrection broke out, it was a fear over the consequence of the looming coal shortage, not the treatment of the Polish Silesians, which caused the Peace Conference to address the problem. But even this was strictly under the aegis of ‘crisis management’.

The real problem for the British after the Peace Treaty had been signed was how to deal with the German Government. Whilst never enamoured by the thought of helping socialists remain in government anywhere, British contacts in Berlin nevertheless insisted that allowances had to be made for the German Government’s political problems. Reports from General Malcolm, for example, warned that if the Republic collapsed, it would lead to total anarchy in Central Europe and the end of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Therefore,
because of the Republic’s shaky democratic foundations (which many Germans regarded as having been forced on them by the Allies), in dealing with the German Government a question of striking the correct balance between exhortation and coercion nearly always arose. Germany’s political leaders turned this to their advantage. After the Peace Treaty had been signed, what Britain especially perceived as Berlin’s apparent weakness became its greatest asset. For example, should Germany indicate that the French or the Poles were claiming too much or pushing too hard, this often resulted in Lloyd George launching a defence of Germany’s interests and modifying a proposal. Ironically, within Germany, persecuting the Polish population in Upper Silesia was the one area where any German Government could count on near-unanimous public and political support. But when the question of the need for intervention in Upper Silesia arose in August 1919, rather than brush aside German protests and rush Allied troops there, the Allies gave due deference to German sovereignty and the position of the German Government vis-a-vis its political opposition. As a result, there was no help forthcoming for the Polish Silesians. Although they had urged the Upper Silesian plebiscite on the Peace Conference, the British only played a small role in settling the troubles it was provoking – a pattern which would be repeated over the following months. Balfour showed insight into the problems created by the insurrection, but allowed his interest to fade as soon as the Germans re-imposed their authority.

In this first crisis the British were not well served by their intelligence sources. The information available through the DMI and the Foreign Office, particularly military intelligence, was highly predictable. From the moment the first British missions entered Germany, despatches from Berlin and Spa became increasingly pro-German. To a lesser extent, the converse was true of intelligence from the British military mission in Warsaw and its outposts. Although Headlam Morley would be horrified at such a term, 'the
competing factions' he was instrumental in developing within the British Delegation in Paris, were highly selective in which intelligence they used and dismissive of whatever information did not fit in with what they wanted to believe. Reading these reports seventy years later, what is striking about them is not their content, but the highly prejudiced views expressed through the recipients' minutes – particularly the junior intelligence officers' remarks. For example, an early report from Colonel Wade in Warsaw warning that both Germans and Czechs were representing the Silesian Polish National movement as a form of Bolshevism, was dismissed as nonsense along with the comment that 'Colonel Ward [sic] has apparently plenty of leisure if he can find time to have this sort of thing typed for our benefit'. With regard to the August 1919 insurrection itself, daily reports contained in *The Times* and *Morning Star* from correspondents on the spot, must have been of more use to the delegates in Paris than the skewed versions received via General Malcolm in Berlin. In fact, Malcolm's decidedly pro-German attitude and the perceived indifference the British appeared to display over the Polish Upper Silesian's fate, resulted in greatly increased Polish scepticism about Britain's ultimate intention for Upper Silesia.

For Paderewski's Government, the insurrection was a test of its ability to resist the simple patriotic fervour that new-found freedom had aroused in Poles everywhere. But if the Sejm had succumbed to popular demand and moved to confront Germany over Upper Silesia, there would have been direct confrontation between them and Pilsudski. Poland's military resources were stretched, and it is highly unlikely Pilsudski would have played into the German militarists' hands. The intelligence documents forwarded by Wyndham reveal that the Poles were well aware of the purpose of Germany's provocative actions in Upper Silesia and the military incursions into Poland. How much Wyndham realised is unclear, but the War Office reports received from the British military mission in Warsaw
express no fear of Polish military intervention. It might also be noted that despite the
British Minister's alarm, the political rallies held in Warsaw during the insurrection were
relatively circumspect in their demands.

Finally, what did emerge in Poland during the insurrection was the awakening of
popular consciousness over the Polish Silesians' predicament. This led to the wholesale
establishment of Polish organisations dedicated to supporting future struggles in Upper
Silesia - struggles they hoped would be eased, if not ended, by the Peace Treaty's
implementation and the arrival of the inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission in Opole.
Chapter 1 - Notes


3. Foreign Office *Handbooks* prepared by the Historical Section of the Foreign Office. See Handbook No.40 *Upper Silesia*, and Handbook No.52 *Prussian Poland* with its Ethnographic Map 1 Germany, and Map 2 Poland.


9. Public Record Office [PRO] FO 371/3896 8151, 31 December 1918. See also the Silesian Institute's *Encyklopedia powstań Śląskich* pp.90-91 for a complete list of the delegates from Upper Silesia plus a breakdown of their gender and political affiliations. Blanke, *Orphans of Versailles* p.12. This notes that the NRL was under National Democrat control. Wojciech Trampczynski was proposed (and later appointed) as the new provisional governor. There were calls for anti-Polish officials to be expelled, recognition of the KNP in Paris, reversal of the eighteenth century partitions, and the establishment of a Polish militia in each town. These demands were feasible in Poznańia and West Prussia but quite impossible in Upper Silesia. The Poles there had their own Peoples' Council which was an adjunct to the NRL in Poznań.


20. HLRO F/201/1/1, *Poland* by A.J.B., October 1918.


23. *Ibid*, pp.54-59. The Church later dropped its support for an independent Upper Silesia and backed the Government's campaign to retain German sovereignty when the Majority Socialists failed to gain a majority in the National Assembly elections held on 19 January 1919.


27. Lundgreen-Nielsen, *The Polish Problem* pp.108-110. The KNP had sent a mission led by Professor St. Grabski, a founder member of the PPS but by then an active National Democrat, to Poland. They had arrived in Krakow on 2nd December 1918 - see *ibid* pp.92-96. See also Davies, 'The Poles in Great Britain 1914-1919' pp.80-82.


29. Roman Landau, *Paderewski* (London 1934) p.120. Paderewski and his wife were accompanied by Paderewski's military aide, Major Iwanowski.


31. PRO WO 144/8 Desp.65, 21 January 1919. Here Lieutenant General Haking, the senior British representative with the Allied Armistice Commission at Spa, complains about Wade and Paderewski travelling to Poznań to 'address political meetings there' when the Germans had only been asked for permission for both of them to travel directly to Warsaw. The minutes added to the documents by the British delegates arriving at the Peace Conference confirm that this was the case - see PRO FO 608/59 No.564 24 January 1919.


33. PRO FO 371/3896 No.564 Wade to Howard 26 December 1918.

34. PRO FO 608/59 No.564 24 January 1919. Includes Wade's reports on the incidents in Poznań on 26 and 27 December 1918.

35. *Ibid*. See also FO 371/3897 32975 Howard to Balfour 14 February 1919 for Korfanty's account of the uprising.


Chapter 1 - Notes


47. Valentine Chirol, 'Four Years of Lloyd-Georgian Foreign Policy', *The Edinburgh Review* No.393 (January 1923) pp.1-20. Valentine Chirol was a former editor of *The Times* (1896-1920) who had attended the Peace Conference.


50. *Ibid*, pp.56-61. Goldstein thinks that the PID may have been Hardinge's counter to the Garden Suburb. But instead of employing amateurs, such as editors and journalists, he staffed the Foreign Office with some of the best available experts.


52. Agnes Headlam Morley, Russell Bryant, Anna Cienciala (eds.) *Sir James Headlam Morley: A Memoir Of The Paris Peace Conference 1919* pp.IX - XI.


Chapter 1 - Notes


59. CCA HDLM Acc 688 Box 2 H.M. to Kerr 25 January 1919.


64. PRO FO 608/59 4408 Howard to Balfour 14 February 1919.


66. PRO FO 608/62 4997 Neulens to Secretary Peace Conference 19 March 1919.

67. PRO FO 608/57 5191 Howard to Balfour 25 March 1919.


69. PRO FO 608/59 4712 Howard to Balfour 13 March 1919. Minute by Crowe.

70. PRO FO 608/62 4626 Howard to Balfour 16 March 1919.


72. HLRO F/57/6/1 Howard to Lloyd George 10 April 1919.


75. Alma Luckau, *The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York, 1971) pp. 28-41. This was known as the Paxkonference Commission.

76. Ibid, pp. 28-41.

77. Ibid, pp. 56-57.

78. Ibid, pp. 200. Document 21: 'Instructions Given to the German Plenipotentiaries of Peace'.


82. Ibid, pp. 327-337. Provides an account of British missions sent to Germany during February and March 1919.


84. PRO WO 144/13 Desp. 134E 31 March 1919.


86. PRO WO 144/13 Desp. 134E 31 March 1919.

87. Ibid. See also Morgan, *Assize of Arms* p. 25.

88. PRO FO 608/140 5310 Gosling to Balfour 24 March 1919.

89. Ibid, 5427 Gosling to Balfour 25 March 1919.

90. Ibid, 5535 Balfour to Gosling 4 April 1919.


Chapter 1 - Notes
94. PRO FO 608/62 8027 22 April 1919. See Newton, British Policy and the Weimar Republic p.380 for details of Gibson and his report.

95. PRO WO 144/22 12 July 1919 pp.166-172.

96. PRO FO 608/62 8027 22 April 1919. See minutes.

97. Luckau, The German Delegation pp.71-72


99. HLRO F/16/7/37 H.A.L Fisher to Ll. G. 17 March 1919. Fisher believed that 'the larger the Poland, the stronger the chances of a German-Russian combination against them'.

100. Latawski, Great Britain and the Rebirth of Poland pp.13-55.

101. FPUS Vol.II pp.773-800 Reports by the Morgenthau Mission. See also Cmd.674 Report by Sir Stuart Samuel on his Mission to Poland (HMSO 1920).

102. Davies, 'The Poles in Great Britain' p.86.

103. Daily Herald Wednesday 25 June 1919, 'Hands off Russia says Manchester'; and Daily Herald 27 June 1919. This records 50,000 people at a meeting beside Queens Hall, London. Some reports gave the figure of 100,000. See also Link (ed.) PWW Vol.59. p.419 for details of the New York protests against treatment of Jews in Poland.

104. PRO FO 608/60 10441 20 May 1919: Winthrop Bell memorandum.

105. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany p.49.

106. PRO FO 608/60 10441 20 May 1919.

107. Ibid.


109. PRO FO 608/60 10871 22 May 1919. Note on Ethnography of the Region of Upper Silesia Assigned to Poland by Bourdillon. As a concession, from 1917, schools were permitted to start teaching in the Polish language. However, very few teachers could speak Polish; therefore, initially at least, the gesture meant nothing. But when making their case to retain Upper Silesia, the Germans quoted the 'low take-up' of Polish as an indication that the population were content to be educated in German. The absence of Polish-speaking teachers was not mentioned.


111. Link (ed) PWW Vol.59 pp.413-419 Smuts to LI.G. 22 May 1919.

112. HLRO F/6/6/47 Cecil to LI.G May 1919.
113. HLRO F/10/7/39 Fisher to LI.G 28 May 1919.

114. PRO WO 144/17 Desp.186 22 May 1919.


117. HLRO F/30/3/71 Balfour to LI.G. 31 May 1919.


122. SRO GD40/17/466/26 3 June 1919.


125. *Ibid*.


130. SRO GD40/17/901 H.M. to Kerr 7 June 1919.


Chapter 1 - Notes
134. Ibid.


137. Ibid.


139. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921: Result of plebiscite held on 20 March 1921. See also Encyclopedia powstania Śląskich pp.687-690.


141. PRO FO 608/140 20182 Von Lersner to Clemenceau 3 November 1919. See PRO FO 608/70 17217 Delegation Minute 6 August 1919, on Germans' request for part of Namysłów to be included in the plebiscite area.

142. Link (ed.) PWW Vol.60 pp.554-556.


146. Vorwärts, Saturday 28 June 1919.


149. Ibid, Vol. 8 No.104 p.996. See also PRO FO 608/82 11335 30 May 1919. Minute by Winthrope Bell.

150. Challener, USMIS Vol.8 No.104 p.996.


152. PRO FO 608/62 12500 Wyndham to Balfour 12 June 1919. See also PRO FO 608/62 12682 Wyndham to Balfour 13 June 1919.


154. PRO FO 608/62 12682 Wyndham to Balfour 13 June 1919.


160. Interview with Dr. Jarosław Macała, Wrocław University, 2 July 1996.


162. PRO FO 608/40 18533A No.129 (262/6/32) Wyndham to Balfour 21 August 1919. Amongst his own observations here, Wyndham reports an interview by the *Kurjer Warszawski* with Stanisław Plodowski, a member of an Upper Silesian Delegation that had arrived in Warsaw to plead for Polish intervention.


164. *Ibid.* See also No.115, p1461 and No.117 p.1573.


169. *The Times*, Wednesday 20 August 1919. See also PRO WO 33/984 5174 Carton de Wiart to Astoria (Paris).


172. PRO FO 608/295/8489 26 August 1919. See also *ibid* 608/68 18585 1 September 1919.


175. *Ibid*, Friday 22 August 1919.


181. Correspondence with Professor Waclaw Ryżewski, Warsaw University (27 July 1997). Professor Ryżewski, author of *Trzecie Powstanie Śląskie* (Warsaw 1977) is a recognised authority on the Upper Silesian insurrections, and he believes that the figure could be much higher.


188 PRO WO 106/967 King to DMI 23 August 1919.

189. PRO FO 371/3899 125366 Wyndham to Curzon 22 August 1919. See also HLRO F/89/4/13 Kerr to Lloyd George 19 August 1919. Kerr tells Lloyd George that the reports from Warsaw probably contain 'a good deal of interested exaggeration'.

190. Correspondence with Professor Ryżewski, July 1997.


192. Morgan, *Assize of Arms* pp.81-92. This work contains his eye-witness account of Freikorps members' behaviour in Berlin during the Kapp *putsch*, March 1920.


196. Bane and Luntz, *Organisation of American Relief* pp.710-713. This investigative committee sent from Berlin, consisted of Lt. Col. Tidbury plus one other British officer, three French, two Italians and one Japanese officer.

197. PRO WO 144/26 Desp.278 84025 23 August 1919: Summary of General Malcolm's Report No.20, 22 August 1919. Although it was the Germans who had asked the Allied military authorities to send a military investigative committee, they refused the terms of reference drawn up by the Allied commanders in Berlin - claiming that they would infringe Prussian sovereignty. The despatch of this committee led by Lieutenant Colonel Tidbury was opposed by the military commanders in Upper Silesia and by the local State Commissioner, Otto Horsing. For the revised instructions see WO 106/971 Malcolm to DMI 24 August 1919.

198. *DBFP* Vol.1 No.43 pp.541-542 *Heads of Delegations Meeting* 26 August 1919. Anna Cienciala and Titus Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p.51 make no mention of Tidbury's investigative committee and describe this second Commission consisting of the three Generals from Berlin as a 'Military Commission of Inquiry'. British documents do, however, refer to it as an 'inter-Allied Commission'. Even more confusingly, after the three Generals returned to Berlin, Tidbury and the five junior officers left behind in Upper Silesia to monitor the situation are often also referred to as the 'inter-Allied Upper Silesian Commission'.


202. This report could not be found amongst the Foreign Office records. Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p.51, mistakenly cite *DBFP* Vol.VI No.172. This is a separate report to the DMI sent from Berlin by General Malcolm.

203. PRO WO 144/29 Desp.307 Summary of Major General Malcolm's Report No.22 of 19 September 1919. For the German response to General Dupont's memorandum, see FO 371/3849 134416 9 September 1919.

204. PRO WO 144/29 Desp.299 Major General Malcolm's Report No.21 on Present Conditions in Germany, 12 September 1919.


209. PRO FO 608/62 1112 Wade to Balfour 3 February 1919.
Chapter 2

The Inter-Allied Commission,

Development of French Ascendancy

and the Second Insurrection

On Wednesday, 11 February 1920, at 10.30 a.m., the three Allied Commissioners responsible for supervising the plebiscite arrived at Opole railway station. They and their senior officials were treated to a grand ceremonial reception. Allied colours decorated the station and a guard of honour was in place. General Gratier, the Commander of the inter-Allied military force was there, as were the representatives of the German Government headed by the Regierung-praesident. A military band played the French, British, and Italian national anthems, the guard was inspected and speeches made.

The Regierung-praesident made a short speech welcoming the Commission to Upper Silesia and saying that all subordinate officials were prepared to continue their functions and observe loyalty towards the new administration. General Le Rond replied, stating that he expected implicit obedience on the part of officials and he hoped all would do their common good for Upper Silesia. 1

This chapter examines Britain’s role in creating the French domination of the Upper Silesian inter-Allied Commission – something unappreciated and scarcely commented upon in English-language historiography. It analyses how the Commissioners, their officials, and the local German administration set about preparing for the plebiscite and also the manner in which their efforts became impaired by personal conflicts within the Commission and by struggles developing between the Powers outside Upper Silesia.
The structure and dynamics of the Commission are described, as are the Polish and German campaign organisations and propaganda strategies. Local factors, including the Roman Catholic clergy's participation in the plebiscite, are discussed, as are the events leading to the August 1920 insurrection. The Commission's reaction to this and subsequent breakdown in trust between the Allied Commissioners is also examined. The chapter concludes by analysing the reaction of the Foreign Office to this crisis, the reasons why Britain was prepared to withdraw from the Commission, and the diplomatic issues surrounding this decision. The latter is necessary because, as the manoeuvrings around the question of French security versus German economic recovery intensified, the British Commissioner, Colonel H.F.P. Percival, quickly allowed himself to be reduced to the role of diplomatic cat's paw for the Foreign Office; and soon, relations within the Commission reflected in microcosm this wider struggle over the Entente's attitude to Germany. Upper Silesia became a pawn in this game. This was manifested in petty jealousies and squabbling amongst officials and controllers over national amour propre – something exploited by both the Poles and the Germans.

Despite the persistent arguments advanced by the French military experts and their Peace Conference delegates in favour of a genuine inter-Allied presence in Upper Silesia, the French were destined to find themselves almost solely responsible for administering and policing the plebiscite area. There were two main reasons for this. First, the United States refused to ratify the Peace Treaty. Secondly, for Britain, the unsettled international situation, the commitments posed by an expanded Empire, the troubles in Ireland and the industrial unrest at home, combined to place an excessive demand upon its armed services. This was a time when Britain's domestic political circumstances and professional army tradition made any further extension to wartime
military conscription untenable. For the British contingent on the inter-Allied Commission the consequence of the British Army’s default was their relegation to a supporting role. This came to be resented by the British Commissioner and many officials. It manifested itself in a constant critique of the Commission’s French members who, due to France’s enforced greater military commitment, held most of the key positions on it. When law and order broke down, and the number of French (and even less numerous Italian troops) proved insufficient to reassert the Commission’s authority, the French in Upper Silesia found themselves accused of pursuing self-interested policies, jeopardising the very future of the Entente itself.

From the start of the Armistice, the British Army opposed commitments in East Central Europe. Most British politicians supported this stance. As early as January 1919, the War Cabinet rejected Marshal Foch’s request for British help in securing the passage of military aid through Gdansk to Poland. And mindful of the British public’s aversion to any renewal of military engagements, at the Peace Conference the British Delegation attempted to load new military commitments on to the United States - though without much success. They also continued their wartime practice of pushing Polish affairs over to the French. But the French, wanting to keep the Allies fully involved in Europe, demanded genuine inter-Allied participation everywhere. Therefore, when the plebiscite in Upper Silesia had been agreed, Lloyd George had conceded that ‘if necessary all the Allies would have to contribute troops’. On 26 June 1919, two days before the Peace Treaty was signed, the Supreme Council referred the question of the Upper Silesian military forces’ size and composition to the Supreme War Council’s military representatives at Versailles.

As well as the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, the Peace Conference had already stipulated several other areas of Allied military occupation in East-Central Europe. For
example, the ports of Gdansk and Memel had to be held until the League of Nations could negotiate suitable local administrations. Plebiscites requiring Allied troops were being held on the German-Danish border, on the Polish – Czechoslovak border at Spisz and Orava, and in East Prussia where Poland claimed territory around Olsztyn (Allenstein) and Kwidzyn (Marienwerder). In September 1919 the Supreme Council decided that a plebiscite should also be held in the Duchy of Cieszyn. These Peace Treaty commitments alarmed the British Army. It was experiencing difficulty meeting its existing commitments and wanted to withdraw from Europe completely. To Headlam Morley, the British official advising Lloyd George on the plebiscite detail, the Army’s strong objections (while predictable) were misguided. Leaving the continent to France was not an option. Apart from the political implications, British military reports concerning the areas to be occupied stressed that the German populations would resent the presence of French troops. The Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), General Thwaites despaired at ‘these continued proposals for the policing of Europe by British troops’. However, Headlam Morley was correct in his assessment.

No doubt the constant call for British troops is inconvenient, but we have undertaken serious political obligations and at whatever inconvenience, our credit is involved in carrying them through ... if the Principal Allied and Associated Powers cannot provide the small number of necessary troops now wanted, it is to be feared that complications will ensue which should entail a far greater burden.

On 10 July 1919, the War Council’s Military Representatives at Versailles reported back to the Supreme Council on the size of the Upper Silesian garrison. Its members recognised that there was a danger of crowd disturbances in the important industrial
towns where 'the population was split into two elements of such different mentality and tendencies that they will only accept the new condition of affairs with reluctance'. They recommended that an armed force of about one infantry division (about 13,000 men) was 'at least for the time being, indispensable to guarantee the maintenance of order and ensure the authority of the inter-Allied Commission'. The question of the composition of this international force was ignored completely. There can be little doubt that it was the influence of the CIGS, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, which was behind this.

Wilson believed that the Allied leadership's handling of international affairs was inept and that the Peace Conference had been a disaster. He thought that the British Government consistently disregarded the Army's post-war difficulties. Today, these problems are now attributed to 'imperial over-stretch' – inadequate resources to meet world-wide commitments. Wartime acquisitions such as Mesopotamia and Palestine had placed new demands on the Army. Around the Black Sea and at Constantinople, the Turkish resistance to Greek demands (supported by Lloyd George) had tied down several British battalions. There was a battalion at Fiume and the nationalist threat in Egypt and India had required an increased security presence. A credible military presence of around 200,000 British troops was also necessary in Western Europe until Germany ratified the Peace Treaty, after which a smaller, permanent force had to be maintained in the Rhineland. In Eastern Europe and the Far East, British support for the various White Russian leaders was proving expensive, and the military presence in North Russia was also unpopular at home. In Britain itself, the Government feared that forthcoming industrial confrontations might be of a revolutionary nature and wanted troops to be held in readiness to support the civilian authorities. And in Ireland, more than 30,000 British soldiers were struggling to contain the nationalists there.
these demands, policing plebiscite areas or maintaining order in Memel and Gdansk were at the bottom of Wilson’s priorities. So when Thwaites telephoned him from Paris to tell him that the War Council’s Military Representatives had recommended that an Allied force be sent to Silesia, Wilson exclaimed, ‘not one British soldier!’.

The War Office’s underlying problem was a manpower shortage. Unlike the peacetime conscription practised by the continental Powers, the British armed services were normally recruited on a voluntary basis. Millions of British men had volunteered or had been inducted into the services under emergency conscription for the War’s duration. Whatever the legal position, many soldiers and, importantly, their families, believed that their engagements expired on Germany’s defeat. During the December 1918 election campaign, Lloyd George’s Coalition candidates had raised expectations by promising a speedy demobilisation. However, the demobilisation plan was flawed, discipline began breaking down and incidents, often verging on mutiny, occurred amongst British troops in North Russia, Egypt, France and in holding camps in England. British soldiers returning to France in January 1919, had demonstrated in Whitehall at the very heart of their government. On one occasion, Sir Henry Wilson dissuaded the Prime Minister from receiving a deputation from amongst the soldiers congregating outside Downing Street. The British Government was forced to remind the public that the War would not be over until the Peace Treaty was drafted, signed and ratified, and after this the country would still provide occupation forces. These events and problems have been detailed by Keith Jeffery in The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918-1922.

Churchill was appointed War Secretary on 10 January 1919. He immediately drew up an equitable demobilisation plan based on the ‘first in, first out’ principle. The plan was well received but his scheme to solve the Army’s manpower shortage by
extending conscription until April 1920, met with some political opposition. This was because it broke specific pledges given during the election. Churchill aimed to retain 900,000 men for overseas service by extending conscription until April 1920. This was a measure that was vital for the Army. Churchill stressed the urgency of a decision and, eventually, reluctant approval was obtained. But when the Paris Conference started to drag on and the Peace Treaty's ratification was delayed it became apparent that the number of conscripts that had to be retained for overseas service had fallen far short of the necessary numbers. Recruitment of volunteers became a priority but this was not really successful until the British economy slid into recession in late 1920. Even then, the standard of volunteers was often deemed unsatisfactory when the recruits were compared to the quality of the pre-war Army. Many of them were just young boys. In an earlier bid to increase numbers, the enlistment age had been lowered to seventeen. The most serious shortages were of skilled personnel such as drivers, artificers, mechanics, telegraphists and wireless operators. Because Treasury constraints on expenditure restricted the funding to train them, these shortages persisted for many years. These types of problems, and especially the need to secure Britain’s ‘home base’ (including Ireland) and the Empire, provided Wilson’s justification for resisting the despatch of British soldiers to the plebiscite areas.

Wilson’s campaign against committing British troops began when he attended the discussions in Paris on the Military Representatives’ report on garrisoning Upper Silesia. Under Wilson’s influence, the British Delegation’s new policy was to avoid participating in the multi-national inter-Allied forces stipulated by the Peace Treaty’s various plebiscite clauses. Instead, they wanted each plebiscite area’s control commission and military force to be provided by individual Allied Powers. Thwaites believed that the French intended to take Upper Silesia. Since it was accessible by
sea, the British Delegation’s preference was for Gdansk. However, the talks held on July 15, 1919, were inconclusive – with each delegation declaring difficulty in finding the necessary troops. Crowe, now the senior Foreign Office official in Paris, had been under the impression that Wilson had supported this policy, but the latter made it clear to Thwaites that he still opposed British military involvement anywhere in Europe. If troops were taken from the Rhine he did not know how they would behave. And he warned the British Delegation not to commit British troops anywhere after 31 March 1920. That was when the new Conscription Act lapsed and ‘no troops, except the new post bellum volunteer army required for normal garrisons, would be available after that date’. 

At the Heads of Delegation’s meeting on 21 July, it was finally decided that the Upper Silesia force could be taken from the Allied Army on the Rhine. Marshal Foch, however, stipulated that it must comprise an equal ratio of Allied troops, a condition that he adhered to over subsequent negotiations. This was referred back to individual Allied Governments for their approval. When General Sackville West, the British Military Representative at Versailles, took over Thwaites’ duties with the British Delegation, he wrote to Wilson to say that he believed that Balfour, the Delegation’s leader, realised the British Army’s problems. However, he noted, not everyone in the British Delegation agreed with Wilson’s ideas; therefore, sustaining Wilson’s position of non-involvement would not be an easy task. The accuracy of Sackville West’s assessment was confirmed when, on 8 August, the Heads of Delegations agreed that ‘the United States, Great Britain, France and Italy, would each supply a quarter of the total effectives necessary for Upper Silesia’. 

Despite this apparently unequivocal resolution, it is quite clear that only the French Delegation believed in the principle of equal troop contributions. During the
discussions Balfour had alluded to the difficulties that would arise in supplying British Army units in Silesia, giving him the excuse to propose British activity be restricted to the two Baltic ports and East Prussia. He went on to suggest that since it would be easier for the French Army to operate in Upper Silesia, France could perhaps make a proportionally larger contribution there. Although the dispersal of the plebiscite forces would be modified, the numbers and the overall ratio of troops from each country could remain the same. This idea was resisted by France, but at meetings over the following weeks, the British Delegation pursued this idea ruthlessly. Meanwhile, as recorded in Chapter One, escalating violence that month culminated in the first Upper Silesian insurrection. This forced a review of the number of troops to be sent there once the Peace Treaty that had been ratified by Germany and the Allies – which it was envisaged would be sometime during October.

Discussing the insurrection with the Heads of Delegations on 22 August, Foch’s Chief of Staff, General Weygand, told the delegates that the population of Upper Silesia had demonstrated that they were capable of military action. After pointing out that the recommendation to send just one division of Allied troops had been based on an assumption that the region would be tranquil, he proposed that at least two divisions (circa 26,000 men) be sent instead. The Heads of Delegations agreed and ordered Weygand to consult Wilson and General Bliss about furnishing British and American troops. But the following day Balfour once again took the opportunity to challenge the concept of distributing the plebiscite forces on a composite basis. Clemenceau drew attention to the political significance of a composite force, as well as his country’s very close relations with Poland. Balfour agreed with the latter point and suggested that, this being the case, France should enjoy having the largest Allied representation in Poland. This appealed to Clemenceau, and the delegates asked the
military experts to examine means by which homogeneous forces could be distributed throughout Gdansk and the plebiscite areas. However, the French military authorities opposed this. Citing the Allied resolution of 8 August, they claimed that this decision, which called on each of them to contribute one quarter of the force for Upper Silesia, precluded discussion on homogeneous units. To cover all of the Peace Treaty’s commitments, Wilson calculated that the Allies would have to find over four divisions (circa 52,000 men) for possibly up to eighteen months. Yet it appeared that Italy could only spare three battalions and after talking to Generals Pershing and Bliss, Wilson felt that the Americans could not be counted on for any. It seemed that France and Britain might each have to find 26,000 men. Writing to Churchill, Wilson pointed out that in a few months time they would not be able to lay their hands on two divisions even if they wanted to.

The problem was compounded in September when the Allies decided to also hold a plebiscite in Cieszyn. Crowe (who had now taken over from Balfour as head of the British Delegation), reaffirmed Britain’s disapproval of composite forces. But General Le Rond, who had served on the Peace Conference’s Cieszyn and Oravia Sub-Commission, reasserted the French military’s contention that the Allies had collective responsibility for each plebiscite area. Crowe replied ‘that the British military authorities felt so strongly they hesitated to send troops to any part of the world, until this principle is settled’. The French answer was that the military occupation by a single power gave the Germans grounds for complaint. They also highlighted the danger of homogeneous forces being used to create spheres of influence in areas in which they were interested. That said, they appeared to have given way when a French Foreign Office senior official conceded that a formula might be found.
Reporting this to Curzon, Crowe noted that the suggestion now was that command of each occupied area should be awarded to the largest military contingent. Therefore by supplying the main forces in Gdansk, Memel, Kwidzyn and Olsztyn, Britain could secure command there.\(^{39}\) Sackville West also recommended this to Wilson.\(^{40}\) At the War Office, Sir Percy Radcliffe, the Director of Military Operations (DMO), quickly prepared a paper estimating the number of troops necessary – adding that any other Allied detachments ‘should be kept as small as possible’. He suggested that only one British battalion be sent to Upper Silesia.\(^{41}\) Policy approval was rushed through for a Heads of Delegations meeting in Paris on 13 October.\(^{42}\) However, when the meeting opened and Crowe began to reveal the British proposals, his interpretation of the previous discussions was immediately challenged by Foch who said that he knew nothing about this divergence. He only recognised the Versailles Treaty. If it was not to break down, at least two divisions had to occupy Upper Silesia, and it had already been resolved that this force would comprise equal contingents. Pichon, the French representative, quickly stepped in to affirm that his Government had admitted the principle of homogeneous forces, but they had not admitted that the military units representing the other Allies could be so small. The whole subject, he said, was dominated by politics. Occupation by inter-Allied forces was necessary to prove the unity of the Allies in guaranteeing the Peace Treaty’s execution. In this spirit, Foch proposed that a special meeting be held to discuss the subject from both a political and a military point of view.\(^{43}\)

This meeting, on 14 October, was a great success for Crowe and Sackville West. Before it had commenced the French had moved some way towards their position and they must have felt that the Italians’ difficulties in finding troops, also the Americans’ increasing self-marginalisation, suited their single power solution. And so
At the meeting's conclusion, practically all of the British proposals had been accepted. France would take military command in Upper Silesia with an inter-Allied force comprising eighteen battalions and some ancillary units (in total about 22,000 men). Britain had to contribute just three infantry battalions there – just two more than the DMO had allowed for. However in reporting the decision (tabulated below) to London, Sackville West also warned London that the Italians might still only provide three battalions and the Americans remained doubtful.

Table 1

Inter-Allied Forces for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalions</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Silesia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cieszyn</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdansk</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwidzyn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
<td><strong>10</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
<td><strong>9</strong></td>
<td><strong>7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In mid-November the United States Senate refused to ratify the Peace Treaty and the Anglo-American security guarantee to France – the British guarantee falling with it. With good reason, the French felt deceived, deserted and isolated. To help contain Germany, they turned even more towards the Czechs and the Poles. As a consequence, they now took more interest in Upper Silesia. And having already been awarded military command there (another decision taken by the Heads of the Delegations), this inevitably elevated the designated French commissioner General Le Rond, to the
Presidency of inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission, whose task it would be to govern the region and prepare the way for the plebiscite. 47

Apart from the British Army desire to have a minimum presence in Upper Silesia, several other factors conspired to produce French domination of the inter-Allied Commission. While some decisions were taken by the Allied Delegates, others were made by the Commission formed in Paris to interpret and execute the Peace Treaty. 48 Later known as the Ambassadors’ Conference, this Commission, chaired by Le Rond, negotiated the protocol on the Peace Treaty’s implementation with the German Delegation in Paris. Le Rond also chaired talks between the President-designates for the various other plebiscite commissions. These established such things as common manpower requirements, the common procedures for the handing over of territories and defining the extent of administrative control to be included within the Protocol which was signed on 9 January 1920. 49 An important factor which emerged during the discussions was that holding a plebiscite commission’s presidency entailed additional executive obligations. It was decided that the nation holding the presidency had to supply these extra officials. And, although it was still hoped the United States might participate in Upper Silesia, until that happened the American share of the inter-Allied Commission’s administration was also assumed by France. 50

The British could have shared in providing these extra officials needed to run the Upper Silesian Commission but they declined. Instead, Whitehall started to raise all sorts of petty obstacles. For example, it took Crowe several weeks to obtain Treasury permission for British officials to be paid at the high salary rates which the French thought necessary to recruit competent personnel. 51 And after having sought control of the plebiscite areas around the Baltic because of their easy access by sea, the War Office then found themselves unable to provide the military contingents,
including their own, with sea transportation to these areas – leaving it to France to arrange rail transport through the not very accommodating Germans. None of this augured well for the parties’ future relationships, but despite these problems the military element now appeared to be in place. At least that was the impression.

Despite his rhetoric, during October 1919 Wilson had responded to the political requirement for plebiscite troops by forming a British ‘Independent Division’ on the Rhine, under General W.C. Heneker. This force comprised depleted battalions of conscripts who were awaiting demobilisation. Many were untrained; some of them had never fired a rifle. With the extended period of conscription due to end on 31 March, the Peace Treaty’s delayed implementation meant that the Army had to replace this force with regular soldiers from Britain. Unfortunately, many of the battalions that Wilson had in mind contained a high proportion of young recruits still undergoing their basic training. In mid-December Sackville West informed Foch that the earliest date British troops could move to the plebiscite areas would be 15 January 1920. The three battalions placed on standby for duty in Upper Silesia were the 1st Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, 2nd Battalion Gordon Highlanders, and 2nd Battalion Cameron Highlanders. However, leaving aside the effect that the United States’ default may have had on the inter-Allied force’s credibility, events within Upper Silesia were also calling the adequacy of the size of the military force in question.

Because of their poor performance in Upper Silesia’s local elections (which had been postponed until November 1919 because of the strikes and the disturbances leading up to the insurrection), Germans there were now feeling much less confident about the plebiscite’s outcome. The State Commissioner, Otto Horsing, had held these elections against the advice of his compatriots. Nevertheless, they were a constitutional pre-requisite for the Prussian Landtag granting Upper Silesia the status of an
independent province. Apart from the Poles mobilising their existing support, the new
voting system had also given the poorer, Polish-speaking Upper Silesians, an increased
proportion of the vote.\(^5^8\) Out of 11,255 councillors elected, 6,822 were Polish party
supporters and only 4,373 were German.\(^5^9\) From Upper Silesia, Colonel Tidbury, who
was there with the small inter-Allied Commission sent from Berlin in August, reported
that if the Poles had enjoyed absolute freedom, they would have won by much more.\(^6^0\)
Believing that Horsing, a Social Democrat, had gravely jeopardised the German cause,
the nationalists forced him to resign.\(^6^1\) German nationalist pressure was mounting. The
election results had come on top of a further influx of irregular forces into Upper
Silesia. The Peace Treaty's plebiscite clauses required the Reichswehr and other semi-
military formations, such as the Grenzschutz, to be withdrawn or disbanded before the
inter-Allied military force arrived there. The Prussian administration used the outsiders
to create the semblance of a new regular German armed formation in Upper Silesia.
This force was the Sicherheitspolizei (security police).\(^6^2\)

These heavily militarised police forces were being established across Germany.
They comprised locally recruited ex-army officers and NCO's. Housed in barracks,
they were generally equipped with machine guns, mortars, artillery, and even some
aircraft. Allied officials recognised this as a blatant attempt to circumvent the Peace
Treaty's disarmament clauses. But the British Foreign Office concluded that, given the
prevailing unrest in Germany, it was difficult to see how order could otherwise be
maintained.\(^6^3\) Nevertheless, establishing the Sicherheitspolizei in an area to be policed
by an Allied force was a different matter. The Polish Government demanded that it be
evacuated along with the Reichswehr.\(^6^4\) And in a note to the delegates in Paris, sent
just a few days before the Treaty's implementation on 10 January, 1920, Foch
highlighted 'the abnormal deployment of police forces' in Upper Silesia, also the

Chapter 2
influx of young men from von der Goltz’s demobilised Baltikum ‘whose bad character and want of discipline are well known’. He pointed out that, apart from intimidating the population, the presence of these ‘active elements of agitation’ would undoubtedly lead to conflict with the occupying inter-Allied force. Thus, from the start, the Plebiscite Commission would find itself ‘in inextricable difficulties’.65

This was dealt with by Le Rond through the protocol he was negotiating with von Simson, the German Foreign Minister. Viewing the Sicherheitspolizei as a means to augment the inter-Allied military forces, the Heads of Delegations decided to limit it to 3,000 men, reduce its weaponry, and bring it under the inter-Allied Commission’s control. However, the Commission’s failure to tackle its German character would later provide the Polish Silesians with a constant source of grievance. The recruitment of the Baltikum and many other Freikorpskämpfer by the Upper Silesian landowners and industrialists as insurance against Polish nationalist activities, was something the Allies thought that they could do little about. These professional ultra-nationalists, hidden away on the larger landed estates as Abergemeinschaften (labour associations) or else employed in the mines and factories as security guards, helped the landowners to maintain their grip on the Polish-speaking peasantry. They were also the nucleus around which the German Selbstschutz (self-defence force) would be formed and their activities proved an ever-increasing source of tension and instability in the region.66

Discussing a German request that the size of the proposed inter-Allied force to Upper Silesia be reduced by one third, Crowe reminded the delegates in Paris about the build-up of the German paramilitary forces and warned against the Allies having insufficient forces there.67 Refusing the German request, in their reply the delegates nevertheless made a virtue of the absence of the United States contingent.68 Ironically, whilst the British Delegation in Paris was urging its French and Italian counterparts to
maintain the plebiscite forces as they stood, Churchill, in response to Wilson’s prompting, started a last minute campaign to withdraw the British military contingent altogether. This appeal was based on the Army’s diminishing ability to deal with perceived challenges to the Government’s authority in Britain. The British press had excited public opinion by running ‘Red Scare’ stories over a forthcoming rail strike. To rally support for unpopular fiscal measures, the British Government had been portraying itself as a bulwark against revolution and anarchy. The quality of their self-deceit was such that at a meeting of the Supply and Transport Committee held on 15 January 1920 (after the movements of British units to Upper Silesia and elsewhere had started), Churchill and Wilson witnessed first hand the ‘near hysteria and irresolution’ which some of its members displayed over the ‘Bolshevist threat’. They raised the question of the strike at a meeting with Lloyd George in Paris the following day. Wilson recorded that ‘Winston asked formally to be excused from sending the 11 Plebiscite Battalions’. But neither Bonar Law, the Coalition's Conservative leader (who had already been harangued by Wilson over the plebiscite battalions and the state of the nation), nor the Prime Minister’s personal staff were convinced.

Reinforced by the arrival of Sir Robert Horne, the Minister of Labour who had painted the direst of scenarios at the Supply and Transport meeting a few days earlier, Wilson and his companions, who included Admiral of the Fleet, Earl Beatty, and the First Lord of the Admiralty, Walter Long, continued pressing the point. On Sunday, 18 January, Lloyd George finally gave way and promised to take the matter up with Clemenceau. He did this the following day. Just before a meeting of the Supreme War Council, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir Maurice Hankey, informed Wilson ‘that Lloyd George had told both Clemenceau & Nitti [the Italian Prime Minister] that owing to
the internal conditions at home he was not able to send the Battalions to the
Plebiscite!' In his diary, Wilson recognised that 'this would have grave consequences
in France and Germany'. Although Wilson claimed that 'Foch took the news like the
great man he is', Foch was reported to have observed to Wilson; 'Now you are not
Allies but Associates'.

The obvious question arising from this decision not to send the British troops is
why, in the light of his own well-documented scepticism over the 'revolutionary
nature' of the industrial unrest, did Lloyd George yield to the hard-liners' demands?
The answer may be that his post-war politics were expedience personified – the
plebiscite in Upper Silesia being just one illustration. Often, his actions were sops to
the Coalition's Conservative majority. Many of its members represented business
interests and readily believed that revolution was a real possibility. Therefore, pressed
to take some action to reassure the British public and calm the fears of his Coalition
partners (however irrational he thought they might be), withdrawing the plebiscite
troops would have been the easiest of gestures presenting itself to the Prime Minister.

It is perhaps significant that Wilson's diary records that neither Churchill nor Lloyd
George appeared to think anything of the consequences of what they had done.

The question of how to garrison the two Baltic ports and secure the plebiscite
areas with the reduced forces available, was tackled by two inter-Allied meetings held
the next day, 20 January. These were attended by the Allied Prime Ministers and
Foreign Secretaries. Weygand, Foch's Chief of Staff, envisaged great difficulties in
Upper Silesia and Clemenceau stated that the inter-Allied Commission could only
really proceed to Opole if its President, Le Rond, accepted this reduction in military
support. Foch suggested a meeting of political and military representatives with the
presidents of all the plebiscite commissions. They met that afternoon. There, Le Rond
said that he could not see how any reduction could be countenanced in Upper Silesia. He pointed out the military and political dangers awaiting his Commission and predicted that the Germans would revolt at the first opportunity. Without the three British battalions, Le Rond believed that in any emergency it would be impossible to occupy the principal industrial centres, the strategic railway crossings, and the cities that had to be held. Lloyd George, however, warned Le Rond that it was the Poles who were most likely to cause difficulties in Upper Silesia. But, he added, after talking to Wilson, that he might now be able to offer two British battalions - one for Gdansk and one for Olsztyn. Representing France at his last-ever meeting of Allied ministers before retirement, Clemenceau proposed partially to compensate for the loss of the four United States and three British battalions from Upper Silesia by furnishing two more French infantry units.80

Table 2

Revised Schedule of Inter-Allied Forces
for Plebiscite and Garrison Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Battalions GB</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Upper Silesia</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cieszyn</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gdansk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwidzyn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memel</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 18 (33) 2 (10) - (7) 11 (9) 5 (7) *(recommended battalions) *plus two artillery battalions
Over the coming months this reduction in the size and composition of the plebiscite force would have severe political repercussions. It was not long before the British came to rue the loss of influence the decision cost them in Upper Silesia. But that lay ahead. For the moment Sir Henry Wilson was delighted to have saved his battalions. With the exception of the 3rd Battalion Royal Fusiliers and the 1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, who were going to Gdansk and Olsztyn respectively, he ordered all other troop movements cancelled and recalled the advance parties.\(^8\) The Peace Treaty had come into effect on 10 January 1920, the *Reichswehr* and associated forces had been evacuated and the French element of the inter-Allied force had departed to secure Upper Silesia prior to the Commission’s arrival in Opole on 11 February. And so, even before it had arrived there, the French military and administrative ascendancy in Upper Silesia was complete.

The French leaders had not sought this outcome, quite the reverse. It was thrust on them by the United States’ failure to ratify the Peace Treaty, and by the inadequacy of Britain’s resources to meet the political, economic and military demands placed on her in the wake of the Great War. The wide diversity of factors underlying these basic problems was very much apparent in the negotiations surrounding the size of the plebiscite force and its composition. Whilst the French had attempted to maintain a unity of purpose amongst the Allies (albeit from motives related to the wider issue of European security, and French security in particular), in Italy, the United States and Britain there was already growing disillusionment with the Peace Treaty.\(^82\) Paradoxically, in Britain, one of the leading figures undermining the Treaty was Lloyd George himself. This contradiction was not only attributable to his desire to conciliate Germany, but was partly due to attempts to rehabilitate himself in the eyes of
liberals, radicals, and even Labour Party supporters, all of whom had provided him with political support in the past. Unlike the British Government, Wilson had confidence in France, or at least in its military leadership. Provided the French did not distract British attention (or troops) from the Empire, he did not see too much wrong with the picture Lloyd George was starting to paint of a France acting as ‘the new militaristic power, pursuing Napoleonic dreams of empire’. 84

But outside Westminster, such opinion had started to come into its own. British ‘revisionists’ opposed transferring any more German territory to France’s ally, Poland, and consistently attacked Poland’s attempts to re-establish its eastern borders. Underlying this new liberal view was a passionate desire to return to a mythical pre-war economic ‘golden age’. The loss of Upper Silesia’s resources would undermine Germany’s role as the economic motor for European recovery. The cost to Poland if the Polish Silesians failed to acquire these industries went either unconsidered or discounted. Instead, the view of the Poles as a people enslaved by land-owning military imperialists was one widely held by Western liberals and socialists, and one much exploited by Poland’s enemies, especially Germany and Russia. 86

Several British Army officers who were seconded as officials to the Commission arrived in Upper Silesia already viewing Polish abilities in these very negative terms. This was usually coupled with a similar contempt for their French colleagues. The most prejudiced were the ex-members of General Malcolm’s British military mission in Berlin. Malcolm’s close friend, the historian John Wheeler Bennett, claimed later that the mission’s reports from Berlin had played an important part in moderating the original conditions of peace. Whilst any overt partiality by the
French towards the Polish Silesians also threatened the plebiscite area’s stability, it was highly noticeable that in successfully evading their security responsibilities in Upper Silesia, the British had studiously ignored this danger. They had paid scant regard to the many cautions they had received about sending French forces into these areas. A warning that French sympathy for Poland might possibly endanger a peaceful plebiscite, was first raised in a War Office paper briefing British personnel travelling to Silesia. It was echoed again by Malcolm in a letter to Headlam Morley in February 1920. He felt that ‘the dice were now being loaded against the Germans’. Malcolm visited Opole shortly before the Commissioners arrived on 11 February. Reporting his impressions to London, he remarked how these British officials who were already in Upper Silesia were embarrassed by their French colleagues’ open declaration of sympathy for Poland. He believed the French soldiers and officials to be extremely unpopular [with the Germans] and that before long they might provoke serious demonstrations against themselves. Those searching for discrimination could find it everywhere. For example, the day after the inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission arrived, a British official protested to it about a French military order disarming all civilians. He believed that only the ‘better class [the Germans] would comply, leaving them at the mercy of the ‘unruly class’ [the Poles] who would not’.

As we have seen, the Commission’s structure had been agreed when all the Plebiscite Commissioners had met in Paris during November and December 1919. The Presidency of the Upper Silesian Commission had gone to General Henri Le Rond. The British Commissioner was Lieutenant Colonel Harold Franz Percival and the Italian Commissioner was General Armando de Marinis. All three controlled the Commission, which was, in turn, responsible to the Conference of Ambassadors, which met in Paris. After the Peace Conference’s last meeting (9 January, 1920), this
4. The Three Commissioners (by Heather Soutar)
Photo 2: Site of Inter-Allied Commission Opole
"General Henri Le Rond a friend of Poland"
Conference of Ambassadors took charge of the Peace Treaty’s detail. The plebiscite Commissioners in Upper Silesia were nominally independent. In practice, however, they increasingly referred their problems to their individual governments and acted on instruction. This itself encouraged even more external interference, which did much to increase friction between its members, but the administrative practices that evolved in the Commission also contributed to this development.

At first, the Commission’s governmental decisions were taken at daily meetings between the three Commissioners and their most senior officials. These were the ‘directors’ of Upper Silesia’s various administrative departments. The directors communicated the Commission’s orders to their department’s executive officials and the original Prussian administrators who, along with their staffs, had almost all remained in place. The Commission’s control of the various departments was quite rigid and jealously guarded. Dealings with the Prussian and German Governments were only handled through the respective director. Having met the directors, the three Commissioners would retire to discuss new proposals, problems on which they had disagreed, and the following day’s business. Though the Commissioners were equal, the President was ‘more equal’ than the others. He was the ceremonial and administrative figurehead, the Commission’s executive authority and he handled all official communications. He also co-ordinated the work of the Departments. After just three weeks, Marinis was complaining bitterly to Percival about their lack of influence in the conduct of public affairs. But Percival told him that their ‘positions in the Commission were necessarily subordinate to that of the President, for if it were absolutely equal we were bound to pull in different directions’.

Once immersed in their own departments, the directors showed an increasing reluctance to attend meetings which had little or no relevance to them. The directors’
meetings thus became less frequent and were eventually replaced by encounters between individual directors and the Commissioners – placing even more departmental co-ordination in Le Rond’s hands. One other practice that quickly fell into abeyance at this time was the discipline of the deputy Commissioners attending the meetings and recording the decisions that had been reached. This made it increasingly difficult for Percival and Marinis to question Le Rond’s actions. With little else to do, the British and Italian Commissioners started receiving private deputations and requests to initiate this or that action in the Commission. Before long, rifts that had always existed developed into chasms. By September 1920, analysing the British Commissioner’s performance over the first nine months of the Commission’s life, a senior Foreign Office official formed ‘the pretty definite conclusion that things have been rather badly mismanaged by Col. Percival and his deputy Bourdillon’. The view of the principle under-secretary, Lord Hardinge, was that ‘Percival had shown himself to be weak, and overawed by General Lerond [sic]’.  

Another practice detrimental to good inter-Allied relations, was Percival’s insistence whenever the business under discussion involved departments headed by a French or Italian director, on calling that director’s subordinate British officials to the meeting as well. But perhaps the greatest strain was over the languages. Despite having agreed in Paris that the official language of the Commission would be French, Percival insisted on conducting business in English. Apart from Le Rond, few French officials understood English and almost none of the Italians, including Marinis. All the official correspondence between British officials was conducted in English; as was business transacted in the two departments headed by British directors - Communications and Food. On this subject, Percival told Le Rond that he was only reiterating some of his subordinates’ fears ‘that England was likely to lose prestige’ if French was the

Chapter 2
Commission’s only political language. Since Percival’s subordinates had also objected to only French being used on the official stamps, he forced Le Rond to concede the use of the English term ‘District Controller’ on the stamps of British officials engaged in this work.\(^{101}\)

Each of Upper Silesia’s administrative districts (Kreise) was the responsibility of a district controller. Helped by one or two assistant controllers, they represented the Commission at local authority level. At first there were five British, five Italian, and ten French district controllers. Relying very much on their own initiative, they dealt with all sorts of problems, ranging from strikes, murders, disputes between political opponents and, not least, the implementation of the Commission’s decrees. Generally working through existing local officials such as the Landrat or the Burgermeister, they were responsible for maintaining law and order in their district. The civil police came under their orders and they could also call on the local military commander’s help.\(^{102}\)

As we have seen, because of the British and American troop withdrawals, the Commission had retained the services of the 3,000 strong German Sicherheitspolizei. Like the district controllers and the civil police force, they were controlled by the Commission’s Interior Department. The German Silesian population naturally wanted the Sicherheitspolizei to be retained, but the military commanders distrusted this all-German para-military force. In a co-ordinated operation, the Commission’s French troops partially disarmed them, leaving them with just enough weapons for police work.\(^{103}\) This eased the military force’s anxieties even if the Commissioners recognised that the security force at their disposal was too small to deal with major problems, such as a general strike in the mines or the railway works.

On 30 March, Percival informed the Foreign Office that the Commissioners had asked the Ambassadors’ Conference for three additional battalions and a cavalry
regiment. In London, Crowe reminded the Foreign Secretary that the force was under-
strength because various War Offices had claimed that they did not have enough
troops, but Curzon did not think that Britain could help. In fact, prior to the
plebiscite in March 1921, the force never exceeded the 13,000 troops that had been
recommended by the military experts for ‘tranquil conditions’. The revised
establishment of eighteen battalions (22,000 men) was never achieved. Yet the
administrative element did enjoy a proportionally greater increase in its personnel.

To closely supervise the activities of each Upper Silesian administrative service,
it had been suggested that each Power send out between 50 and 60 officials but the
British had refused this on cost grounds. At first the Commission’s staff comprised 98
officials (69 French, 33 British and 26 Italians); the French also supplied the clerks,
interpreters, chauffeurs, telephone operators and orderlies. By September 1920 the
numbers and distribution of officials (classified by grades 1 – 3) had climbed to 139
(75 French, 39 British, and 25 Italians) with 56 additional employees. As a result of the
Commission’s reorganisation in November 1920, the numbers then started to rise quite
dramatically. By May 1922 its total strength had risen to 274 officials (122 French, 82
British, and 70 Italians) with 293 employees (comprising 159 French, 101 British, and
33 Italians). The British contingent’s expansion was agreed by the Foreign Office
because Percival believed more British officials were necessary to enable the French
activities in Upper Silesia to be monitored more closely. However, a large proportion
of the extra numbers were brought in to train and run the Commission’s new mixed
plebiscite police force. This was formed from what remained of the Sicherheitspolizei
after the second Polish insurrection in August 1920. By controlling this police force,
London had hoped it would compensate for the absence of British troops.
Table 3

Distribution of Officials in the Upper Silesia Administrative and Plebiscite Commission by Nationality, September 1 1920.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role/Department</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. 2. 3. total</td>
<td>1. 2. 3. total</td>
<td>1. 2. 3. total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinets</td>
<td>1  1  9  11</td>
<td>1  1  2  4</td>
<td>1  -  2  3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sec. General</td>
<td>1  1  2  4</td>
<td>-   -  1  1</td>
<td>-   -  1  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior</td>
<td>1  3  3  7</td>
<td>-   1  -  1</td>
<td>-   1  -  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance</td>
<td>1  1  3  5</td>
<td>-   1  1  2</td>
<td>-   1  -  1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1  1  -  2</td>
<td>-   1  -  1</td>
<td>1  1  -  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>1  3  3  7</td>
<td>-   1  2  3</td>
<td>-   -  2  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1  2  3  6</td>
<td>-   -   -</td>
<td>-   1  1  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comms.</td>
<td>-   1  3  4</td>
<td>-   6  2  8</td>
<td>-   2  -  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Cont.</td>
<td>-   1  1  2</td>
<td>1  1  4  6</td>
<td>-   -  2  2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts</td>
<td>- 10  17 27</td>
<td>-  5  8  13</td>
<td>-  4  5  9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In its relations with the German Government, the Commission first conducted negotiations through their representative to the Commission, von Moltke. He was superseded by Prince Hatzfeldt who extended his own role with the Commission to include speaking on behalf of the German Silesians. The Polish Government was represented by its own Consul General, Daniel Keszycki. Locally however, Keszycki was eclipsed by the role and personality of Wojciech Korfanty – who had now been appointed by Warsaw to head the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat and was destined to become both the British and German governments’ *bête noire*. The Polish and the German plebiscite campaign teams maintained support committees in
practically every Upper Silesian town and village. They also had support committees in the trade unions, the political parties and the professional associations. Sporting and cultural groups were vociferous campaigners, and organisations that had been formed in Poland to assist the Polish Silesians during the August 1919 insurrection continued their support.

In terms of resources, however, the two sides were worlds apart. The Prussian state administration directed Germany’s covert financial, political, and military activities in Upper Silesia through the Zentralle, a special organisation established in Wroclaw for that purpose. In Upper Silesia, the German Plebiscite Commissariat was led by Dr. Urbanek, a lawyer and recently the mayor of Rozbark (Rossberg), a suburb of Bytom. The Commissariat was a development of the Schlesische Ausschuss (Silesian Committee), an existing executive body for a loose federation of German associations located throughout Silesia. As with the Polish organisation, the German Commissariat aimed to unite representatives from practically all the German political parties, the trades unions and any semi-official German bodies - bringing them under its political and industrial control. Its district offices acted as intelligence centres and information bureaux, uniting local German organisations, coordinating campaigns and representing German interests in their dealings with the district controllers. Schlesische Ausschuss’s branch associations, which had not been incorporated into the Commissariat, continued as the semi-independent Vereinigte Verbände (United Associations) - a propaganda organisation which also brought individual German supporters together. Almost all German language newspapers were at the German Commissariat’s disposal. And since they were the preserve of educated people sympathetic to them, the German campaigners also enjoyed the support of Upper Silesia’s professional associations and societies. All the principal
landowners, the mine-owners, and the industrial magnates were allied to the German Commissariat and the Vereinigte Verbände. The senior clergy of all denominations also supported them; as did practically all the schoolteachers, the public officials and (important since most of them lived in the industrial area) the Jewish population.  

Due to their socio-economic position, the Polish-speaking population was much less well organised. Some still remained grouped in German trade unions and most of the agricultural labourers were not organised. This made the Polish Commissariat's task much more difficult. It attempted to extend the Polish network by making sentimental appeals to the Polish-speakers' national consciousness - drawing attention to every iniquity that they were suffering. The Germans countered by working to retain Polish-speakers in their organisations, attacking the Polish leadership and obstructing their attempts to organise the Polish Silesians. Failing to understand the political battle raging around him, Percival put it all down to agitators and terrorists. And rather than avail himself of the French-controlled Interior Department reports, he made do with the personal reports and the opinions of the British district controllers. Unsurprisingly, his reports to London reflected their general hostility towards the Poles. From May his main theme was French partiality towards the Poles; and from August (after suspecting that he was being spied on), he started dwelling upon Le Rond's alleged duplicity.  

General Le Rond's knowledge about Upper Silesia's problems was unsurpassed. He had participated on almost every Peace Conference committee handling Polish questions, attended all the Supreme Council and Heads of Delegations' deliberations about the plebiscites and had negotiated the agreement implementing the Peace Treaty. The Director of the Upper Silesia Food Department, J.I. Craig, who was widely experienced in both British and Colonial governments, thought that General Le Rond
was 'one of the cleverest men' he had ever met. Craig also admired the President's deputy, Ponset. In Craig's view, both men worked harder than anyone else on the Commission and he believed that their achievements proved 'what brains backed by hard work can do'. This was not an opinion wholly shared by Percival's deputy. In his 1923 final report on the Commission, Bourdillon allowed that Le Rond was 'an indefatigable worker' who literally lived in the Commission's headquarters. He was also very persuasive but

He was not physically courageous. He was disliked both in Paris, where his rapid rise had promoted jealousy, and in Upper Silesia, where he bullied his subordinates into submission or resignation... He had few scruples, hardly ever lost his temper, even when roundly abused, and scarcely showed any embarrassment when discovered in deception.

Bourdillon concluded by claiming that before long, acquaintances doubted anything Le Rond said in any scheme that he proposed. That said, in Craig's view, the British and Italian Commissioners' abilities fell far short of Le Rond's. One theory circulating amongst British officials was that the British and Italian leaders had been 'specially selected so as not to give too much trouble'. This was probably not the case, but once Percival and Marinis were in place it was certainly in Le Rond's interest to keep them in Upper Silesia. Le Rond was especially dismissive of Marinis, and in their first months in Opole, Percival twice talked the Italian out of resigning.

Apart from spending two years as an instructor at the Army Staff College and the first few months of the war in France as a staff officer with the British Expeditionary Force, since 1909 the greater part of Percival's career had been spent at the War Office. After the Armistice he had spent several months with Malcolm in Berlin where he prepared reports on the military occupation of Gdansk, Memel, the plebiscite
He was 44 years old and had an extensive knowledge of German history and literature - continuing these studies when he became Steward of Christ College, Oxford on his retirement from the Army in 1929. Because he displayed an over-abundance of the qualities British Army officers tended to attribute to themselves – honour, duty, loyalty, and fair-mindedness, it is tempting to caricature Percival in some stereotypical manner, but this would be unfair and misleading. In the best sense of the term, Percival was a gentleman, sensitive to the feelings of others and, when first in Upper Silesia, refusing to condemn anyone out of hand. But in the Commission’s world of nationalist rivalries, government by decree and international politics, to some extent these same qualities made him the proverbial ‘innocent abroad’. Here, Percival’s open-mindedness led to indecision, his fair-mindedness to manipulation and pliability, and his non-confrontational nature to a festering dissent within himself. Exposure to this world affronted his sense of honour.

Witnessing Le Rond nudge Upper Silesia’s political balance towards the Poles, Percival’s scarce-suppressed support for the German ‘underdogs’ surfaced. But despite Percival’s anger being reinforced by the many German representations he received, the French military force’s partiality and his own resentment at Le Rond’s manipulation of the Commission, the British Commissioner’s resistance (which had started developing from around May, 1920), always remained confined to subjects on which he was under firm Foreign Office instruction. The real water-shed in his relationship with Le Rond occurred during the August 1920 insurrection. Supported by Marinis, from then onwards Percival opposed almost every French initiative and encouraged British officials in the districts and various departments to report each and every perceived misdemeanour on the part of their French colleagues directly to him. Thus, some, though not all, British officials acquired dual loyalty and responsibility. Working for
the Commission meant professional responsibilities and allegiance to their colleagues and superiors. Yet, as Foreign Office appointees themselves, they also felt a separate responsibility and patriotic loyalty to the British Commissioner.

Percival’s support within the British contingent was most readily forthcoming amongst colleagues at the Commission’s headquarters in Opole and British officials serving in departments headed by French directors. The opportunities this afforded to the Germans were seized on and exploited. For example, in the Economics Department the German civil servants fed the Commission’s British officials a stream of warnings and dire forecasts about the detrimental effect that Poland winning the plebiscite would have on Upper Silesian industry. The British officials passed these directly to Percival who forwarded them to London, where they confirmed similar messages fed through the British Commercial Secretary in Berlin. Less active co-operation was forthcoming from officials in the two ‘British Departments’ - Communications and Food. There, success was readily apparent and all of the officials had to pull together to achieve it. In any case, with the higher officials being British, they would scarcely complain about themselves. Percival’s increasing contrariness had little effect on the British district controllers. Most of them had been complaining about their French colleagues and the Polish Silesians since the moment they arrived in Upper Silesia.

The Commissioners nevertheless were aware that the Commission’s various elements had to present a united profile to the Upper Silesians and took steps to foster good relations between their officials. They established an inter-Allied club in Opole for them where they entertained each other and their guests. Families started to arrive to join the officials in Opole around mid-April. After this there were regular dinner parties - often with local and visiting dignitaries as guests. But, as within the Commission, when the personal relationships became less cordial, social life also
divided itself into two camps. Hereafter, the Percivals’ most frequent guests would be de Marinis, Prince Hatzfeldt, von Moltke, and his own immediate staff on the Commission. Bourdillon attributed the animosity and the deteriorating relations specifically to Le Rond’s behaviour rather than to any changed attitude on Percival’s part. He asserted in his final report that, after returning from attending the Spa Conference and several meetings in Paris in July 1920, Le Rond began abandoning all his appearance of impartiality. From then on, according to Bourdillon, Le Rond strove ‘to obtain the greatest possible share of Upper Silesia for Poland by fair means or foul’. But how much ‘this was of his own devising or how far it was enjoined on him in Paris’, Bourdillon could not say. However, if true, this raises an interesting point because at this time there were Franco-Czech negotiations taking place over industrial concessions in Cieszyn.

Le Rond had participated in the attempts by the Peace Conference to resolve the Polish-Czech frontier dispute in Cieszyn. He was still involved in the question of Cieszyn’s security through the Commission’s control of the small inter-Allied force which had recently arrived there. At the Spa Conference which Le Rond had just attended, in exchange for the Entente’s (unspecified) help in halting the Red Army’s advance into Poland, the Polish representatives had been forced into abandoning the plebiscite in Cieszyn (which they stood a good chance of winning) to permit the Entente to fix the frontier. The British were convinced of the economic argument for the Czechs’ possessing the area. With France having a vested interest in Czech control of Cieszyn’s industries as well, then placing the decision in the hands of the Entente amounted to Poland conceding the full Czech demands there and then. Not wanting to alienate the Poles, it is possible that in exchange for dropping the plebiscite, the French gave the Poles informal promises of support over Upper Silesia. Although there is
gave the Poles informal promises of support over Upper Silesia. Although there is no evidence to support this either, alternatively, Le Rond's own understanding of the situation, his alleged political ambitions, and the pivotal position he held on the Upper Silesia Commission, provided both motive and opportunity for what might have been a personal initiative to secure the region for Poland.

Meanwhile, during the spring of 1920, around Opole and especially within the industrial district, incidents between the French forces and German Silesians started to escalate. Polish Silesians had been disappointed that demonstrations to welcome the Allies had been discouraged. With the Grenzschutz units disbanded and the Reichswehr gone, they had hoped to welcome the 8,500 French soldiers as liberators. But even without the demonstrations, the French soldiers felt and responded to the warmth of the Polish greetings. On the other hand, Upper Silesia's German population had greeted them with overt displays of nationalist hostility. The French population had of course suffered greatly in the Great War with the north of France enduring a particularly brutal German occupation for four years. Unsurprisingly then, there were many instances where French soldiers also behaved badly. For example, in a bar room brawl early in April 1920, a French soldier, accompanied by two Italians, shot three Germans, one of whom died. At the best of times, such behaviour was undesirable; but with the inter-Allied Commission's military deficit, it was both short-sighted and reckless. Over the following two days, crowds of angry young Germans held illegal demonstrations in front of the Commission's building in Opole and gangs of Germans chased French troops through the town's streets, wounding ten of them. The Commissioners realised the delicacy of their position. Le Rond knew how unpopular the French contingent was and feared the reaction if, in restoring order, his troops started to shoot German Silesian civilians. The military, however, believed that Le
Rond was too soft with the demonstrators. The inter-Allied Military Commander, General Jules Gratier, who had crushed similar demonstrations in Gliwice in February, sent a note to the Commission protesting that, ‘the Allies were there as conquerors and had not come to be insulted by the conquered’. 141

Le Rond’s inclination was to have the Sicherheitspolizei or the local police deal with any troubles of a political nature. Nevertheless, even Percival admitted that in matters involving the Germans, the Sicherheitspolizei’s loyalty was questionable. 142

The Commission finally authorised the French cavalry and infantry to clear away the crowds, but this only gave rise to further allegations of French brutality. 143 On the day of the funeral well over two thousand German mourners followed the procession. In Katowice that same day, a French officer struck a German electrician with a riding whip and the workers retaliated by cutting the area’s water and power supplies until the officer had apologised. The Commissioners sent for Gratier and warned him that he was not commanding in a hostile country, but in one which was at peace with the Entente, and the action of his troops in the last few days was calculated to make the conduct of the government here impossible. 144

Because Percival was based in Opole he tended to only record incidents occurring there, but such events were repeated throughout the plebiscite region each day. 145

Typical daily incidents would be the throwing of stones at soldiers and tearing down Allied flags. 146 Gradually the composition of the French troops changed with young conscripts, who had no desire to serve in Upper Silesia, replacing many of the seasoned soldiers. 147 The mutual antipathy between the French forces and the German Silesians deepened, causing very difficult public order situations. 148 Not wanting to upset the German Silesians further, the Commission held back on some of the more necessary reforms such as the reconstitution of the Sicherheitspolizei to include Polish
Silesians. The Commissioners had been charged with creating the conditions necessary for a free and informed plebiscite vote to take place. Their inaction therefore resulted in the Poles starting to become impatient for change.

Aspects of the discussions leading up to the Supreme Council’s decision to hold a plebiscite in Upper Silesia had displayed an enlightened understanding of the need to grant sufficient time and take measures to help certain groups of Polish-speaking Upper Silesians rid themselves of a life-time’s mentality of servitude. Germany’s new constitution permitted its citizens, including those living in Upper Silesia, equal rights. But in Upper Silesia the ingrained racial prejudice and the ethnic conflict meant many constitutional rights remained theoretical. The Poles wanted the Commission to implement measures that would raise their status and boost Polish self-esteem. They had expected Polish appointments to be made to the all-German administration and public services. But after the Commission’s first two months of operation, their only advance had been the establishment of Polish as an official language – and even this had not been fully implemented. On 28 April, Korfanty led a delegation of 15 Polish leaders for talks with Commission. Amongst their demands were disbandment of the Sicherheitspolizei; officials to swear allegiance to the Commission; a halt to the export of some foodstuffs from Upper Silesia to Germany; the expulsion of agitators who had entered Upper Silesia from Germany. They expected a definite answer by 5 May.

Replying for the Commission, Le Rond told Korfanty that the Commission would not be coerced into adopting measures not in the country’s interest.
Poznań rebellion in early 1919.\textsuperscript{153} With similarly negative reports on Korfanty reaching the Foreign Office from Germany, it is not surprising that the officials handling them in London also adopted and circulated this view. With the exception of Sir Eyre Crowe, who became Permanent Under Secretary in the Foreign Office at the end of 1920, none of the Foreign Office officials dealing with Upper Silesian matters were familiar with the Paris negotiations. And again, unlike Crowe who had been involved, they all failed to appreciate the merits of the Polish case.\textsuperscript{154} Their attitude towards the Poles was not helped by the arrival at the Foreign Office in October 1920 of Major L.E. Ottley, the former District Controller of Bytom \textit{Land}, to advise them on Upper Silesian issues.\textsuperscript{155} Ottley’s reports about his difficulties in Bytom and accounts of private conversations with Korfanty, whose headquarters were in Bytom, helped to colour Percival’s pro-German despatches to London.

It must be said that neither Percival’s, Ottley’s nor any other British district controllers’ personal circumstances suggest familiarity with the oppressive world and the relentless grind of daily life that was the lot of most Polish-speaking Silesians. In his comprehensive study of Upper Silesia, W.J. Rose commented on the manner in which the ‘mill and the mine’ shaped the lives and attitudes of the people working them, no matter where they lived. Upper Silesians were no different. Rose found them much less polite than their cousins in the Polish Republic. They were very ‘down to earth’, their ‘religious piety obscured by the rough brutality with which they treated each other’, and ‘even among the halfway educated classes, it was a difficult task to find urbanity’.\textsuperscript{156} Outside the industrial area, their reputation for lawlessness was legendary.

Committed to physical toil, they could appreciate muscle and the advantages of possessing it far more than any intellectual gifts. It was the admitted fact that
the man who could make his authority felt, if and when necessary, by the use of force was the best foreman. Such people looked for strong, active leadership, and so Korfanty the journalist and politician gave way to Korfanty the demagogic dictator - a brash, assertive figure who knew how to inspire confidence in a sceptical people, much hardened by their recent experiences. From the fortress that was the Polish Commissariat’s headquarters at the Hotel Lomnitz in Bytom, he issued orders and directed events. However, political reality contrasted sharply with Percival’s portrait of Korfanty the despot, who was allegedly behind every indignity and inconvenience that the Commission suffered.

Korfanty’s position in the Polish coalition of forces was far weaker than the image he presented to the world. There was little or no linkage between his political campaign and the Polish para-militarists. Despite experiencing unremitting attack in the German press and being pilloried by the British and Italian Commissioners, many of his own side regarded Korfanty as being too close to the Commission. He did not control the undisciplined bands of armed Polish Silesians who later emerged, nor the Bojowka-Polska death squads that would terrorise some areas. Though Korfanty had little say over the para-military forces he was often blamed for their actions. It was not every Polish Silesian who shared his belief that a fair diplomatic settlement could be achieved. As we have noted, critics claimed that his part in preventing a Poznan-style coup de main in Upper Silesia had simply bought the Germans time to reinforce themselves before provoking the disastrous Polish rising in August 1919. Military leaders, such as Michal Grazynski of the POW (appointed Governor of the province in 1922) continually questioned his tactics. Korfanty also sometimes clashed with the more headstrong of the Polish labour leaders. Rather than dissipate support in the

Chapter 2
sporadic industrial actions they had sometimes become embroiled in, he demanded that strikes should be co-ordinated with his political initiatives.\textsuperscript{162}

Another organisation Korfanty had no direct influence over was the Catholic Church. Whether they considered themselves German, Polish or neither, nearly all native Upper Silesians were Roman Catholic. In the 1910 Prussian Census 1,779,494 are listed as Catholic and only 175,079 as Protestant. This explains the Catholic Centre Party's powerful position in Upper Silesia. With the Centre becoming the mainstay of the German Government's coalition and therefore of Germany's fragile democracy, this added a party political consideration to the many economic reasons Berlin had for retaining Upper Silesia. And because the great majority of the people in the territories threatened with annexation were Roman Catholic, Germany, in its search for allies to modify the likely peace terms, had revived full diplomatic relations with the Vatican. This opened up fascinating rounds of diplomacy centred on the Vatican's Curia, as Poland and Germany (often aided one way or the other by Percival, the Foreign Office and Count John de Salis, the British representative at the Vatican) tried to influence the organisation of the Church's affairs in Upper Silesia.\textsuperscript{163}

The plebiscites themselves proved a dilemma for the Papacy. Poland had been a bulwark of the Catholic faith for centuries and the Vatican had supported the Prussian Poles in their struggles against assimilation following Bismarck's \textit{Kulturkampf}.\textsuperscript{164} This had aimed at securing a Prussian ascendancy in post-1870 Germany by imposing the Reich's authority on to the Catholic Church and then using it to encourage loyalty to the Prussian dominated Reich. But in Upper Silesia as elsewhere in Prussian Poland, the \textit{Kulturkampf}'s effect and later attempts at cultural assimilation was the opposite to that intended - instead of eliminating non-German allegiances, they reinforced them.\textsuperscript{165} For the Vatican, this new post-war relationship with Germany offered the Catholic
Church an opportunity to improve its position in the new Republic. However, whilst over 23.8 million Germans (around 35%) had been Catholic in the pre-war Reich, due to the annexations this had fallen to 17.5 million (around 29.5%) and it would fall by almost a further two million if Germany lost Upper Silesia. The German Catholic hierarchy needed its Government’s help to preserve its existing ecclesiastical boundaries across the new Polish-German frontier which the plebiscite was designed to establish. The diplomatic struggle surrounding these and other issues related to the plebiscite, have been detailed in Stuart Stehlin’s *Weimar and the Vatican 1919-1933*.166

Upper Silesians assimilating into German culture found it easier to support the ‘state-organised’ Catholicism than did Polish-speaking Upper Silesians.167 When Georg Kopp had been appointed Bishop of Wroclaw in 1890, Polish-speakers in his diocese, which included Upper Silesia, had suddenly found themselves to be rather second class citizens. One reason was that Kopp moved his clerics away from the Latin elements of the mass and ordered that singing and notices must now to be conducted in the German language.168 By mid-1919, realising the critical role that the Church could play in influencing how Polish Silesians voted (a point Paderewski made at the Peace Conference), Kopp’s successor, Cardinal Adolf Bertram, relaxed the political and linguistic constraints on his priests.169 Enforced over the years, these had ensured that all the Church’s hierarchy and at least 75% of the Upper Silesian clergy supported the German cause.170 Of course, this was not the only solution favoured by German Catholics. Another group supported the *Bund der Oberschlesier’s* campaign for an independent Upper Silesia –though this was really a German-inspired *pis aller* to permit the region to slip back into the German fold when an opportune moment arrived.171
Most Polish clerical support came from the clergy's lower ranks – the clerical work-face, so to speak – and from outside the Wroclaw diocese. Responding to Polish moves to persuade the Pope to suspend his ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the plebiscite area and appoint an impartial apostolic vicar for the duration of the plebiscite, Bertram asked the Papal Nuncio in Munich, Eugenio Pacelli (Pope Pius XII, 1939-1958) to intercede. In December 1919 Bertram visited Rome and warned the Curia that Berlin would interpret such a move as favouring the Poles. Steering a middle course, the Pope (Pius X), appointed the Papal Nuncio to Warsaw, Achille Ratti (Pope Pius XI 1922-1939), as the religious commissioner for the plebiscite areas. To placate the Germans, Bertram continued holding his ecclesiastical jurisdiction whilst Ratti was instructed to reside in Upper Silesia rather than Warsaw ‘so that he would not be seen to be unduly influenced by the Poles’. Percival had objected to the nomination, requesting that a local priest be appointed instead. But the Vatican pointed out that it would be difficult to find a neutral Upper Silesian.

When Ratti finally took up residence in Opole his every move was scrutinised by both sides and he eventually found that pursuing ‘strict impartiality generally meant dissatisfying both parties’. He had not been helped by the Polish press trumpeting that his appointment was a great political success for Poland. In fact, Ratti always acted impartially – though not very effectively. As the political tension mounted throughout 1920, at one point Percival noted that clerics could invariably be found amongst the more extreme nationalist agitators on both sides. Fearing riots and demonstrations if Bertram appeared in Upper Silesia, the Commission blocked the Bishop’s entry into the plebiscite area – something to which he could not reconcile himself. Ratti visited Bertram in Wroclaw to explain matters and he and others such as Hatzfeldt, made frequent appeals to the Commission to allow him in.
Campbell notes that ‘mindful of Polish resistance to Bertram, Church officials [in Rome] hoped that he would voluntarily cancel his visit if the Commission formally recognised his right to enter Upper Silesia’. Early in November Ratti paid what proved to be his last visit to Wrocław to propose a solution along these lines. He was not well received and writing to Berlin about the visit, Hatzfeldt made some uncomplimentary observations about Ratti who, in less than fifteen months time, would be the new Pope.

We will never find the slightest support from this man. He is the typical diplomat of the Middle Ages, slick as an eel and he squirms like an earthworm; he engages in monologues – even with the Cardinal – and in every sentence there is a ‘but’.

The Commission’s problem with Bertram was not their only long-standing conflict with Germany. Tensions, however, had been minimised by the firm line the Commission took to ensure that the Prussian officials in the administration remained co-operative. Whilst the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians had good reason to be disappointed with their lack of emancipation under the Commission, the slowness of the pace was in part attributable to the Commission’s desire to maintain German cooperation. That said, it was also in Germany’s interest that its officials remained where they were. This not only encouraged the German supporters but it helped to prevent Polish supporters getting their jobs. Though the Germans had earlier promised the Commission loyalty, and they were forbidden to participate in any political activity, this did not mean that all of the officials refrained from doing so. The line that they dare not cross was drawn on March 23, 1920, when the German Government advised the Upper Silesian judiciary to refuse to co-operate with the Commission’s plan to introduce a Supreme Court and a Court of Appeal staffed by Allied law-officers. The
officials took their cue and adopted a hostile attitude to the Commission. The German trade unions followed suit, with the Railway Union threatening to strike if their official gazette was printed in Polish as well as German. When a senior judge was dismissed his colleagues took strike action.

The confrontation re-ignited the German plebiscite campaign, something Percival suspected the whole affair had been engineered for. However, the Germans were shaken when Le Rond told von Moltke to inform Berlin that henceforth the Commission would regard any dissent by officials ‘as a request to be relieved from office’ and that they would be replaced by Polish officials ‘to the last man if necessary’. Learning this, the Germans quickly backed down and although the judges’ strike dragged on well into the summer, the officials remained superficially co-operative.

By June 1920 the pattern of the German and Polish plebiscite campaigns had started to emerge. Here it is useful to summarise their respective political arguments and their tactics, most of which remained unchanged through to the vote on 20 March 1921. The Germans could rely upon about 90% of the votes cast by the educated and skilled population. The Polish vote was concentrated amongst agricultural labourers, peasants, the miners and unskilled industrial labourers. The battle was on for the many Upper Silesians who had no strong nationalist leanings and were likely to vote for the side offering them the greatest political or economic advantage. The German campaign was supported by Berlin, run from Wrocław, well funded and highly sophisticated. The Polish political campaign was organised locally, but because of the enormous problems Poland was experiencing during 1920-21, the campaign relied heavily on French diplomatic support. The Germans claimed that Poland had no friends, no agreed
frontiers, and was unlikely to survive as a state. If internal pressures failed to cause it to self-destruct then its neighbours would re-partition it. To this, the Poles argued that Poland was free and that it enjoyed the Allies’ protection. They counter-claimed that following the Reich’s defeat and revolution, it might be years before the Germans completely recovered their independence. Germany could fall to a restored autocracy or to the Communists before then.

To the German claim that a ‘corrupt army of inefficient Galician and Congress Poles’ would replace the Prussian officials currently administering the country, the Poles replied that only the officials sent from other parts of Germany ‘to oppress the inhabitants’ would be removed. To the charge that ‘the educated German landowners would be replaced by uneducated Polish nobles’ the Poles replied that, as with the officials there, the native Upper Silesian landowners ‘would be left unmolested’. The suggestions that Protestants would be persecuted and that personal liberty would be better assured in Germany, were also rejected - the Poles pointing out that the new Polish constitution, the minorities treaty and Polish history itself, all guaranteed individual rights. And since they considered Poland to be the regional home of the Roman Catholic Church, there would be neither socialist hostility towards the Church nor government oppression such as Bismarck’s Kulturkampf. Attempting to make a virtue out of the Peace Treaty, German supporters reminded Upper Silesians of the military conscription still existing in Poland. The Poles argued back that, under Polish sovereignty, the atmosphere of the Prussian parade ground associated with every Upper Silesian church, school, factory, farm, and mine would disappear forever. 187

The most effective German arguments were their economic ones. By claiming that a vote for Poland would mean inefficient management of industrial
units as the leaders of industry withdrew and the German markets were lost, they called every individual’s economic security into question. This, they forecast, would result in the ruin of industry and widespread unemployment. Poland had no regard for the true interests of the inhabitants, the Poles only wanted to exploit the country’s riches to bolster the low-valued Polish currency. Whatever the case, the workers were bound to lose their existing levels of security because Poland could never maintain the benefits of German social legislation. 188

The Polish response to these charges was to adopt a very pragmatic line. They claimed that should capital and expertise withdraw to Germany, offers from Western Europe and America would never be lacking. Upper Silesian markets such as Poznania and parts of West Prussia had already been incorporated into Poland. Germany still required Upper Silesia’s coal, and there would always be a market in south and south eastern Europe. The Ruhr’s mines and industries dominated Germany. This meant that over the longer term, agricultural Poland offered Upper Silesia’s mines and manufacturing industry a far bigger, expanding market than Germany ever could. Instead of depending on imported food, Polish agricultural resources would ensure that Upper Silesia enjoyed its share in this self-sufficiency. 189 Appealing to Upper Silesia’s landless agricultural labourers, the Poles cited recent and forthcoming land reform legislation in the Polish Sejm, to suggest that in parts of Upper Silesia the large estates might be broken up for settlement. 190 They guaranteed continued payment of pensions and allowances to invalided war veterans from the German Army, even hinting that they might be increased. Then, responding to the jibe about being unable to maintain standards of German social security, the Poles attacked the German industrialists for having
'treated Upper Silesia as a Cinderella', paying lower wages to its workers there than anywhere else in Germany. 191

Both the German and Polish sides had to deal with Bund de Oberschlesier’s call for a neutral, independent Upper Silesia. 192 Support for this had waned after the plebiscite had been announced and the Catholic Centre Party, which had been early advocates, now wanted Upper Silesians to vote to remain in Germany. 193 Nevertheless, the Bund had given the idea of autonomy intellectual respectability, and in an attempt to win over its residual support, both the Polish and German campaigns promised Upper Silesians devolved government. To give credence to these promises, both Warsaw and Berlin passed legislation to facilitate this. 194 After the plebiscite there was a slight revival of interest in the Bund’s ideas, when elements within the German Foreign Office thought that it might be used to avoid partitioning the industrial area. 195

Mass demonstrations, legal or otherwise, played a big part in both campaigns. As we have seen, ‘political funerals’ provided an opportunity, so did holidays. On 1 May 1920, and for several days afterwards, German nationalists paraded through Polish areas. 196 On the Polish National Day (3 May), quasi-religious processions whose significance was lost on the British district controllers, demonstrated Polish strength. 197 Percival records that the German demonstrations passed off without any ‘unpleasantness’ but the much smaller Polish ones, parading ‘illegal national symbols’ had caused disruption by provoking the German youths and the Sicherheispolizei into attacking them. 198 The Polish Consulate building in Opole was besieged and the Gazetta Polska’s premises were sacked. 199 But because of their unpopularity, Le Rond still refused to permit French troops to be used on the streets. 200 Both sides intensified national sentiments by widely publicising any incident highlighting the morality of

Chapter 2
their cause.\textsuperscript{201} This, however, did not mean that the Polish Silesians wished to be left to the mercy of the German gangs. When Korfanty refused the Commission’s request to call-off a strike in support of the Polish demands made on 28 April (see above), he met the Commissioners to tell them that the conditions prevailing in Upper Silesia were untenable. The Upper Silesian Poles were being terrorised and should the Commission continue to take no action, they would be forced into helping themselves.\textsuperscript{202} That this meeting had to take place in the forest between Bierdzany (Bierdzan) and Olenso because, in Percival’s words, ‘Korfanty’s life in Opole would not be worth a farthing’s purchase’, perhaps confirmed the Polish Silesian leader’s assessment.\textsuperscript{203} Events over the following months provided further testimony to the Commission’s reluctance to confront the major problems of internal security.

The differing sympathies between the French and British district controllers were most vividly illustrated in the Bytom district, where the French ran the town and Major Ottley controlled Bytom Land. Their respective authority often overlapped, resulting in the emergence of conflicting priorities.\textsuperscript{204} On the evening of 25 May, Ottley became the local Germans’ hero when during a crowd disturbance in the town square, he took their side against a French military patrol attempting to restore order there.\textsuperscript{205} This naturally annoyed the French officials, who asked him not to interfere in a town in which he was not the Controller. During fresh disturbances in the town between off-duty French soldiers and local Germans three nights later, Ottley had to refuse to help a crowd of Germans who had besieged his office, begging him to take charge over the heads of the French. At the same time, some local Germans took the opportunity to attack the Polish Commissariat’s Headquarters at the Hotel Lomnitz. Both sides used firearms, and the hotel’s ground and first floors were sacked before French troops arrived from Katowice and elsewhere to restore order.\textsuperscript{206} Ottley reported
that during the fighting he had seen Korfanty throwing hand grenades out of one of the windows.\textsuperscript{207} Though he continued to maintain contact with Korfanty, from then onwards Ottley was increasingly used by the Germans to register complaints against the Poles and to articulate their interests to the Commission via Percival - who saw nothing amiss.\textsuperscript{208} In fact, when Le Rond appeared to be about to prohibit the district controllers from associating with the Polish and German political leaders, the British Commissioner immediately headed this off – noting in his diary that this ‘would not suit my book at all, as it would mean I should lose….perhaps the most important source of information at my disposal’.\textsuperscript{209} Without being unfair or unjust to someone with many admirable qualities, this entry sums up a great deal about Percival’s acumen in relation to his position and work on the Commission.

Another person whom Ottley must have impressed was E.H. Carr. A well-known historian in later years, he was then British Secretary to the Ambassadors’ Conference. After spending a few days in Upper Silesia early in June, one in Ottley’s company at Bytom, he produced a report for the Foreign Office. He believed that the Poles were desperate, on the offensive and pursuing a policy of disruption. Advancing the usual pro-German arguments, Carr declared that the area’s problems were not ethnic but economic. He had also found a total lack of confidence in the French officials and French troops. However, British prestige stood ‘extraordinarily high’ and ‘the presence of a British officer alone [Ottley?] suffices to quell an incipient riot’.\textsuperscript{210} He thought that the Commission should be re-organised under a British President, the French pre-dominance eliminated and that British troops be deployed throughout the plebiscite area.\textsuperscript{211} Though both Hardinge and Curzon found the report interesting, nevertheless, Crowe regarded Carr as ‘a misleading guide’; in a private letter to Carr, Headlam Morley cautioned him against ‘pressing his points too far’.\textsuperscript{212}
Shortly after Carr’s visit, the Commission decided to send Le Rond to Paris to persuade the Ambassadors of their difficulties - especially over the shortage of Allied troops which Le Rond believed was the root of their troubles. But Percival refused to approach London directly about the shortage. Instead, he declared that his own Government ‘knew sufficient of the situation to decide for itself matters of this description’. His diary entry for 21 June mocked Le Rond’s summary of their position, which was that

In spite of the fact that the Commission has a hostile population, a hostile police force, a hostile magistracy, a hostile German Government, and a not altogether friendly Polish Government, it could be maintained that on the whole Upper Silesia has been fairly quiet and at any rate has not flared up, which might well have happened had our own [the Commission’s] Government been less wise (!!!).

But events elsewhere were about to dramatically alter this situation.

By the close of 1919 the Red Army had defeated the Allied-backed White Russians on almost all fronts. Compounding this for Poland, Britain had lifted its Russian naval blockade to permit a resumption of trade. But unlike Lloyd George, Pilsudski did not regard Bolshevism as a mere transitory phenomenon and he was convinced that once the Red Army had finished-off the last of the Whites and consolidated Soviet power in the Ukraine, they intended attacking Poland. An independent Ukraine was a vital factor in Pilsudski’s vision of a Polish-led association of states on Russia’s western border but it had been taken over by the Bolsheviks. After prolonged and difficult negotiations, on 21 April 1920, Poland and the Ukrainian Peoples’ Republic had signed political and military agreements. Four days later, two Polish armies supported by two divisions of Ukrainians had advanced into Ukraine and
quickly captured Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, from the Bolsheviks. But their success was short-lived. By mid-June the Poles were in full retreat. On 4 July, the Red Army launched its counter-offensive across Poland’s still undefined eastern frontiers. The Red Army’s advance would take them to the gates of Warsaw and threaten the continued existence of Poland itself. For the Germans the equation was simple: ‘no Poland - no plebiscite’.

Poland’s British critics, indeed, began anticipating its demise. Claiming that events had now justified his negative views, the Foreign Office’s former Polish expert, Lewis Namier wrote, ‘should the Gods still favour me with a Polish collapse soon, even my vanity as a prophet will be satisfied’. To Headlam Morely it appeared retribution was coming to Poland much quicker than expected. The British Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party responded to a Soviet call for members of socialist organisations everywhere to implement a European-wide boycott of Polish trade. And to prevent Britain providing the Poles with any military assistance (which the British Government had little intention of doing), their hastily convened joint ‘Council of Action’, threatened Lloyd George with a general strike. Should Poland go under, Churchill was already speculating about the Entente’s need to seek German assistance to contain the spread of Communism. Whatever remaining credibility Lloyd George had with the Poles evaporated when he urged the Polish Government to accept the Soviet’s peace terms – something which would have effectively turned Poland into a Soviet satellite. From Warsaw, the British Army’s DMO, General Radcliffe commented

It is a humiliating thing to listen to the foreigners’ criticism of our own P.M. and feel that it is highly justified. Whatever happens in this country I am afraid that our prestige has received a blow from which it can hardly recover.
The Polish Army’s retreat also helped prompt huge German majorities in the Kwidzyn and Olsztyn plebiscites. They had been held on 11 July, and the British officials in Opole believed that these results and the Russian advance would have a very great effect on Polish support in Upper Silesia. Posters with the words ‘Upper Silesians Follow This Example’ splashed above the East Prussian plebiscite results, started appearing all over Upper Silesia. Hoping that former Polish support might now favour independent statehood, the Bund der Oberschlesier started pressing their ideas once again. A Polish leader, favouring this as a temporary expediency, told Percival that ‘it was unreasonable for loyal Poles to commit this country to a Poland which, for all they know, might have Bolshevik tendencies in a few weeks time’. Despite their proximity to it, the implications of the Polish crisis were not discussed by the Commission until 3 August. Two days later, Le Rond announced that it was quite possible that Warsaw would be occupied by 10 August. Percival noted that even if this occurred, the general feeling was that there was little danger of trouble in Upper Silesia. Events proved this assessment wildly inaccurate.

The opportunities that the Soviet advance offered Germany’s opposing political factions are clearly presented in Norman Davies’ work on the Soviet-Polish War. Most importantly, they believed that should the Soviets defeat Poland, then they would be freed from the constraints that the Peace Treaty had placed on Germany in the East. After assurances that the Red Army would respect Germany’s frontiers, the German Government declared their neutrality on 20 July. And though Berlin did not control Upper Silesia, they considered the Commission also bound by their declaration. German neutrality was very much to the Soviets’ advantage. An order forbidding shipment of war material across German territory was implemented. Suspecting that
French troops or munitions travelling to Upper Silesia were bound for Poland, German officials interpreted the order as including anything being sent there.\textsuperscript{235} If Germany's neutrality might not have been constitutionally applicable to Upper Silesia, German fears that the region could be turned into a battlefield did have a basis in fact.\textsuperscript{236} At Spa on 14 July, when discussing Upper Silesia in relation to the Soviet advance, Marshal Foch had stated that if Poland was defeated, then the remnants of its Army could ‘crystallise’ around the inter-Allied force in Upper Silesia, and ‘hold on for some time’.\textsuperscript{237} Reports of ‘an extraordinary number of movement of troops’ connected ‘with the Polish \textit{débacle}’ began appearing in Upper Silesia’s German press.\textsuperscript{238} Coincidentally, Paris informed Le Rond that his request for the transfer of the inter-Allied force in Cieszyn to Upper Silesia had been granted.\textsuperscript{239} On 10 August the Commission duly became embroiled in the neutrality question when it delayed the implementation of some of the related German decrees about military supplies.\textsuperscript{240} Railway workers started obstructing the transfer of the troops from Cieszyn into Upper Silesia and on 15 August, four French soldiers were killed and several injured when an engine was run into one of their trains.\textsuperscript{241} Press articles called for a general strike to ‘prevent the movement of French troops in Upper Silesia’. Public meetings were held to call for the neutralisation of the plebiscite area, and German officials protested about the Commission returning soldiers in Polish uniform back over the border instead of interning them.\textsuperscript{242} Le Rond attributed these protests and other incidents to orders issued from Berlin, but Percival disagreed.\textsuperscript{243} He told London they were simply due to the people of Upper Silesia wanting to be bound by Germany’s declaration of neutrality. In a note delivered by von Moltke on 17 August, the Commissioners learned that Moscow had warned Berlin about the possibility of Polish troops being concentrated in Upper Silesia.
Silesia. The German Government assumed that the Commissioners had agreed that Upper Silesia was bound by the declaration of neutrality. They proposed co-operation between themselves and the Commission to ensure that ‘arrangements are made to render neutrality effective’. When he delivered the note, von Moltke reminded the three Commissioners that the German Government still had considerable authority in Upper Silesia, and if this authority was to be used to support the Commission, it was necessary for the German Government to know that its own declaration of neutrality would not be infringed in Upper Silesia.

In reply von Moltke was reminded that it was the Commission which now constituted Upper Silesia’s Government, not Berlin. Le Rond said that he could not understand why Germany doubted the Commission’s own neutrality. However, after heated exchanges in which Le Rond accused Germany of being partly responsible for the disturbances, it was conceded that the Commission would intern all Polish soldiers who crossed into Upper Silesian territory.

Earlier that morning, the German trade unions had surprised the Commission by notifying them of a 24 hour general strike in protest at what they alleged was the Commission’s support of Poland by armed force. Whilst the Commissioners were talking to von Moltke, outside their headquarters in Opole and across Upper Silesia all public services, shops and factories had closed down, demonstrations were underway, and resolutions in favour of Upper Silesian neutrality were being endorsed. Sara Wambaugh notes that it was generally believed that these demonstrations were supported by Berlin. In Katowice, German demonstrators greeted a press report about the Red Army having captured Warsaw, by cheering Lenin and Trotsky and attacking the French soldiers on duty. The Sicherheitspolizei failed to intervene either
THE PROBLEM

Poland to Mr. Lloyd George, organiser of the Human Chess Tournament. "How are you going to play the game? I was led to believe I was to be a queen, but I find I'm only a pawn."

5. The Problem (Punch, 18 August 1920)
then or later that same evening, when a mob armed with rifles, revolvers and hand
 grenades stormed the District Controller’s offices and broke open an arms store. By
 this time the Germans had killed four French soldiers and wounded eight more. A
 Polish-sympathising doctor tending the wounded was dragged from his home, lynched,
 and his body thrown in the river. Meeting hurriedly, the Commissioners declared a
 state of siege in Katowice. When Allied troops fired on the crowds to disperse them,
 they killed ten Germans and wounded between 30 and 80 more. With the situation
 calmer, the troops were ordered out of the town leaving the Sicherheitspolizei to
 enforce the state of siege. What followed was almost inevitable. The German mob
 returned to the streets, besieged the Polish plebiscite campaigners’ offices and set them
 on fire. When the occupants attempted to escape the flames, one was shot, two were
 beaten to death and the remainder taken prisoner. With nobody to stop them, because
 the Sicherheitspolizei had absented themselves, the mob proceeded to pillage all Polish
 shops and property, including the offices of the Gazeta Ludowa. They murdered the
 owners and attacked anyone whom they suspected was a Polish sympathiser. On 19
 August, almost 24 hours later, four companies of Italian troops arrived in the town to
 bring the situation under control. However, by then Korfanty had issued a
 proclamation calling the Polish supporters to arms.

Whilst Upper Silesian Germans and the Government in Berlin had been busy
pressing neutrality on the Commission, the Polish Army had launched a successful
counter offensive. The magnitude of Pilsudski’s victory was only now beginning to be
realised. When the riots had started in Katowice on 17 August, instead of Warsaw
falling to the Soviets, it was the Red Army that was now in full retreat. Armed with
this knowledge and the failure of the Commission to protect them, the Polish para-
militarists finally took the action Korfanty had been threatening for several months. A
20,000 strong army of ragged Polish-speaking youths appeared, some from refuge over the Polish border but the majority from towns and the villages in and around the areas of industry. First they occupied Siemianowice (Siemianowitz), Huta Laura (Laurahütte) and Szopieniel (Schopinitz) and other villages around Mysłowice. The action then quickly spread throughout the districts of Rybnik, Pszczyna, Bytom and Tarnowski Gory. A strike by Polish miners shut down three-quarters of the region’s coal mines. When Percival seized on a chance to question Korfanty about these actions, the Polish leader pointed to the Commission’s failure to protect the inhabitants and claimed that had the Polish leadership not done something to protect them, the whole population would have risen in revolt.

The insurgents’ first actions were specially directed at German authority as represented by the Sicherheitspolizei, the police, customs officials and the forest guards. They were disarmed and expelled along with other German functionaries from the local administration which the Poles took over and ran themselves. A two-way traffic in prisoners, hostages and supplies was opened up across the Polish border. By 31 August, the insurgents operations extended into the districts of Lubliniec and Toszecko-Gliwicki (Tost-Gleiwitz). This was not conducted without disturbances. Numerous murders took place and a German village, Holdunów (Anhalt), was partially burned down. But with the French soldiers fraternising with the insurgents and the Poles again demanding that the Sicherheitspolizei be disbanded, the Commission and the Germans were forced to negotiate. This was too much for some of the British district controllers and four, including Major Ottley, promptly resigned.

The common thread running through their resignation statements was resentment at the manner in which the Commission had dealt with the disorders and how this had
now disadvantaged the German population. Major Perry particularly objected to the
Commission taking the decision (see below) to disband the *Sicherheitspolizei* and to
grant the Poles equal rights even before the insurgents had been disarmed.\(^{259}\) Captain
Macpherson claimed that his ‘British standard of justice, impartiality and integrity’ did
not permit him to participate in the Commission’s current policy.\(^{260}\) Major Cassels
complained about the French troops in his district being anything other than ‘impartial
and strictly neutral’\(^{261}\). Major Ottley, however, identified the Allies’ greatest problem.
He stated that the Commission had to be ‘in a position to impose its will upon the
population, in spite of any possible resistance’. But, continued Ottley, no one could
now feel any confidence in the French military contingent’s willingness to attack the
Poles if ordered to do so. Some British controllers’ requests for military assistance had
been rejected or simply ignored, whilst others had been told that they should have
brought their own British troops.\(^{262}\) In his report to the Ambassadors’ Conference, Le
Rond highlighted the Commission’s shortfall in military personnel and stated that
because of this, Gratiet’s military measures had been restricted. They only had half the
number of troops which the military experts had recommended and when faced with a
general breakdown in law and order, these had proved to be inadequate.\(^{263}\)

Though this second Polish insurrection was a setback for the Commission
and the German campaign, it also tested the Polish leadership’s ability to control the
insurgents. For example, one incident in which ten Germans were executed and buried
in woods beside the hamlet of Josefthal, was later used repeatedly in anti-Polish
propaganda. When the bodies were uncovered a few days later, Ottley’s brother (who
had been visiting him) took the photographic evidence of the killings directly to the
Foreign Office.\(^{264}\) To help persuade the Polish rebels to stand down, yet provide them
with security after disarming themselves, Korfanty suggested an interim measure
whereby the local councils appointed an armed *Burgerwehr* (citizen guard) of mixed population. Le Rond agreed, provided the strikers returned to work. By 27 August nearly all of the mines were in production and after the leaders of the Polish and German Plebiscite Commissariat's had met in Bytom and confirmed the Polish gains, the armed bands began to melt away.

The Bytom Agreement's origin was a provisional understanding between Korfanty and Dr. Urbanek concluded on 25 August. Other Upper Silesian leaders were consulted and the respective heads of the two plebiscite organisations signed the Agreement in Le Rond's office on 2 September, 1920. Because the Germans concurred in the concessions to the Polish Silesians, neither Percival nor Marinis felt justified in withholding their recognition. The Agreement had been the Polish Silesians' first tangible achievement in their long struggle for equality in their own country. It went some way towards rectifying the Commission's failure to establish the conditions under which a fair plebiscite could take place. One of their main gains (the immediate disbandment of the *Sicherheitspolizei* and the proposed expulsion of the remaining *Freikorps* and *Baltikum* elements) were demands the Commission could have granted at any time. In fact, the Commission initiated the deportation process whilst the talks in Bytom were still underway. Also included in the Agreement was the Commission's long-standing commitment to grant the Polish-speaking Silesians equal representation in a new mixed Plebiscite Police force. But other clauses, such as prohibiting intimidation and discrimination in industrial and social settings, establishing joint committees to examine reports of attempts to unlawfully influence the plebiscite, and the setting-up of a twenty-man joint German-Polish committee to supervise the terms of the Bytom Agreement, could probably only have been achieved at the point of a gun. Though the insurgents wanted much more, it is a measure of the Polish
Silesians’ restraint and a vindication of Le Rond’s optimism over Percival’s pessimism, that their demands were so limited. But yielding to Polish demands, however reasonable and moderate they appeared to be, was foreign to any German. And they were accepted with equally bad grace by the leaders of the Commission’s British contingent. 272 On the day that the Commission endorsed the Bytom agreement, Percival offered the Foreign Office his resignation. 273

These events in Upper Silesia had not passed unnoticed in Germany. Concern about the insurrection had replaced fears about infringements of German neutrality in the Soviet-Polish War. The German Government’s attention focussed on the Polish miners’ strike and the effect that this would have on the commitment that they had given at the recent Spa Conference to maintain reparation coal deliveries – Upper Silesian coal being a crucial element in this operation. 274 In a note delivered to the Ambassadors’ Conference, the German Government denied encouraging disturbances in Katowice and pointed out the impossibility of fulfilling reparation coal deliveries under the prevailing circumstances. 275 The Ambassadors rejected a German proposal for an international commission of enquiry to investigate the disturbances but did ask Poland to halt the flow of arms across its frontier into Upper Silesia. 276

Disturbances had also occurred in Wrocław after an anti-Polish demonstration there. At a meeting in Berlin on 29 August, speakers attacked the Polish Silesian miners for halting production ‘when every ton of coal was of supreme value to Germany’. They claimed France was bent on destroying Germany by taking away her coalfields. They then marched down the Unter den Linden some waving placards illustrated with a pile of fleas and bugs beneath the words Was kann mann sich aus Polen - holen (What do you get out of Poland?). 277 In conversation with the British Minister in Berlin the following day, the German Foreign Minister also mentioned ‘the
serious and grave consequences’ that could result from losing Upper Silesia’s coal production. And in Upper Silesia itself, the mine-owners in Pszcyna asked the Commission to suppress what they described as the outbreaks of ‘Bolshevism’ that were occurring there. Polish miners had been driving out anyone that they suspected might support Germany and they had told the German officials administering the mines ‘to clear out or take the consequences’ – and many had complied.

With neither the Germans nor the Poles confident in the Commission’s ability to protect them, Percival correctly predicted that this could only result in arms flooding into the area. He doubted the Bytom Agreement’s durability and neither he nor Marinis shared Le Rond’s perception that it had resulted from his ‘tactful handling of the situation’. In Percival’s view, the Germans had been ‘driven to the conference table because they felt themselves unprotected by the troops’. In the private letter containing his offer of resignation, Percival expressed his disenchantment with the Commission and its President.

The events of the last few days have opened my eyes. I fear that there is little doubt that the French have no intention of playing the game. The President is, I think, the worst offender, but he has managed things most cunningly, so that there is no definite proof against him personally....I hate the whole thing.

With the French troops unlikely to oppose any future Polish insurrection, Percival believed that by simply threatening a new *putsch*, Korfanty could dictate terms to the Commission. He noted the President’s continuing ‘violent bias against the Germans’ and the manner in which the absence of British and American troops was invariably mentioned whenever he questioned the French military contingent’s commitment. He also complained about Le Rond’s reluctance to share information with either himself or Marinis, that he purposely kept them ignorant of the Commission’s activities and
employed French Secret Service agents to spy on them. The whole atmosphere was one of mutual suspicion and both Percival and Marinis were convinced that they could no longer rely on Le Rond to conduct the plebiscite with strict impartiality. Responding to this in the Foreign Office, the Central Desk’s senior official, S.P. Waterlow minuted that ‘the Silesian tension is pregnant with dangers to the peace of Europe’. Recent despatches had brought ‘the Silesian situation to a head and make necessary a decision affecting our whole relations with the French Government’.  

Representations on developments in Upper Silesia had also been received from the German Chargé d’Affaires in London. The district controllers’ resignations and their reasons had appeared in the Berlin press. In early September, Lord Derby, British Ambassador in Paris, asked if the officers’ resignations and the future of the Commission had to be settled by the Ambassadors’ Conference. Should this be the case, he wanted the Foreign Office’s instructions. This task fell to Waterlow who noted the effect the unrest could have on Europe’s general economic situation and its potential to disrupt the Spa Agreement. It seemed obvious to him that a breakdown in Upper Silesian coal production ‘would have far-reaching political results’. They would have to seek a solution in accordance with the Peace Treaty, which meant the restoration of the Commission’s prestige and holding a fair plebiscite. Waterlow recommended that Le Rond and General Gratier be replaced and that the Commission be re-organised. Since it seemed to be clear that they were prepared to resign, Britain could offer to replace Percival and his staff. Should the French decline this proposal, he suggested Britain’s only alternative would ‘seem to be that we withdraw altogether, and make public our reasons for doing so’. Curzon agreed, and he suggested that the Italian Government be asked to support Waterlow’s proposals at the Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris. Notes to this effect were despatched to Paris and Rome.
Waterlow used the district controllers’ resignation statements and supplementary reports which Percival had asked them to compile, to formulate his detailed proposal for the Commission’s re-organisation. He believed that their content ‘fully justified the action which we [Britain] have taken in pressing for a thorough cleansing of the Augean stables of the Commission’. But Crowe who had represented Britain on the committee in Paris which had established the Allied troop contributions, cautioned that ‘it was just possible that the French forces were not really adequate’. He predicted that before agreeing to censure Le Rond and recall Gratier, the French would argue much along these lines. 293 When Waterlow interviewed Bourdillon (who had travelled from Opole to advise him), the extent of the Commission’s malpractices began to emerge. 294 These were confirmed when Percival’s analysis of the Commission’s organisational defects arrived in London. From these sources, Waterlow was able to conclude that the absence of fundamental organisation and ‘the mechanical precautions that it is necessary to take in dealing with Frenchmen’, had diminished the roles of the British and Italian Commissioners to an unacceptable level. 295 And although Percival had little or no experience with inter-Allied organisations, Waterlow found it ‘almost incredible that anyone with common sense’ could fail to insist that proper minutes be kept, the Secretariat be organised, and that all three of the Commissioners be involved when any submissions were discussed or decisions were taken in their name.

I cannot therefore altogether acquit Colonel Percival himself of responsibility for a situation which has got entirely out of control. But his fault has been not lack of goodwill, nor even lack of tact, firmness and personality. It has simply been failure to perceive that proper organisation is all-important. For this reason, if for no other, it will be necessary to replace Colonel Percival by some one experienced in inter-Allied organisation. 296

Chapter 2
On 18 September, two documents, one outlining the Commission’s deficiencies and another proposing changes, were sent to Derby. Learning that Le Rond had been invited to state his case to the Conference, the Foreign Office endorsed Derby’s request that Percival also travel to Paris. However, on 11 September the British Commissioner suffered a nervous breakdown and had to be sent over the Czech border for a period to rest. After some shuffling of personnel, Ottley and Bourdillon were sent to Paris instead. For the British Ambassador this was not a happy choice. Derby’s success as Ambassador was due to his easy affability with the top figures in French politics and he must have found Ottley’s zealotry quite trying. When the negotiations were concluded, thinking Ottley was under General Malcolm’s command, Derby wrote to the C.I.G.S.

This is the young gentleman who is supposed by the French to be at the bottom of all our Upper Silesia trouble. Personally I think that he was quite right in protesting but I cannot say that I think he was extremely tactful. I took rather a dislike to him. He poured words out like a torrent and was very venomous.... I wonder whether you could give him a post elsewhere and not where he might meet people with whom he has quarrelled in Upper Silesia.

But far from being removed, bizarre though it must have seemed to the French, Ottley soon found himself in London at the Foreign Office, installed as their expert on Upper Silesia.

Summary

The situation developing in Upper Silesia had resulted from factors, each of which had been predictable, but whose overall effect could probably not have been foreseen. For the British, Upper Silesia had come down to a question of priorities. Having forced the plebiscite on their Allies and expressed concern that it should be fair, extraneous
factors meant that the British could not supply the means to ensure conditions to ensure this. A combination of 'imperial over-stretch', troubles in Ireland and an illusionary revolutionary threat in Britain, had caused the British Government to push responsibility for organising and holding the Upper Silesian plebiscite on to France. By resorting to 'Red Scare' tactics, Churchill and Wilson had finally persuaded Lloyd George to withhold the British military contingent from the inter-Allied military force. At the time, the British Prime Minister had little to lose from this and a lot to gain by agreeing.\textsuperscript{301} This situation changed as a result of French policy, forcing reparations up the international agenda and dragging the Upper Silesian plebiscite along with it. By 1920 the British people were taking a much more complacent and increasingly sympathetic view of Germany after its defeat than the French could afford to do. Not unreasonably, the French demanded a tangible security guarantee against a resurgent Germany. Therefore when the linked American and the British security guarantees to France collapsed, France reverted to a policy aimed at hindering Germany's recovery by imposing a rigid application of the Peace Treaty and encouraging the Rhineland's separation. British policy towards Germany sought to encourage economic recovery, therefore the intensification of French policy after the Peace Treaty's implementation in January 1920 put the Entente allies at odds with each other. The theatre where this policy clash was most graphically illustrated was Upper Silesia.

Although Ottley and many other British officials serving with the Commission were frustrated by their marginal role in its affairs, it must not be assumed that the Commission's troubles were due solely to their opposition. Far more cogent reasons can be found when examining the situation which the Commission had encountered on its arrival, the reduction in size of the military force, and the effect of two international developments occurring during the first months of the Commission's life – the Spa
agreement on reparation coal deliveries and the Soviet-Polish War. That the German organisations in Upper Silesia and the Prussian officials retained in its administration would do what they could to further Germany's cause in Upper Silesia was only to be expected. The German population's hostility towards French troops had been widely predicted while it was only natural that French soldiers would identify with the Polish-speaking Silesians who had welcomed them as liberators. In fact, Dr. Lukaschek, the German Silesian leader whom Percival saved from expulsion by the Commission's Interior Department, later revealed to him that the agitation against the French troops had been orchestrated and that 'in spite of several instances to the contrary, the discipline of the French troops was undoubtedly good'. But without the requisite number of troops Le Rond walked a diplomatic tightrope. It was impossible to protect the respective communities without risking his soldiers' lives by having them instigate or be drawn into violent incidents that would have international repercussions.

With regard to the Spa agreement on coal deliveries, France would not recognise any linkage between Upper Silesia and reparations nor accept, as Lloyd George did, that the region's future was an integral part of the overall reparation question. Nevertheless, from the British and German Governments' point of view, the agreement reached at Spa in July placed a premium on the region's future stability and its continued coal production. Pursuing Lloyd George's appeasement policy even before Spa, the Foreign Office had interfered in the Commission's business by instructing Percival to oppose a proposal to bring the Upper Silesian import and export licences under their own control. Ultimately, the Commission's shortcomings were exposed by the tensions which the Soviet-Polish War created within Upper Silesia. First was its slow response to the German riots in Katowice and then its troops withdrawal from the town. Then came the second Polish insurrection, which met with little or no resistance.
except from the Sicherheitspolizei. This was followed by the sight of French troops openly fraternising with the insurgents. It had been this and the inclusion of certain clauses in the Bytom Agreement which Percival deemed had disadvantaged Germany, that had brought the growing differences within the Commission to a head.

Before this, Percival had generally avoided expressing his misgivings and kept the lid on the complaints he had received from his officials about Le Rond and other senior French officials. But with a few notable exceptions, it cannot be said that the British officials sent to Upper Silesia approached their task with an open mind either. This may have been partly attributable to the quality and background of the people the Foreign Office selected to act for them. One British officer serving with the Allied Commission (who was never given to understatement) believed that his colleagues were a bunch of ‘hopeless nonentities’ and that Percival ‘lacked determination and courage’. ‘On the other hand’, he wrote ‘the French employed picked men in every department….most notably General Le Rond’. 304 And, as we have noted, all the British officials with previous service in Germany were as openly sympathetic to the German Silesians as the French were to the Poles. The officer commanding the military mission in Warsaw claimed that he found the British members of the Commission in Upper Silesia so pro-German, they could never agree on anything with him.305

Finally, for the Foreign Office, the insurrection and Percival’s increasingly pessimistic despatches appeared to signal yet another attempt by France to ensure its future security by destroying Germany and European economic recovery along with it.306 London’s then current irritation with Paris was Millerand’s apparent evasiveness over attending another reparations conference in Geneva.307 For Curzon, the Foreign Office officials, and Lloyd George’s still-powerful political advisers, there was a feeling that a line had to be drawn somewhere. If it was not, then Britain would be
continually dragged into these French-initiated manoeuvres to crush Germany.
Threatening to withdraw their officials from the Commission and invalidate the
plebiscite was to be the first of several British attempts to draw that line.
Chapter 2 - Notes

1. PRO FO 371/16, Colonel Sir Harold Franz Passawer Percival's Diary (9 February - 16 September 1920).


3. PRO FO 371/3896 4513 Derby to Balfour 8 January 1919. See reply, also ibid Curzon (London) to Derby 10 January 1921. The War Cabinet felt that help for Poland was a minor aspect of the much larger question of the Allies' attitude towards Russia and its neighbouring states. Curzon knew that to assist Poland even with a small force 'might lead far, and would not be popular with army or country'.

4. Link (ed.) PWW Vol.60 p.602. Here, Woodrow Wilson estimates that 10,000 to 15,000 American troops may be needed to occupy Upper Silesia for six to eighteen months. See also Link (ed.) Deliberations of the Council Vol.2 pp.282-286.

5. Link (ed.) PWW Vol. 60 p.417. Lloyd George's suggestion that Upper Silesia be responsible for the cost of the troops, was also accepted.


7. CCA HDLM Acc 688 Box 2 H.M to Namier 26 June 1919. See also PRO FO 608 15762 Haking to Balfour 20 July 1919. Minute by Headlam Morley.

8. Ibid, Military and Political Report on Upper Silesia by Lieutenant Lowe 27 July, 1919. See also PRO FO 608/65 15421 Percival to Malcolm 9 July 1919. Percival reports that the Oberburgermeister of Gdansk 'begged most earnestly that the High Commissioner and any troops sent to Danzig (Gdansk) might not be French...he also begged that in no case should Polish troops be sent'.


11. PRO WO 33/5467 CIGS to Secretary of State for War 6 November 1919 (to Cabinet as CP111). See also PRO WO33/1004 Memorandum by Secretary of State for War (to Cabinet as CP1467) 9 June 1920.

12. IWM HHW2/48/14 Wilson to Moggridge 9 July 1921. Thwaites reports Balfour's request that troop deployments be discussed.
13. PRO FO 371/3896 4513 Derby to Curzon 8 January 1919. Commenting on Foch's request for British troops to help Poland, Derby (former Secretary of State for War when conscription was introduced) reported that he had 'pointed out the difficulty of providing any British troops, since our soldiers were only enlisted for war against Germany'.


19. Callwell *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* Vol.2, p.164-167. The scheme increased the conscripts' overseas pay and Wilson hoped that they would serve 'if the case is properly put to the men, and if Winston and I can get the support of the Press'. See also Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire* p.13-15. In November 1918 the British Army consisted of 3,500,000 men. One year later this had been reduced to just under 800,000. By November 1920 there were only 370,000 serving.

20. PRO WO 33/1004 CP1467 British Military Liabilities 1920-21. Appendix A *Summary of British Troops* pp.26-27, 14 June 1919. 'To sum up, it is urgently necessary to...devise some means of attracting tradesmen to the Colours, if the Army is to be converted into an efficient fighting force'. See also Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire* pp.16-17. Visiting Cologne in March 1920, Wilson found the 2nd Battalion Black Watch soldiers 'all very untrained'.


22. IWM HHW2/45/14 Thwaites to Wilson 9 July 1919, and *ibid* 13 July 1919.


25. PRO FO 608/65 15393 16 July 1919. Minute by Thwaites.
26. Ibid.

27. DBFP Vol. I No. 16 p. 164 Heads of Delegations Meeting 21 July 1919


29. DBFP Vol. I No. 31 pp. 375-377 Heads of Delegations Meeting 8 August 1919

30. Ibid.

31. DBFP Vol. I No. 38 pp. 450-452 Heads of Delegations Meeting 20 August 1919. The delegates hoped to persuade Germany to allow them to advance the plebiscite date. At the time they were expecting the Peace Treaty's implementation within two months.


34. Ibid, No. 62 p. 756 Heads of Delegations Meeting 22 September 1919. Interestingly, Wilson's diary entry for 25 August implies that Weygand was unavailable that day and that he (Wilson) only talked to the Americans - see Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Vol. 2 p. 209.


36. Ibid.

37. PRO FO 608/162 18987 15 September 1919. Minute by Lloyd George appointing Sir Eyre Crowe as the British Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference.


40. IWM HHW2/12D/41 Sackville West to Wilson 23 September 1919. 'I think we shall have to accept something of the following sort. The command of and the great bulk of the troops for any particular area to be entrusted to the power sending the largest contingent with representatives of other powers sending small contingents. Thus we should leave...Silesia to the French but with one small contingent of our own, etc. I know that there are grave objections but it is better than equal proportions everywhere'.

Chapter 2 - Notes
41. PRO FO 608/161 19410 3 October 1921. Notes by the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Regarding Proposals for Employment of British Troops in Regions to be Occupied Under Treaties of Peace.

42. Ibid, 19515 Crowe to Curzon 10 October 1919. When Crowe complained to the Conference Secretary about delays to proceedings, Clemenceau sent a note pointing out that the Council had been waiting several weeks for a reply from Britain about the distribution of Allied forces in the plebiscite areas. 'The indecision prejudices the organisation of the army of occupation that should be sent to the plebiscite regions'. See ibid 19530 Curzon to Crowe 10 October 1919 for approval of Crowe's proposals.

43. DBFP Vol. I No.73 pp.931-934, Heads of Delegations Meeting 13 October 1919. Foch believed that the Allied ratification and their exchange was imminent. As the Allied Supreme Commander, he was responsible for sending the force that was to occupy Upper Silesia.


45. PRO FO 608/161 19664 Sackville West to Wilson 18 October 1919.

46. Ibid, 19685 Sackville West to War Office 18 October 1919. Notes the Supreme Council's approval of the Committees' recommendations for occupation of the plebiscite areas. The British troops in Kwidzyn were to be under the unified British command. Three battalions, one British, were also being sent to Flensburg - where a plebiscite was being held on the German/Danish border.

47. DBFP Vol. II No.2 p.14 Heads of Delegations Meeting 18 October 1919.


49. PRO FO 371/8810 C 9145/3961/18 17 May 1923 Report on the Upper Silesian Plebiscite Commission by F.B. Bourdillon p.17. The Le Rond - Simson Agreement, signed 9 January 1920, was the protocol which defined the powers of the inter-Allied Upper Silesian Plebiscite Commission not specified in the Peace Treaty. They were all the powers hitherto vested in the German and the Prussian Governments, except those of legislation and taxation. However, the Commission could veto any extension to Upper Silesia of any new law or change in taxation introduced by the German and Prussian governments. It was also awarded powers to help ensure a fair and free plebiscite campaign and voting secrecy. These additional measures included power to

- recruit gendarmarie among inhabitants
- expel and replace local authorities
- expel persons attempting to distort the plebiscite's outcome by corruption or intimidation.

Chapter 2 - Notes
A supplementary agreement regarding the evacuation of German troops and the entry of the inter-Allied force, was also signed on 9 January, 1920.

50. PRO FO 371/8810 C9145/3961/18 17 May 1923 p.15 There was one exception, the Commission's Department of Food Control was given to the British contingent.

51. PRO FO 608/65 19634 Crowe to Curzon 20 November 1919. See also FO 608/123 (no number) 21 November 1919. Allowances decided upon in Paris would be paid to the officials of each nation. It was much easier to recruit in Britain than in France because nearly all non-regular Army officers were being demobilised, whereas in France military conscription had been retained. The French proposed an allowance of £1,200 per annum. In comparison, a senior official in the Foreign Office, such as Headlam Morley, only received around £1,000 per annum. Curzon made repeated attempts to have the rate reduced but when he succeeded it was only the British who implemented the pay cut.


53. PRO WO 33/982 No.10407 p.116 War Office to Rhine Army 21 October 1919. The Independent Division under General Heneker comprised 641 officers, 14,747 other ranks, 2,689 horses and 799 vehicles. The British contingent earmarked for Upper Silesia was to be commanded by Brigadier General J.V. Campbell V.C. and consisted of 180 officers, 3,891 other ranks, 482 horses and 181 vehicles - see PRO WO33/982 No.19419 p.119 Rhine Army to War Office 2 November, 1919.

54. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland (HMSO facsimile 1987) p.164 Most regular Army officers and NCO's had been recalled to Britain to join the new regular Army units. Temporary commissioned officers and young inexperienced NCO's promoted during the war, who had little experience in maintaining order and discipline, had been left in charge of the battalions awaiting demobilisation.


56. PRO FO 608/161 21178 (Copy) Sackville West to Weygand 15 December 1919. See also DBFP Vol.II No.40 p.532 Heads of Delegations Meeting 16 December 1919.

57. PRO WO 33/982 10444 War Office to Rhine Army 18 January 1919.

58. DBFP Vol.II No.18 Appendix F p.115, 'Draft of Letter from Allies to President of the German Delegation in Paris' 30 October 1919. The idea behind holding the elections was to nullify the campaign for an independent Upper Silesia, which was then at its height.

Chapter 2 - Notes
59. Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p.52. See PRO WO 144/34 File 4 Summary of General Malcolm's Report 20 November 1919 p.22. The election results are analysed here by district and national affiliation. Malcolm counted every non-Polish Party vote as a German vote overlooking the awkward fact that Polish-speaking Silesians also voted for Socialist and Centre Party candidates - the Catholic Church urging the Poles to vote for the latter. PRO FO 608/70 11753 4 June 1919 *Observations of the Polish Delegation in Response to Remarks of the German Delegation on the Condition of Peace*, makes similar points about counting non-Polish Party votes as German for the earlier Reichstag election held in Upper Silesia.

60. *DBFP* Vol. VI No.293 p392 Note 10. Tidbury reported that 'On one occasion a party of about six German soldiers entered one of the election halls and, merely by their presence, caused a good many Poles to leave the building, and produced an atmosphere of timidity which was all against the Polish interest'.


64. PRO FO 608/140 20028 Polish Delegation to Secretary of Peace Conference 24 October 1919. See also *ibid* 19977 General Nudant to Secretary of Peace Conference 29 October 1919.


66. Robert G.L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism - The Free Corps Movement in Post War Germany 1918 - 1923* (Harvard 1952, reissued 1970) pp.137-138. Until the law creating the provisional Reichswehr was implemented in August 1919, the Freikorps had been financed by Noske's Defence Ministry. When the Government believed that the Spartacist threat was over some of the Freikorps units formed to counter this were incorporated in the new Army. But others, such as the Marine Brigade in Upper Silesia, remained outside as 'independents', unofficially financed through a group of 'political generals' in the Reichswehr, but also drawing funds from heavy industry and from agrarian interests. Wheeler Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* pp.91-95, describes the Arbiets-Kommandos (AK), officially 'civilian labourers' employed by Reichswehr. See also J.H. Morgan's *Assize of Arms* pp.21-44 who confesses how ineffectual the efforts that he and his fellow officers on General Nollett's inter-Allied Military Commission of Control had been, when attempting to supervise the Peace Treaty's disarmament clauses in Germany.

67. *DBFP* Vol.II No.51 Appendix B pp.698-699 Von Lersner to Clemenceau 2 January1920. Lersner acknowledged that the industrial region 'contained numerous disturbing elements'. However, he pointed out that order had been re-established there for several months and martial law might soon be lifted. He argued that unlike
the Germans, the Allies would not have to guard the Polish frontier. At that time the
Germans were thought to have reduced troop numbers to 35,000 - see ibid No.79
p.946.


*Supply and Transport Committee Meeting 15 January 1920.* The following quotation
exemplifies the mood of pessimism. ‘Fears were expressed that the country would
have to face in the near future an organised attempt at seizing the reins of
Government in some large cities, such as Glasgow, London, Manchester and
Liverpool. The Army could not be dispersed in order to anticipate such an attempt,
the regular police were not sufficiently strong the repress it, and the response to a
call for special constables in industrial districts would probably be most
unsatisfactory, in view of the act that Trades Unions were threatening to expel any
member who joined the Special Constables’. See also Callwell, *Field Marshal Sir
Henry Wilson Vol.2* p.222, for Wilson’s impressions of these meeting.


73. HLRO F/24/2/3 Hankey to Lloyd George 17 January 1920. Outlining preparations he
believed necessary in the event of serious unrest in Britain, the Cabinet Secretary, Sir
Maurice Hankey, said that he found it ‘difficult to understand the reason for the very
obvious preoccupation of the First Lord and the C.I.G.S. as to the future...though
there are many clouds on the horizon, on the whole, the sky seems to be getting
clearer’. See also Stephen Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets Vol.II 1919-1931*
(London, 1972) p.144; Jeffery, *The British Army and the Crisis of Empire* p.27;
Jeffery & Hennessy, *States of Emergency* p.34; and Jeffery, *The Military
Correspondence* pp.146-148 Wilson to Churchill 1 January 1920.

74. IWM DS/Misc/80 Reel 9 Wilson’s Diaries p.224 18 January 1920; Jeffery &
Hennessy, *States of Emergency* p.34. At the meeting in Paris that day, Sir Robert
Horne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared that the miners ‘planned to take
the country when it was at its weakest, that is March’. Hankey attributed much of
the blame for the ‘Red Scare’ stories to Horne - see Morrison, *Responses to Industrial
Unrest* p.221.


76. PRO FO 371/8810 C9145/3961/18 17 May 1923 p.17.

77. Roskill, *Hankey: Man of Secrets* Vol.II p.144. Lloyd George may have been
receiving similar advice from advisors more sceptical about the ‘revolutionary threat’
than Wilson. Hankey claimed that he also recommended that the troops to be sent to the plebiscitary areas should be reduced and half a dozen battalions destined for Egypt, Palestine or India held at home. This, of course, would have made it even more difficult not to withhold the troops from Upper Silesia.


79. *DBFP* Vol.II. No.78 pp.938-942 *Notes of Meeting* 20 January 1920. See also *ibid* No.79 pp.946-949 *Notes of Meeting* 20 January 1920.


81. PRO WO 95/123 1.A.79 CIGS to Deputy CIGS 20 January 1920. Also PRO WO 33/982 No.10445 DMO to C in C Rhine Army 20 January 1920. British battalions on standby with advance parties *en route* to the plebiscite areas, had been:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>Destination</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Btn. Royal Irish Regiment</td>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Btn. Lancashire Fusiliers</td>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Btn. Royal Munster Fusiliers</td>
<td>Olsztyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Btn. Royal Dublin Fusiliers</td>
<td>Upper Silesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Btn. Gordon Highlanders</td>
<td>Upper Silesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Btn. Cameron Highlanders</td>
<td>Upper Silesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Btn. Royal Irish Fusiliers</td>
<td>Kwidzyn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Btn. Royal Berkshire Regiment</td>
<td>Memel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Btn. Essex Regiment</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Btn. Royal Fusiliers</td>
<td>Gdansk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PRO WO 33/982 10449 War Office to C in C Rhine Army 21 January 1920. This detailed the two British battalions (Royal Irish and Royal Fusiliers) remaining on plebiscite duty. Two companies of the Royal Irish Regiment travelled to Olsztyn by rail via Warsaw. On breaking their journey in Warsaw on 3 February, they were received by a Polish military guard of honour - see Stannus Geoghegan, *Campaigns and History of the Royal Irish Regiment* Vol.2 (Edinburgh, 1927) p.132.

82. J.M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (London,1919) is the primary example of this. Written with the encouragement of members of the British War Cabinet and possibly with Lloyd George's encouragement, this attack on the Peace Treaty was also greeted with great enthusiasm in the United States and in Germany. It had five reprints in eleven months and by 1923 had been translated into eleven languages. Reviewing Keynes book, Headlam Morley warned him 'that the Germans will use a book such as yours so as to create a feeling that the whole treaty is unjust and will try to use the general atmosphere of dissatisfaction created in order to create prejudice against all parts of the Treaty' - see also CCA HDLM Acc 688 Box 1, (Copy) H.M. to Keynes 16 December 1919.


84. *Ibid*.

Chapter 2 - Notes
85. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences* pp.272-273. Keynes observes that '...unless her neighbours are prosperous and orderly Poland is an economic impossibility with no industry but Jew-baiting'.

86. *The Communist International* No.13 August 1919 p.27. '...Poland is ruled by a clique of capitalist adventurers and landowners, who have involved the country in a criminal military adventure'. Although Comintern propaganda targeted the British trade unionists, particularly the shop stewards, its language and discourse was picked up by the socialists and radical liberals. The latter were then moving into the Labour Party, taking over and dominating its foreign policy-making process.

87. Apart from the British Commissioner, Lt. Colonel Percival, these were Lt. Colonel Tidbury (the leader of the inter-Allied Commission from Berlin which had been in Upper Silesia since August 1919), Captain Keatinge and Captain Kensington. In Berlin, members of the British military mission rubbed shoulders with Germany's political and military elites on a daily basis, some adopting German views on Poland. Major Ottley had been with the Rhine Army. General Hammond and Major Clarke had been in Poland with the Peace Conference's Railway Commission.


89. PRO WO 106/975 January 1920 *Appreciation of the Situation in the German Territory to be Occupied by the British Independent Division*.

90. CCA HDLM Acc 72 Box 37, Malcolm to Headlam Morley 7 February 1920. 'I am afraid our good friends [the French] are loading the dice against the Germans in Silesia & in favour of the Poles'.

91. PRO FO 371/3901 179614 Malcolm to DMI 10 February 1920. *Report on a Visit to Upper Silesia and Cracow*. Malcolm had only spent fourteen hours in Silesia. Malcolm (later the League of Nation's Commissioner for Refugees) was unpopular with the French. Writing to Sir Henry Wilson, Lord Derby, the British Ambassador in Paris, observed that the French 'almost spit with rage when they mention his name' - see IWM HHW2/313/37a 12 October 1920.

92. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.2 12 February 1920.


94. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.68 1 May 1920. This came up when Le Rond questioned the British Government's right to instruct Percival to block a Commission proposal that they take control of Upper Silesia's imports and exports.
95. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 Appendix C pp.126-137 The Commission’s Administration. The main departments were 1. Interior 2. Finance 3. Justice 4. Economic 5. Military 6. Communications 7. Food. The Food and the Communications Departments were headed by British directors, the Justice Department by an Italian. All the remainder, plus the Commission’s secretariat and the Presidential staff were headed by directors from the French contingent. The various sub-divisions within each Department were controlled by representatives from all three contingents. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War p.210, estimates that including the priests, who were appointed by the Bishop of Wrocław, there were about 78,000 state officials and employees in Upper Silesia.

96. PRO FO 890/16 Percival’s Diary p.22 3 March 1920.

97. PRO FO 371/5909 C115809/92/18 Craig to Lindsay 14 May 1921.

98. PRO FO 371/4816 C6525/1621/18 17 September. Minute by S.P. Waterlow.

99. Ibid, C6221/162/18 16 September 1920. See Lord Harding’s cover index minute regarding British officers resigning from Commission.

100. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p.20.

101. PRO FO 890/16 Percival’s Diary p.10 20 February 1920.

102. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p.22. There were sixteen districts. British controllers were in charge of five of the northern districts; Olenso (Rosenberg), Tarnowski Gory (Tarnowitz), Lubliniec (Lublinitz), rural Bytom (Betheun Land), and Strzelce (Gross Strelitz).

103. PRO FO 890/16 Percival’s Diary p.3 13 February 1920. Percival records that when French troops arrived in the Tarnowski and Bytom districts, orders to disarm the Sicherheitspolizei ‘gave rise to energetic remonstrance’s on the part of the civil authorities...’ See also DBFP Vol. XI No.6 p.5 Percival to Curzon 30 March 1920.

104. Ibid, pp.5-6

105. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p.18.

106. PRO FO 371/5927 C3345/92/18 Draper to Foreign Office 11 October 1921. This reveals that the greatest number of inter-Allied troops in Upper Silesia were the 20,516 who were serving there in September 1921.


108. PRO FO 371/4818 C8412/1621/18 Derby to Curzon 9 October 1920. This contains proposals for the reconstruction of the Upper Silesian Plebiscite Commission. See also PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923.

Chapter 2 - Notes
109. *Ibid*, p.23. This was in accord with the Le Rond - Von Simson Agreement. Prince von Hatzfeldt, Duke of Trachenberg, used the title 'German Plenipotentiary'. Though he was not paid by the Commission, Le Rond maintained that Hatzfeldt was in the service of the Commission.

110. *Ibid*.

111. Cienciala & Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* pp.54-55.

112. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920. Enclosure: *Note on Political Parties in Upper Silesia and their Activities in View of the Plebiscite* by Major Ottley. This is both balanced and comprehensive.

113. *Ibid*. Ottley notes that of the German political parties only the Independent Socialists refused to join the Commissariat.

114. *Ibid*. The Vereinigte Verbände der Heimtreuen Oberschlesi were a federation of German societies whose executive body, the Schlesische Ausschuss (Silesian Committee), became the German Commissariat. During the plebiscite the Vereinigte Verbände used its network to keep groups of individual supporters 'on board' and to spread German propaganda. Its head, Dr. Lukaschek was forced to resign from his official position as a Landrat. Percival prevented his expulsion from Upper Silesia.

115. *Ibid*. Ottley cites the Ostdeutsche Morgenpost, the Schwarze Adler, the Oberschlesische Morgenzeitung, the Kattowitzer Zeitung, and the Völkswille but there were many more newspapers, many subsidised by the campaign organisations. Peter Wozniak, 'Blut, Erz, Kohle: A Thematic Question During the Interwar Years', *East European Quarterly*, XXVIII No.3 September 1994 pp.319-334, cites Rudolf Vogel's doctoral thesis *Deutsche Presse und Propaganda der Abstimmungskampfes in Oberschlesien* (Leipzig, 1931), as dealing with many the aspects of this subject. Regarding the Jewish vote - see PRO FO 371/5898 C3942/92/18 LucianWolf to Tyrrel 3 May 1921, Enclosure: *The Jews of Upper Silesia* (10 pages). An appendix provides a breakdown of the 20,000 Jewish population in Upper Silesia by district.


118. FO 3171/5909 C1158909/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 19 May 1921.

119. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 pp.26-27. British politicians and Foreign Office officials believed Le Rond 'succeeded in gaining more for Poland than was its due'; therefore we can view Bourdillon's report as being defensive in nature.

120. *Ibid*, p.27.

121. PRO FO 371/5909 C115809/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 19 May 1921.
122. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.27 11 March 1920 and ibid p.44 1 April 1920.

123. The Army List 1921 Book 1 p.247. Percival was born in 1896 educated at Christ Church, Oxford and commissioned into the Derbyshire Regiment 1898. He served in the Boer War 1899-1902, was mentioned in dispatches and awarded the DSO.


125. DBFP Vol. XI No.7 p.6 Curzon to Percival 13 April 1920. Instructed not to agree to a proposal whereby the Commission controls Upper Silesia's imports and exports. This is one of the first issues on which Percival fails to give way to Le Rond.

126. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/162/18 (Private letter) Percival to Wigram 1 September 1920. 'The events of the last few weeks have opened my eyes. I fear that there is little doubt now that the French have no intention playing the game'.

127. PRO FO 371/5999 C115809/92/18 Private letter Craig to Lindsay 14 May 1921. Craig described this policy of spying during Percival's period as Commissioner, as fatal to inter-Allied relations.

128. DBFP Vol. XI No.123 pp.146-147 Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Curzon 6 January 1921, Enclosure: Memorandum on the Probable Effects of the Transfer of Upper Silesia to Poland 29 December 1921; and ibid No.144 pp.165-174 Percival to Curzon 26 January 1921, Enclosure: Precis of Reports from Managing Directors of Mines, Ironworks, etc in Upper Silesia compiled by Major R.W. Clarke, Captain Mather, and Mr. A.T. Saxton of the Economics Department. This condemnation of Polish aspirations ends with the comment 'It is unfortunate that we have had no opportunity of consulting practically experienced industrial magnates of Polish nationality as these do not at present exist in Upper Silesia'.

129. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 pp.97-118 Report of Communications Inter-Allied Commission Upper Silesia 1920-1922 by its Director, Mr. W.D. Cruikshank, 24 July 1922; and ibid pp146/185 Report on the Administration of the Department of Food Control of the Inter-Allied Administrative and Plebiscite Commission of Upper Silesia by its Director, Mr. J.I. Craig, 31 July 1922.

130. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p10 20 February 1920. '[Le Rond said] He had dealt again and again with the need to present a united front and for working together in harmony and in that connection I thoroughly agreed with him'.

131. Ibid, p.21 2 March 1920; and ibid p.46 4 April 1920.


133. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary passim.


137. *DBFP* Vol.VIII No.55 pp.502-506 Meeting of Allied and Polish Representatives at Spa 9 July 1920; and *ibid* No.59 p530 Meeting of Allied and Polish Representatives at Spa10, July 1919. See also No.59 Appendix: *Agreement Signed by Grabski*.

138. Wandycz, *France and her Eastern Allies* p.169, pp.176-179. Wandycz describes Poland even at this point in time, as mattering 'only as a pawn in the French political game', with Paris still looking upon a non-communist Russia as a possible ally again.

139. The site of the Commission's headquarters is now a commemorative garden. A plaque mentioning General Le Rond is inscribed 'A good friend to Poland'.

140. PRO FO 890/16 *Percival's Diary* p.54 12 April 1920.


143. PRO FO 890/16 *Percival's Diary* p.55 15 April 1920.


146. *Ibid*, *passim*.

147. *Ibid*, p.112 10 June 1920. See also PRO FO 371/4816 C6221/1621/18 10 June 1920. Crowe's cover minute compares the young French soldiers to 'our own on the Rhine and in Ireland, untrained boys under very young officers'.


152. *Ibid*, pp.15-16. Percival recounted here that when Korfanty left the meeting the Sicherheitspolizei arrested the Polish leader for driving without a motor pass.

153. PRO FO 371/57 Sir Esme Howard (Warsaw) to Balfour (Paris) 25 March 1919.

154. Matters relating to Upper Silesia were dealt with by the Foreign Office officials who regularly dealt with German matters. Loss of territory in Upper Silesia would affect British relations with Germany, therefore Percival's reports, already treated sympathetically, were interpreted still further from an Anglo-German perspective.

155. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No 17 p.36 Note 1. Major L. E. Ottley's resignation was accepted in November 1920 but he was retained as the Foreign Office's expert on Upper Silesia.

156. Rose *The Drama of Upper Silesia* p.177.


158. *The Observer* Sunday 12 December 1920; 'A big hotel in the town of Beuthen [Bytom] ... with armed guards at the entrance, whose doors are lined with steel plates. There are more guards on each landing and the stairs are barricaded at every storey, heavy gates shutting off each flight from communication with the rest of the house, if necessary'.

159. *Ibid.* See also Witold Malik, 'The Elites of the Polish National Movement in Prussian Poland in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries', *Polish Western Affairs* Vol.XXXIV (1993) No.2 p.71. Malik notes that 'the specific Upper Silesian conditions shaped a different type of leader, a 'man of ideas', missionary, guide, protector and advisor of people'.

160. Rose *The Drama of Upper Silesia* p.174. Interview with Professor Theresa Kulak, Wrodaw University, 26 July 1995. See also PRO FO 371/5889 C3299/92/18 Max Muller to S. Waterlow 9 February 1921.


162. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.12 p.17 Percival to Curzon 11 May 1920. Their first use of the strike weapon under the Commission was to support the Polish demands for the Sicherheitspolizei disbandment. Percival anticipated political strikes would be a regular occurrence.

163. Link (ed.) *Deliberations of the Council* Vol.2 p.308, *Conversation between Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Paderewski* 5 June 1919. At the Peace Conference, Paderewski had made it clear that, although the Poles form nine-tenths of the peasantry, 'the expression of their opinion would be strongly affected by the influence of this German clergy'.


Chapter 2 - Notes

166. Stehlin, *Weimar and the Vatican 1919-1933* pp.102-160; and *ibid* pp.54-55 for the statistics in the immediately preceding text.

167. Interview Dr. Jarosław Macala, Wroclaw University, 2 July 1996. While the Polish and German-speaking Silesians had at first unified in defence of the old Catholic Church and continued to co-operate within the Centre Party, both the Prussian Administration and later Wroclaw's Bishop Kopp favoured Upper Silesia's German-speaking minority. After Bismarck's dismissal, international tensions mounted and statements of loyalty became an increasingly essential attribute for all Germans. In this political atmosphere the Polish-speakers were regarded as even less trustworthy.

168. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* pp.106-130. This gives a comprehensive outline of the effect of Bismarck's policies and provides statistics and notes regarding the changes to the language used in the Catholic Church in Upper Silesia.

169. *Ibid*, p.170 In June 1919 Bertram issued a pastoral letter stating his own views as German patriot but allowing others to think differently. He appealed for political agitation to be kept out of the pulpit. Ratti made a similar appeal the following year and issued an order prohibiting all priests from participating in propaganda - see also Wambaugh *Plebiscites Since the World War* Vol.1 p.234.

170. Trzeciakowski, *The Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* p.58, describes the Act of 11 May 1873 dealing with the training and appointment of clergymen. Dr. Jarosław Macala, Wroclaw University, 2 July 1996, said in an interview that an exact figure for Upper Silesian clergy working towards or just hoping for a German or for a Polish victory, will never be known but he thought a reasonable guess was 75% for Germany. This figure and opinion is confirmed in several British documents. In an interview with Professor Theresa Kulak, Wroclaw University, 26 July 1995, she described how, as a consequence of the early Bismarck regulations through to the 1908 'Muzzle Regulations', how some of these German trained priests working in the Polish-speaking parishes become closely involved in the Polish Silesians aspirations and provided leadership but at the cost of their careers.

171. Rose, *Drama of Upper Silesia* p.170

172. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920. An enclosure by Major Ottley quotes a local politician's estimate that 'of the local Roman Catholic clergy, 40 per cent. are in favour of Germany, 40 per cent are doubtful, the remaining 20 per cent are Polish in sympathy, those in favour of the Poles being for the most part young men in subordinate positions'. This, however, appears to over-estimate the support for the Poles.

173. Carlo Falconi, *Popes in the 20th Century: From Pius X to John XXIII* (London 1967) pp.170-179. Achille Ratti (Pope Pius XII from 1922-1939) was appointed as the
Apolistic Visitor to Poland and Lithuania on 25 April 1918 - just after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk. Regarding Ratti's additional appointment to the Plebiscite Commission, Campbell, 'The Struggle for Upper Silesia' p.369, notes how, in retrospect this brought about 'the intriguing situation of two future popes, one in Poland and one in Germany, each closely identified with the nation to which he was papal nuncio and therefore with sharply contrasting policies in Central Europe'. On Bertram's position, Campbell, p.368, states 'in the Spring of 1920, Allied and Polish diplomats exercised sufficient pressure in Rome to achieve the temporary removal of Upper Silesia from Bertram's jurisdiction'. And Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War pp.234 also claimed that 'early in June 1920, the Holy See suspended the authority of the Cardinal and transferred it to Monsignor Achilles Ratti'. However, although this was generally believed to be the position, in fact it was never the case.

174. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p20 I March 1920. Learning of Ratti's nomination from the Foreign Office, Percival approached Le Rond who agreed that Percival should protest and request that an Upper Silesian priest be appointed in his place. William Teeling, The Pope in Politics: The Life and Work of Pius XI (London 1937) p.66, notes how Ratti had 'begged that some Dutch or other neutral Catholic be appointed. Failing that, he asked that Monsignor Pacelli, then Nuncio in Berlin [Munich], should at least be asked to go at the same time, thus ensuring a representative from each country'.

175. DBFP Vol. XI No.5 p.3 Count de Salis to Curzon 11 March 1920.

176. PRO FO 371/4821 C13076/6121/18 Loraine to Curzon 2 December, 1920. Ratti's assistant M. Pellegrinetti speaking of their experience with Upper Silesian politics.


179. Ibid. Cites Hatzfeldt's report to the German Foreign Office, November 8 1920. Campbell also quotes notes written on another German Foreign Office document where Bertram allegedly remarked to a German Foreign Office official that 'Ratti is scarcely fitted for his post, was formerly a library administrator in the Ambrosiana, and is hardly qualified to be a diplomat.' - see ibid p.369-370.


181. DBFP Vol. XI Chap.1 No.11 p12 Percival to Curzon 2 May 1920. The plan was intended to eliminate the involvement of the German courts outside Upper Silesia. For example, as things stood, appeals could be taken outwith the plebiscite area's udicial process.

182. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920. Enclosure by Major Ottley.

Chapter 2 - Notes
183. PRO FO 608/16 Percival's Diary p.27 16 March, 1920. Over this period there was some apprehension about the 'Kapp Putsch' taking place in Berlin. The top positions in Wrocław changed hands temporarily but no incidents occurred in Upper Silesia.


185. PRO FO 608/16 Percival's Diary p34 23 March 1920. Le Rond warned Moltke against any future intervention by the German Government. Moltke confessed to being much upset by the Commission's threat - but it would have been very difficult for the Commission to have carried it out.

186. During this period Poland was under sustained press attacks from Western Radicals, Socialists, Communists, Zionists, and her neighbouring states. The Red Army would almost wipe Poland off the map again when a trade embargo was imposed by her neighbouring states during the most critical point in the Soviet-Polish War. In late 1920 Poland also came under sustained diplomatic attack in the League of Nations after Zeligowski's occupation of Wilno and the country only secured its borders with the Soviets two days before the plebiscite vote was taken. There were great economic costs caused by over six years of war and near starvation in some areas. There were huge problems with refugees arriving from Russia and the Ukraine and Poland was the front line of the cordon sanitaire for a cholera epidemic spreading out from these countries.

187. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920. Enclosure: Memorandum by Major Ottley. Most of these arguments were taken from the section of the document entitled Methods and Programmes of the German and Polish Parties.

188. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/4819 C9301/1621/18 23 September 1920, for Polish views on the actual economic situation in Germany and Upper Silesia (12 pages).

189. PRO FO 371/5890 C4368/92/18 Percival to Curzon 23 February 1921. Enclosure: Memorandum 'A' Supplies to Consuming Districts After the Plebiscite. Here the Commission's Food Department pointed out that should the whole plebiscite area be transferred to Poland, with the exception of potatoes and sugar, that country was in no position to furnish the whole of Upper Silesia with food. After the plebiscite, one long-standing joke amongst the Polish Silesians was over 'Korfanty's cow'. At public meetings the Polish leader was reputed to have promised each peasant a cow. with Urbanek promising a goat - see Wambaugh Plebiscites Since the World War Vol.I p.229.

190. PRO FO 371/5886 C741/92/5886 Loraine to Curzon 4 January 1921. Reports that Polish Prime Minister, Wincenty Witos, promised a delegation of Upper Silesian farmers that discharged Polish and German soldiers would be granted the right to obtain land which would be parcelled out as a result of agrarian reform.

192. PRO FO 371/4814 C1621/1621/18 Kilmarnock (Berlin) to Curzon 13 July 1920.
Enclosure: Proposal by Confederation of Upper Silesians [Bund der Oberschlesiern] To
Revise Article 88 of the Peace Treaty and Declare Upper Silesia Neutral. This was issued
to each of the inter-Allied powers, repeating earlier proposals received through other
diplomatic sources. In the covering letter to Kilmarnock they stated that the British Section
of the Plebiscite Commission favoured this scheme. Foreign Office officials in London
attributed this statement in the covering letter to the interest that Ottley had probably
expressed to


194. Ibid. In 1919 the Polish Government granted wide autonomy to Poznania, West Prussia,
and East Galicia, and promised the same to Upper Silesia. The Polish autonomists in Upper
Silesia formed the Oberschlesische Volkspartei. Its programme included self-government
within Poland on questions concerning language, religion, education, railways, taxes,
labour, trade and industry. See PRO FO371/3902 209064 Rumbold to Curzon 17 July,
reporting that the Polish Sejm had passed a resolution two days earlier granting a wide
autonomy to Upper Silesia after the plebiscite. See also, PRO FO 371 C9838/1621/18
D'Abemon to Curzon 1920, which notes that Germany's political parties had only reached
agreement on Upper Silesian autonomy within the German Federation 'after violent
discussion'. The main dispute was between the Centre Party, who hoped that they would
control 'a federated Upper Silesia, and the nationalists who were opposed to any further
diminution of Prussia's territory. The Socialists were not enthusiastic but believed that it
was necessary to help Germany to win the plebiscite.

195. PRO FO 371/5916 C14724/92/18 20 July 1921 Memorandum by Major Ottley The
Autonomy Movement in Upper Silesia. Responding to his officials' minutes pointing out
the problems of independent statehood, Curzon wrote that he did 'not think the idea ought
to be described as impractical'. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.194 pp.218-219 Kilmarnock
to Curzon 25 June 1921.

196. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.68 1 May 1920.

197. This is the Feast of St. Stanislaw and celebrates the Polish Constitution of 1791. Its
introduction precipitated Poland's third and final partition in 1795. See also PRO FO
890/16 Percival's Diary p.136 and pp.140-141.


199. Ibid. pp.69-71 2 to 4 May 1920. Percival personally defused the situation at the Polish
Consulate by taking German police into the premises to search for arms. Outside his office
he witnessed a Pole being chased by two Germans. The Pole drew a handgun and shot one
of his pursuers. Percival understood that the Gazeta Polska's premises in Opole had been
sacked by 'a German crowd of workmen and hooligans'.

200. Ibid. p.69 4 May 1920.
201. PRO FO 371/4814 C2233/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 21 July 1920 Memorandum by Major Ottley. In districts where their support was stronger, the Poles retaliated by attacking German demonstrations and breaking up their public meetings.

202. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.73 7 May 1920. The strike was held on 10 - 12 May and it closed most of the mines in Upper Silesia.


204. Ottley's uncle, Sir Charles Ottley, a former Rear Admiral who had been Director of Naval Intelligence (1905-7) and the Naval Secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defence (1907-11), was Managing Director of Armstrong Whitworth - one of Britain's leading engineering companies. It had a holding in an Upper Silesian railway requirements company, commonly known as Oberdedorf, located in the industrial triangle. There is no evidence for supposing Major Ottley had contact with the German company but Ottley's near instant expertise on Upper Silesian matters does beg the question. When the League's line of partition had been accepted shortly after Major Ottley's death, Stepney Mile End's M.P, Sir Walter Preston, wrote to the Foreign Office on Armstrong Whitworth's behalf requesting an adjustment to the line to enable Oberdedorf's complete operation remain within German Silesia - see PRO FO 371/92/18 C22347/92/18 Sir Walter Preston M.P. to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Affairs 2 December, 1921.

205. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.92 27 May 1920. This incident occurred on 25 May. It started with some Germans molesting a few French officers. A section of French chasseurs (infantrymen) arrived but the growing crowd demanded that they retire. The French district controller could not be located. Ottley was sent for and when he asked the troops to leave, he was cheered by the crowd which tried to carry him around the square on their shoulders. The Polish newspapers made much of Ottley's popularity with the Germans.

206. Ibid,  p.96 29 May 1920. This incident occurred on 28 May. The subsequent investigation by a German magistrate blamed French soldiers for instigating the trouble by keeping company with German women - a source of great friction and the cause of numerous incidents (and killings) between Allied soldiers and local men. During the night, posters were often stuck up on walls and windows, listing women accused of having relations with the Allied soldiers - see ibid p.107 7 June 1920.

Ibid,  p.101 2 June 1920. At the Poles next meeting with the Commission, Korfanty referred to the Lomnitz Hotel incident and said that 'it was quite clear to him that every right-thinking citizen of Upper Silesia thought that the Commission was no longer able to protect the Polish-speaking population, and that the latter must and will take their protection into their own hands'. Percival thought him 'somewhat insolent'. They once again asked for Polish employment in the administration and the Sicherheitspoliziei's disbandment.


Chapter 2 - Notes

210. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.18 pp.23-27 12 June 1920; Extract from Notes by Mr. E.H. Carr on a Tour of Danzig [Gdansk], Warsaw and the Eastern Plebiscite Areas,

211. *Ibid*. Just as Ottley was doing at this time, so Carr also pushed the idea of an independent Upper Silesia. Since he had only spent a few days in Upper Silesia, there can be little doubt that most of his impressions reflected Ottley's views. He met Ottley on 2 June and spent some time with him in Bytom - see PRO FO890/16 *Percival's Diary* pp.99-102 1-3 June 1920.

212. PRO 371/3902 205318 Grahame (Paris) to Curzon 15 June 1920. This is a duplicate copy of Carr's report. Crowe minuted that 'Mr.Carr's well-known dislike of everything Polish makes it necessary to treat his observations with the utmost caution. He is a misleading guide'. Crookshank (Northern Dept) also notes Carr's anti-Polish credentials. See also CCA HDLM Acc 72 Cor. E.H. Carr to H.M.14 June 1920; *ibid* Box 37 (Copy) H.M. to E.H. Carr 22 July 1920; and *ibid* Acc 72 Cor. E.H. Carr to H.M. 23 July 1920.

213. PRO FO890/16 Percival's Diary pp.125-126 21 June 1920. The decision was arrived at after Le Rond successfully contrived to get Marinis to suggest that he go to Paris. To motivate Marinis he promised the Italian Commissioner that he could be the acting President of the Commission during his absence. A few days later, Le Rond was invited to Spa and then Paris. For Le Rond's address to the Ambassadors' Conference on 22 July, 1920 - see *DBFP* Vol. XI No. 23 pp.30-34.

214. *Ibid*. Percival only agreed with Le Rond's intention to raise the troop question in Paris after gaining a series of tortuous qualifications ensuring that the French Government would not use his name to pressurise London into sending troops - see *ibid* p.125 21 June, 1920.

215. The spate of confrontations across Upper Silesia suddenly abated in June. Le Rond told Percival and Marinis that he had taken strong measures with the Commanding Officers to deal with the indiscipline (*Percival's Diary* p.116 14 June). This despite the French troops believing that the Commission was too soft with the Germans (*Percival's Diary* p.113 16 June).

216. Michael Palij *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance 1919-1921* (Toronto 1995) Chap.8 pp.80-91 'The Genisis of the Polish - Soviet Russian War'. This is a good analysis from the Ukrainian point of view.

217. *Ibid*, pp.70-76.


220. CCA HDLM Acc72 Box 37 Namier to Headlam Morley 22 May 1920. Namier was referring to his 'struggle with Polish Imperialism'.

221. ibid, (Copy) Headlam Morley to Carr (Paris) 22 July 1920.

222. Museum of Labour History [MLH], Manchester CA/ADM/25 The Council of Action Report of the Special Conference on Labour and the Russian-Polish War Friday 13 August, 1920 (24 Pages). See also ibid LPAC/Box1/155 where a draft memorandum on the Russo-Polish War by the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Relations pointed out that if it did not oppose the British Government helping Poland, then the alignment on the Left 'will be Communists against the war, Labour Party for it'. Polish views were put to the Labour Party Executive in a letter by M. Niedzialkowski, the PSP General Secretary - ibid CA/For/87/1 16 August 1920. However, Labour Party advisors dismissed them as 'deserving no serious consideration' and claimed that 'it would be absurd to take seriously the socialism and democracy of these [Polish] people' - see ibid CA/For/90i. L.G. Macfarlane's Hands of Russia: British Labour and the Russo-Polish War 1920' in Past and Present No.38 December 1967 pp.126-152 provides an interesting account of events in Britain. This is only marred by its sketchy and not wholly accurate depiction of the related international politics and the military background to the war.


224. IWM HHW2/44A /29 P. deB. Radcliffe to Wilson (London) 18/20 August 1920. This is a postscript not included in Jeffery's, Military Correspondence pp.194-197. Radcliffe, Hankey and Lord D'Abernon represented Britain on the inter-Allied mission to Warsaw led by General Weygand.

225. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War Vol.1 Chapter III 'The Plebiscites in Allenstein and Marienwerder' p.140 These plebiscites were held 11 July, 1920. She concluded that 'There can be no doubt that the Russian advance played an important role and discouraged the inhabitants with Polish sympathies. '

226. CCA HDLM Acc 72 Corr. Bourdillon to H. M. 21 July 1920. Bourdillon had travelled to Olsztyn to observe the organisation of the plebiscite there.

227. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.178, 21 July, 1920

228. There were numerous instances of this. Interviewed by Percival (Percival's Diary, 21 July) Lukaschek the leader of the Germans' Vereinigte Verbände propaganda campaign, predicted that in view of their present difficulties, the Poles would no doubt adopt the idea as their own. One week later (Percival's Diary, 7 August) von Moltke told Percival that Ottley backed the idea of an autonomous state in Upper Silesia. When the British Commissioner visited Ottley in Bytom later that day, Ottley...
invited Percival to meet leading members of the *Bund der Oberschlesier* - Percival declined.

229. PRO FO 890/16 *Percival's Diary* pp.208-210 8 August 1920.


233. Davies, *White Eagle Red Star* pp.182-185. Each group was ready to exploit the situation in its own way, For example, Ludendorff offered to lead an army of liberation into Poland on condition that Poznania was returned to Germany. General Seeckt, commander of the *Reichswehr*, counted on Poland being swallowed up. The Spartacists hoped that it was the prelude to another German revolution.


235. PRO FO 371/4814 C2943/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 28 July 1920. The railway authorities implemented Germany's prohibition on the transit of munitions to Poland immediately. At Kottbus they detached two wagons of arms and munitions from a French train travelling to Upper Silesia, claiming that they were intended for Poland.

236. PRO FO 371/4815 C4091/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 16 August 1920 and *ibid* C4326/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920.


238. PRO FO 890/16 *Percival's Diary* p.202 4 August, 1920


240. *Ibid*, p.213, 10 August, 1920. These decrees were dated 25 July. The order prohibiting the export of munitions of war to Poland, included the blasting powder that the nearby Dombrowa mines relied upon, The Commission decided not to implement this because 'it might get us into political difficulties'.


243. PRO FO 890/16 *Percival's Diary* p.224 16 August 1920.

244. PRO FO371/4815 C4326/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 18 August, 1920. Though the Commission conceded internment, they refused to reply to the German note without
first consulting the Ambassadors' Conference. Obviously, Le Rond knew nothing about Foch's idea for re-grouping the Polish Army in Silesia if defeated - although the Soviets apparently suspected this was the case. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary pp.226-227 17 August 1920.


248. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.26 p.36-37 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920. This report is a summary of the previous days events. But over this particular period Percival's Diary is more comprehensive and more illuminating.

249. Wainbaugh *Plebiscites Since World War* p.236.

250. *DBFP* Vol. XI, No. 26 pp.36-37 Percival to Curzon 18 August 1920. See PRO FO371/4816 C6229/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 September 1920. Enclosure: Lt. Col. Bond (District Controller, Lubliniec) response to Captain Macpherson's resignation in which he notes that one cause of the disturbances was the Germans' belief that Warsaw had been captured. See also PRO FO 371/4816 Percival's Diary p.229 18 August 1920.

251. *Ibid*, pp.232-234 19 August 1920. See also PRO FO 371/4816 C6030/1621/18 Ottley to Percival 31 August 1920 'Report on Disturbances' pp.1-2. Ottley claimed that the insurrection around Katowice probably started before Korfanty had issued his proclamation and that he was simply following events.

252. Paliji, *The Ukrainian-Polish Defensive Alliance* p.128. This notes that the 17 August was the date that the Polish Provisional Revolutionary Committee had been given as the day Warsaw was expected to fall. Although alluded to, British documents fail to confirm any co-ordinated activity between the advancing Soviets' propagandists and the Independent Socialists in Upper Silesia. In earlier reports and in his diary, Percival anticipated disturbances by Spartacists/Communists during the Soviets' advance into Poland. But Percival's German sources were now blaming most German nationalists' activities on the Independent Socialists. In the Commission, however, Percival still maintained that it was the Communists who were largely responsible for much of the trouble (*Percival's Diary* 19 August). He believed that the German's 'unpremeditated excesses' were a 'spontaneous outburst of pent up feelings against the French and the Poles' (*DBFP*, Vol. XI, No.31 p.40). Percival excused this by claiming that the demonstrations and killings had occurred only because they 'found a large measure of support among Communist international elements' (*DBFP* Vol. XI, No.37 p.50).


254. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary pp.234-235 19 August 1920.

Chapter 2 - Notes
255. PRO FO 371/4815 C5616 Derby (Paris) to Curzon 3 September 1920. Enclosure: Translation of Le Rond's report to the Ambassadors Conference 24 August 1920. When Percival's report to London (DBFP Vol. XI Chap. I No. 31 pp.39-44) is compared with Le Rond's, the difference in emphasis is striking. Le Rond minimised the gravity of the situation whilst Percival exonerated the Germans and blamed the Polish Silesians and the French for all that had occurred. The Poles not only moved 110 captured Sicherheitspolizei into Poland also returned 250 Jewish deserters from the Polish Army who had sought refuge in Upper Silesia.

256. Lesniewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-1921', Stachura, Peter (ed.) Poland Between the Wars p.27.

257. DBFP Vol. XI No.31 pp.43-44 Percival to Curzon 25 August 1920. The demand was made to the Commission by the Polish labour leaders Rymer, Biniszkiewicz, Adamek, Rosanski and Pyrek as a condition for a return to work.

258. PRO FO371/4815 C5002/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 28 August 1920. See also ibid C5661/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 31 August 1920, for a fuller explanation for the resignations, also Percival's assurance that the 'these resignations were the result of independent and not of concerted action, nor of course have these officers been prompted by me in any way'. Also DBFP Vol. I, No.35 pp.46-47 31 August, 1920.


261. Ibid, C6219/1621/18 Cassels to Percival 8 September, 1920.


263. PRO FO 371/4815 C5616/1621/18 Derby to Curzon 3 September, 1920. Enclosure: Translation of Le Rond's report to the Ambassador's Conference, 24 August, 1920 Refers (p.5) to the Sicherheitspolizei's replacement by an Upper Silesian mixed police force, an action that Le Rond claimed had been deferred by the Bolshevik advance into Poland.

264. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.255 27 August 1920 (Note By Colonel Tidbury). See also FO 371/4815 C5508/1621/18 Minute by E. Phipps re.visit of Mr. Ottley to Foreign Office, 3 September 1920; FO 371/4816 C6089/1621/18 Hardinge re. visit of Polish minister 8 September 1920; and FO371/4816 C6221/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 8 September 1920 Enclosure 1.

265. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.246 26 August 1920. The Germans refused to agree to each Burgerwehr's Polish/German mix being decided by the results of the November 1919 municipal elections, in which the Polish vote did well.

Chapter 2 - Notes
266. *Ibid*, p.252 27 August, 1920. Percival records that although tensions remained high, the situation was a easier with over 75% of miners back at work.

267. PRO FO 890/ 4816 C6089/6121/18 Ottley to Percival 31 August 1920. Report on events in Bytom since 17 August. On the evening of 25 August, Dr. Bloch (leader of the German Democratic Party) and Father Ulitzka (leader of the Centre Party) had explained the terms of the agreement reached with Korfanty to Ottley. He told them that he did not think the Commission would endorse them.


269. PRO FO 890/16 Percival’s Diary p.259 29 August 1920. These deportations were not without opposition from local German Silesians.

270. Wambaugh Plebiscites Since Vol. II, No.77. See *DBFP* Vol.XI, No.23 pp.31-34. On 22 July, Le Rond told the Conference of Ambassadors that; 'It only remains for us [the Commission] to convert the Sicherheitspolizei into government police. This will be done before August 15th'. But in a later despatch, Percival notes that Le Rond had sent a telegram from Paris ordering that the transformation be postponed until he had returned to Opole and that orders had still not been given for it to go ahead when the insurrection broke out. See also PRO FO 371/4816 C6029/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 4 September 1920; and PRO FO 371/4816 C6039/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 6 September 1920, Enclosure: Captain Macpherson resignation statement confirms that there had been an early and secret recruitment of Poles for a Plebiscite Police force, but 'then the whole reformation of the Sicherheitspolice[sic] came to a standstill'.

271. *Ibid*, C5661/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 31 August 1920. This lists the Bytom Agreement's main clauses.


273. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 (Private letter) Percival to Wigram (London) 1 September 1920. Condemns Le Rond and offers to resign 'if by so doing I shall not be letting you down'. See also PRO FO 890/16 Percival’s Diary, p.239 21 August 1920, a record of the conversation that Percival had with Marinis that day, revealing that he had been talking about resigning for some time. This is interesting because this had occurred just a few days before the four British district controllers resigned.

274. *DBFP* Vol.VII pp.422-648 *Proceedings of the Conference at Spa* (5-16 July 1920) *passim* for details of the coal delivery negotiations. Germany had failed to maintain deliveries and cited the Plebiscite Commission's action in taking control of Upper Silesia's coal distribution as one of the reasons for this.

275. PRO FO 371/4815 C4741/1621/18 23 August 1920. Copy of Note handed to Peace Delegation in Paris by German Chargé d’Affairs. Wigram, in temporary charge of
the Central department was of the opinion that; 'It is most improbable that the German Government encouraged these disturbances...By such actions the Germans would be risking their Spa obligations, as well as making it likely that their remaining officials would be expelled from the plebiscite area, which they naturally wish to avoid'.

276. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.39 p.51 Derby to Curzon 6 September 1920. There is no doubt that many of the Polish insurgents' arms were supplied from across the Polish border and were returned there. As a result of the brutality displayed by the Germans in August 1919 the Poles and, importantly, the Army's officer corps, were overwhelmingly with the Silesian Poles. There was little that the politicians could do to stop covert assistance - even if they had wanted to. But although (like the German officer corps), the Polish military authorities and POW were a law unto themselves, the insurrection in August 1920 occurred when all Poland's military resources and its attention were concentrated on a fight for its own survival. The Silesian Poles again fought their own battle and the German claims that regular Polish soldiers were participating in the insurrection (*ibid* No.26 pp.37-38 22 August, 1920) had to be retracted (*ibid* No. 31 pp.39-44 25 August, 1920).

277. PRO FO 371/4816 C5628/4621/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 31 August 1920. Enclosure: Report by Captain Warburton of the British Military Mission on Meeting of League of Upper Silesians, Berlin, Lustgarten, 29 August, 1920. The drawing represented the commonly-held perception amongst Germans that Poles were covered in lice and fleas. Other examples of slogans given were *Ober Schlesien bleibt Deutsch* (Upper Silesia stays German), and *mit Korfanty's kap lasst ans in Rub* (Korfanty's head is slow and dreaming).

278. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.33 p.45 Kilmarnock to Curzon 31 August 1920. The meeting was on 30 August. Simson also claimed that the German supporters had been terrorised into signing the Bytom Agreement without consulting their Government and that they much regretted their action.

279. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.267 3 September 1920. The trouble was at the Prinzengrube and the Heinrichgluckgrube mines. The representatives requesting that force to be used to restore order were Pistorius, Dr. Ebling, Hucker and Arndt. For a constructive and enlightened view of the miners' conditions of work see PRO FO 371/4815 C5010/1621/18 by Mr. Craig (Director Food Department) 27 August 1920.

280. PRO FO 371/4817 C6874/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 17 September 1920.

281. PRO FO 371/4816 C6029/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 4 September 1920.

282. *Ibid.* This seems reasonable, but Percival's estimate of a 70,000 strong Polish Army (*Percival's Diary* p.238 29 August), also his reports to London depicting the Polish insurgents' grip on the country, means that his reason for the Poles compromising, 'because they are aware of the disapproval of the Italian and British sections of the commission and feared its consequences if they did not make some show of being desirous of putting an end to their reign of terror,' does not bear objective analysis.
283. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 Percival to Wigram 1 September 1920.

284. DBFP Vol. XI No.37 pp.48-50 Percival to Curzon 5 September 1920. Several entries in Percival's diary refer to this. On 20 July (Percival's Diary p.175), he noted that certain papers were missing and that he had been aware for some time that information in the possession of the British Mission was 'leaking out'. At a meeting of the Commission on 13 August (Percival's Diary p.219), Marinis brought the definite charge that two women at Rybnik had received instructions from a French agent named [left blank] to spy on Colonel Pisenti and ascertain how he spent his time and also whether he had any pro-German tendencies etc.

285. PRO FO 371/4816 C5700/1621/18 Cover minute by S. P. Waterlow 7 September 1920 commenting on Percival's offer to resign. He suggests that 'we ought seriously to consider whether we should not do so well either to press for a radical re-organisation of the Commission or to threaten to withdraw our participation'.


287. Ibid, C5757/1821/18 Percival to Curzon 6 September 1920. Although the Foreign Office had informed the French Foreign Minister about them privately, Percival had not informed the Commission's President of the resignations, Le Rond demanded that Ottley, Perry and Cassells cease to function immediately but Percival refused and had asked London for instructions.


289. Ibid, No.39 pp.51-52 Derby to Curzon 8 September 1920. see also Randolph S Churchill, Lord Derby: King of Lancashire (London 1959) p.379. The author notes that over the years Derby had frequent brushes with Curzon and that there was a latent antipathy between them. However, they did not let it interfere with their work.

290. PRO FO 371/4816 C5930/1621/18 Cover minute (5 pages) by S. P. Waterlow 10 September 1920. Waterlow thought the French military commander as culpable as Le Rond: 'I cannot resist the conclusion that the French have throughout displayed, not merely political insincerity but military incompetence'.

291. Ibid.

292. DBFP Vol. XI No.42 pp.55-56 Curzon to Derby 13 September 1920. A request for Italian support was sent to Rome the same day - DBFP Vol. XI No.43 p.55. On 9 September, the Italian newspaper the Corriere D'Italia discussed the Silesian situation in an article sent from Berlin. Its author thought England was cunningly 'creating an atmosphere favourable to her prestige in Germany' - see PRO FO 371/4817 C6400/1621/18 9 September 1920.

293. PRO FO 371/4816 C6221/1621/18 Cover Minute by S. P. Waterlow dated 15 September, 1920. Reviewing the statements Waterlow felt that 'British officers do not use such language until their endurance has been tried to its utmost limits'. But
Crowe well knew that the Commission in Upper Silesia only had half the troops that it should have had. Crowe always retained a sceptical attitude over the worth of appeasing Germany. So much that when he was at the Peace Conference, Lloyd George became displeased with him because he appeared to be unduly anti-German in negotiations - see R. S. Churchill, *Lord Derby* p.379.

294. PRO FO 371/4816 C6525/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow on 17 September 1920 (with reference to DBFP Vol. XI No.39 pp.51-52 Derby to Curzon 8 September 1920). Because there were no records except the decrees that were published, Percival could never pin the French down to anything. See PRO FO 371/4816 C6221/1621/18 Cover Minutes by Crowe and Hardinge. Reviewing the officers' resignations, Hardinge blamed Percival for allowing the situation to have developed.

295. *DBFP* Vol. XI, No. 46 pp.58-65 Percival to Curzon 14 September 1920. This despatch contains a long rambling repetition of details previously provided but it is expressed in a manner which is increasingly hostile to the Poles. When this report was dispatched Percival had been ill for several days (*Percival's Diary* p.295 15 September) during which time he had received notification from London that he was being sacrificed to help them to replace Le Rond - see *DBFP* Vol. XI p.54 Note 2. Percival's recommendations were that:

1. There be an equal distribution of districts between the Italian, French and British contingents.
2. Control of the police be removed from the Commission's French-controlled Military Department and be put under a special department commanded by British officers.
3. The establishment of an Allied Secretariat-General.
4. Control of the industrial district to be divided amongst the three contingents. [The first three were implemented]

PRO FO 371/4816 C6560/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow (to Percival's above despatch) written on 18 September 1920,

296. PRO FO 371/4816 C6560/1621/18 Minute by S. P. Waterlow to Percival's despatch DBFP Vol. X1 No.46 pp.56-65.

297. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.49 pp.67-69 Curzon to Derby 18 September 1920. The main charges against the Commission were yielding to organised demonstrations and failing to provide both populations with protection. There were also complaints about the French troops, a long indictment about Le Rond's alleged deficiencies, including his domination of the administration. In addition to Percival's proposals (above) the administration of the recommended Allied Secretariat General was also specified in great detail, as were procedures for meetings, etc. There was also a proposal to reform the Secret Service and another demanding an audit of the Commission's finances.

299. PRO FO 371/4816 C6525/621/18 Curzon to Percival 18 September 1920 and PRO FO 371/4817 C6688/1621/18 Craig to Curzon 18 September 1920. Craig reports that Percival is unfit to travel. See also PRO FO 608/16 Percival's Diary p.295, 15 September 1920 which records that he has been 'laid up' since Saturday 11 September. The first indications of his breakdown occur in his diary on 5 September.

300. IWM HHW2/313/37a Derby to Sir Henry Wilson 12 October 1920.

301 Though many British trade unionists and socialists held romantic notions about the nature of the Russian revolution, almost all were opposed to non-constitutional changes. This explains why Lloyd George and his ministers 'Red Scare' tactics raised fears throughout the traditionally conservative British society. The great drawback was that, however illusory the danger, the tactic stoked disproportionate fears within Lloyd George's Conservative coalition partners and amongst the reactionary elements in his Cabinet. Amongst the Coalition's back-benches there was a rapidly developing 'Retreat to Empire' mentality. They aspired to closer economic trading links within the Empire as a means of competing with the United States. Given this, and also being held responsible by the British liberals and socialists for allegedly unjustifiably harsh peace terms, Lloyd George had little to lose and much to gain by demonstrating that British interests came first and that the Peace Treaty's terms and conditions were not carved in stone.

302. PRO FO890/16 Percival's Diary pp.175-179 21 July 1920. After his dismissal as Rybnik's Landrat, Dr. Lukaschek gradually revealed himself to be the power behind Urbanek and eventually became the acknowledged leader of the German Silesians. In July, when Percival was successfully intervening to stop his exile, Lukaschek told Percival that the agitation had been useful at first but was now against German interests therefore, 'he and those with him had taken steps to put a stop to it'.

303. DBFP Vol.XI No.7 p.6 Curzon to Percival 13 April 1920.


306. Lloyd George could not regard Germany as a potential aggressor and believed that the French were being ridiculous in their fears. When the Anglo-American guarantee to France collapsed with the United States Senate's refusal to ratify the Peace Treaty, he was determined not to make either any multi or bilateral defensive alliance with France because he feared that it would be employed to extract British assistance in crushing Germany still further.

307. HLRO F/53/1/50 Derby to Curzon 20 September. This had been agreed before the Conference at Spa was concluded. Millerand indicated to Derby that public opinion in France, 'headed and voiced by Poincare' was against it.

Chapter 2 - Notes
Chapter 3

The Reorganised Commission, the 'Outvoting' Regulations and the Plebiscite.

On 9 October, 1920, Derby telegraphed Percival to inform him that the Ambassadors’ Conference had negotiated a compromise agreement giving the British an increased influence in the Upper Silesian Commission. The Commission’s administrative procedures were to be revised, control of Upper Silesia’s towns and districts was to be equalised between the three Allies and, to compensate for the British military deficit, British officers were to be introduced into the new police militia replacing the Sicherheitspolizei. The French Government had refused to remove Le Rond, but he had warned that his rights as the Commission’s President were no greater than those of the other two commissioners. Derby’s message ended with a reminder to the British Commissioner that since the Commission’s decision were taken by majority vote ‘it should therefore be possible for you and your Italian colleagues to carry such further reforms...as you consider desirable’.1 Two weeks later Percival informed the Foreign Office that Le Rond had substantially accepted the decisions taken in Paris and the solutions to the questions which the Conference of Ambassadors had left the Commission to resolve by itself. He went on to observe that in consequence of this attitude on the part of General Le Rond, the business of the Commission is at present proceeding with a smoothness which was often absent from its proceedings (under his presidency) during the past four or five months.2
The following chapter examines the substance of this new co-operation and the reorganisation's effectiveness in increasing British influence within the Commission. And because it provides a stark illustration of the British Government's motivation and its increasingly strong support for Germany's position on the Upper Silesian issue, a short account of the international debate surrounding the Commission's attempts to establish a date for holding the plebiscite and finalising its voting regulations, is also included. It also investigates the background to the dispatch of four British battalions to Upper Silesia prior to the plebiscite vote (held on 20 March 1921), and outlines the issues surrounding the Polish campaign to deter thousands of non-resident German 'outvoters' from travelling to Upper Silesia. The effect of these non-residents' votes on the plebiscite outcome is considered by a statistical analysis of 1,545 towns, communes and Gutsbezirke (manorial estates) participating in the plebiscite.\(^3\) The reactions to the result in London, Berlin, Warsaw and Upper Silesia are examined and the implications of voting and the factors influencing it, are analysed. After discussing the plebiscite's historiography, the chapter concludes with an outline of the situation prior to the outbreak of Upper Silesia's third and most dramatic insurrection, which commenced on the evening of 2 May 1921.

When Le Rond had met the Allied Ambassadors in Paris on 21 September 1920, the strength of his opening presentation had been such that, afterwards, the Italian and American Ambassadors told Derby that they could not support a call to remove the French Commissioner.\(^4\) As a consequence, Derby suggested a compromise proposal to the Foreign Office which Curzon agreed could be 'held in reserve' until he had cross-examined Le Rond.\(^5\) However, realising the French negotiators were unlikely to agree to Le Rond's removal, Derby (assisted by Ottley and Bourdillon), negotiated directly
with their Foreign Affairs Ministry and reached a settlement which was endorsed by the Ambassadors’ Conference. The British Government’s approval was readily forthcoming and the Foreign Office appeared pleased with the outcome. Hardinge wrote that ‘it was impossible to maintain our original demand. French amour propre would never have sanctioned General Le Rond’s withdrawal. Our control is considerably increased by the new scheme’. This view of Derby’s compromise was not universally shared. Ottley, now retained in the Foreign Office as an expert on Upper Silesia, attacked it. He noted Derby’s failure to alter the preponderance of French officials who were serving with the Commission and complained that the concession on the police (by the inclusion of twelve British officers) had been neutralised by the new force being placed under the Commission’s French–controlled Interior Department. These concerns about the British climb-down were ignored, but Le Rond’s continuing tenure as President did raise another problem. Despite Percival’s severe nervous breakdown and the question that had been raised about his competence, British amour propre required that the current British Commissioner should also continue in office.

On 23 October Percival had returned from convalescence in the Czech Riesengebirge mountain area which was about a four hour drive from Opole. Le Rond had returned from Paris four days earlier. During Percival’s absence, the Foreign Office had requested that he return to London for some guidance as to his future procedure under the new regime. However, a revitalised Percival postponed his journey until after the Commission had completed discussing the matters that the Ambassadors’ Conference had assigned to them. During these talks Le Rond accepted almost all of the British proposals. Minutes of all the meetings would be kept, communications
with the Commission would be widely distributed, and the Commission’s Secretariat would now be staffed by British and Italian officials, as well as the French ones. All three nationalities would also be represented in the new External Affairs Department being established to deal with the ambassadors and consuls in Opole. The sticking point was over distributing the towns and districts between the Allied district controllers. After several days of discussions it was agreed to change the current system whereby each district controller had two assistants of his own nationality, to a system whereby each district controller would be given one assistant from each of the other two nationalities. Percival welcomed this because it secured a British presence in every district. However, he did anticipate that it might prove unpopular with the district controllers and that some assistant controllers might not be willing to serve under these conditions. In fact, immediately the word got out, Colonel Pepys Cockerell, Ottley’s replacement at Bytom Land, sent Percival a seven page letter objecting to the arrangement, citing as his reasons, ‘language difficulties, lack of knowledge of Kreis affairs by officers from other Krieses, social reasons, effect on subordinate staff, and reference to superior authority’. Despite this objection, Percival left for London in a much more optimistic frame of mind than prior to the reorganisation.

At the Foreign Office, the first problem Percival and Waterlow tackled was the officers’ resignations. They decided to let Ottley go to the Foreign Office, Macpherson and Cassells were asked to withdraw their resignations, which they did. Percival was told to impress on his officials that their dual loyalty (to Percival and to the Head of their Department) should not cause any friction. Waterlow also expressed concern about Percival’s health, telling him that if he found ‘it necessary to take things easy at
any time’, then a new deputy could be sent out.\textsuperscript{16} He noted that the Foreign Office had ‘nothing whatever against Bourdillon’ and wanted him retained by the Commission, nevertheless, they felt that he was not the right man to take control should Percival experience another ‘physical breakdown... in the stressful times ahead’.\textsuperscript{17} One of the most important questions addressed was the date of the plebiscite. Percival was reminded that Germany’s total reparations liability could not be fixed until the plebiscite result was known. And on this hung ‘the economic reconstruction of Europe and the tranquillity of the world’. He must, therefore, do ‘everything possible to expedite the taking of the vote’. Waterlow’s own estimate was that it could be done within 100 days and he promised Percival that the Foreign Office would do all it could to ease his path.\textsuperscript{18} Regarding the Commission’s re-organisation, Percival was advised that he should demonstrate the ‘practical reality’ of the changed circumstances to Le Rond by forcing Korfanty’s expulsion from Upper Silesia.\textsuperscript{19} Summarising the discussions, Waterlow concluded in a letter to Percival that although he would have felt happier had Percival rested another month, it was important that he lost no time in returning to Upper Silesia ‘in order to supervise personally the starting of the new era’.\textsuperscript{20}

However, Percival had barely left London when Waterlow compiled a minute for his superiors highlighting the British Commissioner’s shortcomings and urging that he be replaced. Arguing that Upper Silesia was a crucial factor in European politics and that ‘even peace or war, may depend on the personality of the British Commissioner’, Waterlow told them that Britain was ‘represented there by an officer in whom we cannot have unbounded confidence’. It was clear that Colonel Percival had let his staff get out of hand and that the majority of them had little or no confidence in him. In

\textit{Chapter 3}
Waterlow's opinion, the only solution was to replace him with a trained administrator.\textsuperscript{21} This burst of candour was inspired by Waterlow learning that Colonel Tallents, the Head of the Baltic Mission, might be available to take Percival's place. Nevertheless, the words serve to illustrate that Percival was sent back to Upper Silesia despite strong Foreign Office misgivings about his inept handling of inter-Allied diplomacy and the evidence of his poor management skills - all of which had no doubt contributed to his nervous condition. Apart from British \textit{amour propre}, Percival's retention perhaps also indicates the problem of the British Government in finding suitably qualified people to fill these highly politicised, short-term posts thrown up in unfamiliar territory, by the Central Powers' collapse and subsequent Peace Treaties. That said, by the end of 1920, Britain's short post-war economic boom was over and with jobs at a premium, the Foreign Office experienced little difficulty recruiting the additional number of junior officials which the Commission's reorganisation entailed - even at the reduced rates of pay British officials had received since September.\textsuperscript{22}

Between 40 and 50 recently demobilised, generally well-connected officers were interviewed to fill positions with the Commission's new police force and increase the number of British assistant district controllers.\textsuperscript{23} This recruitment process took place at the Foreign Office and was conducted by Ottley and Captain G.S. Hutchison, Percival's new \textit{aide-de-camp}.\textsuperscript{24} All applicants were questioned on their ability to communicate both in German and French. Derby had requested that an effort be made to recruit German speakers, with any shortfall made up from candidates who spoke only French.\textsuperscript{25} Out of the 27 officers selected, 23 were classified as fluent German speakers, with a dozen of them classified as fluent in both languages. Eight officers speaking both German and French were selected as district controllers. The

Chapter 3
remainder, plus four more who were classified as only fluent in French, were given posts either with the police or elsewhere in the Commission, where vacancies existed due to some of the original officials having departed on health grounds or for domestic reasons. Waterlow was impressed by the ‘surprisingly high’ standard of the officers recruited, at the same time he regretted the fact that for Britain to ‘have so many men of this calibre out of work and without prospects’ was ‘deplorable however satisfactory the result from our point of view’. In his autobiography, however, Hutchison agreed that perhaps too much emphasis had been placed on language skills and not enough on the officers’ personal qualities. It would be reasonable to surmise, however, that Ottley and Hutchison selected officers in their own particular image.

By 24 November, the Commission’s new recruits had arrived in Upper Silesia where Percival began to test the new concorde by attempting to set a plebiscite date and force Korfanty’s expulsion from the region. Yet, contrary to Derby’s intention, with so many political, economic and financial outcomes for the respective powers now riding on the plebiscite, every major difference between the Commissioners quickly became a subject for direct negotiations between their governments. Another reason for this move towards inter-governmental negotiation was the intense lobbying by Berlin and Warsaw. Allegations and counter-allegations, reports of coups and counter-coups, and warnings of invasions and wars flooded into the Foreign Office from every source of official interest. Adding to this paper stream was the output of the extensive, well-organised, international network of propaganda agencies which the Germans had maintained and even increased since the War. Foreign Office officials were inundated with letters and petitions from all parts of Germany and from Germans

Chapter 3
living in ex-neutral countries such as Holland, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden. From Lower Silesia a ‘Scotch shipmaster’s daughter from Montrose, Scotland’, wrote to Lloyd George begging him to help ‘the thousands of poor Germans’ in Upper Silesia being shot down in the streets by Poles, who were allegedly plundering their homes while French soldiers looked on. Waterlow was certainly impressed by the response: ‘The Germans are amazing, someone turns the handle and they all act like machines’. But apart from the Polish Silesians fearing a German coup in Upper Silesia and the Germans warning of another insurrection or even an invasion by Poland, it is clear that the issue driving most lobbying activity at this time was the ‘outvoting’ question.

In *Plebiscites Since The World War*, Sara Wambaugh provides an extensive and detailed account of how the plebiscite was organised. Papers dealing with the non-residents or ‘outvoters’ in published British documents provide an equally comprehensive coverage of this subject. For our purpose it is sufficient to note that the Peace Conference had established that the plebiscite vote would be counted by communes and that, even if they now lived elsewhere, anyone born in Upper Silesia was free to participate. Details about how and when these non-residents would vote, the date of the plebiscite, and related regulations such as the residential qualifications necessary for recent migrants to the area to vote, had been left for the Commission to sort out. The Commission had set-up a sub-committee on 22 June 1920 to work out these rules and make arrangements for holding the plebiscite. At a meeting in Paris during July, Le Rond had told the Ambassadors that the Commission had been considering holding the plebiscite that autumn. But even if this sub-committee’s
work had not been interrupted by the insurrection, it remains doubtful whether they could have even drawn up the voting regulations by then.

The reason is that both Germans and Poles were already questioning the most fundamental provisions of the plebiscite. Hatzfeldt had drawn Percival’s attention to the anomalies inherent in counting the vote by communes and Korfanty had forwarded proposals to the Commissioners ‘to assist them’ in drawing up the regulations. Early in August 1920, before the insurrection later that month, the Commissioners had learnt that the Silesian Poles were planning demonstrations demanding changes to the Peace Treaty’s articles on non-residents’ voting. This resulted from the Polish experience with the East Prussian plebiscites. There, they had discovered that the vast majority of outvoters were German supporters. They now feared a similarly disproportionate ratio of German outvoters to Polish ones would appear in Upper Silesia. To the Poles, these East Prussian plebiscites had demonstrated Germany’s ability to fund and organise their support whilst simultaneously inhibiting any likely sources of Polish support elsewhere in Germany. In a memorandum sent to the British Foreign Office on 19 September, the Polish Government argued that because of inconsistencies in the Treaty articles the outvoting provisions for Upper Silesia should be abolished. Four days later the Polish Foreign Minister, Prince Sapieha, repeated this request to the British Minister in Warsaw - claiming that a large influx of outvoters into East Prussia before the plebiscites had led ‘to [civil] disturbances and a vote by no means reflecting the true wishes of the population’. Asked to comment, Percival told the Foreign Office that the outvoting question ‘would play a part of so much importance in the plebiscite’ that it should be submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors for their interpretation. Estimating the outvoters could comprise as much as twenty per cent of
the total votes cast, he forecast that their arrival in communes currently enjoying small
majorities in favour of Poland, could ‘turn the scale in favour of Germany’.44

Outvoting thus became a highly contentious issue, but the Poles were over-
looking the inconvenient fact that the provisions for this were the indirect result of
their own request for non-resident voting to be included in the East Prussian
plebiscites. It was incorporated in the Upper Silesian Plebiscite Articles by accident
when in the last minute rush to include provision for an Upper Silesian plebiscite in
the Peace Treaty, the Chairman of the Eastern Frontiers Committee (General Le
Rond), sought to save time by proposing that the East Prussian Plebiscite Articles be
duplicated for Upper Silesia. Headlam Morley, the Committee’s British representative
later recalled that this was carried out with practically no discussion.45 However, once
accepted, they became an integral part of the settlement and, on observing Polish
attempts to scrap them, Berlin quite correctly pointed out that deviation from its
provisions ‘would be a manifest breach of the Treaty of Peace’. 46 Sensing that this
question might delay the plebiscite and consequently the fixing of the amount of
Germany’s total reparations, the Foreign Office instructed Derby to press the
Ambassadors’ Conference to decide the matter.47 Another dimension was added to this
when Derby received a telegram from Opole advising him that as a result of the unrest
amongst Silesia’s Polish-supporters over the inclusion of outvoters, the three Upper
Silesian Commissioners were demanding that military reinforcements be sent there.48

On 18 November, the Ambassadors considered the question of the possible
arrival of 300,000 outvoters in Upper Silesia and the necessity for more troops. The
French argued that this could result in civil war and supported by Foch, they declared
that they were only prepared to accept the consequences of giving outvoters the right

Chapter 3
to vote if the Commission’s military force was increased to 60,000 men. Derby later reported to Curzon that the French position ‘was to refuse to accept responsibility for the maintenance of order unless the Treaty of Versailles was modified in such a way as to exclude the outvoters’. But in the opinion of Derby and of the Italian Ambassador, to exclude the outvoters was contrary to the Treaty and could not be countenanced. Derby warned Curzon that the Ambassadors’ Conference would be referring the matter to the Allied Governments to resolve. He felt that there were just two alternatives: the British must ‘either take their share in the military responsibility involved in sending troops to Upper Silesia or abandon the plebiscite entirely’. 

Discussing the French attempt to have the outvoters excluded, Crowe told the Italian Ambassador to Britain that he thought that the question ‘was assuming very grave proportions’. An attempt by Waterlow to involve the Rhine Army came to nothing, its Commander in Chief claimed that its current strength (12,000 men) was insufficient to permit a detachment to Silesia. Crowe also dismissed Waterlow’s proposal that the United States be asked to send its Silesian Plebiscite Division (which was still located on the Rhine). From Berlin, D’Abernon (the British Ambassador) made some positive suggestions. The German outvoters could vote at their place of residence or at certain other fixed points in Germany. Or the plebiscite could be held in different parts of Upper Silesia over a comparatively wide space of time, thus obviating the necessity for the estimated 300,000 outvoters arriving together. Crowe and Waterlow could see ‘immense practical difficulties’ with D’Abernon’s proposals but recommended that, if the French would consider them, Curzon might instruct Derby to submit them to the Ambassadors’ Conference. Whatever pressures the Poles and the French applied the view of the Italian and British Governments was that non-

Chapter 3
residents born in Upper Silesia were entitled to vote. It was the duty of the Allied
signatories to the Peace Treaty, especially France, Britain, Italy and Poland, 'to try to
arrange either for the place, or the time, or the duration of the voting that would best
secure a peaceful result'.

The issue was further complicated by the Foreign Office's attempts to have
Korfanty expelled. Driven by Percival's and Ottley's accounts of Korfanty's alleged
activities and by reports received from British diplomats in Berlin, the Foreign Office
had come to believe that by removing someone from the Polish leadership, order
might be restored in Upper Silesia. London was also convinced that had Le Rond put
down the recent Polish disturbances 'with greater severity', then the Poles would not
now be demanding the abolition of the outvoting provisions. Waterlow's earlier
instruction to Percival to have Korfanty expelled was a manifestation of this policy.
However, Derby had already rejected an instruction from London for the
Ambassadors' Conference to secure Korfanty's recall. The pretext for that request by
London had been the 'interception' of a fairly innocuous German telegram alleging
that Korfanty headed a spy ring known as the Polska Obrona Górnołonska (Defenders
of Polish Upper Silesia) with threads extending to Wrocław, Berlin and the Rhine.
Derby claimed that the French would refuse to accept such biased evidence. He
advised that Percival should gather the evidence of Korfanty's activities himself and
then submit it through the Commission to the Ambassadors in Paris. Resulting from
this instruction, the outvoting question and the decision to expel Korfanty became
entwined when, at a public meeting held at the Hotel Baginsky in Olenso on 23
November, Korfanty made a speech aimed at deterring 'outvoters' from travelling to
Upper Silesia.

Chapter 3
On learning this, Percival visited Olenso the following day and took statements from witnesses. On returning to Opole, he asked the Commission to take steps to expel Korfanty. However, since the Germans had already published similar demands over the speech, an element of collusion was inevitably suspected. Le Rond, of course, opposed this action, not just because the translators of the speech were Germans who had infiltrated the audience (after all Korfanty wanted the speech to be reported in Germany), but because the expulsion might instigate disturbances worse than those experienced in August 1920. Crucially, because of this, Marinis agreed with Le Rond, leaving Percival in the minority. Two weeks later when Percival once again pressed the matter of Korfanty’s expulsion, Le Rond and Marinis suggested that he ask the Foreign Office to approach Warsaw on the matter. London had already tried but had been warned by the Polish Chargé d’Affaires, Jan Ciechanowski, that ‘Korfanty’s removal was impossible and that it would do more harm than good’, so Percival’s request was refused. Nevertheless, Waterlow continued to advise his superiors that Korfanty’s expulsion was the only gesture strong enough to reassure the Germans that the Commission meant to act impartially in the future. Crowe also continued to endorse this course of action. Percival was instructed to reintroduce his proposal to the Commission and, if again placed in the minority, to have the question referred to the Ambassadors in Paris. Amidst these exchanges over Korfanty’s future, the crisis of the outvoters’ vis-à-vis Upper Silesia’s security concerns, was developing apace.

In late November, Ciechanowski surprised Waterlow with a ‘compromise’ proposal. Though wanting the numbers of outvoters limited to those with a genuine (though undefined) interest in Upper Silesia, Warsaw was suggesting that the outvoters might record their votes a few days after the Upper Silesian resident groups
had voted in the plebiscite. When the German Government learned of this and of another Polish suggestion made to the Ambassadors in Paris, they protested to the Foreign Office. Displaying what can only be described as uncharacteristic German enthusiasm for the Versailles settlement, they again demanded nothing short of full compliance with the Peace Treaty. At a meeting held in London the following day (27 November), the British and French Prime Ministers discussed the problem.

The new French Premier was Jean-Claude Leygues. After alluding to Foch’s demand for 60,000 troops should 300,000 outvoters arrive en masse in Silesia, he admitted that the Allied manpower constraints made this impossible. Instead, he repeated Ciechanowski’s proposal that the outvoters arrive and cast their votes in Upper Silesia ‘ten days or a fortnight’ after the residents had voted. Acknowledging French security concerns, Lloyd George said he was prepared to discuss with Churchill whether some battalions could be sent from the Rhine. At the same time he could not resist pointing out that if the Supreme Council had ordered that any trouble-makers in Upper Silesia would be shot immediately, the present number of troops would have been adequate. Returning to one of his favourite Peace Conference themes, Lloyd George reminded the meeting that whether Silesia went to Germany or to Poland was a matter in which the Allies were financially interested, inasmuch as if the result of the plebiscite gave Silesia to Poland, the Allies would have to face the loss of billions of francs in reparations.

Addressing Germany’s plea that Upper Silesia’s transfer to Poland would affect her capacity to pay reparations, the British Prime Minister said that whilst continuing to act impartially, France and Britain should not go out of their way to facilitate likely
6. Polish Plebiscite Commissariat poster. Sweeper:
"Germans have gone from all parts of the world. Depart from Silesia too Prussian parasites!"

7. German Plebiscite poster
"The Polish wolf covets your homeland."

Chapter 3
financial losses to themselves. Taking up Leygues' point that the thousands of likely Polish supporters resident in the United States could not return to vote, Curzon put forward D’Abernon’s proposal whereby the outvoters could cast their ballots in Germany. Citing Cologne as one example of a suitable location from which they could supervise the vote, he explained that this would help them because, ‘it would certainly be easier for them to get to Cologne than go to Upper Silesia’. Although it is unclear how this was meant to assist the potential Polish supporters in the United States, Leygues evidently thought that outvoting in Cologne was an original idea and the meeting agreed to put this proposal to the Polish and German Governments. Should they find it unacceptable, then a French formula would be adopted, whereby the residents would vote one day and the outvoters ten, twelve or fourteen days later.72

This decision was telegraphed to Percival.73 Lloyd George sent notes to the German and Polish Governments and Curzon instructed the British representatives in Berlin and Warsaw to sell the idea to the respective governments.74 But, as one British diplomat had previously observed, the plebiscites had only ‘served to keep alive the hatred and distrust which the Germans and Poles felt for one another’.75 Both sides rejected D’Abernon’s idea and Germany would later refuse to accept the French Government’s alternative.76 D’Abernon thought that Germany’s rejection might be attributed to Cologne affording too many ex-Upper Silesian miners (who were employed in large numbers in the Ruhr area) a chance to vote. But he also noted that a minor reason might be the impetus he believed was coming from the national organisation now mobilising German outvoters for the journey to Silesia.

Ostensibly, the *Deutscher Schutzbund* (German Defence League) was organising special concerts, theatrical performances and street collections, to raise

Chapter 3
funds to send German outvoters to Upper Silesia but, in reality, its task was to raise the public’s awareness and to find as many outvoters as possible. It might also be added that, in their dealings over Upper Silesia, successive German Governments were finding themselves handling a subject where there was a rare political consensus. Measures aimed at retaining the territory were supported by almost every shade of German political opinion – a rare thing at that time. Curzon, however, found the Germans’ rejection incomprehensible and D’Abernon described them as ‘a difficult people to help’. Apart from the Deutscher Schutzbund activities, the German public’s understanding of outvoting and the Upper Silesian issue was derived from the German national press. This claimed that all of the various solutions being offered emanated from the French – something which immediately put the German public on their guard. As for the German Government, any delay to the plebiscite suited Berlin. Although the situation would later change, after the Spa Conference of July 1920 any delay in the Upper Silesian plebiscite had appeared to effectively postpone the reparations ‘day of reckoning’. For every Weimar Cabinet, no matter what its declared intention, its ultimate aim was to avoid paying reparations and to revise the hated ‘Versailles Diktat’. Disagreements stoked up within the Entente served as irritants for Germany to exploit to this end. It was also the case that despite spending vast sums of money and making great efforts to turn the situation in Upper Silesia around, the Germans still felt themselves to be in a weak political situation and were not yet confident of winning the plebiscite.

Polish objections to the outvoting taking place in Cologne were also understandable. They were suspicious because it had been Lloyd George who had communicated the proposal to them. But they also genuinely believed that holding outvoting in Germany...
would facilitate more of the fraudulent practices which they suspected the Germans had employed in East Prussia. Nevertheless, balancing Poland’s desire for a reduction in the number of outvoters was the parlous state of the Polish economy. This was being aggravated by an unofficial trade boycott organised by the German Finance Ministry. Everyone affected believed that it would remain in place until Upper Silesia’s fate had been decided. The rapidly depreciating Polish mark (whose decline Poznań bankers believed was being intentionally accelerated by the German Treasury collecting and dumping Polish marks on the Berlin exchange) was causing imported goods, such as their Allied coal quota from Upper Silesia, to be increasingly expensive. If the Silesian mines became Polish, this was one area of foreign currency outflow that could be reversed. Therefore, for this and other economic reasons, the Polish Government, like Britain, required an early plebiscite. In an interview given to the Polish press, Sapieha moreover explained that Poland’s economic interests were being damaged by lack of confidence in Poland abroad; if some of the Great Powers did not want Upper Silesia to go to Poland, this was largely due to the Powers’ uncertainty over whether Poland was capable of administering it. In a bid to maintain Polish credibility with the Powers, Sapieha set about defusing the outvoter question by pressurising Korfanty to tone down the Polish Silesians’ campaign against them. Meantime, Le Rond, as an alternative to the rejected proposals, resurrected an earlier Polish idea whereby voting in Upper Silesia could be conducted sequentially by zones. Despite this more positive approach on the part of the Poles and the French, Percival was able to report on 23 December that (in accordance with Foreign Office instructions) his proposal to have Korfanty expelled had finally been submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors.
From Paris, Hardinge, now the British Ambassador in France, had already warned the Foreign Office that expelling Korfanty would be strongly opposed by the French and not supported by the other ambassadors. He anticipated that the French would argue that because Britain had no troops in Upper Silesia, this disqualified them from 'dictating measures' endangering the lives of French and Italian soldiers. To give himself some political leverage Hardinge had asked London for permission to once again threaten a British withdrawal from the Commission. Curzon had refused a previous request on this, but Hardinge pointed out that no matter what arguments he deployed, it would take political pressure to force France to support Korfanty's expulsion. From Warsaw, Sapieha had also questioned the advisability of Britain proceeding with the expulsion of someone who had been an elected member of the Reichstag for twenty years; he emphasised the 'very grave situation' that it might create in the plebiscite area. Faced with the possibility of Britain having to withdraw from Upper Silesia if it could not force its will on the French, Foreign Office officials urged caution. It was Crowe, now the Permanent Under Secretary, who contrived a suitably diplomatic nuance acceptable to Curzon. Hardinge was authorised to make 'qualified threats' to the French about Britain 'seriously considering' withdrawing from the Commission should Korfanty fail to modify his campaign against the outvoters. But no sooner had this problem been overcome when later that same day, Curzon was reminded by the French Chargé d'Affaires of Lloyd George's earlier half-promise to reinforce the inter-Allied military force in Upper Silesia.

All of these Upper Silesian problems were discussed at a Cabinet meeting in Downing Street on 30 December 1920. Like the Foreign Office, the Cabinet members
also baulked at withdrawing from the Commission and over-rode the Army Council’s continuing objections to sending troops to Upper Silesia. They agreed that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should be authorised, as a last resort, to state that the British Government would be willing to send a force not exceeding 4 battalions (of 500 men each) from the Army of Occupation of the Rhine to reinforce the Allied Army of Occupation in Silesia until the completion of the plebiscite.94

Curzon advised Hardinge of this decision privately, asking him to keep it confidential and not to use it in his negotiations.95 However, after talking to the Quai d’Orsay and then canvassing the opinions of the other ambassadors in Paris, Hardinge came to the conclusion that expelling Korfanty was both inadvisable and not worth pursuing. On 10 January 1921, just two days before Percival’s demand for Korfanty’s expulsion was due to be discussed by the Conference of Ambassadors, Curzon received a note from Hardinge reporting Britain’s isolation on the issue. Hardinge suggested that this was due in part to the Polish Government having kept Korfanty quiet for well over a month and by news that Korfanty himself was running a poster campaign urging maintenance of public order - adding by way of a rebuke, that these were factors ‘of which we apparently have no knowledge’. Under these circumstances and because of the threat of disturbances should any attempt be made to remove the Polish leader, Hardinge ‘thought it desirable to adjourn the question for more mature consideration’.95 Curzon duly minuted that ‘the Korfanty proposal’ had been dropped.96

The Foreign Office’s inability to have Korfanty expelled illustrated the British Government’s actual weakness over Upper Silesia. The Foreign Office was well aware of the manner in which the absence of British troops marginalised the Commission’s
British contingent and their Commissioner's influence over events there. Of course, this lack of influence was entirely of the British Government's own making. However, as the Cabinet, the Foreign Office, Derby, and even Hardinge (who had been one of the officials most determined to remove Korfanty), had discovered, with nothing to offer or to withhold, the British were prisoners of the French. They were trapped because the only political pressure they were able to exercise (withdrawal from the inter-Allied Commission) was far too drastic a manoeuvre for a Power committed to maintaining the Versailles Treaty to contemplate. But because it now provided them with political options, the one positive outcome of the Foreign Office's attempt to expel Korfanty was the Cabinet's decision to hold some British troops in reserve for policing the plebiscite. And it was this, which helped to shape the outcome of the outvoting dispute when it was finally settled in February 1921.

Before this, in parallel with the outvoting crisis and British attempts to expel Korfanty, Cardinal Bertram had made one final bid to reassert his authority over the Upper Silesian portion of his diocese. The appointment of Achille Ratti, the Vatican's Papal Nuncio to Poland as its Alto Commissario Ecclesiastico for all of the plebiscite areas, offended Bertram by implying that he was incapable of exercising impartiality in Upper Silesia. The Cardinal was also frustrated over the Polish misrepresentation that the Vatican had removed Upper Silesia from his ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This belief was reinforced by the Commission's refusal to permit Bertram entry into the plebiscite area. The Commission feared his presence might provoke demonstrations of support and counter-demonstrations by the Polish campaign. Germany's Foreign Office asked the Vatican to confirm that Bertram remained the ecclesiastical authority for Upper Silesia. Shortly after he had arrived, the German press started criticising...
Ratti, accusing him of partiality towards the Polish cause. To many German critics, his presence in Warsaw during the Red Army’s advance on the city and the Polish victory at its gates, confirmed this. Another factor was his failure to silence the minority Polish-supporting Upper Silesian clergy and the visiting clerics (particularly from Polish religious orders), who were entering the region and speaking in support of Poland. Yet Ratti was also receiving criticism in Polish Silesian papers such as the Gazetta Polska in Opole and the Sztandar Polski in Gliwice for not supporting the Polish cause. Stehlin notes that Ratti himself appeared to be the only person who believed he was in Upper Silesia solely to represent the Church’s interests, act impartially and not identify himself with any party.

At a meeting between members of the Upper Silesian clergy in Bytom on 5 October, no consensus was reached on a proposal by German-supporting clergy to stop visiting priests or other clerical visitors from delivering public speeches without the local parish priest’s approval. The reason advanced was to prevent the local priest’s authority being undermined. But because the vast majority (about 75%), of the parish priests were German supporters, agreeing to this would obviously have inhibited the Polish campaign. In some plebiscite districts it was only a solitary Polish-supporting parish priest, a visiting cleric, or a curate who provided the Polish campaign with any intellectual credibility. The minority Polish supporters were, therefore, unwilling to renounce their right to invite priests in from outside the diocese. Hatzfeldt, Berlin’s representative with the Commission, wrote to the German Foreign Office requesting that Germany seek the Vatican’s help in banning the entry of foreign priests into Upper Silesia. German-supporting Upper Silesian priests also organised petitions and named the offending visiting priests. These were forwarded to Wroclaw where, on
8. Another so-called German emigrant released from prison to increase the number of 'out-voters'.

9. Father Ulitzka (Centre Party leader) finds the plebiscite far more interesting than preaching.

Chapter 3
13 October, Bertram learned that his jurisdiction over the plebiscite area had been reconfirmed and that the Vatican had asked London to use its influence to have his exclusion from Upper Silesia revoked. But despite Percival’s instructions and clarification of the ecclesiastical situation, the Commission failed to give way.

Bertram had come to believe that Ratti was not supporting him with sufficient energy. Early in November 1920, paying what proved to be his last visit to Wrocław, Ratti had found Bertram quite obdurate when he advanced yet one more compromise proposal over the Commission’s ban. After Ratti’s departure, Bertram acted. Armed with the petitions, the lists of ‘foreign’ priests and a guarded reply from Gasparri, the Papal Secretary of State, confirmed that, since Bertram’s jurisdiction extended over the whole of the Wrocław diocese, there could be ‘no obstacle from the side of the Apostolic See’ to the Cardinal restricting his clergy’s ‘too free interference in politics’. Using Gasparri’s statement to claim that his action resulted from ‘careful negotiations’ with the Vatican and that it had only been taken with ‘the approval of the Holy See’, Bertram published his controversial edict of 5 November, 1920. This was more or less the proposal advanced by the German-supporting clergy at Bytom exactly one month earlier. Because all parish priests appointed in Upper Silesia since the Kulturkampf had been politically vetted, the edict’s first and most crucial clause gave the game away.

All priests and clergy, of whatever nationality or language, in the Upper Silesian plebiscite area, are strictly forbidden to take part in political demonstrations, or to make any political or other speeches, without the express permission of the competent parish priest. (my italics)
The second clause empowered individual parish priests to prohibit visiting clergy from making speeches or participating in demonstrations. Thus the edict struck at the Polish cause and the reaction was both predictable and furious.

Because the Polish campaign leaders had exaggerated his ecclesiastical authority in the plebiscite area, the Polish outcry was directed at Ratti. His critics turned on him, asserting that Bertram could not have issued such an edict without Ratti’s knowledge or permission. Asked to inquire, the British Legation in Warsaw, after consulting Ratti’s office, reported that Ratti knew nothing about the edict, let alone ‘the nature of the special Papal authority to which Bertram had alluded to’. In Warsaw, the temporary British Minister, Percy Loraine, described the ‘intense irritation’ provoked by the edict amongst the Polish public. In response to demands by the socialists in the Sejm that diplomatic relations with the Vatican be severed, Sapieha, on 30 November, told them that a strong protest had been sent to Ratti and another one to the Commission in Opole. He informed the Sejm that Poland’s Minister at the Vatican had been instructed to insist on the edict’s withdrawal, demand that the plebiscite area be removed from Bertram’s jurisdiction, and that a special administrator be appointed to run that part of his diocese.

The Polish episcopate also appealed to the Pope pointing out that ‘putting so much power into the hands of the predominately German parish priests did grave injury to Poland’. They sent the Bishop of Krakow and the Armenian-rite Archbishop of Lwow to Rome to inform the Pope about the true position. However, a German memorandum had already been submitted to the Vatican asking the Pope to support their just demands and preserve the Church’s neutrality over the plebiscite. In December the Vatican calmed the situation by appointing a Commissario Apostolico,
to the area. Campbell notes that this decision was taken on 10 December, after Gasparri had interviewed Rudolf Steinmann, Bertram’s representative in Rome. Reporting back to Bertram, Steinmann welcomed the decision as having effectively eliminated Ratti’s authority in Upper Silesia: a positive measure that he believed greatly assisted the German campaign. Three months later, Ratti was also relieved of his duties in Poland and appointed Archbishop of Milan.\footnote{112}

On their arrival in Rome, the Polish bishops had been presented with another version of the same story. Gasparri had explained that on learning of the true situation in Upper Silesia, the Pope had acknowledged that the Polish bishops’ fears were well founded. Therefore, to prevent Bertram’s edict from disadvantaging the Polish Silesians, Monsignor Ogno Serra, the Vatican’s Chargé d’Affaires in Vienna, had already been sent to Opole with instructions to enforce political neutrality on the clergy there.\footnote{113} Ogno had been instructed to reside in Opole until after the plebiscite had been decided. Just after his arrival, he issued what was, in fact, a Vatican decree, forbidding all Upper Silesian and visiting clerics from involving themselves in any form of political agitation.

While this appeared less damaging to the Polish cause than Bertram’s decree, it was no real improvement. The Polish campaign required their priests’ articulation far more than the German campaign relied upon active clerical support. Therefore the Poles had good reason to feel Ogno’s decree continued to disadvantage them.\footnote{114} The Polish demands to remove Upper Silesia from the Wrocław diocese had also been ignored, with the Vatican again reaffirming Bertram’s jurisdiction in Upper Silesia. However, Stehlin notes that in exchange for this, the Vatican asked Bertram to defer his visit to the plebiscite area.\footnote{115} Gasparri also thought Bertram at fault over the edict’s

Chapter 3
phrasing. He believed that 'this harmed Germany’s chances in the election’ because the Polish campaigners were now using it as proof that the Church’s ecclesiastical administrators were biased and that only a Polish hierarchy would treat Polish-speaking Catholics fairly. He also reprimanded Bertram for unnecessarily stating that he had Papal authorisation for his edict because this had brought about attacks on Rome as well as on Wrocław.  

Stehlin also highlights the fact that Gasparri generally supported the German clergy. He accepted their argument for retaining the maximum number of Catholics in the country. He wanted to negotiate a Concordat with Berlin, therefore the two million Catholics in Protestant Germany were worth far more there, rather than relocated in an already overwhelmingly Catholic Poland. Gasparri also had ‘grave doubts’ about supporting an ‘overtly aggressive Poland, embroiled in unwise, ultra-nationalistic policies and territorial disputes with Russia, Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, and Germany, with the unrest in Silesia part of this aggressive strategy’. It has to be said that this was a gross distortion of Poland’s position because when the Peace Conference closed, the only Polish frontier that it had defined had been the German border - and even that was subject to plebiscites. Most of the other Polish frontiers had been left an open question because neither Britain, France nor the United States would recognise the Bolshevik regime – ultimately leaving the ex-Tsarist Russian border states, including the Poles, to their own devices. Nevertheless, with France also reopening diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Upper Silesia provides a good illustration of the subtle considerations, the hard choices, or the very delicate balances which the Catholic Church very often had to strike between its members’ competing national interests.
Ogno’s reports to Gasparri were generally sympathetic to the Germans. In January 1921 he obtained the Vatican’s permission to discipline several clerics who were openly supporting the Polish campaign. This was a bonus for German diplomacy. They had expected Ogno to incline towards the Poles and the French. In February, learning of an attempt by the Polish episcopate to have his decree revoked, Ogno enlisted Percival’s aid to forestall them. By acting immediately, the British representative at the Vatican, Count John De Salis (supported by yet another flurry of German diplomatic activity), ensured that the clerical restrictions remained in place until the plebiscite was held on 20 March - by which time, in Percival’s words, ‘moderation had been forced on both sides of the clergy’. 

The diplomatic battle to stop the minority Polish-supporting Catholic clergy campaigning for Poland had clearly been won by Wroclaw and Berlin. The German politicians and clergy held the levers of power, therefore the odds were always in their favour. Percival had only supported the ban on Bertram from entering Upper Silesia because Ratti had led him to believe that it was the Pope’s wish. Once Prince Hatzfeldt, the German Government’s representative to the Commission, had told him otherwise, he ended his opposition to Bertram’s entry. However, leaving aside Bertram’s machinations and Ratti’s efforts to maintain the clerical status quo, any attempt to keep what was, both in Poland and in Upper Silesia, a politicised Church out of the plebiscite debate, was doomed to failure. And whatever decrees or edicts were circulated there was no escaping the fact that priests possessing strongly held views and having local authority, would always be able to ‘guide’ their congregations. This does not mean that parishioners would be persuaded away from strongly held positions of their own, but that no matter what edicts were issued, priests in Upper
Silesia would certainly have been in a position to influence the more simple and less nationally committed members of a parish.\textsuperscript{124} Despite Korfanty's campaign slogan 'Catholic equals Pole', denied outside clerical help to redress the existing clerical political balance, the Polish Upper Silesian campaign received no support from the Catholic Church.\textsuperscript{125} With Gasparri's guarded support for Bertram, the 'neutrality' that was imposed only worked to Germany's advantage.\textsuperscript{126}

But if the Church was determined to concern itself only with temporal affairs, then the French officials with the Commission were equally determined to assist the Poles with their own form of secular assistance. This provided the new British officials with their first experience of one new aspect of inter-Allied diplomacy at Commission level. With every French district controller now having a British assistant district controller, Percival hoped that this would enable him to keep French activity, or lack of it, under wider surveillance. The British police officers also helped him to build the bigger picture. Soon Percival was reporting increased seizures of Polish arms, often directly due to the work of British officers. Some British officers had, moreover, made complaints about the French controllers placing difficulties in their way, and others suggested that their French colleagues were forewarning the Poles about the intended police searches.\textsuperscript{127} That said, not all of the new British officials, nor all of the longer-serving ones, were quite as diligent in their duties.

In December 1920, after it became public that British officials had been disparaging Poland's ability to run Upper Silesia's industries should they acquire them, Percival circulated a confidential memorandum reminding British officials of the necessity to maintain an impartial attitude.\textsuperscript{128} In early January 1921 he cleared out several British officials whom he suspected of 'behaving in an unbecoming manner'.
Allegations against them included boisterous behaviour in restaurants (in one instance, firing a revolver); being seen in public places with ‘women of doubtful character’; remaining in bed until mid-day instead of attending work; and general incompatibility with other members of the Commission. One of the new arrivals had accidentally shot himself. This picture of their behaviour provides a stark, though welcome, contrast to the impression of general aloofness that the Foreign Office’s published documents convey of the British officials in Upper Silesia. However, despite the Commission’s reorganisation, the gulf between members of the British and French contingents remained. In the new Police Command, the senior British official, Major Keatinge, found himself quickly marginalised. Then a French attempt to supplant the British representative on the sub-committee drawing up the plebiscite regulations was aborted only after Percival threatened to boycott the Commission’s meetings if the proposal was not dropped. Ironically, this sub-committee was the one area where there had been some accord between the Allies. By 2 January, Percival was able to report that, with the exception of the voting procedure and the method of counting being finalised, the plebiscite regulations were now complete.

Apart from the outvoting question and negotiations over whether or not the Gutsbezirke should be treated as communes, the plebiscite regulations were arrived at fairly harmoniously. The Gutsbezirke (manorial estates) were the numerically smallest communal units after the towns and the Landgemeinden (rural communes). The 1912 Gemeindelexikon listed 792 Gutsbezirke, of which 389 had less than 100 inhabitants. However, these Gutsbezirke were important not because of their total population (only some 158,000), but because they comprised roughly half of Upper Silesia’s territory. Therefore, with Upper Silesia’s partition depending on the result of the vote within Chapter 3
each commune, the voting status of the *Gutsbezirke* units was of vital importance.\textsuperscript{133} The Poles feared that because the German landowners, their agents and the priests enjoyed a near feudal authority within them, they would compel the Polish inhabitants to vote as the German landlords wished – voting secrecy being a near impossibility with such a limited electorate. They wanted the *Gutsbezirke* merged into the adjacent communes, where they hoped that there would be sufficient Polish majorities to absorb them. The Germans naturally wanted them to vote separately and because he believed in the justice of their case, Percival argued for them in the Commission. But Le Rond steadfastly opposed this. Therefore, to avoid any further delay to the plebiscite by involving the Ambassadors’ Conference, Percival accepted a compromise whereby *Gutsbezirke* containing less than 101 inhabitants were merged into adjacent polling communes – the remainder voting separately.\textsuperscript{134}

Another important issue overcome was the establishment of a qualifying period entitling recent immigrants, now resident in Upper Silesia, to vote. The French argued for 1900 (the date favoured by the Poles), because that was when the Prussians had increased anti-Polish measures in the eastern provinces. The British wanted a vote for everyone who had arrived prior to 1914 (the date favoured by the Germans). After attempting to gain a compromise on 1908, Percival settled for 1 January 1904, a date chosen on the grounds that it coincided with several Prussian decrees preventing Polish workmen from the Russian and Austrian partitions from obtaining any form of domicile in Upper Silesia.\textsuperscript{135} In accepting this date, Percival conceded that the Germans had gained some advantage from the outvoting clauses and he felt that this redressed the balance to an extent because, in his estimation, this measure disqualified some 50,000 German immigrants from voting.\textsuperscript{136} This was not an insignificant figure

Chapter 3
because, by late January, German plebiscite organisations were desperate for more
time to register out-voters. In early February, Lord D’Abernon received a letter from
one of the region’s leading landowners, the Prince of Pless, revealing that, as a result
of the Polish campaign against the *Heimatstreur* (the people born in the country but
living outside it), instead of receiving the anticipated 250,000 to 300,000 applications
to travel to Upper Silesia, the *Schutzbund* had received just 170,000. He claimed that
the outvoter numbers would be increased only by the deployment of British troops in
Upper Silesia and having the residents and outvoters voting there simultaneously.\(^{137}\)

Hadzfeldt, von Moltke and the local German leaders, had been studiously cultivating
Percival and Marinis on this, and they had already advocated this course of action to
London and Rome.\(^{138}\) After reading Percival’s reports, Lord Hardinge suggested that
should Britain definitely decide to send four battalions of troops to Upper Silesia, this
could be made conditional on Britain getting its way over the out-voting question.\(^{139}\)

On 7 February, Curzon authorised Hardinge to reopen the question on this basis.\(^{140}\)

Le Rond had once again requested an increase in the Commission’s security
forces. This meant the question of troops was already on the agenda for a meeting of
the Ambassadors in February. It was, therefore, an opportune moment for the British
to raise the outvoting question and they indicated that, should the French Government
accept the views of the British and Italian Commissioners on this, then they ‘might
possibly be induced to send troops not exceeding four battalions’.\(^{141}\) When the
Ambassadors’ Conference met on 17 February, on Curzon’s instructions, Hardinge
made this into a definite proposal ‘provided that the French Government agreed to
alter the voting system so as to enable outvoters and residents to vote simultaneously’.
Foch declared that if the Conference agreed to this they would require 45,000 troops.
Despite the French appeals for Britain to send the troops unconditionally, Hardinge stuck to his guns. After the meeting, he recommended to Curzon that he raise the proposal at the Supreme Council’s next meeting.\textsuperscript{142}

This met in London a few days later and it was a lively affair.\textsuperscript{143} Curzon put the British case for holding the vote on a single day. The Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, announced that 2,000 Italian troops were being sent.\textsuperscript{144} But the French would not give way. Their opposition provoked Lloyd George’s fighting spirit. After first questioning Le Rond’s impartiality and reiterating his previous arguments about it not being in the Allies’ financial interest for Upper Silesia to be awarded to Poland, he declared that it was only by holding the plebiscite honestly and quickly, that the Peace Treaty could be prevented from becoming a ‘discredited document’.\textsuperscript{145} The new French Prime Minister, Aristide Briand, pointed out that the French Government was maintaining 13,000 troops in Upper Silesia, therefore he had special responsibility in this. He also thought it a serious matter that Germany should learn that her obstructive tactics had divided the Allies. Britain’s attitude would only encourage fresh German demands. But Lloyd George dismissed this. He believed that the Allies were ‘morally strengthened’ by the acceptance of ‘Germany’s just demands’. He took issue with Briand over the wider political question dividing the Allies, namely, whether the view was to prevail that wherever an ally assumed greater responsibility in an area, then that ally’s will should prevail over the other allies. This, he believed, was a question even more serious than the plebiscite in Upper Silesia and ‘if the division of responsibility was to be on lines of that kind, then there would be an end to the alliance’.\textsuperscript{146}

Provoking a crisis by painting a dramatically stark alternative was a negotiating technique well practised by the British Prime Minister. Reminding the French that the
Germans were about to come to London, he demanded to know where the French Government stood on the matter. Briand caved in, conceding that should the Conference take a decision then ‘France would bow to it’. Lloyd George had taken France to the brink, but the French had not jumped. The plebiscite would now take place on 20 March 1921 - something that the Polish Sejm had advocated. The outvoters and residents would vote together in Upper Silesia with the despatch of four battalions of British troops addressing any threat that this posed to law and order. The Germans naturally welcomed another Lloyd George success. D’Abernon ventured to hope that they might now be more accommodating regarding reparations.

In Poland, however, there was strong condemnation of the Allied decision. Newspaper articles, posters and films had been fanning Polish public opinion, and the plebiscite support organisations’ activities never permitted interest in Upper Silesia to subside. In an atmosphere of heightened national awareness, the Allied decision was seen as a concession to Germany if for no good reason other than the Germans had wanted it. Aware that Britain had pushed for simultaneous voting on Germany’s behalf, the Allied decision was regarded as another in a long line of rebuffs in the British Prime Minister’s hands and part of the international bargaining going on under the cover of the plebiscite. In Warsaw the French and Italians tried to distance themselves from it. The Warsaw-published Journal de Pologne claimed that Briand had only given his consent to the decision to preserve the solidarity of the Entente. And although Sforza had supported the decision, in Warsaw his Minister denied Italian responsibility. However, the Poles distrusted the Italians, and it was rumoured that in exchange for Germany not opposing Italy’s claim on the South Tyrol, the Italians were supporting the Germans over Upper Silesia. Regarding Germany’s success in
coupling reparations to the plebiscite (something not anticipated by the Peace Treaty), the Poles could claim that Lloyd George was overlooking their Government’s proposal to compensate the Allies should Poland win the Upper Silesian coalfields.157

Though the Poles wanted good relations with Britain, since 1918 they had learned to expect nothing but disapproval. Loraine explained to Curzon that the considerable unpopularity of the British in Warsaw was due to perceived British anti-Polish bias over questions such as East Galicia, Upper Silesia, Gdansk, and Wilno. Lloyd George urging the Soviet peace terms on them, when the Bolsheviks were advancing on Warsaw in August 1920, had not helped either.158 In January 1921, Curzon had a Supreme Council meeting in Paris rescheduled to avoid encountering Piłsudski.159 And when Piłsudski finally paid a state visit to Paris in early February, Britain indicated its disapproval – a snub which did not go down well in Poland.160 Sapieha, who had been in Paris with Piłsudski, visited Britain instead. But during the talks, which were quite cordial, he failed to detect any sign that Britain was moving to support simultaneous voting in Upper Silesia.161 In fact, Upper Silesia barely received a mention.162 Therefore, when news about the outvoters voting with the residents in Upper Silesia reached Warsaw, Sapieha, an Anglophile, was unfairly blamed for the decision and suffered bitter political and personal attacks, including accusations about his inept representation of the country abroad. After attacking him, one Polish newspaper demanded a more energetic and vigorous Foreign Minister

in order to convince Mr. Lloyd George that he has played too long on the strings of Polish patience and pliability. Public opinion in England and Italy must learn that Poland is to the very highest extent aroused and indignant at the injury which had been done to her.163

Chapter 3
Commenting on the decision to send four British battalions to Upper Silesia, one government news-sheet asked if they would 'belong to that model troop known in Ireland as the Black and Tans'? 164

When the War Office first learned that Curzon had agreed to send British troops to Upper Silesia (7 February), the news caused some confusion. Churchill, still the Secretary of State for War, told the Army Council he knew nothing about the troops being sent. On 15 February he asked the Foreign Office 'to suspend action pending further reference to the Cabinet'. 165 It was true that the Army Council had already rejected a request to send troops. That had been on 27 December 1920, but just three days later both Churchill and the CIGS, Sir Henry Wilson, had attended the Cabinet meeting which had over-ridden their objections and made the battalions available. 166 During a meeting in Paris in January, Curzon had asked Wilson to dissuade Foch from replacing any of the British troops (that might be sent to Upper Silesia) in the Cologne area with French ones. The British feared that the arrival of French troops, especially those from their colonies, in a British-occupied area, would be disastrous on their relations with the local population. The decision to send the British troops was finally taken on 21 February and the War Office sent an officer to Paris to make arrangements for their transportation. 167 The following day, the Commission in Opole notified General Gratier, the inter-Allied military commander, that four British battalions (amounting to 102 officers and 2,157 men), would be arriving to reinforce the French and Italian units. 168 Wilson knew nothing of this until Foch visited him at his London home on 28 February. He had been on holiday with his wife, first at Biarritz and then in Madrid, throughout the whole month. C.E. Calwell, Wilson’s first biographer, notes

Chapter 3
that he was ‘much put out’, on learning that the Foreign Office had finally got their hands on the four battalions.\textsuperscript{169}

Although ultimately under the inter-Allied military control structure, the British Brigade’s participation was conditional on its units remaining under a unified British Command.\textsuperscript{170} The plan was to locate them in the north of the plebiscite area – mostly poorly drained, flat, open land, with lakes, dense forests, and a long, open border with Poland. When he surveyed the terrain, the British Commander, Colonel Arthur Wauchope of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion Black Watch, thought that Silesia appeared as flat as ‘Flanders, Mesopotamia, the coast of Palestine and Egypt, the Delta of Egypt, and the banks of the Rhine’, places his battalion had served over the past six years.\textsuperscript{171} The three other battalions under Wauchope’s command were the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion Middlesex, the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion Royal Sussex, and the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Battalion Royal West Kent.\textsuperscript{173} Each Battalion was below the accepted 600 man establishment. The Sussex and the West Kent Battalions each had 550 men, but the Middlesex and the Black Watch Battalions had under 350 men respectively.\textsuperscript{174} To ease travel to the outlying districts and provide proper mobility in the event of disturbances there, Percival wisely advised the Rhine Army to equip the force with plenty of light motor transport vehicles.\textsuperscript{175} He also recommended they bring crockery and table linen for the officers’ messes and, because venereal disease was prevalent, they should ensure ‘adequate precautionary measures’.\textsuperscript{176}

Edmonds records Wauchope and the advance party leaving Cologne on 28 February and arriving in Opole on 6 March. The main party arrived on 8 March – only twelve days before the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{177} Whilst they had travelled through unoccupied Germany, their ammunition was withdrawn and labels declaring them to be ‘Transport Under the Peace
Treaty', were affixed to their railway carriages. At every stop German security police guarded them. The soldiers noted that as they crossed through Germany there were no signs of civil unrest; on the contrary, everyone 'appeared to be set on regaining what they had lost through the war, every factory chimney emitted smoke, and there was scarcely a piece of uncultivated ground to be seen'. It was only on reaching Opole that they started witnessing degrees of poverty approaching that which Germany had pleaded since the Armistice. There, during a break in the journey, the Battalion’s Pipes and Drums provided an impromptu performance on the station platform, 'much to the apparent amazement and delight of the natives'; and when the train pulled out bound for Lubliniec, where the Black Watch were to be quartered, children ran alongside the carriages calling aloud for more of the 'biskwee and cigarettes' that the soldiers had been throwing out to them. Finding no suitable building in Lubliniec, the Brigade H.Q. was established outside the town. The 2nd Black Watch remained there, in barracks vacated by the French. The 1st Middlesex were split between Lubliniec and nearby Olenso. Three companies of the 1st Sussex went to Tarnowski Gory and the fourth was sent down to Bytom. The main body of the West Kents went to Kluczbork with one company detached to Pokoj (Carlsruhe), north of Opole. Amongst the officers with the force was Lieut. Colonel A. Wavell, a figure of interest in his own right. Second in Command of the Black Watch in Upper Silesia, in 1913 he had become the only future British Field Marshal ever to have been imprisoned in the Warsaw Citadel.

At Herby, and other road crossings into Poland, British troops checked passports and issued ration cards. Small detachments were stationed in villages such as Wozniki (Woischnik), already troubled by fighting between the local Poles and Germans. Armed parties attempting to cross the frontier were arrested and disarmed. To reinforce the British
presence, foot patrols were sent out on long marches around the villages. Because of the
delicate political situation, fraternisation with Poles and Germans was ‘limited to what was
necessary for common civility’. When off-duty, the British troops were confined to their
barracks. After a week of this activity, on 17 March, Wauchope informed Gratier that he
found that ‘the conduct of the inhabitants in my area is at present extremely good’ and did
not think serious disturbances likely.\footnote{182}

Although there had been an escalation both in violence and rhetoric prior to the
British troops’ arrival, Polish Government appeals to the Polish Silesians through Korfanty
had helped to quieten the situation.\footnote{183} These had been necessary because, prior to the Allied
decision to hold simultaneous voting, a second wave of protests against outvoting had
occurred. In Polish-dominated communes, councils there passed resolutions declaring that
the outvoters were terrorists distorting the plebiscite result.\footnote{184} The Polish Government
claimed it would not accept responsibility for any consequences arising from the Allied
decision to hold simultaneous voting. Though Percival failed to find evidence implicating
Korfanty in the renewed protest, he was sure that it was the Polish Plebiscite Commissariat
which was behind it.\footnote{185} However, from its headquarters in Bytom, Korfanty welcomed 20
March as the date when Upper Silesia’s soil ‘would be returned to its legitimate owner’.
Declaring that the rejoicing in the German press was premature, he called upon all Upper
Silesians
to remain calm, to maintain public order, to preserve discipline and dignity ….and
not to fall into the traps of the enemy who is endeavouring to falsify the true
expression of the will of the people through corruption, terror and abuse of
power.\footnote{186}
Table 4

Provisional List of Voters February 22 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts/Towns</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Outvoters</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Total Voters</th>
<th>Percentage Outvoters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom</td>
<td>133,596</td>
<td>13,347</td>
<td>5,776</td>
<td>152,719</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>32,237</td>
<td>6,112</td>
<td>3,516</td>
<td>41,865</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzelce</td>
<td>38,324</td>
<td>7,319</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>46,410</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>110,599</td>
<td>11,666</td>
<td>4,386</td>
<td>126,651</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krowleska Huta</td>
<td>37,436</td>
<td>4,904</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>44,260</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozle</td>
<td>65,110</td>
<td>20,408</td>
<td>2,111</td>
<td>87,629</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluczborz</td>
<td>25,693</td>
<td>15,478</td>
<td>2,041</td>
<td>43,212</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głubczyce</td>
<td>42,786</td>
<td>22,112</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>66,827</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubliniec</td>
<td>24,782</td>
<td>4,478</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>29,663</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
<td>14,793</td>
<td>5,486</td>
<td>2,619</td>
<td>22,898</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole Land</td>
<td>62,616</td>
<td>17,343</td>
<td>1,706</td>
<td>81,665</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna</td>
<td>65,794</td>
<td>5,991</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>73,041</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raciborz</td>
<td>55,526</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,051</td>
<td>70,065</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olenso</td>
<td>25,967</td>
<td>8,711</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>35,290</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik</td>
<td>69,583</td>
<td>9,118</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>80,448</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory</td>
<td>39,629</td>
<td>4,459</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>45,142</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toszecko- Gliwicki</td>
<td>41,000 est.</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze</td>
<td>79,353</td>
<td>7,892</td>
<td>2,795</td>
<td>90,040</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>964,824</td>
<td>181,882</td>
<td>38,689</td>
<td>1,185,395</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 3
Perhaps the voting lists were giving Korfanty grounds for optimism. Table 4 indicates that the Polish campaign had so far restricted the registered outvoters to just under 182,000. The list was later revised but only a further 10,000 outvoters found their way on to it.

With the plebiscite being measured by the number of communes (or what might be more accurately described as ‘voting units’) won or lost, for Poland the good news was that the proportion of outvoters to residents was greatest in the rural districts already overwhelmingly German. This was especially the case in Głubczyce and Kluczbork – the two districts where the Council of Four permitted German-populated land to be added to the original plebiscite area (see Chapter 1). However, as we will see, Polish confidence was misplaced. Pouring outvoters into these areas would not add to the number of communes Germany would win there. But by increasing their total vote, the Schutzbund paved the way for Germany to attempt to claim the whole plebiscite area on the grounds that they had ‘won’ the overall numerical vote. How the Germans’ manipulated the plebiscite outvoter regulations is well illustrated by the Gutsbezirke Starościn’s (Sterzendorf) electoral figures. Starościn was one of several small Namysłów communities added to Kluczbork. Its 61 resident and eight migrant voters were joined on the electoral register by 435 German outvoters (see Addendum, Annex 1). Further study of the electoral list reveals that this form of electoral abuse was commonplace, especially in the German districts the Polish campaign left either uncontested or, due to insufficient support, were unable to monitor effectively.

It was in the south and east, where the workforce was industrialised, that the Polish-supporters had higher hopes for a favourable outcome. The proportion of German outvoters in the industrial districts was lower than in the rural communes. This applied to the Poles as well. It was not that recent migration from the industrial
districts had been any less than from the rural areas, but rather that fewer of the people who moved away into industrial jobs elsewhere, had the determination, opportunity, or even the encouragement to register to vote in the plebiscite, let alone the means to return. Apart from the many thousands in the USA, the most likely Polish-supporting migrants from Silesia were working as miners and labourers in Germany. Wambaugh notes that there, German employers, especially those in the Ruhr, and German officials everywhere, allegedly discouraged these groups of Polish Upper Silesians from registering to vote. On the other hand, for many potential German outvoters, there is little doubt that the Polish campaign against outvoting (aided by the demonising of Korfanty and atrocity stories in the German press) ‘frightened-off’ many Germans who might otherwise have participated. As we will also see, however, Upper Silesia’s socio-political cleavage, as reflected in the result of the plebiscite, was such that in each town, commune, and Gutsbezirke, one party tended to be supported to the near total exclusion of the other. In other words, the towns and villages tended to be either wholly ‘German’ or ‘Polish’ – adjectives Allied personnel had been associating with Upper Silesian place-names from the moment that they had arrived there.

After reviewing the outvoting returns (see Table 5 and Table 6), Bourdillon wrote an unofficial summary for Waterlow on the likely outcome of the plebiscite and on problems that might be anticipated. He reported that there was a general acceptance that Kluczbork, the districts west of the Oder and all of the towns would vote for Germany; Rybnik, that Pszczyna and Lubliniec, and also Bytom Land and Katowice Land would vote for Poland; and that Tarnowski, Zabrze, and Toszecko-Gliwicki were likely to be split. He believed that the outcome in Olenso, Strzelce and the Opole Landkreise still remained uncertain. The pro-Polish element was strongest in the east,
Table 5: Finalised List of Registered Voters in Towns 20 March 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Towns</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Outvoters</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage Outvoters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom *</td>
<td>34,796</td>
<td>5,464</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>42,990</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gilwice *</td>
<td>32,381</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td>41,949</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głubczyce</td>
<td>5,772</td>
<td>3,943</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>10,371</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kietrz</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>3,043</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baborow</td>
<td>1,479</td>
<td>663</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>2,181</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice *</td>
<td>22,556</td>
<td>3,562</td>
<td>2,712</td>
<td>28,830</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myślowice *</td>
<td>8,327</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>10,908</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kłucznbork</td>
<td>4,733</td>
<td>2,478</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>7,917</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byczyna</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>985</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2,211</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolczyn</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>2,769</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozle</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>1,477</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głogowek</td>
<td>3,220</td>
<td>1,885</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>5,334</td>
<td>35.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Królewsko Huta</td>
<td>37,436</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>44,052</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lublinec</td>
<td>2,261</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>3,187</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dobrodzień</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>2,140</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wozniki</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
<td>14,890</td>
<td>5,531</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>22,930</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krapkowice</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyńa *</td>
<td>2,771</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>3,933</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bierzun Stary *</td>
<td>1,327</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mikolow *</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>5,785</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raciborzy</td>
<td>17,647</td>
<td>5,836</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>25,336</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olesno</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>3,966</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorzów Śląski</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik *</td>
<td>5,494</td>
<td>1,080</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>6,923</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadisław *</td>
<td>1,804</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2,435</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zory *</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>22.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory</td>
<td>6,618</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>585</td>
<td>9,053</td>
<td>20.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miastecko *</td>
<td>1,089</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,224</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnów *</td>
<td>1,031</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psznówic **</td>
<td>2,812</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>3,547</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sosnówic **</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>231,536</td>
<td>57,916</td>
<td>20,452</td>
<td>309,731</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Industrial Area and Coalfields

Chapter 3
Table 6

Finalised Lists of Registered Voters Overall 20 March 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Residents</th>
<th>Outvoters</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percentage Outvoters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom *</td>
<td>133,578</td>
<td>13,288</td>
<td>5,869</td>
<td>152,725</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice *</td>
<td>32,581</td>
<td>6,009</td>
<td>3,559</td>
<td>41,949</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzelce *</td>
<td>38,381</td>
<td>7,399</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>46,548</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice *</td>
<td>129,880</td>
<td>14,474</td>
<td>6,816</td>
<td>151,170</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krolewska Huta *</td>
<td>37,436</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>44,052</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozle</td>
<td>65,409</td>
<td>20,465</td>
<td>2,101</td>
<td>87,975</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluczbork</td>
<td>29,915</td>
<td>18,283</td>
<td>2,011</td>
<td>46,209</td>
<td>39.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głubczyce</td>
<td>42,686</td>
<td>22,090</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>66,697</td>
<td>33.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubliniec</td>
<td>24,999</td>
<td>4,751</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>29,991</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
<td>14,890</td>
<td>5,931</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>22,930</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole Land</td>
<td>63,183</td>
<td>17,820</td>
<td>1,712</td>
<td>82,715</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna *</td>
<td>66,157</td>
<td>6,402</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>73,823</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raciborz</td>
<td>54,802</td>
<td>13,465</td>
<td>2,977</td>
<td>71,244</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olenso</td>
<td>26,190</td>
<td>9,167</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>35,977</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik *</td>
<td>70,265</td>
<td>10,047</td>
<td>2,003</td>
<td>82,412</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski</td>
<td>40,123</td>
<td>4,362</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>45,561</td>
<td>9.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gory *</td>
<td>42,371</td>
<td>5,138</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>48,153</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toszecko-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głewicki</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabre *</td>
<td>79,934</td>
<td>8,008</td>
<td>2,851</td>
<td>90,793</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>988,580</td>
<td>191,183</td>
<td>41,074</td>
<td>1,220,837</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Industrial Area and Coalfields.
gradually thinning away towards the west, thus giving 'a line which could afford a basis for a satisfactory division of the country'. The industrial triangle, however, posed a real problem with towns such as Katowice likely to be cut off from the territory that would probably be voting to rejoin Germany. But apart from these 'important German islands', even worse might occur. Should the Toszecko-Gliwicki Kreis show a Polish majority, Bourdillon feared that the whole industrial triangle might 'be cut off from what one might call the German mainland'. Bourdillon suggested that if this did occur, then allocating the territory simply by commune would need to be modified to take account of the size of the numerical majority. If not, then, as a result of ten or twelve villages to the west of the industrial triangle voting for Poland, several industrial towns voting for Germany by large majorities might have to be incorporated into Poland.

Though Bourdillon made a great play about the towns, it should be noted that many of the industrial area's communes had much larger electorates than some of the smaller towns. Commenting on Bourdillon's voting scenarios, Waterlow minuted that the difficulties he described would undoubtedly require the Supreme Council's intervention. More worrying for the Poles, he added (and Crowe and Curzon initialed without dissent), 'that it must not be supposed that the voting will by itself decide anything of importance'.

Forwarded a copy of Bourdillon's report, William Max Muller, the new British Minister in Warsaw, took exception to what he regarded as its inherent partiality. Writing to the Foreign Office privately, he complained that, whereas it did not seem to matter if Germany absorbed 'small Polish islands' of voters, the same criteria did not seem to apply to 'small German islands' near the Polish frontier. Also, Bourdillon's references to a

Chapter 3
revival of Polish terrorism were not balanced by any mention of the German terrorism that had also occurred. Max Muller added

I may be doing Mr. Bourdillon an injustice, in part due to the impression I gathered at the F[oreign] O[ffice] even before I came out here that the members of our Commission in Upper Silesia were inclined unduly to favour the cause of our former enemies, an attitude which may in part be ascribed to a natural desire to counteract the French tendency to go to the opposite extreme.\textsuperscript{199}

The remainder of Max Muller’s long letter was a plea for improved Anglo-Polish relations. Max Muller said that, like his predecessors, he found great difficulty giving a satisfactory reply as to why Britain constantly opposed Polish aspirations. When he raised the ethnicity argument, they asked him ‘why were the Czechs allowed to absorb Poles, Ruthenians, Slovaks, and Germans?’ At Cieszyn, the Czechs’ economic needs had over-ridden Polish numerical preponderance, yet, at Gdansk, Germany’s ethnographic argument over-rode Poland’s economic needs. He thought it vital that the final decision on Upper Silesia should be impartial but, in saying that, he did not believe that Britain had to favour Germany unduly. Poland’s difficulties, ‘flanked as she is by Russian chaos and by a Germany apparently resolved to bring her into something like industrial bondage’, were immense. The Poles required help, but realised that the French were unlikely to be useful either politically or financially. Britain could help in reconstructing the country but, the Minister cautioned, ‘unless we do something to destroy the legend that the policy of H.M.. Government is anti-Polish’, then Britain would find itself heavily handicapped when doing business there. This plea for an alternative British policy towards Poland was written just three days before the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{200}
After the August 1920 insurrection, the Germans’ campaign for Upper Silesia had, in the words of T. Hunt Tooley, taken ‘on an urgency resulting in the kind of controlled panic that loosened purse strings and inhibitions’. Money poured into all the legitimate and the clandestine bodies working for a German victory. Though the full amount spent can never be established, Tooley estimates that over three years, Germany spent well over one billion marks [£100,000,000] to win the plebiscite. Backed by this spending, with the Church under control, a vicarious victory on outvoting, and news that British troops would soon be arriving, the Germans had every reason to be confident of winning a sizeable majority. But, Tooley also notes that they were not ‘so naive as to think that winning the vote would necessarily preserve their control of the region’. It was the German Foreign Office which now handled the Government’s input to the plebiscite campaign. And it was there that Upper Silesia’s future became even more intertwined with the conduct of Germany’s reparation policy. At a conference held in London on 1 March, where some aspects of these reparation claims were once again discussed, the British were disappointed by another display of German intransigence on this issue. On 8 March, the day before the first groups of outvoters started travelling to Upper Silesia, the French, Belgians and British retaliated by occupying towns in the Rhineland. In the wake of this action, the German Ambassador in Paris informed Berlin that

in light of the friction that had now developed between Germany and the Allies over the reparations proposals, it would no longer be easy for England and Italy – even with a favourable plebiscite result – to secure all of Upper Silesia for Germany. The new expectation was that ‘the Allies would hold Upper Silesia as a deposit for reparations’.

Chapter 3
This friction, however, did not inhibit the German Foreign Office from conducting intensive lobbying in Opole, London, and Paris over acts of ‘Polish terrorism’ - mainly in Pless, Rybnik, and Katowice. Conversely, London also received reports from the Polish Legation and from Warsaw about German violence and preparations to invade Upper Silesia. Percival reported that large quantities of arms (mainly German) continued to be confiscated, that armed civilians had freed political prisoners ‘of German sympathy’ from Kozle prison, and that a British officer’s car had been shot at and a German police officer passenger seriously wounded. Nevertheless, even Percival felt that many of the German complaints were exaggerated. Regarding the reports of a German invasion, British officers in the Olenso-Lubliniec area were also reporting ‘that the Poles intended to invade Upper Silesia in the next few days’. Percival himself was certain that Sokol societies were being armed and undergoing military training on the Polish side of the frontier but, despite both sides being in a position to start a rising, he thought neither would ‘take the first step without serious provocation’. In fact, almost all participating organisations appealed to the Upper Silesians not to disrupt the plebiscite. Addressing fears that the outvoters would act as an invading army, the Commission introduced various measures designed to reassure the Poles. The outvoters’ arrival was to be spread over twelve days. On arriving in Upper Silesia they and their trains would be searched for weapons. After this, they would be conveyed directly to their individual voting areas. Concentrations of outvoters would occur in the larger towns, but there, troops would be available to maintain order. To help with this, the Commission had also restricted the sale of alcohol and banned outdoor assemblies. And from 8 March, entry into the plebiscite area was to be closed to all except qualified voters with tickets from the election committees.
The German authorities also played their part by displaying posters and placards in the principal German stations on the routes into Upper Silesia. These warned outvoters that, whilst there, they should avoid making any provocative gestures, such as singing patriotic songs.\textsuperscript{213} That said, Wambaugh describes how, inspired by the wave of German patriotism generated by the Allied occupation of the Rhineland towns, the outvoters' rail journeys became 'a triumphal progress, bands playing and flags waving at every station'. Travelling \textit{gratis}, many had not been there for decades, whilst others had left so young, they had no memories at all. Some were old, others were crippled, and a few were in the later stages of confinement.\textsuperscript{214} The reception arrangements were excellent. On arriving at the main rail depots, outvoters were greeted by welcoming crowds. \textit{Schutzbund} officials and volunteers directed them to their pre-arranged accommodation where they would stay up to twelve days. These outvoters not only delivered crucially important German votes. The well-organised manner of their arrival also boosted the local German supporters' morale.\textsuperscript{215} But because all categories of votes were counted together without distinction, there is no record of the number of outvoters who travelled and cast their ballot. Consequently, there is a divergence amongst historians about how many outvoters actually voted.

To strengthen their respective arguments, historians sympathetic to Poland have tended to place the number of outvoters near the registered total of 191,183, whilst those favouring a German interpretation of events have usually minimised their numbers.\textsuperscript{217} The Commission's British-run, communications department which co-ordinated the movements of the 280 special trains used to transport the outvoters, put the number of outvoters at over 200,000 — a figure exceeding the total number of outvoters registered.\textsuperscript{218} Tooley advances
the more precise claim that 79% (151,034) of the registered outvoters made the trip.\textsuperscript{219} This figure is similar to Sarah Wambaugh's estimate of 'more than 150,000'.\textsuperscript{220} But simple arithmetic requires that, even had every registered resident and immigrant voter living in Upper Silesia cast a vote (1,029,654), then to balance the overall total number of plebiscite votes (1,190,533), then at least 84% (160,879) of the total registered outvoters must have participated. The overall turn out was 97.5% but it is unlikely that every vote registered in the immigrant and resident categories was used. On this assumption, this thesis calculates that 97.6% (186,603) of the total registered outvoters cast their votes in the plebiscite.\textsuperscript{221}

With the outvoters arriving and Upper Silesia tense but secured, the way was clear for the vote to take place. In Warsaw, the Sejm's adoption of the new Polish Constitution on 17 March and the news of the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Peace Treaty at Riga the following day, inspired the Polish Prime Minister, Wincenty Witos, to declare 'that the Polish population of Upper Silesia could now cast their votes knowing that they were voting for a country secure at home and abroad'.\textsuperscript{222} But in Berlin, protests about 'Polish terrorism' continued to be delivered to Allied Representatives until late into the evening preceding the vote.\textsuperscript{223} To the surprise and relief of all concerned, the following day turned out to be, in Percival's words, 'one of the quietest days experienced in Upper Silesia since August 1920'.\textsuperscript{224} It was a Sunday and in some areas an almost holiday atmosphere prevailed. Expecting to find trouble in the industrial districts, the only crowds a British journalist could find 'were around some French tanks and at Post Offices in search of plebiscite stamps'.\textsuperscript{225} As the votes began to be counted, it became clear that (as Bourdillon had predicted), the voting units to the west of the Oder had voted for Germany, while those around the industrial area had generally opted for Poland. However, there was no clear outcome across the industrial area's patchwork of towns, communes and \textit{Gutsbezirke}. Out
of the 1,545 voting units, 55.5% (845) had voted for Germany and 44.4% (700) for Poland. 

Table 7 breaks down this result by towns, communes and Gutsbezirke. But in the ensuing battle of statistics, it was the total of 707,392 votes (59.6%) cast for Germany and 479,358 (40.4%) for Poland that was seized on by Germany and Britain and through their news agencies, broadcast to the world – see Table 8 for a numerical breakdown by district. 227

According to the Peace Treaty, the inter-Allied Commission was to make a recommendation to the Supreme Council on Upper Silesia's disposal. President Ebert immediately published a proclamation claiming the whole plebiscite area for Germany. 229

And when the British Cabinet met on 22 March, they instructed Percival that he must not award any part of Upper Silesia to Poland. 230 Marinis informed the Italian Foreign Ministry that he would support his British colleague but failing an instruction to this effect, he would be disposed to let Poland have certain narrowly circumscribed districts on the south east of the plebiscite area. 231 Needless to say the Poles did not view the results in the same light. Like the French, they focussed not on the huge German majorities in the uncontested west, but on the number of communes won in the south east and the Polish victories in the mixed communities in and around the industrial area. 232

There can be no doubt about which interpretation was correct. Allocating the whole territory by majority vote would have constituted a breach of the Peace Treaty. 233 The addition of part of Namysłów and the southern part of Głubczyce (overwhelmingly German territory and not claimed by the Poles), to the original plebiscite area, and then including their populations and non-residents in the vote, was alone enough to undermine any interpretation of the plebiscite based on the overall vote. 234 Although significant to persons unfamiliar with the decisions taken in Paris regarding the plebiscite vote, technically the total vote was irrelevant to such an extent that the plebiscite area's western boundary could

Chapter 3
Table 7

Result of Plebiscite by Voting Units Won 20 March 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Polish Towns</th>
<th>German Towns</th>
<th>Polish Communes</th>
<th>German Communes</th>
<th>Polish Gutsbezirke</th>
<th>German Gutsbezirke</th>
<th>Probable German Gains Through Outvoting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzelce</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krolewska Huta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozle</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluczmbork</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glubczyce</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubliniec</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole Land</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raciborz</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olenso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toszeck Gliwicki</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Industrial Area and Coalfields

Chapter 3
Table 8

Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20 March 1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Total Excluding Spoilt Votes</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Voting Share Poland</th>
<th>Voting Share Germany</th>
<th>Percentage Registered Outvoters (Number of Outvoters)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom *</td>
<td>146,689</td>
<td>73,122</td>
<td>73,567</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>9% (13,288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice *</td>
<td>40,587</td>
<td>8,558</td>
<td>32,029</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>14.8% (6,009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strzelce</td>
<td>45,461</td>
<td>23,046</td>
<td>22,415</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>16.2% (7,399)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice *</td>
<td>145,685</td>
<td>70,019</td>
<td>75,666</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>9.9% (14,474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolewska Huta *</td>
<td>42,628</td>
<td>10,764</td>
<td>31,864</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>11% (4,674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kozle</td>
<td>86,183</td>
<td>16,707</td>
<td>69,476</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>80.6%</td>
<td>23.7% (20,465)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kluczbork</td>
<td>45,108</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>43,323</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>40.5% (18,283)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Głubczyce</td>
<td>65,387</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>65,128</td>
<td>.4%</td>
<td>99.6%</td>
<td>33.8% (22,090)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lubliniec</td>
<td>29,132</td>
<td>13,679</td>
<td>15,453</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>15.7% (4,751)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole</td>
<td>21,914</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>20,816</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>27% (5,931)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opole Land</td>
<td>80,888</td>
<td>24,726</td>
<td>56,170</td>
<td>30.6%</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>22% (17,820)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna *</td>
<td>72,053</td>
<td>53,378</td>
<td>18,675</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>8.9% (6,402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raciborzech</td>
<td>69,385</td>
<td>20,745</td>
<td>48,640</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
<td>19.4% (13,465)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olenso</td>
<td>35,007</td>
<td>11,150</td>
<td>23,857</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>68.1%</td>
<td>26% (9,167)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik *</td>
<td>80,266</td>
<td>52,347</td>
<td>27,919</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>12.5% (10,047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory *</td>
<td>44,590</td>
<td>27,513</td>
<td>17,077</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>9.8% (4,362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toszeko-Gliwicki</td>
<td>47,296</td>
<td>27,198</td>
<td>20,098</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>42.5%</td>
<td>10.8% (5,138)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze *</td>
<td>88,483</td>
<td>43,264</td>
<td>45,219</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>9% (8,008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Total</td>
<td>1,186,658</td>
<td>432,264</td>
<td>754,392</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>16% (191,183)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Industrial Area and Coalfields

Chapter 3
equally have been at Leipzig, Dresden or even Berlin.\textsuperscript{235} What counted was the Polish vote and, more importantly, its location. Therefore, despite the British Cabinet’s initial reaction to the results, after a closer analysis of the outcome, caution began to prevail. It became clear that, in addition to Poland winning Upper Silesia’s vital coal fields in Pszczyna and Rybnik, the German vote in the industrial area was confined to four large towns, with most of the surrounding communes from which the towns drew their labour, voting for Poland.\textsuperscript{236} From the British policy-makers’ point of view, what was even worse, was that Bourdillon’s fears about ‘ten or twelve villages’ in the rural district of Toszecko-Gliwicki rejecting Germany had been realised, and the industrial triangle had been isolated from the solid German-voting regions to the west.\textsuperscript{237}

Waterlow suggested the British Government’s ‘extreme position’ might be turned to an advantage by intimating to the German Government that British support for their claim to the whole of Upper Silesia depended upon Germany producing ‘new and acceptable proposals about reparation’. Rejecting this, Crowe, the only Foreign Office official familiar with all aspects of the plebiscite negotiations in Paris, warned Curzon that:

\begin{quote}
We must remember, as regards the territorial arrangements to be made as a result of the plebiscite in Upper Silesia, that the French will be in a strong position if they maintain that the treaty, by expressly stipulating for a frontier line to be laid down in pursuance of the vote by communes, clearly contemplates a division of the territory.\textsuperscript{239}
\end{quote}

Curzon agreed that it would be difficult to implement the Cabinet’s decision and explained that instructions to Percival to recognise the German claim to the whole of Upper Silesia had ‘merely indicated the trend of British policy’. He wanted to ‘abstain from any action which might make the French even more suspicious’.\textsuperscript{240} But, where Poland or France was

\textit{Chapter 3}
concerned, Curzon’s views counted for little with Lloyd George – the man who mattered. D’Abernon, who had been on leave, had visited Downing Street on 22 March where he had learned that the Cabinet had recommended returning Upper Silesia to Germany. Lloyd George told him then that partition would be sanctioned only if it was unavoidable because; ‘We are all interested in German prosperity and the Poles could make nothing of this or any other country’. Perhaps a hint of the line D’Abernon was to take to solve the reparations impasse with Berlin?

There, as the first trainloads of outvoters were returning, Kilmarnock was noting that there was some disappointment amongst the ‘well-informed circles’ that had expected Germany’s share of the vote to be much higher. Nevertheless, the sense of euphoria continued in the German press and no reappraisal of the results had occurred. It was evident, wrote Kilmarnock, that the Government was systematically priming ‘the man in the street’ to expect all of Upper Silesia to be returned. Assertions that Polish terrorism had prevented Germans from voting, reappeared in the press but the Independent Socialist’s newspaper, the Freiheit, was the only German source which admitted a large proportion of Upper Silesia’s industrial district had voted against Germany – see Tables 9 and 10. In a succinct analysis of the international position, Wambaugh observed that this inconvenient fact was also being overlooked in Britain and Italy. Leading newspapers there were also arguing that Europe’s economic interests would suffer if any part of Upper Silesia went to Poland. With the British press and many politicians presenting the plebiscite results in this manner, and the German Government conducting an energetic campaign to promote their claim at home and abroad, it is understandable why, even today, most English-language historiography perpetuates the myth that Germany had ‘won’ the plebiscite in Upper Silesia.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Towns Poland</th>
<th>Towns Germany</th>
<th>Communes Poland</th>
<th>Communes Germany</th>
<th>Gutsbezirke Poland</th>
<th>Gutsbezirke Germany</th>
<th>Probable German Gains Through Outvoter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krolewska Huta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14 *</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Poland in Industrial Area = 352 Voting Units * Comprising 1 Town
For Germany in Industrial Area = 62 Voting Units 11 Communes 2 Gutsbezirken

For Poland in Industrial Area = 338,957 Votes
For Germany in Industrial Area = 322,009 Votes (including German 57,264** outvoters)

** 67,264 Registered Outvoters
less 10,000 Polish Outvoters
= 57,264 German Outvoters

Chapter 3
Table 10
Numerical Result of Plebiscite by Districts 20 March 1921
(Industrial Area and Coalfields Only) 245

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Total Excluding Spoilt Votes</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Voting Share Poland</th>
<th>Voting Share Germany</th>
<th>% Share Registered Outvoters (Number of)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bytom</td>
<td>146,689</td>
<td>73,122</td>
<td>73,567</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>50.2%</td>
<td>9% (13,288)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gliwice</td>
<td>40,587</td>
<td>8,558</td>
<td>32,039</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>78.9%</td>
<td>14.8% (6,009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katowice</td>
<td>145,685</td>
<td>70,019</td>
<td>75,666</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>9.9% (14,474)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolewska Huta</td>
<td>42,628</td>
<td>10,764</td>
<td>31,864</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>11% (4,674)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pszczyna</td>
<td>72,053</td>
<td>53,378</td>
<td>18,675</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>8.9% (6,402)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rybnik</td>
<td>80,266</td>
<td>52,347</td>
<td>27,919</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>12.5% (10,047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnowski Gory</td>
<td>44,590</td>
<td>27,513</td>
<td>17,077</td>
<td>61.7%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>9.8% (4,362)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabrze</td>
<td>88,468</td>
<td>43,256</td>
<td>45,212</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>51.1%</td>
<td>2% (8,008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>660,916</td>
<td>338,957*</td>
<td>322,009**</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>48.7%</td>
<td>67,264 Outvoters</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 70.7 % of the total Polish plebiscite vote.

** 45.5% of the total German plebiscite vote.

Outvoters = 10.1% of the Industrial Area and Coalfields' vote.

Outvoters = 23.4% of the remaining plebiscite districts.
However, an interpretation of the first plebiscite results received in Warsaw appeared to indicate a favourable outcome for Poland. Newspapers encouraged the idea and soon Warsaw’s streets were crowded with processions, cheering crowds and public rejoicing. When the outcome turned out to be worse than they had expected, the Polish public’s attention concentrated on the industrial district. They hoped that there, the meaning and intent of the Treaty plus the number of Polish votes in eastern, south-eastern, and central districts, would secure the entire district for Poland. Realising Germany was manoeuvring to obtain all of Upper Silesia, the Polish commentators reassured their readers ‘that the total number of votes counts for nothing’. Excellent and extensive analysis of the voting results can be found in works by Tooley, Komarnicki, and Blanke. But, like the various permutations that were formulated by the Commissioners and by the Allied officials in a bid to match their policy objectives, without exception, all of these expositions have centred on which Upper Silesian districts constitute the industrial area and the coalfields. There is little point in duplicating them or reiterating the German claim to the whole region, as discussed above. Instead, this thesis has concentrated on establishing the real contribution which outvoting made to the plebiscite’s outcome and refers the reader to Addendum 1, Annex 1 – Analysis of Outvoting Effect on Each Voting Unit – Data and Statistics.

Apart from questioning whether persons who had little interest in Upper Silesia should vote on its future, the Polish campaign’s objection to outvoting had rested on the outvoters’ potential to create violence. However, due to the manner in which the outvoters were handled and the plebiscite itself, these fears proved groundless. After the plebiscite, however, apart from speculating about what the Supreme Council’s decision would be, the question being asked was why the majority of what appeared to be an overwhelmingly

Chapter 3
ethnic Polish population, had refused to join the reborn Polish Republic? At this populist level, questions about what constituted Upper Silesian national identity (addressed by Tooley and Blanke), were ignored. Instead, the Polish nationalists and succeeding generations of Poles have tended to blame the machinations of Britain and Germany and the large influx of German outvoters for Poland’s failure to win a greater share area of the vote. However, after examining the outcome of voting in each of the 1,545 Gutsbezirke, communes and towns listed in the official results, it would appear Germany probably gained only an additional 106 (6.8%) of the plebiscite area’s 1,545 voting units through the support of its outvoters. In the vital industrial area and in the coalfields, where the percentage of registered outvoters was just 9.8% (compared with an average of 16% across the whole plebiscite area), Germany probably gained at most only fourteen voting units – comprising one small town (Myslowice), eleven communes, and two Gutsbezirke or 3.4% of that area’s 414 voting units.

Rather like the votes for Poland, outvoting’s importance lay in its size and location. As we have noted, for various reasons, the tendency was for the outvoters to reinforce existing majorities. Therefore, in districts such as Pszczyna, Rybnik, Katowice Land, Kluczbork, and Głubczyce, which already had overwhelmingly Polish or German majorities, outvoting had little or no impact on the result. This phenomenon explains why the effect of the often quoted ‘10,000 Polish outvoters’ who, if they existed, would in all probability have voted in almost totally Polish-supporting communes, can be discounted from our calculations. In terms of territory won and lost (as opposed to the numbers of towns, communes and Gutsbezirke), outvoting did have an impact in Strzelce, Olenso and Lubliniec, three of the agricultural Kreis laying to the west and to the north of the industrial area. When measuring and discussing the plebiscite results, politicians and officials found

Chapter 3
THE BITTERS OF VICTORY.

Thomas Atkins (on plebiscite duty in Upper Silesia). "What are you grousesing about, Jerry? You're top of the blinkin' poll, aren't you? Bit of a haul for the Fatherland."

German. "Ace, yes. But now have we of our best reparations-evading excuse deprived been."

10. The Bitters of Victory (Punch, 30 March 1921)
The *Kreis* was a handy-sized administrative unit for them to conceptualise in numerical terms. Depending on who had the numerical majority within them, they would refer to the *Kreis* or district as being either Polish or German. This worked against the Poles because in the *Kreise* surrounding the industrial triangle, apart from giving the Germans a majority in Lubliniec, outvoting also minimised the bare numerical majorities that the Poles had obtained in Strzelce, Tarnowski Gory, and Toszecko-Gliwicki. And in the industrial area, as well as exaggerating German majorities in the towns, outvoters helped the Germans to ‘gain’ the districts of Zabrze, Katowice, and Bytom.

The overall conclusion can only be that the outvoter effect in terms of winning or losing individual towns, communes, and *Gutsbezirke* within Upper Silesia’s industrialised areas was far less significant than that suggested by their 25.5% share of the total German vote. However, the German outvoters had a considerable effect on what turned out to be the psychologically important (though theoretically irrelevant) numerical voting figures when extended to, first, the *Kreis*, and then the whole plebiscite area.\(^{252}\) This became by far the most influential component in deciding the final line of partition. That settlement, as Prince Sapieha told Max Muller, ‘cast a heavy responsibility on the shoulders of the inter-Allied Commission and ultimately of the Allied Governments’.\(^{253}\)

After the outvoters had departed, as we have indicated, for Polish supporters there was no disguising the fact that thousands of ethnic Poles had voted to remain in Germany. ‘Why so many did’, wrote W.J. Rose in 1936, ‘would never be known’.\(^{254}\) But since then several scholars, most notably Rosenthal and Zielinski, have attempted answers, the most convincing of which are material considerations. The German campaign’s central theme had been economic continuity and their leaders’ concern for the well being of the whole population. Rosenthal argues that, over the centuries, Upper Silesians had always been
unconcerned with national identity and were more apt to follow their economic and their political interests. Stimulated by Keynes' comments in *The Economic Consequences of Peace*, both the Germans and the Poles had been compiling, publishing and circulating books and articles full of economic statistics and forecasts about Upper Silesia's future. These sophisticated arguments aimed to influence the policy-makers and were far beyond the mass of non-assimilated Polish-speaking Silesians who had now cast their votes for Germany. Their economic concerns had been addressed by the many local newspapers, almost all of which were subsidised by the German campaign. These were readily accessible and comprehensible, issuing incessant warnings to the population about job security, aspects of social insurance, the continuity of their pensions and so forth, should the country become part of Poland.

All arguments were designed to make every Upper Silesian feel that they had 'a stake in the German status quo'. The Prussian and Federal German Governments had both made funds available to support community projects and to compensate people materially affected by the recent insurrection. Several of their new taxes and many of the rises in the existing ones, had not been extended to Upper Silesia, and a 500 million mark fund to repair war-damaged areas in the German borderlands (half of which, it was promised, earmarked for Silesia), had also been announced. If we add to these economic incentives, the continual pressure from all of the other sources, such as German industry, the feudal landowners, their agents, most of the Catholic clergy, the Centre Party, and the Prussian administrators and officials which the Commission had retained in office, also urging a vote for Germany, it is only then that we can begin to grasp the enormous leap of faith that had been made by the Upper Silesians who had voted for Poland. For, despite the Polish Prime Minister's eve-of-poll remarks about Poland's new constitution and the
recently established security on its eastern borders, there could be no rational economic comparison made between an apparently economically recovering Germany and Poland which, despite Witos’s claims of normality, was plagued by epidemics, threatened by famine, suffering from a severe spiralling inflation, and still possessing a war-time economy geared to the military requirements of its continuing confrontations with neighbouring states. Forced to make such a choice, the fact that Poland won 46.5% of Upper Silesia’s residential vote, perhaps said more about the alienation that had been engendered by the Prussian authorities amongst sections of the Polish-speaking Upper Silesians over the past fifty years, than it did about the failure of the Polish campaign to win over more non-assimilated Upper Silesians to their cause. However, these soon became only points of academic interest when, ignoring the Polish majorities in the border districts, Ebert published a proclamation claiming the whole plebiscite area for Germany. This had brought bands of Poles on to the streets of Katowice and Bytom and the ‘truce’ between the contending parties broke down. 

Travelling down from Lubliniec, two companies of the Black Watch went quickly into action in Bytom when seven Germans, including six policeman, were killed at the mining village of Karp (Karf) after being attacked by a Polish armed band. German customs officials in Mysłowice fled for their lives when set upon by Polish crowds armed with sticks. The disorder quickly spread into Krolewska Huta, Pszczyna and then Rybnik. The Commission declared a ‘state of siege’ and sent reinforcements including troops from the Royal Sussex Regiment, to implement it. Percival reported that in the outlying areas, ‘many hundreds of Germans’ had been beaten and forced to leave their homes’. They could not be protected by the Commission’s new mixed police force. This had been largely ineffective because German members had ‘been forced or persuaded to leave their posts’.

Chapter 3
Hundreds of refugees had crowded into the towns (where German voters were in the majority), most notably Katowice, Bytom, Gliwice. Nikolow, and Pszczyna. However, he added, the worst of the disturbances had subsided around 26 March and by the end of month the violence had diminished everywhere. Percival believed the disturbances had reflected the mood of the population in these areas.

Rough and ill disciplined, they have both the cruelty and cowardice of those accustomed to live in gangs. They are plentifully equipped with arms, and living, as they do, in a frontier zone they can obtain as many more as they wish. They are bitterly influenced against everything German and are liable, on the slightest pretext, to wreak vengeance on any unprotected Germans they find at their mercy.

One effect of this show of force may have been to persuade Percival that, in addition to complying with London’s recent suggestion that he recommend Rybnik and Pszczyna be granted to the Poles, he ought also to follow Marinis and suggest that ‘the eastern fringe of Kreise Bytom and Katowice’ should also be awarded to Poland. But if it took a violent Polish reaction to wring this concession from the British and Italian Commissioners, the lesson would not have been lost on the leaders of the Polish campaign. This did not bode well for any line of partition that the Commission recommended, should it leave thousands of Polish-supporters still inside Germany.

In Britain, meanwhile, industrial confrontation was threatening yet again. The War Office’s reaction was the mobilisation of reservists and recall of all military units within reach. This included the British troops in Upper Silesia. Within a few days of receiving their orders all four British battalions had departed. Their hasty departure not only undermined Percival’s recently found authority in Upper Silesia but further weakened

Chapter 3
British influence. It also removed the only near-certain military opposition in the way of a third Polish insurrection – something which the Polish para-militarist had been urging on Korfanty since the plebiscite, but which he had been successfully resisting up to that point. However, this was something far removed from Wilson and the War Council’s concerns. Having failed to reach agreement with the mining unions on their wages and conditions before the war-time nationalisation of the mines ended on 31 March, the mine owners began to ‘lock-out’ their employees. The spectre of a Triple Alliance strike leading to revolution once again raised its head amongst the military leaders, some Government members, their supporters and certain groups across the country. Although the question of whether the railwaymen and the other transport workers would strike in sympathy had not yet been decided, the CIGS had acted. And when Lloyd George questioned recalling the troops from Upper Silesia, Wilson, still determined to avoid entanglements outside the Empire, replied by asking him whether ‘he wanted to be Prime Minister of England or of Upper Silesia?’ Seizing the opportunity presented by the divisions within and between the three unions involved, Lloyd George eventually called their bluff. But when the strike collapsed on 15 April (Black Friday), the British troops did not return to Upper Silesia. It was once again left to the French and Italians to handle a situation that was becoming increasingly tense as the parties awaited the Commission’s recommendations.

In a message to the Polish-voters on the day following the plebiscite, Korfanty had congratulated them on ‘bursting their bonds of enslavement to Prussia’ but he had also reminded them that the struggle was not yet over. They were entering a crucially important period of diplomatic struggle and international negotiations. Until the boundaries had been determined he asked them to maintain their national unity and continue to suppress any party-political divergences. Similar sentiments prevailed amongst the Germans.
Throughout Germany the press continued to assert the Germans' right to the whole of Upper Silesia. In Opole, however, Hatzfeldt, the German representative, conceded to Percival that he would not be surprised if the Pszczyna and Rybnik Kreise were allotted to Poland.271 In Berlin D'Abernon also observed the prevalence of this 'concessionary' thinking, and agreed that these two particular districts should go to Poland.272 The only dissenting voice came from Max Muller who wanted much more to be done for Poland. He suggested that Britain should demonstrate that it genuinely cared about Europe's general welfare by helping to establish an economically strong Poland. This could be done by supporting a modified Polish claim to the parts of the district lying closest to the Polish frontier – enabling Poland to finance its own reconstruction from the profits generated by its Upper Silesian industries.273 Any such ideas were anathema to Major Ottley. A stream of increasingly robust reports and memoranda contesting all Polish claims outwith Pszczyna and Rybnik, streamed from Ottley's pen.274 But even before Ottley had time to comment on Max Muller's proposal, on 3 April Curzon had given his approval to the substance of Percival's recommendations on Upper Silesia. Hatzfeldt's warning, that Polish resentment over the decision, when it came, would spark another Polish rising in Upper Silesia, possibly leading to war between Germany and Poland, was not considered.275 Referring to a suggestion from the Italians that some territory in the east of the industrial triangle be granted to Poland, the Foreign Office sent Percival a telegram confirming that Suggested compromise (i.e. allocation of Pless [Pszczyna] & Rybnik to Poland together with such strips of territory on eastern border as may be necessary) seems on the whole fairest solution. You are therefore authorised to support your Italian colleague in recommending this.276

Chapter 3
The British hoped the Commission’s recommendation would be unanimous and delivered in time for a Supreme Council meeting scheduled to start on 1 May. This meant that whatever the French Government instructed Le Rond to recommend to the Supreme Council would be decisive. A French Senate discussion on foreign affairs held on 6 April gave some indication. Briand insisted that to think that Germany would be less able to pay reparations if deprived of Upper Silesia’s industry was a fallacy. And, from the floor of the Senate, in an oblique reference to Lloyd George, the French leader was urged to prevent Germany using the plebiscite results to extract concessions on reparations ‘which some...might be more ready to grant than Monsieur Briand’. Notes sent to Percival from London urging that the Commission complete its report, implied that this was just what the British were planning to do. But when Percival reported that Le Rond intended that the whole industrial area should go to the Poles, with Poland becoming responsible for paying a proportionate share of the German reparations (an obvious French sop to Lloyd George’s continued preoccupation with their possible loss), the receipt of an unanimous report from the Commissioners was unlikely. Instead, Percival was instructed to prepare a majority report on the basis agreed with Marinis.

Though no such principle as the indivisibility of Upper Silesia is to be found in the Peace Treaty, significantly, in view of future events, not one of the three Commissioners (nor the Powers that they represented), desired that its industrial area should be partitioned. Even Le Rond, supporting his recommendations with powerful argument, proffered solutions to Lloyd George’s concerns regarding possible loss of reparations if this occurred. After first recommending that the whole industrial area should be awarded to Poland, he proposed that an inter-Allied economic organisation be established to supervise the area’s continued economic output, enabling them to levy a share of Germany’s
reparations from Poland. And far from interpreting the plebiscite results as the confusing mass of towns, communes and *Gutsbezirke* with mixed preferences, as described by Percival and Marinis, Le Rond felt that the results had produced two clear distinct blocks of different populations, the limits of which he believed ought to define the new frontier. The area he wanted to allot to Poland encompassed the territory that the Poles had originally claimed in Paris - before the Peace Conference’s Polish Committee’s over-generous experts extended it into what was indisputably German land. Le Rond admitted the Germans’ skill in exploiting Upper Silesia’s resources in the past. However, there were now profound national differences separating the Polish miners from their German managers. The Allies could not ask workers who had tasted freedom under the Commission’s rule to accept German subjection again. They were now organised and conscious, and having learned how the industrial area had voted, the vast majority believed that they had actually won their independence. Should the Allies try forcing them back into Germany, Le Rond predicted that this could very well provoke yet another insurrection. This in turn, could have ‘lamentable consequences for European economy…. and be dangerous for the peace of Central Europe.’ Such considerations, however, were left unbroached by Percival and Marinis.

Like Le Rond, both Percival and Marinis were both ultimately acting under their superiors’ instructions. They were, therefore, especially preoccupied with protecting German capital investment in Upper Silesia and encouraging a swift return to pre-war levels of coal production and industrial output. Above all, the British wanted to avoid placing German voters in Poland – although, as Max Muller pointed out in his complaint about Bourdillon, the converse did not appear to apply. The implication was that the Polish majority in most areas claimed by the Poles was composed of the lowest and most

Chapter 3
ignorant elements of the population' and, therefore, did not really count. Almost to a
man, British and Italian officials were sceptical about Poland's capacity to run Upper
Silesia's industries. Many years of propaganda by the partitioning powers and the strong
social-Darwinian philosophy prevailing within the strata of British society from which
British officers were drawn (reinforced by military training), had conditioned them to
regard Poland's long years of partition as something which the Poles had brought upon
themselves. This was seen as due to some weakness of national character - including an
inherent incapacity to administer themselves. These were, of course, classic excuses for
unfettered imperialism. To this way of thinking, only 'strong' nations were capable of
industrialisation, therefore deficiencies in the Polish character obviously meant that they
were incapable of industrial organisation. This meant that should the industrial area go to
Poland, German capital and technological expertise would have to be replaced by someone,
and that someone appeared to be France. Percival had already been alerting the Foreign
Office about Franco-Polish discussions on joint ventures.

The British line duly conceded the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts to Poland whilst
sacrificing most of the Polish voters to Germany – see Map 4. The Italian line was similar
to the British one, but the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Szforza, with the sort of typically
confusing gesture that then characterised Italian diplomacy, would soon suggest a more
generous settlement for the Poles (conceding large areas of the industrial triangle). The
Commissioners signed the report on 30 April, but whilst it was being rushed to the various
capital cities (Le Rond went with it to Paris), the British and Italian recommendations were
leaked and published in Korfanty's newspaper, the Grenzzeitung, the following day.
Fearing that their wishes were about to be disregarded, the Polish miners immediately
responded to fresh calls for a general strike. On the evening of 2 May, as the Commission's

Chapter 3
Map 4 The Commissioners' Recommendations 24 April 1921
Chapter 5
recommendations arrived in London, the third and most serious of the Polish insurrection, broke out in Upper Silesia. \(^{289}\)

**Summary**

Surveying the period leading up to Upper Silesia’s third and final insurrection, it would be fair to say that a developing *modus vivendi* had permitted the existence of more reasonable inter-personal relations between the Commissioners, at the same time recognising where each others’ sympathies and aims lay. Whilst the Commission’s reorganisation provided Percival with increased sources of information, it never altered Le Rond’s tendency to regard his British and Italian colleagues as anything other than junior board-members whose eccentricities had to be accommodated. Interviewed by the press, he scarcely mentioned them. Colonel Repington has also recorded Le Rond’s tendency to credit himself with every achievement - even the excellent German outvoting organisation. \(^{290}\)

After his London interviews with Waterlow in November 1920, Percival found his role much more comfortable. He appears to have been much happier following London’s orders and reporting back, than he ever was during his initial period as Commissioner, when he was constantly agonising over whether or not to confront Le Rond. Therefore, in a sense, we can say that relations between the Commissioners did improve during this period but only because the contentious issues were now being referred to the Ambassadors in Paris and to the Supreme Council where, aided by the odd compromise, Lloyd George’s negotiating skills invariably carried the day.

However, without Lloyd George, at this level of diplomacy the Foreign Office itself achieved little in the way of influencing events within Upper Silesia. For example, when they had sought a confrontation with France over Le Rond’s presidency and Korfanty’s

Chapter 3
expulsion, the officials had to climb down when forced to think through the implications that threatening to withdraw the British contingent from Upper Silesia would hold for international affairs. It was not until they addressed the French Government's real fears over the security of their forces in Upper Silesia (should 300,000 outvoters arrive en bloc) that Britain managed to make progress on the outvoter question. After all, it had been the British military default that had placed the French and Italian troops in such a vulnerable position. A half-promise by Lloyd George to send a few British troops immediately brought about indirect pressure on Korfanty to end his campaign against the outvoters. And Percival's contention that thousands of outvoters could travel into Upper Silesia quite safely and vote alongside the residents there, was accepted by France the moment Curzon was able to confirm the British commitment to send the four battalions of troops from the Rhine to Upper Silesia – though this met Wilson's opposition as soon as he found out.

The Germans never failed to utilise any source of support that could be mustered over Upper Silesia or to exploit the divisions within the Entente. Their Foreign Ministry was guilty of using Upper Silesia to delay the final reparation demand, though it did overplay its hand at the London Conference on 1 March. Once the plebiscite results were known, Germany's attempt to retain the whole plebiscite area by placing an emphasis on the overall numerical majority it had been gifted, was so successful that today many, if not most, Western historians continue to perpetuate the myth that the Poles had unjustifiably deprived Germany of territory in Upper Silesia in 1921. In this the German cause has been greatly aided and historians misled by Lloyd George's pronouncements on the subject in the House of Commons – although in Lloyd George's case he quite possibly believed the distortion he was perpetuating. Warsaw never had any intention of being drawn into a war with Germany over Upper Silesia, but what the Polish Government wanted and what the

Chapter 3
Polish militarists did very often diverged. A similar story existed in Germany where the situation was further complicated by differences between the Prussian and Federal German governments over the handling of Upper Silesia. Once the Bolshevik threat had receded in Poland, much clandestine military support flowed to the Upper Silesian POW units that traversed the border. Fearing a pre-emptive Polish strike there prior to the plebiscite, the Finance Minister, Joseph Wirth, working through the Reichswehr, had resumed Federal funding to Freikorps units. Wirth intended using them in Upper Silesia if there was a paramilitary insurrection. General von Seeckt, the Reichswehr's Commander in Chief, intended using them there only if Polish troops invaded Upper Silesia. Illicit German weapons also flowed into the region but with the French military concentrating on finding them, the arms were being discovered at such an embarrassing rate that Hatzfeldt wrote to Berlin in early March pointing out 'that such activities only worked against the German cause in Paris'.

In these months the outvoter question was also a particularly contentious topic, and it has remained so to this day. The outvoters had a right to vote, but had the plebiscite's outcome not been distorted by re-focussing on the numerical result, their contribution would have been minimal. This was because the vast majority were concentrated in the German-dominated towns and in rural areas already possessing huge German majorities. The statistical analysis indicates that only 12,742 or just 7% of the total number of German outvoters made a difference in a handful of towns, communes and Gutsbezirke. However, without the Polish campaign's own anti-outvoter campaign, aided by German press stories about Polish atrocities, discouraging many thousands more, the outcome might have been different. This was because Upper Silesia's partition (see Chapter 5) was finally calculated on a numerical basis (a ratio of territory to total votes gained), rather than, as the Treaty had required, by the number of the towns, communes and Gutsbezirke won. Therefore every
one of the estimated 186,000 votes cast by the German outvoters (who formed a staggering 25.5% of the total Germans vote) did make a difference.

It was the interpretation of the plebiscite results and the reactions in the various capitals, especially London and Berlin, which brought about the third insurrection when it broke out in May 1921. The recommendations advanced by the three Commissioners were predictable in the extreme. However, it is unlikely that they would have been any different even without 'guidance' from their respective Foreign Offices. As for the British Cabinet’s recommendation that the whole plebiscite area should go to Germany - this can only be attributed to the ministers’ ignorance of the Peace Treaty’s related provisions and Lloyd George’s advice from the chair. This was later corrected by the British Foreign Office, but even amongst the officials there, the impetus was towards granting Germany as much territory as possible. For many Polish Silesians witnessing the political intrigues and trade-offs that were taking place over their future, what still rankled with many was having allowed themselves to have been persuaded by Korfanty into trusting international diplomacy in early 1919, instead of following Poznania’s example in ‘casting of her Prussian shackles’ by force. For the miners in Bytom Land, Katowice Land and elsewhere in the industrial triangle who had voted for Poland, the recommendations of the British and Italian Commissioners proved that the diplomatic path had failed them. They now faced the return of their Prussian oppressors, having believed that they had voted them away. The more headstrong Polish Silesians leaders pointed to the gains of the August 1920 insurrection. They knew that they had the sympathy of French soldiers, that there were also Poles in the plebiscite police force, and that the only part of the inter-Allied force likely to oppose them (the 2,000 British troops) had been sent home. By rising up united as one people in areas of Upper Silesia where they formed the majority population, the Polish
supporters now hoped to display to the world their determination to govern themselves and
demonstrate their ability to do so.
Chapter 3 - Notes

1. PRO FO 371/4818 C8399/6121/18 Derby to Percival 9 October 1920. See also DBFP Vol.XI No.62 pp.81-82 Derby to Curzon 9 October 1920.

2. PRO FO 371/4820 C10205/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 27 October 1920.


Both Derby and Ottley had travelled back to London together on 23 September. In the Foreign Office, Ottley persuaded Hardinge that Le Rond's statement had been a 'suppression of the truth'. Hardinge minuted that 'Lord Derby therefore decided to confront General Le Rond...and ask him for an explanation...It will then be for consideration whether the proposal that he has outlined should be accepted'. See also PRO FO 371/4820 C7132/1621/18 23 September 1920 Major Ottley's notes on General Le Rond's Statement. This contested each of Le Rond's Statements(DBFP Vol.XI No.55 pp.74-75). For example, to Le Rond's assertion that 49 Germans and 41 Poles were killed between 19 August and 17 September, Ottley argued that it was impossible to know the numbers yet because a high proportion of Polish crimes still had to come to light. Two days later the British contingent claimed that 70 Germans and 41 Poles had been killed during the second Polish insurrection - see PRO FO 371/4817 C7235/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 25 September 1920.

5. DBFP Vol.XI No.61 pp.80-81 Derby to Curzon 9 October 1920. For details of the settlement see ibid No.62 pp.81-82 Derby to Curzon 9 October 1920. For the settlement's acceptance see ibid No.63 p.82 Curzon to Derby 13 October 1920.


8. PRO FO 371/4819 C9076/1621/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 19 October 1920.

9. Ibid, C9660/1621/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 20 October 1920. Bourdillon notes that on Le Rond's return to Opole, the Commission's president claimed that he had held conversations with most of the French Cabinet. He told Marinis that he had convinced everyone in Paris that the German accusations were grossly exaggerated.

10. Ibid, C8565/1621/18 Minute by Waterlow 11 October 1920. Waterlow suggests in this that a telephone call be put through to Percival and asking him to report to the Foreign Office; ibid C8336/1621/18 (Private telegram) Crowe to Percival 16 October 1920. This expresses surprise at the Foreign Office not having received a reply to their telegram to Opole asking Percival to come to London. See also ibid C9378/1621/18 Tidbury to Wigram 19 October 1920. Here, Tidbury confesses that the failure to respond to Crowe's telegram had been his fault. Percival was over the
Czech border recuperating in the Reisengebirge mountains, and Tidbury did not know what his intentions were.

11. Ibid, C9076/1621/18 Bourdillon (Opole) to Curzon 19 October 1920. Bourdillon reports that Percival proposes to report to London after discussions with Le Rond. See also ibid Curzon to Bourdillon 20 October 1920, regretting Percival's indisposition and asking him to return when his health allows him to travel safely.

12. Ibid, C10205/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 20 October 1920. Le Rond had tried to argue the question had been *ecarte* in Paris.

13. Ibid.


15. Ibid, C10223/1621/18 Percival to Bourdillon 2 November 1920. This asks Bourdillon to find out whether the other Commissioners would accept Macpherson and Cassels withdrawing their resignations. See also ibid C10458/1621/18 Bourdillon to Percival 4 November 1920 which confirms the Commissioners agreement and that the resignations have been withdrawn and requests authority to accept Major Perry's resignation. This was granted on the grounds of ill health - see FO 371/4820 C104/1621/18 Foreign Office to Bourdillon 4 November 1920.

16. Ibid, C10849/1621/18 Waterlow to Percival 9 November 1920.

17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.

20. PRO FO 371/4820 C10849/1621/18 Waterlow to Percival 9 December 1920.

21. PRO FO 371/4821 C12093/1621/18 24 November 1920. Memorandum by Waterlow on Upper Silesia. This discusses the possibility of replacing Colonel Percival with Sir Stephen Tallents. Waterlow had heard Colonel Tallents was returning from the Baltic States where he had very successfully headed the British Mission there. Sir Eyre Crowe had also noted the problems with personnel in Upper Silesia, minuting, 'The military officers are all out of hand and have lost all sense of discipline', see FO 371/4819 C8953/1621/18 17 October 1920. Derby had just described Percival's action in signing a letter from the Commission demanding military reinforcements to deal with problems over the Polish campaign to abolish outvoting, as 'a grave error of judgement' - see DBFP Vol.XI No.77 pp.96-97 Derby to Curzon 18 November 1920.

22. PRO FO 371/4777 C3427/92/18 Percival to Curzon 3 August 1920. The British Treasury and Percival himself had taken the initiative in persuading the Conference.
of Ambassadors to reduce the salaries of the Commission from 1 September, 1920. Percival gave the British officials one month's notice and then re-appointed those who were prepared to work at the new, lower rates. Only General Hammond, the Communication's Director, protested officially and left the Commission to take up an appointment with the Colonial Office - see FO 371/4778 C8302/226/18 Percival to Curzon 8 October 1920. The Italians and the French found ways of avoiding reducing the pay to their officials who continued to receive higher salaries than their British counterparts - see FO 371/4821 C12084/1621/18 Memorandum Allowances of Silesian Plebiscite Commission 26 November 1920. The cuts were quite sizeable.

23. PRO FO 371/4777 to 4779. These files contain application forms and interviewers' notes on the candidates. FO 371/4777 C3335/226/18 contains an application from Major Charles Forbes Mackenzie (Chaterhouse and Edinburgh University) citing as his references an Army general living near the CIGS at Eaton Place in London, and two leading members of the Scottish aristocracy, Lord Dundas and Lord Dunedin. Another successful candidate, Lieutenant Fredrick Cazalet, ex-Eton, was currently employed as 'a public speaker and private lecturer on anti-Bolshevism and industrial peace'. He spoke French, German, Russian and Polish and he had recently been with the British Forces in North Russia - see FO 371/4779 C11544/226/18 18 November 1920. One former temporary officer recruited claimed to have been the manager of Vicker' Ltd. in Germany before the War.

24. PRO FO 371/4799 C9690/266/18 Oliphant to Capt. Hutchison 5 November 1920. Hutchison had family connection with Waterlow and had recently run Lloyd George's political organisation in the West of Scotland. They recruited 27 officers, seconded three Army drill sergeants from the Army, and took on six male civilian interpreters, stenographers and shorthand/typists. They asked the War Office to re-commission all the officers to give them the right to wear their uniforms - each were granted a £50 uniform allowance. The police posts were established from Opole by military rank (one Major, five Captains, and six Lieutenants). The Treasury had suggested rates of pay for them lower than the Commission's new reduced rate for the officials (PRO FO 371/4818 C8336/1621/18 13 October 1920). To avoid any discrepancy Percival had their pay raised (PRO FO 371/4819 C8853/1621/18 16 October, 1920). Because men who had held much higher (wartime) ranks applied for these lower positions in the police, the posts were filled by men nominally one or two ranks higher than had been deemed necessary, for example, a Major filling a Lieutenant's post.

25. PRO FO 371/4818 C8303/1621/18 Derby to Curzon 8 October 1920. Derby had originally asked that suitably qualified Army officers be supplied by the War Office but had been informed that they would have difficulty finding them - see DBFP Vol.XI No.60 p.80 6 October 1920.

27. PRO FO 371/4819 C9615/1621/18 Minute by Waterlow to Ottley's Memorandum 25 October 1920


29. PRO FO 890/14 British Commissioner's Index of Despatches to Foreign Office February - August 1921. See *Addendum 1, Annex 4* for the list of officers recruited during November 1920.

30. The Commissioners began referring more and more problems to the Ambassadors and their own Governments because (a) the problems were often due to lack of military resources (b) the individual Commissioners were encouraged to do so by their Governments.

31. The amount of related German correspondence and appeals over this period retained in the Public Record Office, at Kew, London, outweighs the amount of Polish sourced material by a roughly 20:1 ratio.

32. PRO FO 371/5888 C1826/92/19 Kilmarnock to Curzon 21 January 1921.

33. PRO FO 371/4818 C7481/1621/18 Mrs Scheffler to Lloyd George 20 September 1920.

34. PRO FO 371/5888 C1826/92/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 21 January, 1921.


36. *DBFP* Vol.XI Chapter I pp.78-190 *passim*.

37. Section 4 of the Annex to Article 88 of the Peace Treaty with Germany directed that every person was to vote in the commune where they were born, if they had not retained their domicile in the area.

38. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p127 22 June 1920.


40. PRO FO 890/16 Percival's Diary p.99 1 June 1920. Hatzfeldt drew Percival's attention to the great discrepancies in the densities of the population between the different communes. Large, thinly populated rural communes might be awarded to one country, while a town located in the centre of some rural communes and with a far greater population, might vote and be awarded the other way. See also *ibid* p.211, 11 August 1920. Percival was convinced that it was Korfanty who was behind the demonstrations reported by M. Anjubault.
41. PRO FO 371/4817 C6701/1621/18 Ciechanowski (Polish Chargé d'Affaires in London) to Curzon 19 September 1920. This provides Polish arguments against including non-resident voters in the plebiscite.

42. Ibid. See also DBFP Vol. XI No. 58 pp. 78-79 Curzon to Derby 25 September, 1920.

43. PRO FO 371/4818 C7331/1621/18 Rumbold to Curzon 23 September 1920. Saphiea handed in a note to Rumbold stating 'that in other plebiscite areas the right to vote had been given to all persons born in those areas without consideration of the time they have actually lived there, and that this procedure has led to immigration into the areas on the eve of the vote, of large numbers of persons claiming to have been born there, resulting in disturbances and a vote by no means reflecting the true wishes of the population. This interpretation of the annex has the result of putting it into direct opposition to the spirit of the Treaty'. It went on to point out that the Commission had no means of preventing the names of people born in Upper Silesia but who were now dead, from figuring in the list of voters.


45. DBFP Vol. XVI No13 p. 29 Annex: Memorandum Respecting Upper Silesia at the Peace Conference by Headlam Morley 6 April 1921. Regarding the position of outvoters, Headlam Morley noted that the importance of the decision was not fully recognised at the time and that this was adopted practically without discussion. He felt that it was important 'therefore, that it should be on record that it was introduced by the chairman of the commission'. This had been General Le Rond.

46. DBFP Vol. XI No. 79 pp. 98-99 Dufor-Forence (German Chargé d'Affaires London) to Curzon 22 November 1920.

47. Ibid, No. 70 pp. 90-91 Curzon to Derby 10 November 1920.

48. Ibid, No. 75 p. 95 Percival to Curzon 17 November 1920. When Percival had signed the note that the Commission had sent to Paris demanding more troops, he stated that the outvoters should be permitted to vote.

49. Ibid, No. 96-97 Derby to Curzon 18 November 1920. Reports on the Conference of Ambassadors' meeting that day.

50. Ibid.


52. Ibid, No. 80 pp. 99-100 Conversation between Crowe and Italian Ambassador 22 November 1920.
53. PRO FO 371/4821 C11984/18 Memorandum by Waterlow 'Can Troops Be Sent From the Rhineland to Upper Silesia' 22 November 1920. The Commander in Chief of the Rhine Army was Field Marshal Robertson. The United States was not now a party to the Peace Treaty.


57. PRO FO 371/4820 C10849/1621/18 Waterlow to Percival 9 November 1920.

58. DBFP Vol. XI No. 72 pp. 92-93, Derby to Curzon 14 November 1920. The last paragraph of the letter drew attention to the damage Derby thought that Korfanty was doing to the Polish cause and the attraction he believed that the German Government's announcement of post-plebiscite autonomy for Upper Silesia had for the population.


60. Ibid, No. 72 pp. 92-93 Derby to Curzon 14 November, 1920.

61. PRO FO 371/4821 C13071/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 1 December 1920. Enclosure: German Version of Korfanty's Speech in Olenso 23 November 1920. Although Percival describes it as inflammatory there is no real call to violence in the speech except for the call to the women present that, in the absence of their husbands, 'they chase the outvoters away...with brooms soaked in urine'. Parts of the report which Percival found particularly offensive to Britain (Lloyd George being described as Poland's greatest enemy) can be found in DBFP Vol. XI No. 94 pp. 116-118.

62. Ibid, pp. 116-118 Percival to Curzon 1 December 1920. Marinis had suggested that perhaps the Polish Government could be persuaded to recall Korfanty (who was of course an Upper Silesian, living there). But when Le Rond suggested that the Italian Minister in Warsaw approach the Poles on this, Marinis would not agree - see DBFP Vol. XI No. 97 pp. 120-121 Percival to Curzon 4 December 1920.

63. Ibid. See also PRO FO 890/2 Percival's Statement to the Commission Requesting Korfanty's Expulsion 4th December 1920. This raised the subject of Korfanty's earlier demand for Polish National Day processions to be permitted, his leading the Polish Silesian trade unions' general strike early in May, and his alleged duplicity in whipping up the opposition to the arrival of outvoters in Upper Silesia. The statement repeated Percival's belief about seriousness the of Korfanty's speech in Olenso and complained about the Polish leader's hostility towards the British
members of the Commission. Percival also made intriguing allegations about Korfanty's agents spying on Ottley and claimed that the 'Lominitz Hotel' had assisted Ottley's former secretary, a man named Stroegel to escape prosecution. This was allegedly because Stroegel had offered to provide the Polish campaign with 'certain secrets of Major Ottley's which he thought might be of use to them'. Stroegel was later accused of assisting in another attempt to steal papers from the British Controller's Office in Bytom but this had been foiled by Colonel Pepys Cockerell. Percival concluded his statement by claiming that he 'was convinced that much of the unrest since the occupation, was due directly to him. In fact I consider Mr. Korfanty to be a dangerous agitator, who is doing harm not only to this country but also to the Polish cause which he is supposed to further'.

64. DBFP Vol. XI No.82 p.102 Curzon to Lindsay 24 November 1920. See also ibid No.105 p.129 Curzon to Percival 11 December 1920.

65. PRO FO 371/4822 C13398/1621/18 Percival to London 4 December 1920, minutes by Waterlow and Crowe.


67. Ibid No.82 p.102 Curzon to Lindsay 24 November 1920.

68. PRO FO 371/4821 C12341/1621/18 Defour-Feronce to Curzon 26 November 1920.

69. Jean-Claude Leygues was a cypher for Millerand who had taken over as the President of the Republic (a role with no political power) after President Deschanel had become mentally unstable. Leygues was forced to resign in January 1921.


71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. DBFP Vol.XI No.90 p.113 Curzon to Hardinge (Paris), D'Abernon (Berlin), Buchanan (Rome), Loraine (Warsaw), Percival (Opole) and Ryan (Coblenz) 30 November 1920. Hardinge replaced Derby as British Ambassador to Paris on 27 November 1920.

74. Ibid, No.91 p.114 Curzon to D'Abernon and Loraine 30 November 1920.

75. PRO FO 371/5399 N2424/236/55 Rumbold (Warsaw) to Curzon 7 November 1920.

275

77. *Ibid,* No. 99 pp.122-123 D'Abernon to Curzon 6 December 1920. See also Tooley *National Identity and Weimar Germany* pp.92-99. This was the *Deutscher Schutzbund für das Grenzund Auslandsdeutschum* (League for the Defence of Germany on the border and abroad), the private umbrella organisation through which the Federal and Prussian government's *Reichzentrale für Heimadienst* disbursed funds for the plebiscites. The *Schutzbund* organised and funded the outvoters, as well as public relations and related propaganda throughout the *Reich.* Tooley provides a comprehensive account of how the funding was split between the Federal and Prussian Governments.

78. *DBFP* Vol. XI No. 95 pp.118-119 Hardinge to Curzon 2 December 1920. Curzon minuted on this message 'We know the Poles would object to our proposal. What astonishes me is that the Germans appear to object equally'.


80. *Ibid,* No.100 pp.123-124 Ciechanowski to Curzon 9 December 1920; and *ibid* No.102 pp.125-127 Loraine to Curzon 9 December 1920. When discussing the Polish rejection with Loraine, Sapieha pointed out that if voting at Cologne had been granted he would not have been able to resist the demand for other voting points to be granted around the world, especially in the United States where there were a great number of Upper Silesian emigrants.

81. PRO FO 371/5414 N2527/55 Loraine to Curzon 14 November 1920. See also *ibid* N3387/2527/55 D'Abemon to Curzon 24 November 1920. D'Abemon reports that Thelwell (the British Embassy's Commercial Secretary) assured him that no boycott of Polish trade was underway. But D'Abemon thought that the Poles were in any case 'unconstitutionally unfitted for the controversial discussion of the innumerable details which compose a modern commercial arrangement'.

82. PRO FO 371/5399 N43523/236/55 Loraine to Curzon 14 December 1920 for Loraine's interview with the newly appointed Finance Minister, Jan Steczowski who told Loraine that the Polish mark was being depreciated for propaganda purposes in Upper Silesia. See FO 371/ 6814 N778/117/55 Loraine to Curzon 10 January 1921, Enclosure: Report by Kimens (Commercial Secretary) on visit to Poznan. Also FO371/5399 N3382/236/55 Loraine to Curzon 25 November 1920, Enclosure 1: Summary of an expose presented 8 November by M. Ladislas Grabski formerly Minister of Finance, on 'The Economic Programme of the Polish Government'.


84. *DBFP* Vol.XI No.116 p.139 Loraine to Curzon 23 December 1920. Sapieha told Loraine that he had again written to Korfanty to urge him to keep quiet and abstain from any indiscretions. Sapieha was also under pressure from the French to quieten Korfanty down. Crowe was told on 11 December, that the French Government had been urging Warsaw that Korfanty must moderate his attitude on Upper Silesia.

Chapter 3 - Notes
because this appeared preferable to recalling him and giving the Germans an advantage - see *ibid* No.106 pp129-130 *Conversation between Crowe and Gambon*, Foreign Office, 11 December, 1920.

85. PRO FO 371/4823 C14736/18 Percival to Curzon 28 December 1920. This zonal voting scheme would work by having different districts voting consecutively over a set period. In the earlier objections to it, the Germans had claimed that it was obvious that the proposal was designed to arrange that certain districts in which 'the Polish terror' was still predominant would vote as Zone One, and that all subsequent voting might be influenced - see FO371/481 C12341/1621/18 Dufour-Feronce to Curzon 26 November, 1920.

86. *DBFP* Vol.XI No.117 p.140 Percival to Curzon 23 December 1920. Percival also reported that Le Rond was forwarding a statement to the Ambassadors stressing that the onus for dealing with any disorders that the expulsion created fell on French soldiers - but that he refused to shoulder any responsibility for the consequences. Percival's renewed attempt to have Korfanty expelled had been outvoted in the Commission on 18 December. At the time Le Rond refused to accede to Percival's demand that it be submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors - see *ibid* No. 113 pp.137-138 17 December 1920. And although Le Rond and Marinis had now agreed to allow Percival's appeal to the Ambassadors, they were still united in rejecting his demand to expel Korfanty.

87. *Ibid*, No.107 pp.130-131 Hardinge to Curzon 14 December 1920. He ended with the sentence 'I venture to express the strong hope that I shall not be instructed to use any threat which His Majesty's Government are not in the last resort prepared to execute'.


89. *Ibid*, No.112 pp.135-137 Curzon to Hardinge 17 December 1920. If the talks were inconclusive or the proposal rejected, Curzon wanted Hardinge to first refer the matter of Britain's withdrawal back to the British Government so that their withdrawal from the Commission could be considered. See also *ibid* No.119 pp.141-142 Hardinge to Curzon 24 December 1920.


93. *Ibid*, No.118 pp.140 -143 M. de Fleuriau (Chargé d'Affaires London) to Curzon 23 December 1920. He was informed that there were now 11,420 French troops in Upper Silesia, 2,000 Italians and none from Great Britain, 'il est indispensable que le Gouvernement britannique fasse un effort pour envoyer un contingent en Haute Silesie'. At the London Conference on 27 November 1920. Lloyd George had
said he would discuss the possibility of sending British troops to Upper Silesia - see DBFP Vol.VIII No.99 pp.810-826.

94. HLRO, Bonar Law Papers, Box90/Fld.2/Cab.80(20) Cabinet Conclusions 30 December, 1920. This decision was taken in the context of a general discussion on foreign policy, particularly in relation to France and Germany. During the discussion, the option of a British withdrawal from the Upper Silesian Commission must have been raised. Those present included Lloyd George, Churchill, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson (CIGS), and Lord D'Abernon, see DBFP Vol.VIII No.99 pp.810-826. See also Curzon's minute in PRO FO371/5886 C744/92/18 Carr to Waterlow 6 January 1921. Also DBFP Vol.XI No.129 p.152 Curzon to Hardinge (Confidential) 10 January 1921, which repeats the Cabinet Conclusion (above) on British troops for Upper Silesia. Hardinge is instructed not to make use of or disclose this without further instructions.

95. Ibid. No.128 pp.150-151 Hardinge to Curzon 10 January 1921. Hardinge quoted the following example of a message which he was told had to been placarded throughout Upper Silesia: 'Whatever events may occur, keep calm, maintain your equanimity and be most vigilant supporters of public order. Whatever happens to you do not allow yourself to be turned aside from the only thing that matters - the vote. Calm and tranquillity can alone serve our cause'. He also noted that the Italian troops in Upper Silesia had now been reduced to about 700 men.


97. PRO FO 371/4819 C9789/1621/18 25 October 1920 Minute by Ottley entitled Allied Forces in Upper Silesia proposed raising a British volunteer force of two or more companies of tanks for Upper Silesia to be paid for by the Commission.

98 Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p.115.

99. Ibid, pp.112-113 and p.118

100. Ibid, p.114

101. Ibid, p.115. Se also PRO FO 371/4819 C8467/1621/18 Percival to Curzon 6 October 1920. This provides details of the press campaign against Ratti.

102. Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican p.123

103. Ibid, p.116

104. PRO FO 371/5887 C9550/1621/18 Count De Salis to Curzon 20 October 1920.

105 PRO FO371/4822 C1207/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 13 January 1921, Enclosure 1.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid.

109. PRO FO 371/4821 C14307/1621/18 Loraine to Curzon 2 December 1920. The Sejm debate held on 30 December 1920, took place amidst a wider debate on Poland's diplomatic representation abroad. Bertram's edict had provided an opening for the Government's opponents and there were demands for the Polish Minister to the Vatican, Jozef Kowalski, to be dismissed.

110. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5887 C1207/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 13 January 1920.


112. Ibid. The German Ambassador to the Vatican attempted to have Ratti recalled from Warsaw but at this point this was too much for Gaspari to grant. See also Stehlin, Weimar and the Vatican pp.124-125.

113. PRO FO 371/5887 C1207/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 13 January 1921. Also FO 371/4822 C14307/182/18 Percival to Curzon 10 December 1920. On 9 December, Le Rond had told the Commission that the French Chargé d'Affaires in Rome understood that the Vatican contemplated placing the plebiscite area under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of a special envoy coming directly from Rome. This was incorrect. Onego had been sent from Vienna and ecclesiastical jurisdiction remained with Bertram.


117. Ibid, p.126.

118. Ibid.


120. PRO FO 371/5889 V3685/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 February 1921. The question was due to be discussed at the Vatican on 25 February. Percival told the Foreign Office that 'it would be most unfortunate if the restraint should be removed just as the election campaign reaches its climax'.

Chapter 3 - Notes

122. PRO FO890/16 *Percival's Diary* p.160 12 July 1920.


124. Wozniak, *Blut, Erz, Kohle* p.330. See also Stehlin, *Weimar and the Vatican* p.121 who points out that in these communities the priests were political advisers as well as advisors on religious affairs.

125. *Ibid*, p.331. Wozniak cites the alternative slogan, 'To live and die as Catholics, to serve God, and to be able to speak both Polish and German freely, and to remain with Germany', as an example of the pro-German themes as expressed by Father Paul Nieborowski.


128. PRO F371/5887 1288/92/18 Percival to Curzon 12 January 1921. Enclosure: Circular No.2 11 December 1921. Percival asked that all British officials maintain the strictest impartiality and work 'in close harmony with our Allies'.


130. *DBFP* Vol. XI and Vol. XVI.

131. PRO FO 371/5886 C724/92/18 Percival to Curzon 5 January 1921 including the enclosure Keatinge to Percival 27 December 1920.


136. *Ibid*. The residential qualifications dates set in the other East Prussian plebiscite areas were, Olsztyn - 1 January 1905; Kwidzyn - 1 January 1914.

137. PRO FO 371/5889 C3126/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 9 February 1921. Enclosure: Pless to D'Abernon 7 February 1921. The Prince of Pless remarked on the folly of the German press in creating the outcry against outvoters voting in

Chapter 3 - Notes
Germany. See also PRO FO 371/5888 C1826/92/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 21 January, 1921 where Kilmarnock complains about the number of telegrams and messages now being received, all appealing for more time to register for the plebiscite.

138. DBFP Vol. X No.138, 139, 143 pp.158-164. See also ibid No.147 pp.176-177 Percival to Curzon 8 February, 1921. Here he estimated the number of outvoters to be only 150,000 and advanced the Italian Commissioner's reasons for simultaneous voting.

139. Ibid, No.145 p.175 Harding to Curzon 31 January 1921. Curzon minuted on this despatch, 'I was authorised on Dec. 30 by Cabinet to send 4 battalions and I think that the time has come to exercise that power.' See also PRO FO 371/5889 C2536/92/18 Carr (Paris) to Waterlow 4 February, 1921. Harding later requested that the paragraph suggesting this negotiating linkage between the outvoters and the British troops be deleted.

140. DBFP Vol. XI No.146 p.176 Curzon to Harding 7 February, 1921.

141. Ibid, No.148 pp.177-178 Cheetham also reported that: 'The French undoubtedly attach great importance to securing a small contingent of British troops for the Plebiscite, and it is possible that they may still be prepared to make concessions to gain it'.

142. Ibid, No. 149 p.179 Curzon to Cheetham 12 February 1921; and ibid No.151 pp.180-181 Harding to Curzon 17 February 1921.

143. DBFP Vol.XV No.16 pp.140-146 London Meeting of Allied Representatives 21 February 1921.

144. Ibid, p143. Le Rond asked for 6,000 troops. See also ibid p.146.

145. Ibid, p.143-145. Lloyd George said 'General Le Rond was a very able man, who held extreme pro-Polish views. He had been violently opposed, in the first instance, to the plebiscite, and his sympathies with Poland were so strong that it might be difficult for him to be impartial'. Briand defended Le Rond saying that 'he was a good officer, who had kept order in Upper Silesia in circumstances of great difficulty, and might in the near future have to face even more troubles'.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid, pp.145-146.

148. Ibid.

149. PRO FO 371/6817 N2667/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 1921. The date of the plebiscite had more or less been fixed in January. The Polish deputies
had feared that the plebiscite was to be delayed by the outvoting issue. Max Muller had arrived on 27 January 1921, to take over from Rumbold who had left Warsaw two months earlier.

150 DBFP Vol.XV No.16 p147 London Meeting of Allied Representatives 21 February 1921

Interestingly, in Warsaw the Kurjer Poranny 17 February 1921, claimed that the Germans were preparing to promise to pay all desired indemnities if they could be assured of the possession of Upper Silesia. The paper feared that this might tempt Lloyd George - see PRO FO 371/6817 N2557/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon, 17 February 1921. See also ibid No. 156 p.184 Percival to Curzon 23 February, 1921. Percival notes that the decision 'has given considerable satisfaction in German circles' and that the following day, Prince Czartoryski (one of the Polish Consuls in Opole), predicted that the 'Polish element' would try to stop the plebiscite.

152. Ibid, No.157 p.184 Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 1921.

153. PRO FO 371/6817 N2024/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 10 February 1921. The previous week had been set aside in Poland as 'Upper Silesia' week, with the object of collecting funds for the plebiscite. A committee under Count Adam Zamoyski had formed to collect 120,000,000 Polish marks (circa £40,000). Commercial establishments handed over portions of the week's profits, there were collections at work and in restaurants, flags were being sold and large private subscriptions had been made. Even the Jewish press were behind the campaign, urging all Jewish citizens to co-operate with the Polish plebiscite work. See also FO 688/10/50 No.140 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 2 March 1921. Max Muller describes the activities of the press and voluntary organisations and the efforts being made to stop anti-British feeling from being stirred up in Poland.

154. PRO FO371/6817 N2567/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 1921.
155. PRO FO371/5890 C4375/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 28 February 1921.
156. PRO FO371/5890 N3380/191/55 Loraine to Curzon 25 November 1920.
157. PRO FO371/5887 C1604/92/18 Loraine to Curzon 24 January 1921. If successful, the Polish Government had pledged to create an Allied-controlled coal monopoly paying a percentage of the profits into the Allied reparation fund - see also DBFP Vol.XI No.133 pp.153-154.


159 Ibid, minute by Curzon: 'Indeed, we are arranging the next meeting of the Supreme Council in Paris for Jan. 19 - expressly so as to miss meeting the Marshal who is to leave Paris the preceding day'. However, Pilsudski's visit to Paris was held-over until early February.

Chapter 3 - Notes
160. The *Times* 18 February 1921.

161. *DBFP* Vol. XI No. 691 pp. 719-722 Curzon to Max Muller 16 February 1921. Curzon's report on his meeting with Sapieha who was in London from February 14 to 17 after accompanying Pilsudski on his state visit to Paris 3-4 February. See also *ibid* No. 692 pp. 723-730 Memorandum by Mr Gregory Regarding Prince Sapieha's Visit 18 February 1921.

162. *Ibid*, No. 154 p. 183 Tufton's Record of a Conversation with the Polish Chargé d'Affaires 22 February 1920. Minutes by Crowe and Curzon confirm that Upper Silesia was barely mentioned during Sapieha's visit.

163. PRO FO 688/10/50 No. 125 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 25 February 1921. Summarises article in the Kurjer Poranny 24 February 1921.

164. *Ibid*. No. 124 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 24 February 1921. See also the draft Enclosure: This is a copy of the protest to Polish Government regarding attack by the Government-sponsored 'Polish Bulletin' of 24 February, 1921.

165. PRO FO 371/5890 C3293/92/18 Creedy to Foreign Office 15 February 1921.

166. PRO FO 371/4823 C14782/1621/18 Creedy to Foreign Office 27 December 1920. 'In view of military commitments elsewhere', he rejects the French request for British troops. See Jeffery *The Military Correspondence* pp. 209-210 Wilson to Foch 27 December 1920. 'Last night I received, through the Foreign Office, a letter from Le Rond asking for the help of British troops in Silesia. I had to refuse - a thing I hate doing when the French ask for help - because I really have no troops to spare'. However, see also HLRO Bonar Law Papers, Box 90/Fld.2/Cab.80 (20) Cabinet Conclusion 30 December 1920: Wilson 'depreciated the despatch of British troops from the Rhine to the Silesian plebiscitary area...but admitted that it could be done as an extreme measure'. After this statement the Cabinet agreed to make the troops available 'as a last resort'.

167. PRO FO 371/5890 C3293/92/18 War Office to Foreign Office 15 February 1921. Minutes by Wigram, Waterlow and Curzon. Wigram's minute about the nature on which the offer is to be made, is quite explicit; 'The offer to send troops is being used as part of a bargain with the French by which we hope to induce them to accept Col. Percival's latest proposal with regard to out-voters, which we consider necessary to avoid riots'. See *ibid* C3417/92/18 Memorandum by Waterlow 15 February 1921. Also draft of a letter by Tufton to Army Council 17 February 1921.


Chapter 3 - Notes
169. Callwell, *Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson* Vol.II pp.278-279. The CIGS, who was worried about the Irish situation which was approaching a critical juncture, again objected to sending the British troops 'but the Prime Minister paid no heed to the Field Marshal's remonstrance's on the subject'.

170. HLRO Bonar Law papers Box90/Fld.2/Cab.80 (20) Cabinet Conclusion 30 December 1920. The Cabinet agreed that; 'While this force would come under the control of the President of the Plebiscite Commission, arrangements should be made so that the local command in the area where it was employed should be entrusted to a British officer'.

171. APWO 46/73 pp.12-13 Military Director to Commander Forces Upper Silesia 28 February 1921. This identified the four Rhine Army battalions and detailed where each would be stationed.

172. Black Watch Museum [BWM], Balhousie Castle, Perth, 05.355.486 (411)42 The Red Hackle: The Black Watch Quarterly Vol.1 No.2 July 1921 p.16


174. APWO 46/73 pp.8-9 Military Director to Commander Forces Upper Silesia 25 February 1921. See also BWM, Black Watch Archive [B.W. Arch.] 0069 Historical Record, 2nd Battalion Black Watch 1909-1939.

175. PRO FO 371/5890 C3792/92/18 Percival to Rhine Army 22 February 1921. This also provides logistical information regarding catering facilities, and warns about the very limited possibility of local procurement.

176. Ibid, C4083/92/18 Percival to Rhine Army 24 February 1921. Recommends 'that a Staff officer of field rank be attached to the Staff of French Commander in Chief, General Jules Gratier'. Major A.D.C. Krook, 2nd Battalion Black Watch, was appointed to act as Liaison Officer with the Commission - see BWM B.W. Arch. 0069 Historical Record 2nd Battalion March 1921.

177. Edmonds, *The Occupation* p.220. The main body was under the command of Colonel C.J. Steavenson.

178. BWM 05.355.486.(411042 The Red Hackle Vol.1, No.2 July 1921 p.6). Article by Sergeant Erskine, *The Second Battalion in Silesia*. This, and also the Regimental Record, records that the three day journey was comfortable and greatly assisted by having two cooking vans on the train. The men's behaviour was excellent.

179. APWO 46/73 pp.114-115 Wauchope to General Gratier 11 March, 1921. Answering why he had located his headquarters in a Schloss outside the town, Wauchope explained to Gratier that there were no suitable houses in Lubliniec because some 45 officers were already billeted there. There is an account of the British H.Q. and the troop's activities in C.C. Repington's *After the War* (London 1928) pp.93-94. After a promising Army career curtailed by social scandal, during the war he was a renowned, if sometimes controversial, journalist.

181. John Connell, Wavell, Scholar and Soldier (London 1964) pp.77-81. This occurred in 1913 when as a young staff officer, Wavell was returning home after observing (by invitation) Russian military manoeuvres. The Tsar's Secret Service took him off the Moscow-Berlin express at Warsaw and marched him to the Citadel where he was kept under close arrest and interrogated. He was Viceroy of India 1943-1947.

182. APWO 46/73 pp.131-132 Wauchope to Gratier 17 March 1921. Wauchope requested a copy of the Scheme for General Defence should serious disturbances arise. When it arrived, he raised several points of concern, especially over the reserves that would be available and the difficulty that he would have maintaining communications with Opole, all problems experienced by the French and Italian troops and the officials when the third Polish insurrection broke out in May - see APWO 46/73 p.150 Wauchope to Gratier 30 March 1921.

183. PRO FO 371/5890 C4128/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 25 February 1921.


185. PRO FO 371/5889 C3758/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 February 1921.

186. PRO FO 371/5890 C4128/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 25 February 1921. See also ibid C4409/92/18 Percival to Curzon 1 March 1921 in which Percival agrees with Max Muller's view (DBFP Vol.XI No.160 p.188) that the Poles had welcomed 20 March as the date for the plebiscite.

187. Ibid, C4367/92/18 Percival to Curzon 23 February 1921. The table based on an enclosure giving lists of numbers provisionally registered for the plebiscite by February 1921.

188. Ibid.

189. Link (ed.) Deliberations of the Council Vol. 2 p.392 and p.422 The area added on consisted of one town, 48 communes and 1 Gutsbezirk. The part of Namyslow (Namslau) added to Kluczbork, consisted of 13 communes and 3 Gutsbezirke - taken from the Official Breakdown of the Plebiscite Results PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921. See Chapter One of this thesis.

190. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921. A list of results is also given in the Encyklopaedia Powstania Śląskich (Opole 1982) Aneks 1, pp.677-705. Also Oficjalne Wyniki Plebiscytu Gornosłaskiego from the Gazeta Urzedowa Gornego Slasko Nr 21 z 7 V 1921, Opole.

191. PRO FO 371/8810 17 May 1923 p.52. Bourdillon notes that with six exceptions, in the whole district of Glubczyce (which was to be attributed to Czechoslovakia if
it voted Polish), there was no Polish representation on any of the commune election committees. The Poles made similar allegations about the number of outvoters in other rural areas - see PRO FO 371/5903 C10520/92/18 21 May 1921.

192. Wambaugh, *Plebiscite Since* pp.244-247. This contains a summary of the regulating structure and voting registration procedures. German outvoters in Poland were to apply to the office in Poznań, the Poles in Germany to a similar office in Berlin. But Wambaugh records that the Poles claimed that they were not permitted to build a plebiscite organisation in Germany and that if they had been, no Pole would have dared to travel on a ticket issued by it.

193. PRO FO 371/5891 C5451/92/18 Bourdillon to Waterlow 9 March 1921.


196. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921. See also *Encyklopedia Powstania Śląskich, Aneks* 1, pp.677-705. A German report commissioned by the Economics Department also includes Toszecko-Gliwicki in the industrial area - see PRO FO 371/5899 C9825/92/18 Geisenheimar to Major Clarke 2 May 1921.

197. For example, Bogucice, in Katowice, had 12,389 registered plebiscite voters. Świętochłowice, in Bytom, had 12,934, and the commune of Zabrze had 37,099.

198. PRO FO 371/5891 C5451/92/18 Bourdillon to Waterlow 9 March 1921. In the letter, Bourdillon also accurately describes the problems that dividing the industrial area would pose for the Commissioners, the Supreme Council and, finally, the League of Nations.

199. PRO FO 688/10/50 88.50.108 (Draft) Max Muller to Lindsay 17 March 1921.

200. *Ibid.* See also PRO FO 371/5893 C 59/92/18 Max Muller to Lindsay 17 March 1921.


202. *Ibid.* pp.223. Money was spent on everything imaginable. For example, dozens of small newspapers were purchased and subsidised; properties, including several hotels in the industrial area, were purchased to prevent Poles obtaining them. Grants were given to German trade unions and in Gliwice, a German bank was purchased to save it from closing. Directors of various plebiscite support groups paid themselves huge salaries. Several hundred vehicles were purchased and corruption allegations were levelled at several administrators for years afterwards. In 1921 local currency would equal around about 10 marks to £1 sterling. Today £100,000,000 in 1921 money would equal around £1.5 billion. At today's values, they spent roughly £750 per head of population. At the same time one has to remember that winning was worth billions of pounds.
203. Ibid, p.216.

204 Ibid, p.217.

205. DBFP Vol.XV No.27 pp.216-224 Meeting of the Allied Representatives and German Delegates, London 1 March 1921. The German counter-proposals included their retaining Upper Silesia.

206. Ibid, pp.34-35 Ruhort, Duisburg, and Dusseldorf were occupied. This occurred just after the Silesian force had departed for Cologne, leaving the Rhine Army already depleted - for details see Edmonds The Occupation of the Rhineland pp.221-222. See also Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany p.216. The Allies had threatened to impose sanctions should their proposals prove unacceptable to the German Government. This had been leaked to the German press with the predictable result that, even before the meeting in London on 1 March, German public opinion had been inflamed by the Allies continuing to dictate terms.

207. Ibid.

208. DBFP Vol. XI, No.168 pp.194-195 Hardinge to Curzon 16 March 1921, who reports that two German notes, protesting at the intimidation and ill-treatment of German voters, had been handed into the Conference of Ambassadors for action. See also PRO FO 371/5891 C5667/92/18 German Chargé d'Affaires to Curzon 15 March 1921. Copy of document submitted to Commission in Opole on 13 March. Although there were several claims here about murders, shootings and so forth, the examples which predominate are of the 'rough handling' of pro-German sympathisers which, the German Government claimed was aimed at terrorising the great majority of the people who had not made up their minds. Several similar submissions on ouvoter intimidation and general lawlessness just prior to the vote, can be found in this file - see also ibid C5661/92/18 15 March, C5810/92/18 17 March, C5896/92/18 18 March, and C5894/92/18 18 March, 1921.


211. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5891 C5365/92/18 Mr. E. J. Lassen to Lloyd George 8 March 1921 and Tooley (National Identity and Weimar Germany pp.230-231) who discusses German Government's military preparation to contain another Polish insurrection.

212. PRO FO 371/5891 C5877/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 March 1921. The Polish Prime Minister, made a declaration in the Sejm on 11 March stating 'that the Government had issued strict injunctions [sic] that voting should take place in an orderly manner ... and the government were convinced that the Interallied
Commission would spare no efforts to assure to the population the right to express freely their wishes. See *ibid* C5296/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 9 March 1921. Enclosure: Copy of note from Max Muller to Prince Sapieha on measures being taken to ally Polish fears that the outvoters will be armed and use violence. And *DFBP* Vol.XI No.161 pp.188-190 Percival to Curzon 2 March 1921.


214 *Ibid,* pp248-249: 'Spurred on by propaganda, wonderfully organised throughout Germany, more than 150,000 outvoters came from all parts of the Reich and from abroad. Infirm and aged, crippled and ill, even women approaching confinement, made the journey to preserve Upper Silesia for the Fatherland. Many had not been there for decades'.

215. Tooley, *National Identity* pp.234-236. This provides an account of a typical outvoter's involvement from first noticing a *Schutzbund* advertisement, through to casting his or her vote in the commune of their birth in Upper Silesia.

216. PRO FO371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April,1921 and the Encyklopedia Powstań Śląskich, Aneks I pp.677-705.

Note: The figures given here and in the following tables vary slightly from some previous works which relied on the original manual calculations. These original results have been re-totalled using computer technology. This has revealed small discrepancies in several manually calculated sub-totals. However, they were still insignificant and do nothing to affect any aspect of the plebiscite's outcome.

217. Rose, *Drama of Upper Silesia* pp.181-182. Rose gives Poland 10,000 outvoters and Germany 180,000. Cienciala and Komarnicki *From Versailles to Locarno* p.56 quote Rose. The figure of 180,000 German outvoters is accepted by the Foreign Office. Curzon quotes it on in his minute to a provisional list of results - see PRO FO 371/5891 C5924/92/18 Percival to Curzon 21 March 1921. In Memorandum on the Result of the Upper Silesian Plebiscite (HLRO F/201/1/12 Lloyd George Papers 6 April 1921) E.H. Carr also puts the number of outvoters at 180,000 but points out that it was possible 20,000 voted for Poland. But Carr had no way of knowing this. Indeed, very few local Polish-supporting outvoters would have existed. In the late 19th century, the regional political and socio-economic forces would have deterred movement from Upper Silesia into pre-war Russian Poland and (to a lesser extent) Češska. A copy of this memorandum can also be found in PRO FO 371/5893 C7414/92/18 Carr to Waterlow 8 April 1921.

218. PRO FO890/16 Report by Department of Communications, Inter-Allied Commission, Upper Silesia signed by Mr. W. Cruikshank, Director, 24 June 1922. See also PRO FO 371/5892 C6488/92/18 Clarke to Curzon 24 March 1921. In Prag the *Deutsch-Böhmnen* also had an organisation that sent outvoters to Upper Silesia. The British minister noted the Czechs also wanted the Poles to lose.


221. Total plebiscite vote (97.5% turnout) 1,190,518
Less immigrant and residents registered to vote 1,028,928
Therefore minimum outvoters 160,879

Total Outvoters = 160,879 plus the Registered Resident & Immigrant Voters living in Upper Silesia who failed to cast their ballots.

Residents and immigrants registered to vote 1,028,928
Less 97.5% of residents and immigrants registered to vote 1,003,204
Therefore residents and immigrants failing to vote 25,724

Plus minimum total outvoters 160,879

Therefore Total Number of Outvoters 186,603
(97.6% of registered outvoters)

222. PRO FO 371/6817 N3875/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 23 March 1921.

223. *DBFP* Vol. XI No.169 p.195 Kilmarnock to Curzon 20 March 1921. Kilmarnock suggested that the German motive was to be able to allege that, despite having been giving adequate warnings, the Allies had failed to put adequate security in place to ensure a free plebiscite.


225. *Daily Telegraph* Monday April 4 1921. Colonel Repington wrote that, 'Polling day was like Sunday in the English countryside'.

226. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April, 1921 and the *Encyklopedia Powstań Śląskich Aneks I* pp.677-705.

227. Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since* Vol. I pp.249-250. These are the figures generally quoted. She wrote that; 'From calculations based on this report [Inter-Allied Report by Commissioners 24 April, 1921] it appeared that out of the 1,522 communes and Gutsbezirke, 844, or 54%, had voted for Germany and 678, or 42.5%, for Poland, seventy three were doubtful, the votes of Gutsbezirke having been inadvertently placed with communes of the same name. Of the 1,220,514 registered voters, 1,190,846 had voted. Of these 707,605, or 59.6% had voted for Germany, and 479,359, or 40.3% for Poland. Void ballots numbered 3,882'. These figures were furnished to Wambaugh as final by the Secretariat General of the Conference of Ambassadors. The recalculated figures used in this thesis are scarcely different.

228. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April, 1921 and *Encyklopedia Powstań Śląskich Aneks I*, pp.677-705.

229. PRO FO 371/5981 C5892/92/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 21 March 1921. The results had been greeted as a great victory. Upper Silesia has been regarded as a single voting unit and that flags were to be displayed on the Reichstag and other public buildings.
230. PRO FO 371/5892 C6303/18 Cabinet 14 (21): Extract from draft conclusions of Cabinet meeting, Downing Street, Tuesday 22 March 1921. After some self-congratulatory remarks about the plebiscite result having 'constituted a complete vindication of the British attitude at the Peace Conference' where the 'British Delegation had, with some difficulty, succeeded in getting it accepted by the Peace Conference,' the Cabinet agreed: 'That the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should notify to the British Representative on the Plebiscite Commission, as well as the British representative at the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris, the general view of the Cabinet, namely that the existence in isolated areas of a Polish or a German majority did not justify breaking up the unity of Upper Silesia, and attempts to do so should be resisted.' See telegraph DBFP Vol.XVI No.1 p.1 Curzon to Percival 22 March 1921.

231. PRO FO 371/5892 C6902/92/18 29 March 1921. Minute by Sir Eyre Crowe.

232. The importance of Upper Silesia's enormous coal reserves was recognised - see Colonel Repington's report for the Daily Telegraph, Tuesday 5 April, 1921.

233. Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since Vol.I p.165. Extract from Part III of the Treaty of Peace,...signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919. Article 88 Annex: 'The result of the vote will be decided by communes according to the majority of votes in each commune'. Clause 5 to the Annex continues: 'On the conclusion of voting, the number of votes cast in each commune will be communicated by the Commission to the Principle Allied and Associated powers, with a full report as to the taking of the vote and a recommendation as to the line which the frontier of Germany and Upper Silesia. In this recommendation regard will be paid to the wishes of the inhabitants as shown by the vote, and to the geographical and economic conditions of the locality'.

234. The additional area added to Głubczyc (Leobschutz) after Crowe's intervention yielded Germany around 31,000 votes but only 104 for Poland. The part of Namysłów (Namslau) added to Kluczbork gave Germany 5,360 votes but only 127 to Poland.

235. Historical myths are often far more important than historical fact. This statement is, therefore qualified by the recognition of the mistaken importance Western historiography has placed on the large German numerical majority.

236. PRO FO 371/5899 C9825/92/18 Inter-Allied Commission Upper Silesia Economics Department report prepared for Major Clarke Statistical Table Showing Number of Workmen Employed in Industrial District of Upper Silesia but Domiciled Outside It by Dr. Gesenheimer, Katowice, 2nd May 1921. This was prepared to balance the Polish point that persons resident in the communes in and around the industrial district who had voted for Poland, supplied the industrial town's labour. The report claimed that 19-20,000 German workers commuted into the industrial area daily from Opole, Kluczbork, and areas west of the Oder. However, it failed to mention the Grenzläufer (workers crossing the frontier from Poland each day). This report was brought to London by Clarke when he arrived with the Commission's recommendations in early May 1921.

Chapter 3 - Notes
237. PRO FO 371/5891 C5451/92/18 Bourdillon to Waterlow 9 March 1921.

238. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April 1921 and the Encyklopaedia Powstań Śląskich Anex 1, pp.677-705.

239. PRO FO 371/5891 C5924/92/18 23 March 1920. Minute by S.P. Waterlow. Comments by Crowe same date.

240. Ibid, minute by Curzon 23 March 1921, referring to telegram he sent to Percival with the Cabinet's instruction not to award Poland any territory.

241. British Library Manuscripts [BLM] 48953 D'Abernon Papers. Private and Confidential Diary, 22 March 1921. D'Abernon was really Lloyd George's man in Berlin, having been specially selected by him for the Ambassador's post there. See also BLM 62966 (1921) Riddell Diaries, 15 February 1921. Lloyd George's press advisor had noted that 'LG. is over burdened, and the sooner the administration of foreign affairs reverts to the Foreign Office the better. For the past two years the work has been done by Lloyd George, Philip Kerr, Hankey and his staff'. He noted that the technical work was being done by Curzon and his staff; but nevertheless '...Hankey and his staff have in great measure superseded the F.O'.

242. PRO FO 371/5892 C6329/92/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 22 March 1921.

243. Wambaugh Plebiscites Since Vol.I p.252. Colonel Repington did not go along with this. In his Daily Telegraph reports on 4, 5, 6 April 1921 editions, he gave a very clear picture of the situation, carefully noting that the issue was not to be decided by majority vote - the Peace Treaty having prepared the way for partition. Repington was a thorn in Lloyd George's side during the last years of the War and after it.

244 For example Carr, A History of Germany 1815-1985 p.260. This is but one of many examples of this tendency amongst Anglo-Saxon historians to view the plebiscite area as a single constituency.

245. PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/18 24 April, 1921 and the Encyklopedia Powstań Śląskich, Aneks 1, pp.677-705.

246. Ibid.

247. DBFP Vol.XVI No.2 p.2 Max Muller to Curzon 23 March 1921.

248. PRO FO 371/5892 C6226/92/18 Percival to Curzon 27 March 1921. The British Commissioner complained about the Polish press claiming Lubliniec, Strzelce, Gliwice and Toszecko-Gliwicki, Bytom, Katowice, Pszczyna, Kroleweska Huta, Zabrze, Tarnowski Gory and the Rybnik districts, should be handed over to Poland because in this territory Poland had 52% of the votes. But this was precisely what he and Marinis were doing by splitting off Pszczyna and Rybnik, which bordered
with Poland and the industrial district, and counting the remainder as having a German majority.


251. Cienciala and Kormarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p.56. See also PRO FO 371/5903 C10520/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 21 May 1921. Enclosure: Polish Delegation Paris Note (70 Pages in French) on *Polish Views on Plebiscite in Upper Silesia* p.3, allows 19,000 Polish outvoters Poland but notes the real figure was undoubtedly lower. And Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany* p.236, assumes 'like all Poles and most Germans, that all the outvoters voted for Germany'.

252. This assumes 180,000 outvoters voting for Germany.

253. *DBFP Vol. XVI Pt.I No.7* p.5. Max Muller to Curzon 30 March 1921. The nominal German outvoter figure quoted here is 180,000, or 25.5% of the 707,377 total number of German votes.


256. *Indissolubility of the Economic Bonds Between Upper Silesian Industries and Poland:* Published by the Central Plebiscite Committee (Warsaw 1921). See also *Problem of Upper Silesia and the Reconstruction of Europe's Economics:* Published by Breslau Chamber of Commerce (Breslau 1921), and the file PRO FO 371/5895 C7462/92/178 11 April 1921 also contains several books published in English outlining the Polish case.


260. PRO FO 371/5903 C10520/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 21 May 1921. Enclosure: *Polish Views on Plebiscite in Upper Silesia* p.8, 'The Polish population had against it the German administrative and judicial system and was, in addition, subjected to strong economic pressure exerted by the German businessmen and landed proprietors, who held in their hands numerous Polish voters. For its part the clergy, composed to a great extent of Germans, was often the most active helper of Germanic propaganda and even carried it out from the height of the pulpit'.

Chapter 3 - Notes
work also carries allegations about abuses, confirmed by this thesis, in registering outvoters in areas of Upper Silesia dominated by German-supporters.


262. Ibid. See BWM B.W. Arch. 0069 Historical Record, 2nd Bn. the Black Watch, 1909-1939, 22 March 1921. Received orders about 22.00 hrs for two companies to proceed to Bytom, there having been disturbances in that town. Left Lubliniec about 23.00 hrs by motor lorry, and arrived about 03.00 hrs. See also ibid 05.355.486(411) 42 The Red Hackle Vol.1 No.2, July 1921 p.7. 'Two companies proceeded to the much larger and livelier town of Bytom, were rioting between Poles and Germans had taken place. Their duty consisted chiefly of raiding the houses of agitators and propagandists, and in the confiscation of arms. A little bubble of excitement always existed in Bytom. A few bombs were thrown at a lorry containing some of the Regiment, but the marksmanship of the throwers was exceedingly poor'. They were escorting seven Poles who had been arrested by the police, back to Bytom when five grenades were thrown at them wounding three civilians including a boy ten years of age - see PRO FO 371/5894 C7440/92/18 8 April 1921, Enclosure: Private letter from an unnamed British officer (probably Lieutenant Barry) serving with the Plebiscite Police Force. The worst outbreak of this new round of disturbances is recorded in PRO FO371/5892 C6971/92/18 Enclosure: Report On Incident In Karf During The Night 22/23 March [1921] by Captain Fenton.


264. PRO FO371/5892 C6971/92/18 Percival to Curzon 30 March 1921. Also Enclosure 1: Extract from Colonel Hawker's Report, lists examples incidents 22 March 1921; Enclosure 2: Report and listing examples of incidents 22 March 1921; Enclosure 3: Extract from Colonel Tidbury's Report on visit to Nikolow 25 March 1921 where Polish Deputation has demanded that members of the German Plebiscite Commissariat leave the town.

265. DBFP Vol. XVI Pt. 1 No.6 p.4-5 Percival to Curzon 30 March 1921.

266. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5892 C6971/92/18 Percival to Curzon 30 March 1921.

267. PRO FO 371/5892 C6944/92/18 (Copy) War Office to GOC in C Rhine Army, 5 April 1921. Owing to the possibility of a 'Triple Alliance' strike, the Rhine Army was ordered to send four infantry battalions to England as soon as units in Upper Silesia could be withdrawn; DBFP Vol. XVI No.11 pp12/13 Curzon to Hardinge 4 April 1921. Hardinge is told that British troops might once again be placed at the Commission's disposal after the strike is over.

268. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Vol.2 p.283-284. Wilson actually wanted a complete withdrawal of infantry (seven battalions if the Silesian force was included) from the Rhine. Lloyd George protested that there was a great danger in Upper Silesia. Wilson told him that they 'might get mixed up in some rotten internal rows, and then it would be difficult to get them away'. He may have
been mindful of what could happen however. He had just received a copy of the latest Silesian intelligence report which stated 'that Germans, in order to create bad feeling are spreading lies regarding massacres of British troops by Poles' - see PRO FO 371/5892 C6909/92/18 (Copy) GHQ Rhine Army to War Office, 30 March 1921. To set the problem of the shortage of the British military forces in its wider context, see Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire p.28-30.

269. Jeffery and Hennessy, States of Emergency pp58/65. The authors' discuss the wider political aspects of the threatened strike, governmental response to the course of the dispute, its aftermath and the consequences.

270. PRO FO371/5892 C692/92/18 Percival to Curzon 24 March 1921 enclosing Korfanty's Message to the Polish Voters 23 March 1921. 'On Palm Sunday, the Polish population of Upper Silesia won a complete victory, in spite of German terrorism, of the misuse of the administrative machinery in German hands, and of the sea of German emigrants, of whom as many as 200,000 came to Upper Silesia to vote for Germany: in spite of the falsification and the deceptions which sprang from nothing: in spite of the hundreds of millions of marks which were thrown into Upper Silesia to buy votes - in spite of all these disadvantages, the inhabitants of the Eastern districts of Upper Silesia, and, in particular, of the industrial area, and the districts laying North, West, and South of it have voted for Poland'.

271. DBFP Vol.XVI Pt. I No.5 p.4, Percival to Curzon 29 March 1921.

272. PRO FO 371/5893 C7412/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 2 April 1921.

273. DBFP Vol.XVI Pt.I No.7 pp.5-7 Max Muller to Curzon 30 March 1921.

274. PRO FO 371/5892 C6796/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 30 March 1921. File index minute by L.E. Ottley dated 5 April 1921. Most of the innumerable reports by Ottley during his short period in the Foreign Office testify to his conviction that the Upper Silesians were unique, but if they had to be part of a larger state then it should not be Poland - anything else seemed preferable to him. Apart from compiling his own minutes and memoranda, he had the views and reports of like-minded Commission members, such as Major Clarke, circulated through the Department. He maintained regular contact with members of the German Embassy in London who supplied him with statistics and materials, such as maps of the area.

275. DBFP Vol. XVI No.5 p.4 Percival to Curzon 29 March 1920. Hatzfeldt warned Percival of the danger of civil war in Upper Silesia leading to war between Germany and Poland and suggested keeping Allied troops in Upper Silesia even after the hand-over of territory. This, of course, was before the British units' recall. PRO FO 371/5892 C6226/92/18 File Index and Minutes by R. Wigram, 28 March 1921, provides an excellent summary of the Polish and the German arguments so far and his anticipation of the ones that would soon be made for the industrial area.

276. PRO FO 371/5892 C6509/92/18 Foreign Office to Percival 3 April 1921. Despite the many papers and reports in the PRO files that were submitted later and the number of foreign representations made after that date, it is interesting how quickly the British and the Italian Commissioners' minds had been made up for them.

Chapter 3 - Notes

278. PRO FO 371/5893 C7892/92/18 Curzon to Percival 15 April 1921. Cypher telegram, no distribution, (Copy): 'You have no doubt realised that, even if Germany does come forward with fresh reparation proposals, the approach of May 1st renders it necessary under the Treaty reconsideration by Allied Governments of the whole reparation question at an early date. In these circumstances it would be of advantage that we should be in possession of considered views of the Plebiscite Commission as to future of Upper Silesia at earliest possible moment. I trust that you will therefore do all in your power to expedite report of commission'. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.24 p.46 Curzon to Percival 25 April 1921.

279. Ibid. Apart from opposing handing over the industrial area to Poland, the Foreign Office thought if they had to, then making Poland pay reparations would be 'of little practical use and is an undesirable bargain'. See also ibid No.22 p.44-45, Percival to Curzon 23 April 1921.

280. Ibid. No.26 pp.47-48 Le Rond to Lloyd George 30 April 1921 Recommendation of the Commission on the Polish German-German Frontier through Upper Silesia. There is an English translation of this report in PRO FO 371/5897 C9210/92/18 30 April 1921.

281. Ibid.

282. Ibid.


284. PRO FO 371/5897 C9210/92/18 Le Rond to Lloyd George 30 April 1921.

285. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5896 C6494/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 17 March 1921.

286. PRO FO 371/5892/92/18 File Index Minute by R. Wigram 28 March 1921. He refers to submission to Foreign Office on 26 March by German Ambassador to London of German reasons for awarding the industrial area to Germany.


Chapter 3 - Notes
288. PRO FO371/5897 C9210/92/18 Le Rond to Lloyd George 30 April 1921. See also Lesniewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-1921', Stachura (ed.) *Poland Between the Wars* p.33.

289. Ibid.

290. Repington, *After the War* pp.92-93.

Chapter 4

Political and Military Responses

To The

Third Insurrection

After witnessing the reaction to the plebiscite results in Berlin, London and Rome, the Polish Silesians decided that they had to demonstrate their determination to reject the re-imposition of German rule. Even Korfanty, who had always opposed the use of force, supported this. Plans for another insurrection, this time instigated by them, were drawn up. Some elements within the Polish Government tacitly approved the action; Poland’s political leaders did not. Nevertheless, within one month the Polish Military Organisation (POW) had all the necessary logistic support in place. The decision to go ahead with the insurrection was taken only after the Polish Commissariat had learned the outline of the Commissioners’ different recommendations to the Supreme Council. The insurrection brought the Upper Silesian question to a head. From being pawns in a political device to ensure a German signature on the Peace Treaty, the Polish Upper Silesians were now challenging the Allies’ right to dispose of them as they saw fit.

The chapter describes the course of this, the third and final insurrection. This was the most serious of the three insurrections occurring in Upper Silesia between 1919 and 1921, not least because of the serious differences that had been developing between the Entente partners regarding their future relations with Germany. Unlike the previous two insurrections which had been exercises in self-defence, this third insurrection was a direct challenge to the Commission’s authority. How the Commission responded to this
challenge is examined and the experiences and reactions of some of the Commission’s British officials during this period are recorded. The British Government’s response to the changed situation and the overall effect of these developments on the European political situation, are analysed. The chapter also details the political and military responses by Berlin and Warsaw and examines the background to the return of British troops to Upper Silesia. Their significant contribution towards stabilising the region, also the role of Sir Harold Stuart, the new British Commissioner, in facilitating and executing the political and military initiatives leading to the successful resolution of the crisis, are also examined.

When the Commissioners’ divergent recommendations on the lines of partition were leaked to him, Korfanty published them in a special 1 May edition of the German-language Oberschlesische Grenzzeitung. Entitled The Diplomats have Spoken, this article alleged that only the Rybnik, Pszczyna and a small unimportant part of the Katowice districts had been assigned to Poland. The Commission issued a denial. The following day, the refusal of the German proprietors of a Gliwice mine to grant the Commission’s request to re-employ 200 dismissed miners became the pretext for a general strike. It was supported by almost every coal miner and by some of the iron and zinc miners. The Commissioners decided to introduce martial law, but later that same evening (2/3 May), trained, and well-armed bands of Polish Silesians began crossing the Polish frontier to join forces with the local POW units which had risen in villages in the coal fields and in the industrial area. No uniformed Polish troops were committed although volunteers had been given leave to participate. They helped add a degree of competence to the insurgent forces and they advanced quickly, bypassing any obstructions, leaving them to be dealt with
10a. Sir Harold Stuart (by Heather Soutar)
THE GODMOTHERS AND THE ENFANT TERRIBLE.

French: "CHARMING CHILD! SUCH HIGH SPIRITS!"

British: "WELL, I THINK HE'D BE THE BETTER FOR A LITTLE COOLING MEDICINE."

11. The Godmothers and the Enfant Terrible
(Punch, 25 May 1921)

Chapter 4
later. All efforts were directed at occupying as much territory as possible. Within hours they controlled the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts as well as Bytom and several other towns in the industrial area. Roadblocks were established around the larger towns, and the rail bridges connecting eastern Upper Silesia with Czechoslovakia and Germany were systematically demolished. By mid-day on 3 May (Polish National Day), around 60,000 Polish irregulars were advancing out from the industrial area towards the solidly German voting areas to the north and to the west of the Oder.3

The Commission’s military response was to avoid confrontation. They did this by withdrawing their forces from the rural areas and concentrating them in the towns. This was where most of the German population lived and the decision probably prevented wholesale slaughter.4 The Commission was in complete agreement about the insurrection having to be suppressed. It was aided in reaching this decision by Le Rond’s absence in Paris – something which convinced Percival that Le Rond had known that the insurrection had been about to occur. His deputy, Ponset, backed up by instructions from Paris, took a firm line. A French tank drove the insurgents from Katowice while troops cleared Mysłowice and Tarnowski Gory.5 Twenty-five Italians were reported killed and 34 wounded in fighting at Rybnik. At Strzelce the British District Controller, Colonel Bond, had French artillery attack the insurgents in the surrounding woods and captured some of them.6

But this was a very different situation from the August 1920 insurrection. This time the Polish insurgents were highly organised and most (though not all) of their movements were characterised with the stamp of military efficiency. There were far fewer French and Italian troops in Upper Silesia now, and the plebiscite police force (whose predecessor, the

Chapter 4
Sicherheitspolzei, had offered the most resistance in 1920) had been reduced to less than half its normal strength. This was because, in the occupied areas, the Polish members of this mixed militia had disarmed their German colleagues and then deserted en masse to the Polish side. Conversely, in unoccupied areas such as Kluczbork, German members of the plebiscite police disarmed their Polish colleagues and sent them down to Lower Silesia as prisoners. Fully alive to the gravity of the international crisis the insurrection had created, the Polish Government distanced itself from the conflict. It dismissed Korfanty from his post as Plebiscite Commissar, banned the recruitment of volunteers in Poland, and ordered the closure of the frontier. Korfanty stopped proclaiming the spontaneous nature of the uprising and instead confirmed that he had taken charge of it 'to prevent anarchy occurring'.

Behind Korfanty's announcement was a fear that his political control over events was slipping away. The Naradowa Demokracja element in Upper Silesia's political leadership well understood that the Polish movement was also an outlet for the region's social and industrial tensions. This support was not Bolshevik, but Korfanty had always been nervous about an extreme socialist movement of some sorts developing out of an insurrection. Within a few days the insurgents' militarists had seized the strategically important Góra Św. Anny (Annaberg) and their para-military units were attempting to cross the Oder and enter what the plebiscite vote had revealed was solidly German territory. However, as much to circumscribe the insurgents' own military action as to stake Poland's claim to it, Korfanty limited the territory to be occupied to that which could only be interpreted as Polish – see Map 4 (p.262). This western boundary, or what would become known as 'the Korfanty line', followed the Oder to just south of Opole, veered
12. Orgesch Organizer: "Listen you German people, help break the backs of the French by beating the Poles on the Oder and Vistula."

13. German: "Are you not afraid of me you Silesian Bandit?"
Silesian: "Now wait! Your friend Lloyd George may come soon but he won't be any help."

14. Polish Silesian losing patience: "Enough of this useless plebiscite and international lies and cheating. I may live or die but I'll show these Germans who has a right to this land."
north-east past Dobrodzien and joined the Polish frontier north of Olenso. The plan was to occupy and administer the land to the east until the emergency had ended. Meanwhile, over the next two weeks, thousands of German volunteers from across the Reich raced to the region to support the German Silesian Orgesch (volunteer civil guards) in their struggle to contain and then expel the insurgents.

These German reinforcements included student battalions, the Jungdeutsche Orden, and many other supposedly dissolved Freikorps units that were now illegal under the Peace Treaty's provisions. They included the Rossbach Sturmabteilung, which was already 4,000 strong, Heydebreck's Wehrwolfe, the Bavarian Oberland and the Heinz Sturmabteilung. Waite quoted one Freikorps leader who described the atmosphere as rather like a gathering of the clans.

We got out at Namslau and a defense battalion was formed... the Jungdeutsche were there, the Stahlhelm, Rossbachers, Baltikumers, Landesjäger, Kapp-Putschists... It seemed to me that I knew about every third man from the battles of the German post-war period.

The nucleus of some of these units had been in place for months. They had been funded by the Wroclaw Zentrale, local representatives of the Prussian Staatskommissar and the German Foreign Office (with Federal Finance Minister, Josef Wirth's approval). After the Kapp Putsch, the Freikorps units had been employed to repress the Spartacist rising in the Ruhr. This had been done with great brutality – no prisoners being taken and the wounded executed. Other ex-Freikorps members had been serving in Upper Silesia since before the plebiscite as member's of Hauensteins’s ‘Special Police’ – the much more ruthlessly efficient German Silesian equivalent of the Polish Bojwka. Hauenstein later put...
the number of murders they had carried out in Upper Silesia at ‘about 200 people’.\textsuperscript{18} When the Nazis later made it a practice to claim the \textit{Freikorpskämpfers} victories as their own, many \textit{Landsnecht} (Freebooters) ‘graduating’ to the Nazi movement, found their service in Upper Silesia – more than any other post-war intervention – highly regarded as symbolic of ‘sincere and unselfish patriotism’.\textsuperscript{19}

The \textit{Reichswehr} also gave money, arms and equipment to the volunteers.\textsuperscript{20} Although the German Government did consider using \textit{Reichswehr} units such as the 7th Infantry Regiment, located at Brzeg (Brieg), against the insurgents, it was deterred by the Peace Treaty and an Allied threat (including the British) to occupy the Ruhr.\textsuperscript{21} However, less than 24 hours after the insurrection had started, the German Government did offer the Plebiscite Commission police assistance and repeated the offer two days later. Both offers were rejected.\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Reichswehr} border patrols and their presence on and around the plebiscite area demarcation line were intensified. The main forces, however, remained in their barracks. Nevertheless, this did not stop \textit{Reichswehr} soldiers handing their arms over to the volunteers or enlisting in \textit{Freikorps} units themselves.\textsuperscript{23} Here we should note that the Allied threat to occupy the Ruhr had not only inhibited the \textit{Reichswehr}’s intervention in Upper Silesia, but also prevented France from sending reinforcements to Upper Silesia from the Rhine. It had also given the War Office yet another excuse to avoid returning the four British battalions withdrawn early in April. Whether by coincidence or by informed choice, the Polish Silesians could not have chosen a more propitious moment to mount the insurrection.

On 30 April Briand informed Lloyd George that due to Germany’s failure to make a satisfactory reparation offer, France would commence occupying the Ruhr on 2 May.\textsuperscript{24}
To prevent this and gain time to manoeuvre, the British Prime Minister persuaded the French to suspend their plans and allow an ultimatum embodying a new schedule of payments to be drawn up and despatched to Berlin. By so doing, Lloyd George seized the initiative from France. On 5 May, the London Schedule of Payments and the Allies ultimatum was received in Berlin. If it was not accepted within six days Britain would participate in occupying the Ruhr. To do so, the Allies had to maintain their already over-stretched Rhineland military forces on standby until either the Germans complied or they were forced to take action. It meant that there would be no inter-Allied military reinforcements available for Upper Silesia until at least 12 May – or longer if the Germans rejected the ultimatum. This was cited by Hardinge when replying to Curzon’s request that he check to see if the French and Italians could immediately reinforce Upper Silesia. Crowe foresaw the same problem when the German Ambassador also enquired about the possibility of additional Allied troops being despatched. In fact there was little prospect of increasing the Italians’ involvement, and no hope of French or British reinforcements arriving until the reparations crisis had been resolved. It was also politically impossible to use Reichswehr units in Upper Silesia. Therefore, to take action against the Polish Silesian insurgents, there appeared to be no choice but to use the German volunteers who were already arriving in Lower Silesia.

Within days the existing Silesian Schutzpolizei (Protection Police) had been built into a 4,000 strong force using the volunteers and ‘refugees’ from the Opole area. In an attempt to re-establish the Commission’s authority, British and Italian officers with the plebiscite police rearmed the remaining German police and recruited 3,000 volunteers from amongst those flooding in from the Reich. But apart from the Freikorps, probably

Chapter 4
the most numerous German force was the Selbstschutz (Self-Defence Force). Formed at the instigation of the Orgesch and the Vereinigte Verbände heimat treuer Oberschlesier, it officially consisted of German Silesians recruited from the north and the west of the unoccupied parts of the plebiscite area and the towns and villages bordering the area's demarcation line with Germany. Whilst it included these local Germans and it was partly funded and usually led by members of the landowning aristocracy, it also included Arbeitgmeinschaften men (Labour Associations 'hiding' the ex-Baltikum and Freikorps groups) and thousands of the Orgesch and the Oberland members who had arrived from other parts of Germany. Such were the German forces being assembled against the Polish Silesians. It should be borne in mind, of course, that apart from the Commission's own force, these 'police' and Freikorps units had no more legitimacy than the various Polish units. In fact, the formation of German para-military units divided the Commission because after Le Rond's return to Opole, despite Percival and Marinis encouraging them, the French simply regarded these forces as German insurgents. Fortunately by 11 May the impasse between Berlin and the Allies over the reparation payments was over.

The terms of the London ultimatum had caused Germany's Fehrenbach Cabinet to collapse. The proposal of its Foreign Secretary, Simons, of a superficial compliance with the reparation demands in exchange for assurances of British support over Upper Silesia was, however, carried over into the new Cabinet. This was formed on 11 May by the outgoing Finance Minister, Josef Wirth. When Wirth's Cabinet accepted the terms of the ultimatum and began its pursuit of Erfüllung (Fulfilment), relations between Britain and Germany thawed immediately. Such cordiality was so apparent that rumours about D'Abernon having 'promised Germany a favourable solution of the Upper Silesia question

Chapter 4
began to circulate in the Foreign Office and in the other corridors of diplomacy. Inevitably they found their way into the press. D’Abernon’s diary extracts which he sent to Lloyd George via the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey (bypassing Curzon and the Foreign Office) on a regular basis, appear to confirm that some understanding had been reached. On 24 May D’Abernon reported that Germany’s new Foreign Secretary, Rosen, showed a ‘willingness to conform to any advice regarding Upper Silesia which His Majesty’s Government might offer’. And on 11 June the Foreign Minister’s Under-Secretary, von Haniel, told the Reichstag Foreign Affairs Committee that during the crisis over the London ultimatum, D’Abernon ‘had assured Herr Stresemann that, in the event of acceptance of the ultimatum, the Upper Silesian question will be satisfactorily settled for Germany’. Yet, whilst Lloyd George and the Germans had long considered Upper Silesia an integral part of the reparations question, it was now the case that any outcome there which failed to satisfy Germany’s very high expectations was bound to damage Britain’s new-found status in Berlin.

An important factor involving the insurrection was that Germany’s new Chancellor had close associations with the financing of these volunteer and self-defence groups. Like many of his contemporaries, although realising their politics were hugely at variance with the Freikorpskämpfers, they believed that these para-military forces were necessary to maintain the integrity of the Republic. Therefore, when advised by von Seeckt to discourage them from intervening in the plebiscite area, Wirth ignored him. On 18 June, under a catch-all title of Commander of Selbtschutz forces, he appointed General Karl Hoefer to lead the Freikorps and the other volunteers against the Polish Silesians. By

Chapter 4
this time, the skirmishing which had been taking place along parts of the Korfanty line had
developed into heavy fighting between the Freikorps units and the Polish insurgents.

Apart from their nervousness over possibly losing control over events in Upper
Silesia should an insurrection go ahead, Korfanty and the Polish leadership had also feared
the strength of the German reaction. Rose, who interviewed most of the Polish leaders
later, wrote that, far from being the adventurers depicted in contemporary British
accounts, they were 'sober patriots who knew the situation thoroughly, both in the land
and on the wider horizon of German-Polish relations'. 38 They also knew their opponents’
power and, as the German volunteers began to assemble, Korfanty had searched for a
means of returning to the diplomatic route. As early as 8 May, during discussions with the
Commission’s General de Brantes in Gliwice, he offered to end the insurrection if the
Commissioners provided him with a pretext to do so. 39 Korfanty even advanced some
suggestions, but included the condition that, 'no German force of whatever description
should be used against the Poles during the liquidation of the movement'. 40 Given some
modification, the Commission found most of the suggestions tolerable. They authorised de
Brantes to communicate this to Korfanty, To prove his good faith, however, Korfanty had
to halt the Polish advance, stop attacks on persons and property, co-operate in re-
establishing Commission-controlled railway services and call for a resumption of work. 41

Korfanty accepted these demands on 11 May – the same day that the Wirth
Cabinet accepted the London Schedule of Payments. 42 Percival, however, had second
thoughts. This may have been related to the strength of the German para-military forces,
but also to the influence Hatzfeldt, von Moltke and other prominent local German leaders
such as Lukaschek (whose expulsion he had blocked) had with the British and the Italian
Commissioners. Percival was now convinced Korfanty was just playing for time and that his main object was the restoration of economic conditions in Upper Silesia whilst remaining in permanent occupation of the industrial area. This was something Percival believed that the Germans could easily thwart by withholding food supplies, money for wages and preventing railway communications being restored. He pointed out to Curzon that, should conditions be made intolerable for them, then the workers would break away from the Polish cause – but his assertion that this might ‘establish Bolshevism’ shows how little he understood the Polish Silesians. The restoration of normal economic conditions was, therefore, an imperative for the Poles, but not for the Germans – provided that they did not worry too much about their fellow nationals isolated in the Upper Silesian towns.\(^{43}\)

On the 13 May, Craig, the Commission’s Director of Food Supplies, confirmed that these sanctions against the insurgents were already being exerted. Since the start of the insurrection the Germans had cut the amount of food supplies for distribution to towns in the occupied area. He also recorded that the German authorities were intensifying this de facto food embargo by discouraging their railway engineers from operating there.\(^{44}\)

Percival also questioned Korfanty’s ability to control the insurgents. Apart from the insurgents’ clashes with the German para-militarists, his doubts were reinforced by their continuing confrontations with the reconstructed, mainly British-officered, all-German, plebiscite police force. However, fighting between the Polish insurgents and the inter-Allied military force had ceased within a few days. Overwhelmed by the insurgents’ numerical superiority and sympathetic to their cause, a passive *modus vivendi* developed between the French troops and the Poles. This had the tacit approval of Le Rond. Less sympathetic, but unwilling to risk further casualties, Marinis had pulled most of the Italian

Chapter 4
troops out of the areas occupied by the insurgents, leaving a token force supporting the French troops still protecting the mainly German-populated towns. Nevertheless, with little sign of the insurgents complying with their demands, and indications that the Ambassadors’ Conference was unhappy about the Commission negotiating with the Polish leadership, on 12 May the Commissioners publicly stated ‘that it had not in the past and would not in the future negotiate with Korfanty’.

When Marinis suggested that their troops, backed up by artillery, make one final effort to end the insurrection, Le Rond balked at this - asserting that French troops could not be used in that particular role without his government’s special permission. Immediately after this exchange Percival telegraphed London to state that the Commission had been ‘reduced to utter helplessness’, and that his position had become impossible. He suggested the correct course would be for Curzon to accept his resignation – adding that it might be desirable for Curzon to consider withdrawing the whole British contingent from Upper Silesia.

Like Percival, members of the British contingent had found the occupation a ‘degrading and humiliating’ experience. After informing the district controllers that there were no troops available to help them, the Commission had ordered all of its officials and employees to remain at their posts and make the best of things. Some complied, securing concessions from the insurgents and making effective interventions on behalf of the local inhabitants in their charge. Others railed against it. Bond, the district controller who had resisted the insurgents at Strzelce, resigned. At Lubliniec, one British employee ran away. As the insurgents settled into their new role, some took particular delight in humiliating the British officials at roadblocks with over-zealous searches of their baggage, the endless scrutiny of their papers, accusing them of spying and so forth, while the
French officials were being saluted and waved through. Craig and Percival’s Adjutant, Captain Hutchison, criticised their colleagues and superiors to authorities outwith the Commission: in Craig’s case in private letters to the Foreign Office; in Hutchison’s by talking directly to MPs and Lloyd George himself.

In one letter, Craig recorded the great bitterness existing amongst the British officials. In another, to Lindsay, an assistant under-secretary, he wrote:

There is hardly an official in any of the sections that can now contemplate the actions of the Commission, of the insurgents and of the Germans, without the most violent partisanship. Moreover, for many of the staffs it has now become a matter of personal prestige and I allude not only to the chief participants.

He warned that passions were running so high and nerves were so much on edge that the British contingent was close to disintegration. A communication to Ottley concluded with a half-promise that ‘when the dust had settled’, he would, ‘have a very sorry tale to tell of British activities here since November’. The person who did tell that tale, or at least his version of it, was Hutchison.

Bearing in mind the state of personal relations described above and statements that were made later, it is clear that Hutchison’s good relations with some of the French officials had caused Tidbury, Bourdillon, and other members of the British Headquarters staff at Opole to suspect him of having Polish sympathies – however unlikely this was. When a large German para-military force in Kluczbork threatened insurgent-held Olensko on 9 and 10 May, Hutchison played a peripheral role in negotiating a local 48-hour cease-fire. Immediately on his return to Opole, however, he felt compelled to resign when the British headquarters staff tried moving him with his wife to

Chapter 4
a lesser post in Rybnik, a town which was occupied and seething with revolt. In a statement made after Hutchison had left Opole, one senior British official wrote

I became suspicious of his relations with the French, who in my opinion were endeavouring to utilise him to extract information, and from a political point of view I viewed him as a source of danger. This conviction became the more confirmed when it came to my knowledge that at the time of his departure from Opole, M. Ponset and Capt. Bastard [French officials] were at the railway station to see him off.

Forty-eight hours later Hutchison, who was politically well connected, was back in London wreaking his revenge. Esdale Molson MP sent a note to the Foreign Office questioning the ‘marked lowering of morale’ amongst the officials and the ‘anti-French, if not actually pro-German feeling’ prevalent amongst the British Headquarters staff in Opole. But, even worse, on May 13, just a few hours before Lloyd George made a very highly controversial speech on Upper Silesia, Hutchison gained an interview at Downing Street where he no doubt provided the Prime Minister with his own highly coloured version of events in Upper Silesia.

Colonel Pepys Cockerell, Ottley’s successor as Controller of the Bytom district, was another official with political contacts. The industrial disputes in mines around Bytom had continued unremittingly after the plebiscite, culminating in the district’s occupation on 3 May. Cockerell’s office was attacked and he fled for his life. On 5 May, the Reuter news agency reported that he had resigned due ‘to the insufficiency of the forces at his disposal’. Craig later informed Ottley that Cockerell had refused ‘to be associated with a government which was a farce’. In the House of Commons, news of

Chapter 4
his resignation brought forth some questions from its members. Percival, however,
persuaded Cockerell to remain and he returned to duty in Bytom. Three weeks later, in
one of the insurrection's most bizarre escapades, Cockerell drove a lorry containing
fourteen German para-militarists and an assortment of weapons from Kluczbork to
Bodzanowice, a village located in insurgent-held territory close to the Polish border. On
their arrival, the arms were distributed amongst the Germans who then proceeded to open
fire on the Polish Silesian inhabitants. Two of the Germans were killed and three were
badly wounded before the group was captured by Polish insurgents. Cockerell was sent
home with the recommendation that he rest until his nerves recovered.

Whatever Cockerell's motivation was, it is clear that many of the longer serving
British officials with the Commission found their position increasingly untenable as
French passivity moved to near-active co-operation with the Polish insurgents. And their
frustration was compounded by some of the insurgents taking the opportunity to
demonstrate by word and gesture their resentment over what had been the generally
consistent sympathy of the British officials for the German Silesian position.

As we have noted, the only British officials in a position to resist the insurgents
were the officers in charge of what was left of the Commission's plebiscite police force.
Along with a few Italian officers who had also failed to subscribe to the emerging military
policy of passive co-existence, they concentrated the remaining German police and the
reinforcements that they had recruited, around Strzelce, Opole and Kozle. This was where
the insurgents had ignored Korfanty's dictum and were still attempting to secure territory
on the Oder's west bank. On 12 May, the *Daily Express* claimed that over 500 insurgents
had been killed or wounded by the determined resistance of the German police.
Throughout the first week of the occupation British newspapers were fairly accurate over the origins, scale and objectives of the insurrection. Coverage over these first days concentrated on clashes between the insurgents and the inter-Allied military force – especially the French and Italian success in retaking and securing the towns. Under the headline “British Hero”, the Daily Mail ran the story of Captain Michalson, a plebiscite police officer, rallying the force’s depleted ranks in a bid to resist a Polish take-over of Rybnik. Their coverage then began to take on a definite anti-Polish line and highlighted the splits between the Allies. On 11 May, The Times correspondent noted; ‘The result of French partiality and unconcealed co-operation with the Polish cause is that any person with a sense of justice is driven to support and defend the Germans’. Reports appeared that the insurgents were preparing to destroy mines and factories rather than give them back to the Germans. The Daily Telegraph praised the Germans’ self-restraint, but cautioned that ‘the good impression this made in authoritative British circles would be neutralised by any attempt to appeal to force’.

But, as we have seen, it was the British themselves who were helping to organise the German resistance. We have noted how German volunteers had boosted the plebiscite police force’s numbers and that as early as 9 May the German para-militarist forces were unofficially assisting them against the insurgents. In yet another development, on 11 May reports about a British officer commanding a German Freikorps unit, appeared in the Polish press. The Freikorps units had been itching to attack and had paid scant regard to Hoefer’s strategy of holding a defensive position whilst awaiting the Allies’ decision on the disposition of Upper Silesia. Percival admitted to London that while some German bands were well in hand others were not. On 23 May the Foreign Office learned that
Keatinge, the senior British police officer, had sent Lieutenant Bennet to organise some Freikorps units and use them to attack the Poles.\footnote{81} A report to this effect appeared in The Manchester Guardian the following day. Percival denied it and defended Keatinge’s close liaison with the German groups.\footnote{82} This, he argued, provided valuable intelligence and gave the British an influence over German activities which they would not otherwise have had.\footnote{83} The great contradiction in this was highlighted by the French newspaper Le Temps. It drew attention to the contrast between the Polish Government, which had claimed no authority over the insurgents and was attempting to close its frontier, and the German Government, on whose territory the German bands were being organised, armed, and then transported to invade Upper Silesia.\footnote{84}

As we have seen, the Polish Government had quickly disassociated itself from the insurrectionary movement and taken various measures designed to reassure the Allies. The Polish public believed Percival and Marinis had disregarded the will of the Upper Silesian Poles by allotting so little territory to them. But a conference between Prime Minister Witos and representatives from the various political parties in Poland endorsed their government’s position. None of the foreign representatives in Warsaw, including the German Chargé d’Affaires, believed the Polish Government was directly involved in the insurrection.\footnote{85} In a statement, the Polish Government reminded the population that no decision had yet been taken on Upper Silesia. A communiqué summing up the Polish Government’s position was also issued.

Although the Government fully realises the desperation of the Upper Silesian population dictated by fear that its wishes may be disregarded, it is nevertheless convinced that the insurrectionary movement will not attain its object.\footnote{86}
The public recognised the necessity of their government having to adopt this line, but one of the Democratic Union’s (Zw.D.) newspapers, the *Narod*, warned the political leaders not to distance themselves too far from the Polish people. However, illustrating the Polish administration’s ambiguities, the State Defence Committee was still urging the public to supply the insurgents with provisions, money and moral support. On the other hand, the *Gazetta Poranna* believed that every effort should be made to resolve the *impasse* ‘without involving Poland in a war which should be fought not against Germany, but against the Allied Powers’. Special resentment was felt against Italy and Britain. Italian troops in Upper Silesia became the subject of considerable abuse in the Polish press. There were also several hostile demonstrations outside the Italian and the British Legations in Warsaw. Again, the demonstrators were drawn mainly from the ranks of the socialist parties. After British officials had excused themselves from receiving a petition from the first of these demonstrations because, ‘His Excellency was having his dinner’, the Polish Socialist newspaper, *Robotnik*, asked why Poles were surprised at this when: ‘British officials are accustomed to deal in this manner with Hindoos, Kaffirs, Persians and the like. Why should they behave any differently in Warsaw?’

This was a continuation of the Left’s campaign against what they regarded as the ‘shame, incompetence, and the paralytic blundering’ of the Polish diplomats who had ‘bowed with the subservience of lackeys before the Allies’. Their principal target was the Foreign Minister, Prince Sapieha. He had been under constant attack since his perceived failure on the outvoting question in Upper Silesia and his conduct of external relations during the recent Wilno adventure. At the start of the insurrection he was in London seeking an opportunity to put the Polish case on Upper Silesia to Lloyd George.
Sapieha’s statement deploring the insurrection as a ‘great misfortune’ and praising his Government’s swift response, had been widely reported in Western Europe. However, when comparing Polish diplomacy with the success that the Czechs had been achieving, the Robotnik concluded that Poland had been badly served by her diplomats in all of her dealings with the Entente. Blaming this on its Foreign Ministry officials being invariably drawn from the aristocracy, it concluded that ‘far from knowing anything about the world, they had not even the faintest notion of the country which they represented’. Responding to Max Muller’s complaint about the demonstrations and the attacks on him in the Polish press, the Polish Government promoted articles aimed at calming the population. But Piłsudski’s blase attitude towards the insurrection (which he told Max Muller he blamed on Britain), and the enthusiastic support of the Polish press and public for the insurgents, caused the British Minister to recommend that a joint Allied warning be delivered to the Polish Government. This suggestion was supported from Berlin where the British Embassy was warning that the Upper Silesian situation was strengthening the hand of reactionary circles hoping the reparation terms would be rejected by the Reichstag.

The Warsaw Legation’s other great concern were the various reports about up to 85,000 Polish army regulars massing on the Upper Silesian frontier. To appreciate the credibility the Allies gave to the claims, we have to bear in mind that a few months earlier, in the aftermath of the Red Army’s retreat from Warsaw, General Zeligowski’s so-called ‘independent’ patriotic military force had seized Wilno for Poland. Max Muller did not doubt that many regular Polish Army officers and soldiers were fighting for the insurgents. The British Military Mission sent two British officers to the frontier to investigate. They met General Szeptycki, the General Officer Commanding the region, in

Chapter 4
Krakow. He assured them that his force had not been mobilised and that the only troop movements that had occurred had been when the Polish Government had ordered that border security be tightened. If he were given orders to mobilise, Szeptycki promised that he would let them know. He claimed that his soldiers were under control but he could not stop civilians crossing into Upper Silesia. After inspecting the frontier, the British officers confirmed earlier reports that lorries and trains were still crossing into insurgent-held territory and that Korfanty himself was making frequent crossings to visit the insurgents' headquarters in Sosnowice. But in a signal to General Thwaites (DMI) sent from the British military mission in Warsaw on 10 May, General Carton De Wiart told him that Curzon was wrong if he believed the Polish Government or the Polish military authorities were implicated. He was convinced that they were not.

The whole trouble is that the Government here is not strong enough to stop or punish the insurgents, and here any action committed for so-called patriotic motives, will always go unpunished, no matter what the action might be.

That the Polish Government ran great risks in opposing the uprising is scarcely recognised in Tooley's less than sympathetic portrayal of the Polish Government's position. By misquoting Cienciala and Komarnicki, he attributes to them the view 'that the Polish Government very soon “seized the leadership” of the uprising.' In fact, what Cienciala and Komarnicki do say is that once the insurrection had occurred, the Polish Government 'tried to limit it in scope and time and to use it as a short but powerful demonstration against the proposed Percival-Marinis line'. Warsaw did this by always presenting the Polish Silesians' case in every diplomatic note, interview and submission that they made. Cienciala and Komarnicki attribute attempts to seize the insurrection's
leadership and direct it towards a more ambitious pathway, to the POW’s young officers who had hoped this would force the Allies to recognise the Polish Silesians’ claims. 107 But in Britain there was very little chance of that occurring. There, Curzon and the Foreign Office’s senior officials reacted to news of the insurrection and German offers to assist the Allies in restoring order, by enthusiastically adopting Ottley’s suggestion that uncontested parts of the plebiscite area, including Opole, be handed over to Poland and Germany immediately – thus leaving the Commission free to concentrate all of its military resources on what effectively was the disputed industrial triangle. 108

On 7 May, Hardinge submitted this proposal to the Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris where it received a cool reception. 109 Over the next few days, the increasingly undiplomatic language of Hardinge’s exchanges with the Foreign Office highlighted the fact that Upper Silesia had instigated yet another crisis in Anglo-French relations. 110 From Opole, Percival, Marinis and Gratier also supported the plan provided that the plebiscite police numbers were increased from 6,000 to 8,000, and the Allied force was reinforced by 10,000 non-French troops, plus cavalry, tanks, motor machine-guns, artillery and some aircraft. 111 But, as already discussed, the Italians would not send any more troops, and Ottley’s attempt to sound-out the War Office about the return of four battalions to the plebiscite area met the standard reiteration that ‘the policy of the C.I.G.S. was to avoid commitments in Europe unless and until the dangers within the British Empire had been dealt with’. 112

The military aspects of the British proposal were discussed by Foch’s inter-Allied Military Committee at Versailles. But they concluded that the plan would leave the inter-Allied force dangerously isolated with their lines of communication vulnerable. 113 The
Italian Ambassador also feared that handing territory over to the Poles might be interpreted as rewarding the insurgents, and its overall effect might be to strengthen Korfanty. Nevertheless, he was prepared to agree to the plan provided all of the other Ambassadors expressed an interest in implementing it. Unfortunately, they all saw faults with it. After reading a report in the 9 May edition of the Daily Chronicle, even the new German Ambassador to London expressed concern. German acceptance of the London Terms two days later failed to mollify Curzon who appears to have been particularly wedded to Ottley’s proposal. Curzon was annoyed by what he considered to be specious French arguments, and their failure to offer an alternative means of resolving this danger to European peace.

According to Hardinge, Curzon never understood the French psychology and this caused problems for him as the British Ambassador in Paris. Nor did Hardinge’s own long-standing grudge against Lloyd George and Curzon help matters. Apart from eliciting French support over addressing a joint Allied note to Warsaw (delivered on 10 May) and joining the other Ambassadors in Paris in urging that the inter-Allied Commission renew attempts to draw up a unanimous recommendation on Upper Silesia, Hardinge appeared content to let matters blow over. But, compared to the Versailles Committee’s objections (which had substance), the French political objections to the British plan were rather tenuous. The French Government claimed to fear that the provisional occupation might become permanent and suggested that involving the Polish Government could ‘lead to unforeseen complications’. From Warsaw, Carton De Wiart speculated that one of these complications might be both sides moving troops into their allotted area and preparing for a pitched battle over the remainder. On a more practical
note, Le Rond (and the Italians) warned that an evacuation of Opole would produce administrative chaos. He also pointed out that even the present inter-Allied force would be incapable of controlling the central district, let alone dislodging the Polish insurgents presently in occupation. 123

The reaction in London was to condemn all these arguments as baseless. Means of coercion, such as breaking diplomatic relations with Poland, were mooted. 124 Waterlow described the military arguments as unintelligible and asked if the French Government were now allowing their soldiers to determine policy – which was rather ironic given that due to Britain’s military priorities, the Foreign Office’s political ineffectiveness in Upper Silesia was directly caused by the CIGS’s continuing opposition to sending British troops there. 125 Suggestions and opinions such as these, combined with a renewed German propaganda onslaught, disquieting signals from Percival, and warnings from the German officials in London caused the Foreign Office to adopt an acrimonious line with the Ambassadors’ Conference and the French Government. 126 Curzon reminded Hardinge that had the Commission expelled Korfanty in November, ‘in all probability the present trouble would have been avoided’. He thought that asking the Commissioners to submit a unanimous report was ‘futile’, and even suggested that the Ambassadors’ Conference re-examine the recommendations and reach a decision on Upper Silesia themselves – an idea Briand arrived at independently the following month. Curzon further suggested that the Ambassadors should call for an enquiry into the competence of the French military authorities in Upper Silesia because, ‘the broad fact remains, that some 10,000 troops, equipped with artillery and tanks, have been powerless against forces which can be little more than a half organised rabble’. 127

Chapter 4
At this point Hardinge dug in his heels. He suggested that the Conference’s reasons for rejecting the British plan were sound and dismissed Curzon’s suggestion that the Ambassadors should decide the division of Upper Silesia by themselves. Subject to the Poles assuming a proportion of Germany’s reparations and agreeing to an inter-Allied Commission being established to exploit Upper Silesian resources towards this end, the French, wrote Hardinge, were determined that Poland should acquire the industrial area. He believed partitioning Upper Silesia would complicate reparations and the general question of relations between the Allies and Germany. Therefore, whatever decision the Ambassadors’ Conference might arrive at, the Supreme Council would inevitably overrule it. Finally, Hardinge added, questioning the military competence of the French in Upper Silesia would achieve nothing, except perhaps cause Marshal Foch and other French military authorities to take umbrage. Having withdrawn their own troops from Upper Silesia, it would be ‘invidious’ for Britain ‘to criticise the conduct of operations by other Allied troops in that area’. 128

Furious with Hardinge for not dealing with the situation effectively, Curzon spent the night of 12 May concocting the draft of a telegram to reply to him. He obtained Lloyd George’s comments on it the following morning just prior to the Prime Minister himself making a major speech on Upper Silesia later that day. 129 The themes of Lloyd George’s speech and Curzon’s telegram were remarkably similar. The French did not appreciate the gravity of the situation. A rebel Polish Silesian leader, protected by the French and Polish governments, had flouted the authority of the Allied Commission and openly defied the Treaty. French troops had failed to resist them and the French Government was pursuing the cession of the industrial area to Poland. The British Government could not agree to
15. The Pole Stars (Punch Almanac 1922)

16. Poland start striking at Germany.
One is allowed to do anything now.

Chapter 4
this. Nor could it accept that it was disqualified from commenting on French military
canuct just because their own force had been withdrawn and because it might cause
Marshal Foch offence. If Hardinge's description of the French Government's intention
was correct, he should inform them that His Majesty's Government could not continue to
restrain the Germans from taking counter-measures. The situation, however, was so
dangerous that the Ambassador should inform Briand that both he and the Prime Minister
were prepared to meet him in Boulogne at his convenience.
130 These points, combined
with a remarkably ill-informed and offensive attack on Poland and the Polish people, were
repeated in Lloyd George's parliamentary oration in the Adjournment Debate that same
day, 13 May. 131

Brought by Lloyd George to the House especially to hear the speech, in her diary
his secretary and mistress, Francis Stevenson, describes how, fortified with a strong dose
of port wine, the Prime Minister 'just let go about Poland - and the French'. 132 The Poles,
he claimed, were recent immigrants to Upper Silesia, who had arrived there to work in the
mines. The Germans had won the plebiscite by a majority of six to four. The British and
Italian Commissioners wanted overwhelmingly Polish areas to go to Poland, but in areas
where the combined town and country vote was German they wanted these areas to go to
Germany. The Poles had now raised an insurrection and challenged the Versailles Treaty.
Whilst not criticising Poland, nevertheless, the Treaty was the charter for Poland's
freedom. But the Poles had not won the war. Polish soldiers fighting for the Allies
[Russia] had been driven from the field like cattle, 'beaten, broken and scattered'. At the
same time, the Austrian and Prussian Poles 'fought to the end, shooting down Frenchmen,
British and Italians who were fighting for Poland's freedom'. The liberty of Poland was
due to Italy, Britain and France. Germany would be strong again. Her ‘able, courageous
and resourceful people’ would count for more and more. Russia too, although now a
broken power would not remain so for it ‘possessed inexhaustible resources’ and was
‘peopled by a very gallant race’. It was therefore in Poland’s interest to comply with all of
the Treaty. Britain stood for fair play. The Allies must restore order in Upper Silesia or
allow the Germans to do so themselves.\textsuperscript{133}

The President of the Board of Education, H.A.L. Fisher, thought it one of the
Prime Minister’s finest speeches.\textsuperscript{134} Stevenson noted that despite the predictably angry
reaction in France, all of the English press backed Lloyd George.\textsuperscript{135} Under the headline
‘Fair Play Even To Germans’ the Left-wing Daily \textit{Herald} reported how differences
between the French and British views on Upper Silesia and the Poles could not be more
acute.\textsuperscript{136} And, from Berlin, D’Abernon reported that Lloyd George was ‘the most popular
man in Germany’.\textsuperscript{137} London and Warsaw were making separate, though unsuccessful
attempts to elicit United States support on Upper Silesia.\textsuperscript{138} The American press generally
supported the British attitude but Lloyd George was blamed for suggesting using German
troops against the Poles.\textsuperscript{139}

The European press reviews in neutral countries revealed a more mixed reception.
Some such as the \textit{Journal de Geneve} deplored the possible effect of the British Prime
Minister’s speech, but the intention to restrain France was applauded.\textsuperscript{140} In Holland, \textit{Het
Volk} described British policy as ‘in keeping with a neutral standard of moderation,
honesty and sincerity’.\textsuperscript{141} But an article in the \textit{Niewe Rotterdamsche Courant} interpreted
Lloyd George’s ‘explosion’ as a realisation that, if the British permitted France to embark
on a policy of continental domination, ‘England will be driven into her traditional role of
counterweight against a dominant European Power’. From Vienna, it was reported that the Austrian press had also greeted Lloyd George’s speech with enthusiastic approval and that it had been given prominence in all of the newspapers. The opinion was that should Korfanty be allowed to override the decision of the Powers, then they feared that certain provisions of the Hungarian Treaty would not be fulfilled. Prague took a similar line. There the Česko Slovenska Republika pointed out that the British Prime Minister was simply asking for a strict application of the Peace Treaty, whilst simultaneously ‘throwing cold water on some over-heated Polish heads’.

Italian views were coloured by the deaths of their soldiers. All of the socialist papers disregarded the Silesia story, Avanti describing it as ‘essentially a quarrel between capitalists’. Fascist papers such as Idea Nazionale claimed that ‘British policy was anti-Polish for its own ends’, and the paper led Italian nationalists’ calls for a withdrawal from Upper Silesia. Mainstream papers, stimulated by the anti-French and the anti-Polish sentiment that they detected in Lloyd George’s speech, praised it and quoted it in extenso. The prestigious La Stampa regarded the speech as ‘an international event of the first order’. Significantly in view of future events, Rome’s Messaggero did not, attacking the proposed Percival-Marinis frontier as inequitable.

Justice requires a more equitable ethnic division which can only be obtained by advancing the line into the mixed zone composed of oases of both races. The eastern part of this zone which has, here and there, a predominant Polish character should be assigned to Poland. The problem of economic unity should be solved with subsequent customs agreements. This middle policy could fitly be supported by Count Sforza.
In Warsaw, press reaction to the speech was initially muted, but after the full text had arrived the papers were filled with violent comment. The *Kurjer Poranny* asked from where Lloyd George obtained information on Polish questions for him to arrive at so many distortions. *Narod* stated that the British Prime Minister was mistaken in supposing that Poland should listen humbly to all orders, ‘in particular to those of such indifferent allies as English statesmen’. Others commented on Lloyd George’s hypocritical insistence on strict compliance with the Treaty, whilst being quite prepared to break it himself by promising Upper Silesia to Germany. The main complaint was that by inciting Germany to armed action, Lloyd George’s speech could provoke another war. The Polish reply came from Witos in the Sejm on 18 May. This reaffirmed Poland’s commitment to the Versailles Treaty, reasserted the Polish interpretation of the plebiscite clauses and again appealed to the insurgents to end their action. Although not wholly conciliatory in tone, nevertheless, he did not attack the British Government as such, and helped to calm matters. Attention was also diverted by Prince Sapieha’s resignation on 19 May. This had resulted from an earlier vote of no confidence by the Sejm’s Foreign Affairs Committee. However, because Warsaw had already acceded to Italian demands for Sapieha’s deputy’s removal because he had made some intemperate remarks about the Italian casualties in Upper Silesia, this meant that Sapieha remained until replaced by Skirmunt three weeks later.

Watching events unfold, Max Muller himself questioned whether the British Government was making sufficient allowance for the Polish Government’s difficulties. On 15 May he had pointed out that evidence was emerging that France had engineered the insurrection to coincide with their own planned advance into the Ruhr on 2 May. This,
of course, had been averted by Lloyd George forcing them instead to agree to presenting the ultimatum on reparations to Germany.\footnote{152} Max Muller nevertheless felt that Witos now had Poland’s internal situation in hand and intended to take effective measures to tighten up the frontier. But, continued Max Muller, if the 
Reichswehr marched into Upper Silesia, nothing could prevent the Polish Army’s intervention. Whether or not the French would also intervene, he left to Curzon’s judgement. However, the outcome could not be regarded with equanimity:

If the blame is to be apportioned the French are mainly responsible but the fact cannot be overlooked that had we been in a position to fulfil our obligations and maintain troops in Upper Silesia the rising would almost certainly not have occurred and in any case it would have been promptly suppressed.\footnote{153}

British criticism of the French military’s tactics was also commented on by Briand when replying to Hardinge’s aide mémoire of 13 May.\footnote{154} Compiled on Curzon’s instructions, the British Ambassador had delivered it to Briand just before Lloyd George’s speech in the House of Commons later that day.\footnote{155} The French Premier’s reply also covered all of the additional points of criticism made by the British Prime Minister as well.\footnote{156} Most of the French press had concentrated on ridiculing the historical inaccuracies contained in the speech. One newspaper, Figaro, regretted that Lloyd George should allow himself to be influenced by his well-known antipathy to Poland, whilst another, Gaulois, asked if Lloyd George’s indignation had been provoked by ‘certain obligations’ related to Germany accepting the ultimatum.\footnote{157} Briand had also alluded to this rumour when rejecting British charges that he wanted the whole industrial area to go Poland. Should he, Briand asked, accuse the British Government of wanting to assign the whole of Upper

Chapter 4
Silesia to Germany on no other basis than articles in the British press? With regard to British criticism of the French troops in Upper Silesia, Briand pointed out that, like the Italians, the French had done their duty and also suffered dead and wounded casualties. Once the United States and Britain withdrew their units from the inter-Allied Military Force, the Commission’s inability to suppress widespread insurrection had been inevitable. In his opinion

\[
\text{It is not just to leave one or two Powers to bear by themselves responsibilities and burdens which ought to have been shared among all the Allies, and then to reproach them with their powerlessness and even to question their impartiality.}
\]

Nevertheless, he could not agree to a German force being organised outside the plebiscite area in order to impose a solution within it. This would draw Poland directly into conflict and should this occur he said, France could not passively stand by. This statement had been confirmed by reports from Paris where, it was said, Briand had given assurances that, if regular German troops entered Upper Silesia then the Ruhr valley would be immediately occupied. London responded by instructing the Paris Embassy to investigate and if they received ‘serious confirmation’ of this, then they must inform Briand that this action was ‘inconsistent with the spirit of the Entente’ and endangered the future of the Alliance.163

The most immediate practical effect of Lloyd George’s speech was felt fully in Upper Silesia where the anti-republican, anti-Semitic Freikorps units, unable to contain themselves any longer, had pressed forward towards the Polish line. As this first stage of the uprising reached a conclusion, there were diverse interpretations of the conditions in

Chapter 4
Upper Silesia. Cienciala and Komarnicki describe the uprising as petering out. Yet British documents relayed to the Foreign Office, picture a country gripped by terror, women ‘being barbarously flogged’ and men ‘murdered in cold blood by Polish insurgents’.165 At the same time, the British contingent’s internal documents, such as the diary of the District Controller at Olenso, whilst not diminishing the dangers posed by the situation, reveal a high degree of co-operation between the insurgents, the German para-militarists, and the Commission’s officials that is not apparent in Percival’s reports.166 Addressing the Sejm in Warsaw on 17 May, Witos claimed that the general strike had ended, most workmen had returned to work and that many insurgents had been withdrawn to avoid having them clash with the Freikorps and Selbstschutz units. He asserted that some districts were completely pacified and that if it had not been for the renewed fear of German attacks stimulated by Lloyd George’s speech, there had been every hope of the movement’s complete liquidation.167 On the other hand, Bourdillon reported that with the exception of the towns of Katowice, Bytom, Gliwice, and Krol Hutta, which were still controlled by French troops, the Polish insurgents had reorganised the local administration everywhere by appointing their own Polish district controllers, town commandants, local police and other functionaries. Houses were being ransacked for food and equipment, arrests were commonplace, and some people had been carried off as prisoners into Poland.168 This grip on the occupied area appeared to be have been further secured by Marinis’s decision to withdraw all of the Italian forces and concentrate them on the west side of the Oder.169

With regard to living and working conditions in the occupied area, water and power supplies had been maintained and Bourdillon reported that communications with Poland, including the rail links, remained open. The telecommunications systems were

Chapter 4
functioning but he reported that only a few mines and factories were operating. In any case, he added, there were no means of shifting the coal from the mines or the goods from the factories because, apart from trains being run by the insurgents for their own purposes, the only other trains in the occupied area were the occasional French-escorted military ones, running from Opole to Gliwice. In fact, coal production, which had resumed after Korfanty’s call for a return to work on 11 May, was climbing steadily towards half the normal production levels - see Chart 1. Whilst a proportion of the coal was being transported by rail into Poland, most was either used locally or stockpiled - see Chart 2.170

These restrictions on transportation, food and finance were all part of the unofficial German counter-campaign which Percival had earlier speculated about. Craig confirmed that it was now being encouraged by the German Upper Silesians’ own Politische Leitung or ‘Committee of Twelve’.171 On 15 May, Percival reported that there were now food shortages in the industrial area because the German railwaymen would not run trains there. He also noted that there was no money to pay out wages because the Reichbank had declined to provide the 250,000 marks German employers owed to the workers.172 Ten days later Warsaw also refused a request for money and provisions.173 In despair over the imminent exhaustion of Upper Silesia’s Food Department’s stock and the failure of his repeated attempts to get both the Commissioners or the German authorities to act, Craig telegraphed London on his own authority to alert them to the very serious humanitarian situation facing the towns if the conflict continued.174

As we have noted, Polish and some of the British accounts agree that at this particular point in the insurrection, the military conflict had become a relatively low key affair, with the Commission’s officials staving off the threatened German attacks by

Chapter 4
liaising between the two sides. Although Percival disagreed with him, Le Rond was optimistic that the Poles would soon retire and disperse. On the afternoon of 15 May, from Bytom, the Polish Consul General informed the Commission that to prevent any further bloodshed, the Polish Executive Committee were to invite the insurgents to disarm and return home to their work. A further telegram from General Brantes, relayed a fuller explanation. The Executive Committee believed that the insurrection had done enough to show the world ‘that it would be folly to impose on it a fresh German yoke’. They declared that there had been no ‘anarchy or excesses’ and the tragic incidents that had occurred ‘were deplored by all Upper Silesian Poles’. They declared that over 10,000 insurgents had been demobilised and that, as a first stage in the country’s pacification, they would pull back their forces sufficiently to ensure that they avoided clashing with the German armed units. But

in order that it should be possible to impose this sacrifice on our combatants, and that this should be successful, it is indispensable that [the] inter-allied Commission should supply us with moral arguments and real guarantees…. We request therefore that [the] zone evacuated by us may at once be occupied by [the] allies, so as to guarantee [the] Polish inhabitants against cruel reprisals such as they have already suffered in certain places.

Signed, Korfanty, Roguszczek, Rumpfelt, Rymer, Grogek.

Even if the Commission had been in a position to deliver the inter-Allied troops necessary to enable a peaceful demobilisation to take place, the Polish leadership’s new offer posed a problem. This was that since the earlier negotiations with Korfanty (8 -11 May), because of the prompting by the Ambassadors’ Conference and Percival’s general
reluctance to deal with the Poles, the Commission had declared that it would not negotiate with the insurgents. The new offer had also coincided with news about Lloyd George's speech which the Freikorpskämpfers had interpreted as a British signal for them to push the Poles out of Upper Silesia. However, it was this escalation in military attacks at points along the Korfanty line, but especially around Kosel and towards Góra Św. Anny, rather than any scruple on the part of the other Commissioners, that scuppered this second chance to terminate the insurrection. As for the influence British officials believed they had with the German para-military leaders, this proved of little value when they attempted to dissuade them from attacking the Poles.

Percival again offered to resign and suggested withdrawing the British contingent. Sympathising with their plight, Curzon asked them to continue performing their task in 'the interests of this country and of the European settlement'. However, with the Poles associating British officials with the German cause and an increased threat of full-scale civil war, Percival had good reasons to harbour 'grave fears for the safety of the British officers'. For example, at Olenso on 18 May, Polish leaders warned the British District Controller that should Major Creasy (a British police official whom they claimed had abused Poles and enquired about military dispositions) visit the town again, they could not guarantee his safety. By now Percival was approaching another breakdown. Discredited by the Poles and the French as a German puppet, fixated with compiling evidence about the Polish Army's alleged collaboration and Le Rond's and French officials partiality, his reports had lost all objectivity and his conclusions were despairing. Believing it pointless to be continually promising the Germans that the Commission would restore the situation,
he warned Le Rond that a German offensive ‘in which Upper Silesia would be overrun by a horde of irresponsible bands’, was now inevitable.\footnote{185}

On 15 May, von Moltke, who had replaced Hatzfeldt on the latter’s resignation in frustration at the Commission’s inability to restore order, suggested that the Reichswehr be placed under the control of the Commission’s British and Italian officers.\footnote{186} A very similar suggestion was made to D’Abernon in Berlin the following day. He believed this would enable Percival to use the German para-military forces ‘to clear the country of the invaders’.\footnote{187} By now, Percival and his staff appear to have become so disconnected from reality that it was only the high probability of armed clashes with the French military units which restrained them from accepting the German requests to legitimise Keatinge’s para-militarists by organising them into a security force directly under British control.\footnote{188}

In what was to be his last lengthy despatch about the situation, Percival gave his animosities free rein. The Polish insurgents, he declared, were determined to provoke a German counter-attack, hoping that events would provide Poland with an excuse to intervene or give France a pretext to occupy the Ruhr. The Germans’ patience astonished him. Seeing ‘their country overrun by an army of bandits with the single object of taking from them by foul means what they cannot obtain by fair - is, I think, more than men of any nation can stand’. Not unexpectedly, they were taking matters into their own hands and were attempting ‘to obtain by force of arms that justice which they have a right to expect from the Commission, and which the latter has failed to afford’.\footnote{189} The day after these opinions were despatched, on learning that Lloyd George had criticised the Italian Commissioner, Percival leapt to Marinis’ defence, once again threatening to resign.\footnote{190} Four days later, on 25 May, Bourdillon informed Curzon that

Chapter 4
Colonel Percival is confined to his bed and is on the verge of a serious breakdown as a result of continuous strain. One or two members of his staff are in the same condition and I consider immediate relief should be sent to prevent a breakdown of British representation.\textsuperscript{191}

In an non-attributable report prepared for Max Muller describing the working of the inter-Allied Commission in Opole, the *Times* and *Morning Star* regional correspondents both noted how Percival’s health had been giving way for ‘the last month or two’. It was their opinion that he should not have been directing the British contingent’s work during this time. The effect had been worsened by Percival retaining control from his sick-bed – to which he had been increasingly confined since the insurrection started. He delegated very little to his staff, with the result that their work was ‘unsystematic and haphazard’, with time being wasted on referring matters to Percival. The two correspondents also declared that they could not identify any subordinate there who was ‘strong-minded, broadminded and clear headed’ enough to take-over.\textsuperscript{192} Percival had the same problem. On finally tendering his resignation on 25 May 1921, he informed the Foreign Office that he did not consider his new deputy, Colonel Hawker, a suitable replacement.\textsuperscript{193} Bourdillon was sent to London to explain this and Percival clung on until 30 May – the same day that Sir Harold Stuart, a recent Rhineland Commissioner, was appointed to succeed him as the new British Commissioner.\textsuperscript{194} Writing privately to Crowe, Max Muller noted that several visitors to Upper Silesia had remarked on Percival’s inadequacy for such a ‘heavy and responsible task’. He also made the point that of late ‘poor Percival seemed to be attaching more and more importance to his personal differences with Le Rond’. He hoped that with the advent of the new Commissioner, the shortcomings of the British section of the inter-
Allied Commission would be eliminated. Happily, by this time, the only possible decision that could resolve the situation, namely the return of the British troops to Upper Silesia, had already been taken.

The German Government had been seeking the return of the four British battalions since the start of the insurrection. In London, their Ambassador had repeatedly claimed that British troops were ‘the only real safeguard for restoring order’. The new German Chancellor had declared that ‘a few English troops’ could change the whole situation. This situation was not unique to Upper Silesia. In the Rhineland occupation area the British were equally popular and the French equally despised. Now, with Germany having accepted the Allies’ reparation ultimatum, occupation of the Ruhr valley was now off the British Rhineland force’s agenda. The British troops on the Rhine were once again free for duty in Upper Silesia. In the Foreign Office, however, officials realised that the only way to get these troops there would be for Curzon to take the initiative. Crowe had broached the subject on 14 May, asking Curzon whether the Prime Minister might now consider sending troops. Their presence appeared to be the only means of checking the ‘unruly German elements in Silesia’ whose actions, Crowe pointed out, might provide the French with a pretext for occupying the Ruhr. Curzon, however, hesitated. Crowe tried once more, reminding Curzon of Britain’s treaty obligation to maintain order in Upper Silesia. This, said Crowe, was a duty that should not be taken lightly. He then proceeded to make an unfavourable comparison between Germany’s forced compliance with the Treaty’s provisions and the British Government’s evasion of its responsibilities.

When the Germans... plead the difficulties of internal security they are met with an inflexible demand to give effect to their [treaty] undertaking. Are we in a better

Chapter 4
position when we refuse to do our duty under the treaty on the ground that the despatch of troops causes internal difficulties.\textsuperscript{202}

Crowe concluded by pointing out that sending the British troops back to Upper Silesia, would not only increase the area’s security and put an end to the French jibes about the invalidity of the British criticism, but it would finally enable Curzon to ‘take a firm line’ with France over Upper Silesian issues.\textsuperscript{203}

This pitch appealed to Curzon who, as we have seen, was indeed attempting to pursue that ‘firm line’. Lloyd George concurred and citing his authority, Curzon informed the CIGS that they had decided to send five battalions back to Silesia. However, angered by Curzon’s pre-emptive manoeuvre, Wilson recorded:

I told him of course if he and the P. M. had settled the matter there was nothing more to more to be said about it except to send the battalions, but I would be failing in my duty if I did not tell him plainly that it was madness; that five battalions solved no problem; that they might get into a horrid mess; that we did not know how long they would be there; that they would be under French Command, and quite possibly have a quarrel with the French troops; and so forth; and then I finished up by saying that how anybody in their senses could dream of sending troops to Silesia when Ireland was in the condition she was in passed my understanding.\textsuperscript{204}

Shaken, Curzon consulted Lloyd George. He telephoned back to Wilson to say that the Prime Minister had now ‘agreed to 4 Rhine battalions going to Silesia, but only if the French asked for our help, and if I [CIGS] could arrange it with Foch’.\textsuperscript{205} Wilson did so, but perhaps not quite as the politicians had envisaged. Before the Embassy in Paris had

\textit{Chapter 4}
processed Curzon's official enquiry, Foch let it be known that the situation did not require British battalions to be sent to Upper Silesia. The representatives in Paris saw this as indicative of French military policy there, but this view was not shared by Curzon. Suspecting Wilson's handiwork, he pointed out that, 'This is not a French refusal. Only, so far, the refusal of Marshal Foch'. Indeed, when Briand wrote to London on 21 May, he welcomed the British Government's decision and asked that the move be 'promptly executed'. Similar messages about the troops were sent to Rome. Orders for all four Rhine battalions to proceed to Upper Silesia were despatched on 23 May.

An unhappy Wilson warned the new Minister for War, Worthington-Evans, 'that it was an unwise, and possibly dangerous move', and advised him to alert the Cabinet. It was discussed in Cabinet the following day during a wide-ranging examination of Anglo-French relations. Churchill, supported by Sir Austen Chamberlain, proposed attempting to gain French consent for British-backed economic concessions for Germany by offering France a written guarantee of military assistance in the event of an unprovoked German attack. This was rejected. Instead, the Cabinet decided to send six battalions to Upper Silesia in place of the original four. Once the troops were committed, Wilson ensured that the force was well equipped. Percival had requested that it be mobile, self-sufficient, with 'armoured cars, tanks and aeroplanes'. Wilson described it as 'waspish', suggesting that, though small, it had more than adequate firepower.

Since the British Army Council felt that the loyalty of Southern Irish regiments was questionable (and, therefore, could not use them in Ireland), Wilson decided to send two of them, the 2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment and the 2nd Battalion Connaught Rangers, out of Britain to join forces with the four Rhine battalions forming 'The British Upper
Silesian Force’. Placed under the command of General William Heneker (Commander of the Independent Division on standby for service in Upper Silesia in 1919), the British force was divided into two under-sized brigades. The First Silesian Brigade was placed under the command of Colonel A.G. Wauchope, who had been British Commander during the recent plebiscite. This comprised his own 2nd Battalion the Black Watch, also the 1st Durham Light Infantry and the 2nd Leinster Regiment. Colonel H.B.P.L. Kennedy was the Commander of the Second Silesian Brigade. This comprised the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers, the 3rd Middlesex Regiment and the 2nd Connaught Rangers. A squadron of cavalry from the 14th Hussars was added in June and in September another Southern Irish battalion, the 2nd Munster Fusiliers, and one of the Northern Irish battalions, the 2nd Inniskilling Fusiliers, arrived to reinforce them. Thus, until the Southern Irish Battalions were disbanded on the Irish Free State’s formation early in 1922, Irish and Scots soldiers formed three-quarters of the British Silesian force.

The initial movement of the 4,000 British troops to locations around Opole was completed between 26 May and 6 June. The force was an integral part of the inter-Allied Commission’s military command structure but Heneker retained day to day control. From the outset he refused any orders that he believed favoured the insurgents at the expense of the Germans. To ensure an understanding between the French and the British Staff Headquarters, Wilson appointed Colonel Sir Edward Grogan as his personal liaison officer with Gratier. Whilst Grogan sent regular despatches to Wilson, his real task was to arrange for the exchange of information between the respective commanders and to ensure that each understood the other’s point of view. His appointment reputedly did not please Le Rond, who had been using his seniority and position as head of the Commission to

Chapter 4
dominate Gratier on military matters. But Wilson was determined that the military commanders would not repeat the Commissioners’ mistakes. When difficulties between Gratier and Heneker were reported to him, Wilson reminded the British Commander that in this or any military operations you undertake it is essential to preserve the Allied facade vis-à-vis the Poles and the Germans, otherwise it will give a handle for every kind of mischievous propaganda, and encourage efforts to effect a breach between the French and ourselves which must be avoided at all costs.

This was important. The local German press had been carefully presenting the British troops as separate strike force committed to action against the Polish insurgents. In their conversations with Hoefer’s Chief of Staff, the Times and Morning Star correspondents became convinced that the Germans intended to get the British fighting on their side. They had also warned Max Muller that many British officials on the Commission accepted this German interpretation but failed to realise its implicit danger. Max Muller reported that Narod had published Hoefer’s remarks about German and British troops fighting together against the French. He warned Curzon that should these ideas get around, then the Polish Government might lose influence with Korfanty who, in turn, might lose control over the Polish insurgents. Max Muller told Curzon that Britain’s pro-German image was further reinforced by the British officers’ near-total control over the all-German plebiscite police force. It was bad enough having the plebiscite police co-ordinating their actions against the insurgents with the Selbstschutz, but having them guarding Hoeffer’s headquarters as well, seemed to Max Muller, ‘rather a tall order’.

The British military did realise the dangers and difficulties that being identified with one side posed for them. More than one officer equated their situation to Ireland, with
'Sinn Fein = the Poles, the U.V.F = Selbstschutz, Crown forces = inter-Allied Forces'. The difference was that 'the Poles were not murdering the inter-Allied troops'. A briefing paper alerting British military officers to this and other aspects of the conflict, remarked on the extraordinary situation existing there with Poles not objecting to French troops being behind their lines and Germans wanting to 'advance shoulder to shoulder with the British' to crush the Polish insurgents. But, the paper gave strong and valuable advice:

Owing to German propaganda the Poles believe the British have identified themselves with the German cause, and would probably fire on advancing British troops. This is all the more certain as many of the Poles are without discipline and are recruited from a very low class.

The officers were instructed to impress on their men the need for them to act impartially, and for them to emphasise that they were acting in concert with their French and Italians colleagues. Good will was essential and they must show 'by word and deed' that they valued and respected their allies. It was not long before Heneker could claim that the inter-Allied soldiers were preserving the Entente and that the rank and file were 'the very best of pals'.

Before travelling on to Opole, Heneker spent one day (1 June) in Berlin where he discussed the situation with D'Abernon; he also met von Seeckt, who assured him that the Reichswehr would not enter Upper Silesia. Neither he nor Sir Harold Stuart had direct contact with the German Government – their requests for assistance and co-operation were made through the Foreign Office and D'Abernon. Heneker decided to establish the British headquarters at Strzelce and then try to occupy the high ground around Gora Sw. Anny - still the main area of conflict between the two sides. As we noted earlier, unable to
contain themselves any longer, the German Southern Group had launched a full-scale operation against the insurgents holding this vitally strategic position. In the three days of fighting that followed, both sides had suffered heavy losses. The main fighting ended on 23 May when the Freikorps forces, supported by Selbstschutz and the British led, all-German plebiscite police units, had stormed the hill. But the day after this celebrated Freikorps victory, the German Government had issued a decree outlawing all volunteer military organisations. This had been done not simply in response to French diplomatic pressure and the threat to occupy the Ruhr. It was done because Berlin had misgivings over the many reports appearing about the Freikorps units' undisciplined and insensitive activities in Upper Silesia. And, as Cienciala and Komarnicki have noted, the decision to disband them (nominal since they simply became official Selbstschutz units) was also clearly connected to the simultaneous announcement of the return of the British troops. The decree nevertheless aroused intense bitterness in the ranks of the Freikorpskämpfers, and provided the Weimar Republic's most vociferous opponents with yet another stick with which to beat it. When the Nazis took power twelve years later, one of their first actions was to commemorate the victory at Sw. Anny by erecting a monument there.

Following on from the German Government's new-found understanding with Britain, Berlin had ordered Hoefer to tighten control over his men and prevent any further German advances. When the British troops began arriving in Upper Silesia, in exchange for a more formal status and involvement in the decision-making process, the Selbstschutz tended to co-operate with any requests made by the British military officers. It was the role of Warsaw and the French to negotiate with the insurgents. We should also note that when Heneker and Sir Harold Stuart arrived in Opole, although the situation was
Photo 3: Amphitheatre Góra Św. Anny built during the Nazi era on the site of the Freikorps victory over Polish Silesian Insurgents May 1921.
Photo 4: Freikorps Memorial Góra Św. Anny
(Plates have been removed)
Photo 5: Monastery on top of Góra Św. Anny

The plan eventually adhered to was similar to the proposal the Polish leadership had made on the 15 May which had been, as the Polish insurgents realized, an inter-Allied military force would occupy the vacated territory—preventing Sofia-based units filling the vacuum. *221* Le Bourd had blamed the Commission’s rejection of this offer on Percival’s refusal to deal with the insurgents. *221* However, as we noted, there were no Allied troops available to occupy the area and renewed German attacks around Kościel and Św. Anny had caused a resumption of fighting. Ten days later Marinos and Percival proposed a variation...
dangerous, it was not quite as dire as that which had confronted Percival. Apart from the
French agreeing to bring the Selbstschutz into the negotiations and the renewed British
military participation, the improvement was also attributable to an improvement in the
German food supplies (after strong representations by Curzon), a slight easing in Anglo-
French political tensions and, most importantly, the conciliatory nature of the proposals
emerging from the Gliwice district military commander’s (General Brantes) renewed
negotiations with Korfanty. 238 On the other hand, with the Freikorps units absorbed into
the Selbstschutz, Hoefer’s control was far from complete. Local skirmishing continued and
in direct defiance of Hoefer’s orders German breakouts were attempted from Sw. Anny,
Kluczbork, and at other points along the Korfanty line. Hoefer’s co-operation with the
Allies was also conditional on the French forces continuing to protect the Germans
occupying the towns. Although, on occasion, the French threatened to abandon them to
the insurgents, for Hoefer their occupation had the advantage of tying most of the French
units down and minimising French contact with his Selbstschutz. 239 With the French
garrisoning the towns and the Italians avoiding contact with the insurgents, the greater
share of the work of separating the two sides and defusing the situation fell to the British.

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refusal to deal with the insurgents. 241 However, as we noted, there were no Allied troops
available to occupy the area and renewed German attacks around Kosel and Sw. Anny had
caused a resumption of fighting. Ten days later Marinis and Percival proposed a variation
on Ottley’s scheme (which had already been rejected by the Ambassadors’) to allocate uncontested parts of the plebiscite area to the Germans and the Poles respectively.\textsuperscript{242} Yet, despite Percival’s and Marinis’ modifications to Ottley’s rejected plan, the Ambassadors turned the proposal down again.\textsuperscript{243} This time, however, the rejection was because on 27 May, the Polish leadership offered to surrender the occupied territory unconditionally.\textsuperscript{244}

Welcoming Korfanty’s proposal, the Commission reported to the Ambassadors that it could only be put into effect after the British troops had arrived.\textsuperscript{245} Until then, the Commission still had no means of containing the \textit{Selbstschutz}. The military staff in Opole drew up plans to implement their intervention strategy - later known as the ‘neutral zone’ scheme. But Heneker (then \textit{en route} to Opole) expressed concern about the dangers of the plan, which involved inserting his British soldiers into the ‘no man’s land’ between the Polish and German lines. Despite Korfanty’s agreement to the plan, Heneker envisioned great difficulty persuading the belligerents to retire once the neutral zone was established. He feared that his British battalions would find themselves stuck in the middle of a \textit{de facto} partition between two hostile nations.\textsuperscript{246}

The practical difficulties in implementing the plan soon became apparent when, two days after the Durham Light Infantry’s arrival in Silesia, a German offensive pushed the insurgents back nearly into Gliwice. The Durhams inter-posed themselves between the two sides by occupying Sw. Anny’s southern slopes. But they failed to gain the important high ground that Heneker had wanted because the Germans would not move.\textsuperscript{247} The Leinsters had more success at Olenso on 7 June, when the Poles did agree to yield territory.\textsuperscript{248} The Polish Silesians had responded to the arrival of the British troops by putting their case to them.
To the

**British troops in Upper-Silesia**

The Germans have tried to persuade you that you have been sent to Upper-Silesia to crush a rebellion against Great-Britain and the other Allied powers. They have painted us as black as possible for their own ends.

**Don’t believe them**

We are not rebelling against the authority of the Allies.
We are not Polish regulars disguised as Upper Silesians.

We are not Bolsheviks.

We are not enemies[sic] of Great Britain, France and Italy; we are their loyal friends and many of us deserted from the German army during the Great War to serve in your ranks and help fight the Huns.

We are workmen and farmers born and bred in the country, who will sooner die than go back to German rule...

The only right a “Polish swine” as the German’s[sic], call us ever had was to get less wages than the Germans, and pay higher taxes and go and get killed for the Kaiser and Fatherland...

We are condemned to live and die as white slaves in order to furnish cheap labour to our German masters...

We are not telling you this...to make you disobey orders, you are soldiers and we know that you must do your duty. We only want you to understand that we are not your enemies[sic]...²⁴⁹

With an estimated 60,000 combatants facing each other on either side of the line, there were too few British troops to enforce their will. For example, in the relatively small 180 square mile neutral zone that they had established after occupying Olenso, the

Chapter 4
Leinsters had just 400 men to police it. This meant that the British troops had to rely on diplomacy, good humour and occasional threats, to prise the insurgents from their positions. They then had to apply these same skills to ensure that the insurgents did not try to return or that the Selbstschutz entered the neutral zone thus established. It was soon discovered that ‘if threatened, the Germans would do as they were told, while the Poles, if well treated would do as they were asked’. Contrary to Percival’s reports, the British troops found most insurgents to be youths clad in various mixtures of civilian clothes and uniforms. They carried a variety of arms and practically no equipment, lacked military discipline and it was not unusual for whole groups to disobey their officer. Nevertheless, in their own way, ‘they managed to get things done’.  

The British troops also found passions on both sides were inflamed to unbelievable degrees of hatred and mistrust. Fed an incessant stream of stories from all sides about attacks, murders, battles, and atrocities, after time and effort expended investigating the allegations, the British troops came to the conclusion ‘that there was no such thing as truth in Upper Silesia’. From experience, they also learned that the plebiscite police were incapable of impartiality and that the Poles regarded them as simply another German force. When on 14 June, the Polish and German forces were finally separated by one long continuous neutral zone, the British military force commanders discouraged the British-led plebiscite police from entering it.

In this new situation, the British military’s behaviour not only caused some tension but it also displayed some confusion. Not only was there friction between British soldiers and the Commission’s British officials: orders had to be issued reminding both officials and troops that even when these ex-officers were wearing military uniform, they had no
control over the military action. More seriously from a military point of view, in reports to Stuart, two of his officials, Colonel Hawker, and Major MacVey of the Communications Department, both mentioned that British troops were fraternising with the insurgents. 254 And when visiting the area around Gliwice, they had found that the Middlesex battalion’s officers appeared to be under the impression that the British and French troops were there to stop a German advance. Regarding the insurgents, their only orders were ‘to return fire if fired at’. Hawker believed that the Connaught Rangers’ officers had also failed to grasp the general situation. One told Hawker that keeping the Selbstschutz in check allowed the insurgents to concentrate their forces elsewhere, At Wauchope’s Brigade Headquarters, Hawker noticed Polish flags flying over the building his Black Watch signallers were sharing with the Poles; and at the Polish 1st Division’s Headquarters near Łąbędy railway junction, a lieutenant there had told MacVey how the insurgents had been so agreeably surprised by the attitude which the British troops had taken towards them. They had anticipated their coming as enemies. The reverse had turned out to be the case. Insurgents and British now mingled in friendly fashion whenever they were thrown together. They played football with each other and carried out their respective duties without friction. 255

To anyone who has served in the armed forces, the above descriptions bear the stamp of authenticity. Afraid that the British troops (these were the Black Watch), would soon be as friendly with the Polish insurgents as the French soldiers were, Heneker had Wauchope’s brigade re-deployed closer to the British Commander’s Headquarters at Strzelce where they would have much less contact with the Poles. 256 The confused sense of purpose that Hawker had found amongst the British military officers probably resulted
from the plan for the Polish withdrawal having not yet been formulated. This had been
delayed because many considerations requiring delicate negotiations had to be resolved
beforehand.\textsuperscript{257} Not least were the two conditions submitted by the Poles on 8 June. The
first of these was that the \textit{Selbstschutz} should also withdraw and disband. The second was
that a general amnesty should be granted and that after the withdrawal the Polish Silesians
would not be treated less favourably than the Germans.\textsuperscript{258}

Unsurprisingly, the German Silesians, making the most of their role as innocent
victims, had great difficulty accepting these conditions.\textsuperscript{259} There were discussions between
Commission representatives, Hoefer and the German \textit{Politische Leitung}, face to face
meetings between Heneker and Hoefer, and daily negotiations between Hoefer and
Colonel Dillon, Heneker’s Chief of Staff, before the many differences were eventually
overcome.\textsuperscript{260} The course of these negotiations are more than adequately recorded in the
published British documents. Had all of the sides failed to agree, or had the Poles not
withdrawn from the plebiscite area completely, Heneker had a ‘bolder and more active’
contingency plan which first involved cutting the insurgents’ supply routes by seizing the
Herby-Lubliniec and the Poznan’-Kluczbork railway lines. Then, after Keatinge had
expanded the plebiscite police force to 15,000, with their aid and the acquiescence of the
French, using the \textit{Selbstschutz} as a rearguard, the British and Italian forces would stage a
\textit{coup} in and around the industrial area.\textsuperscript{261} This plan was Heneker’s and Stuart’s preferred
option. In fact, well aware of the difficulty they would encounter getting the French to go
along with such an action, they had only initially pursued the French-backed scheme for a
progressive withdrawal of Polish forces so as to place them in a position to insist on
French compliance with their plan once the Polish withdrawal had failed – as they
expected it would. Therefore, anticipating implementation of their alternative plan, Stuart asked the Foreign Office to once again pursue the closure of the Polish-Upper Silesia frontier by having some Allied officers sent from Warsaw to monitor it. By chance, Grogan later met these monitors when they were in Bytom. They told him that they were satisfied that no arms or munitions were crossing into Upper Silesia.

German press reports that the Polish insurrectionary movement was being taken over by Communists 'waving red flags', found their way into American and British newspapers. British intelligence reported that party and secret meetings attended by prominent Communists from Germany and Russia, were frequently held in Opole and in the industrial districts. One report claimed that a Red Army of 21,000 already existed and that the Comintern had made several million pounds sterling available for propaganda purposes in Upper Silesia. Communists in neighbouring countries had been ordered to enrol themselves in the ranks of Korfanty's troops and to do everything in their power to transform the Polish nationalist movement into a Bolshevik movement – a Bolshevik tactic that they had successfully practised further east. Although there appears to have been some anarchic behaviour as this third insurgency drew to a close, most of these reports about Communist activity were generally crude right-wing German propaganda, bearing little relationship to the actual events. In fact, a Commission intelligence report later put the total number of Communist adherents in Upper Silesia at 5,410 of which only 135 came from the Polish Silesian strongholds of Pszczyna and Rybnik. The vast majority could be found amongst German industrial workers inhabiting the industrial towns.

On the 24 June, Korfanty signed up to the Commission's plan for the phased withdrawal of the insurgents from Upper Silesia. He also issued a proclamation calling on
the Poles to adhere to its conditions and to avoid any ‘excesses’. Apart from the increased amount of German agitation in the towns and occupied territories plus Selbstschutz forays into them, there had also been an escalation in general lawlessness since the first talk of a Polish withdrawal. The final plan that emerged from the negotiations took account of German scepticism over the insurgents’ ability and intention to withdraw peacefully. The Poles were to make four staged withdrawals within seven days. Once the first stage was completed and this had been verified, the German Selbstschutz units would fall back to a new line – though still within the plebiscite area. The Poles would complete two more stages and once these had also been verified, both the Polish insurgents and the members of the Selbstschutz would leave the plebiscite area. Other conditions imposed were that only British troops would take-over Św. Anny, an amnesty would be announced, and the local government officials displaced by the insurgents would be reinstated. If one side refused to complete a stage, the Commission would permit the other to return to its previous position. By not extending the amnesty to people found in possession of weapons, the Commission hoped that this would go some way towards disarming the population. However, as Grogan predicted and as proved the case in practice, the pacification of the country would only be superficial because all arms would simply be concealed until the next emergency.

Like the German Silesians, most of Wirth’s Cabinet did not believe Korfanty’s assurances that the Poles would withdraw, nevertheless, in response to intense Allied pressure, the German Government persuaded Hoefer and the Politische Leitung to also accept the plan. The Berlin Legation had warned London that Wirth’s Government had already been weakened by ‘their inability to show that acceptance of the ultimatum has
Hoefer signed the plan on Sunday 26 June – the same day that Heneker had held a garden party for over five hundred Allied soldiers, officials and their families in the grounds of his headquarters in Strzelce. Grogan thought that it had ‘only required the presence of Korfanty and Hoefer to complete the picture’. The aim of the party was to cement inter-Allied friendship and Stuart believed that its success must have convinced the Germans and Poles of the Entente’s solidarity. The withdrawal plan was implemented just two days later. The insurgents and Selbstschutz faded into their communities, the external para-military forces left the area and by July 5 the third Upper Silesian insurrection was over.

Although the insurgents had offered to vacate the area they occupied before the British troops had arrived, the Allied threat to occupy the Ruhr valley (their main sanction against a German attack) might not in itself have prevented the less-disciplined elements of the Selbstschutz units from following up any early Polish withdrawal and re-igniting the conflict. One inescapable conclusion concerning the insurrection’s relatively peaceful outcome must be that such a disastrous development was solely prevented by the renewed British military presence in Upper Silesia. This, and the patient but firm negotiating tactics of the British military officers in their dealings with Hoefer and the Selbstschutz, provided the German Silesians with sufficient confidence to allow the Allies one final opportunity to fulfil their Peace Treaty commitment to maintain order in Upper Silesia.

The same was true if developments are examined in the wider context. Wirth’s policy of fulfilment coupled with Britain’s increased influence in Berlin (due to Lloyd George and D’Abernon’s personal hints and intimations to the German Government to expect a favourable outcome of the Upper Silesian settlement), provided Berlin with
enough confidence to pressurise the recalcitrant German Silesians and their Freikorps allies to comply with the withdrawal plan. Therefore, leaving aside the degree in which the British Government’s high-handed, if not arrogant, attitude contributed towards inciting the insurrection, all sorts of alternative scenarios, ranging from the ending of the Entente, to renewed warfare across Northern Europe, were possible without the British Army’s return to Upper Silesia. Of course, all of this was appreciated in the Foreign Office, which made Wilson’s call for Heneker’s troops to be immediately withdrawn to the Rhine to be, in Curzon’s words, ‘out of the question’. 279

From having been the main force establishing the neutral zone, during the Polish insurgents’ withdrawal the British were mainly engaged in the plebiscite area’s northern districts. As the insurgents retired, the British troops followed them through each phase of the withdrawal. Because of the lack of inter-Allied troops (and reflecting the status that the Allies had been forced to accord them), the Selbstschutz had been ‘trusted’ to fulfil their commitment to the plan. The British were also responsible for Tarnowski Gory, Bytom and their surrounding districts. Stuart had insisted on them occupying part of the industrial area and places with a predominantly German population. 280 Unlike the French, who had suffered casualties at the hands of the Germans, the British lost only one man during the establishment of the neutral zone and did not suffer any casualties during the insurgents’ withdrawal. 281 This relatively peaceful withdrawal was attributed locally to a long spell of cold weather dampening the Selbstschutz and the insurgents’ fighting spirits. 282 However, some of the Middlesex did become embroiled in one unpleasant incident – typifying what would be the future experience of the French forces in Upper Silesia. Arriving at barracks in Bytom to take over the garrison there, they witnessed the wounding of two French
Map 5  Military Areas of Responsibility from July 1921

Chapter 4
soldiers by shots fired from a crowd of Germans assembled to cheer the British troops' arrival. When the French Commandant went to investigate, he was shot in the back of the head at point blank range. According to the British reports, their troops immediately cordoned-off the area and attempted to stop French troops taking retaliatory action, but some of them opened fire on the crowd as it dispersed. Later, nearby, eight more Germans died after being either shot or bayoneted. The next day, a French armoured car fired on a crowd in Bytom wounding several more.\textsuperscript{283} French troops also seized the mayor and nine hostages but the British Commissioner later interceded and secured their release.\textsuperscript{284}

With the withdrawal completed, Wauchope set up his headquarters at Brynek, north-west of Tarnowski Gory and detachments of the Black Watch were deployed across Lubliniec – territory familiar to them from their March visit. The Leinsters were located at Koszecin and the Durhams stationed around Opole.\textsuperscript{285} After a detachment of Durham’s had been called out to help quell disturbances there on 12 July, a sergeant was killed by a stray bullet.\textsuperscript{286} Kennedy’s Brigade Headquarters were at Kochice. The Royal Irish were located at Tarnowski and at Miasteczko and, as noted above, some of the Middlesex companies were in Bytom (accompanied by the British tanks). Others were located at Meichowice and Rokitnica. They were supported by the Connaught Rangers who were also deployed in and around Bytom.\textsuperscript{287} Throughout the whole period the British forces were present in Upper Silesia, the British Divisional Headquarters remained at Strzelce – although Heneker himself took up residence at Schloss Turawa, the home of Count Garnier (one of Percival’s recent confidants).\textsuperscript{288}

Heneker found that the ‘British troops had been received everywhere with cheers and flowers and elaborate demonstrations of welcome’.\textsuperscript{289} A few days later, however, he
had to report that Polish miners in Bytom were threatening to strike in protest at the presence of the British troops there.290 As well as maintaining readiness in case a Polish putsch or a Bolshevik rising occurred before the Supreme Council reached a verdict on Upper Silesia’s future, the British commander had planned on dispersing his troops in a manner that would assist the police to prevent infiltration and the passage of arms and munitions across the Polish border.291 However, before long, Heneker came to the conclusion that a further Polish insurrection was unlikely. He believed that the looting and destruction said to have been committed by the insurgents ‘had done considerable harm to Poland’s cause in Upper Silesia’.292 But a few days later he was expressing his unease over reports that because of alleged weakness during their recent negotiations, certain influential Germans had managed to have Hoefer replaced. General von Lequis, his rumoured successor, was reported to have commanded a Reichswehr Brigade in Upper Silesia during 1919 when the Germans had committed ‘terrible atrocities’ against the Poles.293 Though both he and Stuart would later play it down, at this point Heneker thought it possible that the Germans were thinking of attempting to seize the industrial area. The British forces had their own contingency plans for a Polish or a German insurrection. Heneker warned that if either occurred, the consequences were likely to be considerable.294 With this in mind, if there was to be any delay to the Supreme Council’s Upper Silesian decision, then both he and Stuart wanted another British brigade sent out.295

The necessity for increasing the British military presence was further underlined just a few days later, when Heneker reported that France was preparing to send an additional infantry division (10,000 men) to Upper Silesia.296 When Heneker and Stuart had insisted
that any inter-Allied military planning must compel the French forces to resist any future Polish rising, Le Rond had wanted even more troops. To Stuart, more French troops also meant a lesser ratio of British troops and the possibility that Le Rond would want Heneker’s men concentrated in a much smaller area completely outwith the industrial triangle. When the French also suggested that a German insurrection was imminent, both Stuart and Heneker (who had been overwhelmed with German reassurances to the contrary), began discounting this. Instead, they continued Percival’s previous line, claiming that the Le Rond was seeking to introduce reinforcements in a bid to provoke German retaliation. This would provide the French with an excuse to occupy the Ruhr valley and give added salience to their argument ‘that the heart of Upper Silesia should go to the Poles’. Heneker told the War Office that:

1. On no account must a fresh French division be allowed to come here.
2. If it does British troops must be augmented.
3. Supreme Council should come to a decision as soon as possible for the time for it is particularly ripe.

By that last remark, Heneker meant that despite the many press reports of the critical situation in Upper Silesia, it was in fact relatively peaceful and quiet. In the agricultural areas harvesting was now underway and industry was returning to normal production. He claimed that the only unrest being created was due to the deliberately provocative actions of the French military as they searched for German weapons, Freikorpskämpfers and any other such undesirables who had not cleared the area. Despite Heneker’s words, apart from a few politically opportune moments of peace, from this point onwards the French troops and Silesian Poles in the more marginal Polish voting districts experienced
escalating violence directed towards them by marauding bands of armed Germans and the
(now-covert) local Selbstschutz units. Nor were the Poles blameless. Relations between
the Polish authorities and some of the ex-insurgents who had re-crossed the border back
into Poland completely broke down. British intelligence reported that 43 were killed and
wounded by the Polish Army in an engagement near Czestochowa. Upper Silesia’s
POW organisation, however, remained intact. Through it, the Poles appear to have dished
out as much as they received. Only two weeks after the insurrection had ended, Heneker
reported that 6,000 Germans had already fled from the Rybnik district. And as
minorities from each side began to seek safety in greater numbers, a spontaneous regional
partition began to take shape.

Another Anglo-French crisis erupted when the news arrived in London about the
French decision to send another division to Upper Silesia. This decision had been taken
without the least inter-Allied consultation. Berlin was set on denying the French division
permission to transit across Germany. After French and German threats and counter-
threats painted both sides into their respective corners, it took skilful diplomacy on the
part of Hardinge to resolve the confrontation. France eventually sent 1,700 men, with
the British and Italians sending 650 each. These numbers were eventually decided upon
after the Supreme Council referred the question to the Versailles Military Committee on
12 August. This draft raised the total Allied forces to just over 20,000 men, which was
an improvement, but well short of the 26,000 that had been decided on in 1919. Heneker
eventually conceded that he could ‘not keep the country free from disturbances unless he
had 60,000 to 70,000’ troops under his command – figures which closely matched the

Chapter 4
64,000 soldiers that Foch had always insisted were necessary to garrison the plebiscite area properly.\(^{310}\)

The insurrection had lasted for two months but a resolution to Upper Silesia’s problems appeared as far away as ever. For various reasons, not least Briand’s parliamentary majority, in the immediate aftermath of the insurrection it proved difficult to arrange a Supreme Council meeting to decide Upper Silesia’s future.\(^{311}\) Yet, from Opole, Grogan had reported to Wilson that amidst the many rumours concerning the region’s fate and the gossip about British and French attitudes, what stood out was ‘the necessity to arrive at some sort of solution – the best or even an indifferent one – quickly’.\(^{312}\) The Entente’s continuing differences over Upper Silesia did not augur well for any agreement between them over its future. In London, as the apparent French procrastination continued, Foreign Office officials began to suspect that France now intended delaying that meeting and the decision as long as possible.

**Summary**

When the May 1921 insurrection was mooted, there may have been elements within the ranks of the Polish Silesians who had more drastic intentions in mind. However, the insurrection that did take place was essentially a demonstration by the Upper Silesian workers against what they considered was a British and Italian plot to force most of them back into Prussian bondage. Having tasted what Social Democratic Prussia and the new Germany had to offer them in 1919-20, they expected even worse than what had gone before. The insurrection’s initial success might have encouraged some early hopes of a Wilno-style coup but this quickly faded in the face of the Allied and Polish governments’
opposition. Despite the allegations to the contrary, given its limited military resources, the Commission's response was all that it could have been. Too much weight cannot be placed on the opinion of the British Commissioner and his officials. They were not employed in Upper Silesia as military experts and most had their own particular axe to grind. It was noticeable that when British troops returned, Heneker was careful to avoid spreading his force as thinly as the French units had been one month earlier. Heneker also moved quickly to halt the instances of British troops fraternising with the Poles. He knew that had it continued it would have been difficult to use them against the insurgents.

Given all of this, and the fact that French troops in Upper Silesia had experienced a hostile, German-run hate campaign for over eighteen months, it has to be said that British expectations about the impartiality of French officials and soldiers were highly unrealistic. Nevertheless, Gratier's action in preserving the major towns as 'safe-havens' for German Silesians undoubtedly helped contain what would otherwise have been a far more serious situation. And notwithstanding Percival's effort to gather such material, it is impossible from the existing British documentary evidence to endorse British allegations of French complicity over the insurrection. The Commission's confused military reaction to the insurrection would also appear to have made this unlikely. It was probably the speedy resumption of the relaxed relationship between the French troops and the Polish Silesians that fed this suspicion. It is also worth noting that despite all of the charges about Polish regular units supporting the insurgents, there is little or no evidence of the Polish Army's direct involvement in the fighting in Upper Silesia.\footnote{Hardinge and Max Muller both complained that many of the British allegations to this effect were derived from German sources. These were unsubstantiated and 'distorted by national prejudice'.} Visiting the
German internment camp at Kottbus on 31 May, a British official found that out of 740 prisoners there, only 18 were not Upper Silesians.\textsuperscript{315}

The involvement of the \textit{Freikorps} units was one of the most fascinating aspects of the 1921 insurrection. The establishment of the \textit{Selbstschutz} units under Hoefer was explicable in that it gave Berlin a degree of influence with German para-militarists operating outside its nominal control. The \textit{Freikorpskämpfer}, however, were generally monarchists and all were vehemently opposed to the Republic. Some of the units in Upper Silesia had even been involved in the \textit{Kapp Putsch} a year earlier, In justification it can be argued that Wirth’s Cabinet was in a difficult position. The signing of the May ultimatum on reparations, committing themselves to fulfilling the Treaty, was not a popular choice and they had made themselves prisoners of the British over Upper Silesia’s future. They also faced stern political opposition from the militarist and reactionary parties. Most German industrialists opposed them because they wanted to implement higher taxation, and the new treaty-limited \textit{Reichswehr} could not be used. Wirth and other senior political figures also believed that despite their political differences, the \textit{Freikorps} was still a necessary evil to be endured as long as a Communist \textit{coup} remained a threat. In Upper Silesia the main threat came from the culturally inferior, universally despised Poles, therefore the volunteers’ services could be accepted in the spirit of a patriotic crusade. The French units garrisoning the towns during the insurrection were under specific orders not to engage either the insurgents or the German volunteer units unless they were fired on. This meant that the French troops did not intervene when the \textit{Freikorps}, \textit{Selbstschutz} and plebiscite police were being used against the Poles – actions condoned, encouraged and sometimes even controlled by the Commission’s British police officials. Nevertheless, the

\textbf{Chapter 4}
German Government eventually found that the risk of an international incident (such as a clash between their volunteers and French troops) stemming from the Freikorps' lack of political and military finesse, became too great. Given this and the Allied pressure to comply with the provisions of the Peace Treaty, Wirth had no option but to officially disband the Freikorps.

With few exceptions, the split between Le Rond and the other Commissioners was reflected at every level of Commission activity. The period around the middle of May was probably the lowest point in the Commission's fortunes. When Stuart arrived in Opole, he found that Percival 'had been too weak' and 'too ignorant of the details of administration' to prevent Le Rond dominating the Commission. This assessment, however, was a shade unfair on Percival. Stuart had arrived in Opole with a sizeable contingent of British troops whereas Percival had never enjoyed any military input, except over the month that the plebiscite had been held. It has to be borne in mind that despite having experienced Percival's administrative failings and well-aware that his staff had little confidence in him, the Foreign Office nevertheless returned him to duty in Opole the previous November knowing that his health was failing.

In Poland the insurrection had tested the Witos Government and ended Prince Sapieha's tenure as Foreign Minister. Despite the strong surge in patriotic support for the Silesian Poles and the concerns of the Polish Left, which had very close links with the Polish Silesian workers, the Government held to its firm line. Unpopular as this was at first, their problems appear to have been more generally appreciated by the press and the public after the initial euphoria had diminished. There was also a realisation that in Poland in matters such as these, power did not necessarily reside with the Sejm. This was a lesson

Chapter 4
rather rudely brought home to Max Muller when an element within the Polish military authorities ran a press campaign against the British passport office after a Polish Army officer had been charged with supplying ‘important mobilisation plans to an English agent’. Max Muller attempted to elicit some credit from London for the part the Polish Government had played in calming press and public attitudes over the insurrection. This, however, drew no response from the Foreign Office. Also discouraging were the results of his attempts to repair the damage to relations caused by Lloyd George’s 13 May speech. Prior to this, most Poles had believed that it had only been Lloyd George who had opposed them. Now, wrote the Kurjer Warszawski, they could see that the whole British nation ‘doubted the possibility of Poland’s continued existence’. This left France as Poland’s only friend - which was probably how French business, with its eye on the Upper Silesian industries, wanted it.

The third insurrection was brought to an end just four weeks after the return of the British troops and the arrival of the new British Commissioner. Their presence gave the German Government and the German Silesians’ leaders sufficient confidence to withdraw the Selbstschutz from the part of the plebiscite area they occupied. As Stuart himself later acknowledged, General Le Rond was also ‘successful in using his influence and prestige’ to persuade the Poles to comply with the many conditions they found difficult to accept. The withdrawal was completed without force, but the presence of the British troops had been the essential factor. One wonders how different the whole plebiscite process might have been had the correct number of troops been present in the correct proportions on the Commission’s arrival. Stuart and Heneker had little faith in what was initially Korfanty’s plan for a phased withdrawal. Initially at least, both of them would have preferred a more
‘muscular’ approach. However, as Upper Silesia’s complexities revealed themselves, they quickly realised that there was little alternative to the scheme. With some arm-twisting from Berlin, it was they who persuaded Hoefer and the German Silesians to also accept it.

A far more equitable working relationship developed within the Commission after Stuart and Heneker’s arrival. This was complemented by Wilson’s determination not to permit any faltering of the military Entente. Several of Percival’s closest colleagues found themselves re-deployed; and contributing to the relentless expansion of the Commission’s bureaucracy Stuart had negotiated several more British Assistant District Controller posts. By September, even Heneker admitted to liking Le Rond.321 But a new understanding did not bring any alteration to the political balance. The French continued advancing Polish interests and the British and Italians did the same for the Germans. Nonetheless, though unofficially pursuing diverse policies over arms searches and implementation of border security in their individual military zones, by July 1921 inter-Allied relations in Silesia were far less embittered than between their political masters in London, Paris and Rome.

The insurrection also marked the end of a period when the British Government had viewed Upper Silesia’s disposal as primarily a German-Polish matter. During these early days in May the question evolved from a problem of economic recovery, ethnicity and reparations into one affecting the very future of the Entente and European security. Ottley (who had extended his Upper Silesian ‘expertise’ to include near-daily observations on international policy), described Upper Silesia as ‘a symptom of the disease in the Entente, the fundamental divergence of policy between England and France’.322 Even before the third insurrection, it is fair to say that most of the influential contributors to British foreign policy-making had reverted to pre-Entente suspicions of France – viewing their policies in

Chapter 4
Upper Silesia and elsewhere as a straight-forward attempt to ensure French security by dominating Europe. With a few exceptions, British political leaders and their officials had conveniently forgotten the circumstances surrounding the decision to hold a plebiscite in Upper Silesia – also the manner in which Upper Silesia’s administration and policing had been pushed on to a far from willing France. This had allowed Lloyd George, Curzon and the interested British officials to persuade themselves that the whole episode was a Gaulish ploy, using the ‘imperialistic’ Poles to stifle German and, by extension, European economic recovery. That these Poles might one day operate and develop Upper Silesia’s economic resources was discounted as a fantasy.

The British Government’s attitude over this question was also coloured by the pressure that the increased Imperial demands had placed on the Army, resulting in the Army’s continuing determination to avoid involvement in continental Europe. The similar fast-developing strand of ‘isolationist’ thinking in a Conservative dominated House of Commons also affected it. This supported the idea of ‘Empire free-trade’ which, though sounding traditionally liberal, was in fact protectionism – a ‘retreat into Empire’. The idea continued to grow until 1932 when the Ottawa Conference finally revealed the fallacy of its assumptions. The normally politically astute Lloyd George had destroyed his Liberal Party base in 1918 and his Government was dangerously, and eventually fatally, reliant for his parliamentary majority on this increasingly restless and hostile Conservative Party backbench. But even at the Peace Conference, Lloyd George had still been liberal (and perhaps calculating) enough to respond to what were fast becoming politically mainstream revisionist demands by the liberal radicals and socialists – though where Poland was

Chapter 4
concerned, there were very few politicians outside Germany who were more revisionist than the British Prime Minister.

However, the most important specific factor governing the British policy on Upper Silesia at this time was Lloyd George and D'Abernon’s ‘understanding’ with the Government in Berlin. Just as granting the plebiscite had overcome the difficulties in getting the Germans to sign the Peace Treaty, so the May ultimatum on reparations coupled with D'Abernon’s reassuring ‘understanding’ on Upper Silesia, had stopped France occupying the Ruhr valley. However, after that, D'Abernon had used the German Government’s expectations on Upper Silesia to elicit their compliance over other matters of concern to Britain such as disarmament and the official disbandment of the Freikorps then the Selbstschutz. The ‘understanding’ had also been helpful in getting Berlin to persuade Hoefer to implement the plan ending the insurrection – an action bought at considerable domestic political cost to the Wirth Government and ultimately the whole Weimar system. The following is a small extract from a longer poetic protest reflecting the sense of outrage felt by most influential German Silesians following Berlin’s action urging that the Selbstschutz be withdrawn and disbanded:

Well then, away from Berlin and our ‘Representatives’!

This cry of torture let it be screamed out, not into Germany – who abandoned and betrayed us – but into the civilised world.

Possibly in England

Who is our last and only hope.

And it ends by explaining that:

Chapter 4
We Upper Silesians are now aware,
that the heaviest torture yet is...
our native land has sold, betrayed and abandoned us.

Graf Huberts Garnier – Turawa. 324

As pressure mounted for a meeting to decide Upper Silesia’s frontier, Granier’s despair was matched by the Wirth Government’s own trepidation over its outcome. On a trip to Lower Silesia, the German Chancellor had found that the lack of any tangible achievement from the German Government’s fulfilment policy had made ‘the population nervous and depressed’. They were also fearful that the outcome of the Supreme Council meeting to decide Upper Silesia’s future, when it was held, would be unfavourable to Germany. D’Abernon agreed that the Upper Silesia decision had become a ‘veritable obsession’ in the minds of the Government and the German public. 325 As the Foreign Minister, Rosen, reminded D’Abernon, Britain could never find a more favourable German Government to work with than theirs, adding that ‘he could not believe that the British Government would allow a decision to be taken which would unseat it’. 326 For Lloyd George, his politics of expediency had started to catch up with him.
Chapter 4 - Notes

1. Ryszewski, Wacław Trzecie Powstanie Śląskie 1921 (Warsaw 1977) p.321. This provides an easy-to-read chart, listing the support organisations for the POW's three operational groups.

2. Interview with Professor Theresa Kulak, Wrocław University 26 July 1995. Professor Kulak is an authority on Franco-Polish relations over this period.

3. PRO FO 371/5896 C9054/92/18 Percival to Curzon 3 May 1921; FO 371/5904 C10625/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May 1921. This is the best documented account of the insurrection's first 48 hours. See also FO 371/5905 C10952/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921; FO 371/5901 C10186/92/18 (Private letter) Bourdillon to Waterlow 4 May 1921. And DBFP Vol.XVI No.31 pp.53/54 Percival to Curzon 6 May 1921.

4. PRO FO 371/5897 C9228/92/18 Percival to Curzon 5 May 1921. Percival placed the number of front line inter-Allied troops at only 9,000. See also Leśniewski, 'Three Insurrections: Upper Silesia 1919-1921', Stachura (ed.) Poland Between the Wars pp.13-42.

5. PRO FO 371/5896 C9090/92/18 Percival to Curzon 4 May 1921; FO890/6 (Undated) Statement by Lieutenant Bennet entitled Events in Katowice on 3 May 1921. Poles attempting to occupy the town were fired on from a French tank; FO 371/5901 C10186/92/18 (Private letter) Bourdillon to Waterlow 4 May, 1921. Le Rond's deputy had shown Percival the Paris telegram instructing the French to take firm measures to contain the insurrection.

6. Ibid. Reports that engagements had taken place between the insurgents and Italians at Pszczyna and at Warmatowice; between the insurgents and the Plebiscite Police at Kedzierzyn; between the insurgents and the French troops and cavalry at Malapane and elsewhere in and around the Opole district; FO 371/5905 C10952/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921; WO 106/1492 WL775 4 May 1921. Radio intercept reporting that to date, Italians had lost 32 dead and 60 wounded.

7. PRO FO 371/5901 C10186/92/18 (Private letter) Bourdillon to Waterlow 4 May 1921.

8. PRO FO 890/10 Diary of Captain H. de C. Toogood, District Controller, Olenso (covering period 28 April to 28 June 1921 and 13 July to 31 July, 1921). Wednesday 11 May 1921 'Seventy two of the Polish police recently deported from Kluczbork to Wrocław were handed over....Several Polish policemen reported that they had been severely beaten by the Germans in Wrocław, and showed injuries in support of their statements'.

Chapter 4 - Notes
9. PRO FO 371/5897 C9054/92/18 Max Muller (Warsaw) to Curzon 2 May 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 29 pp. 51-52 Max Muller to Curzon 5 May 1921, and PRO FO 371/5898 C9366/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 7 May 1921.

10. PRO FO 371/5898 C9413/92/18 Appendix 1, 3 May 1921: FO 371/5897 C9302/92/18 German Ambassador to Curzon 7 May 1921; WO106/1492 WL780, Warsaw Radio Intercept, 12 May, 1921. The Insurgents' Executive Committee, formed on 4 May, was Korfanty (National Democrat), Rymer (National Labour Party), Joseph Biniszkievicz (Polish Socialist Party), Josef Grzegorzyk (Populists). The deputy members were Francois Roguszezak, Michael Grajek, Adam Wojciechski and Clement Borys.

11. Encyklopedia Powstani Śląskich 'Trzecie Powstanie Śląskie' pp. 569-575

12. Ibid

13. Ibid

14. PRO FO 371/5900 C9902/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921; FO 371/5902 C10389/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May, 1921. An estimate that 25 - 30,000 armed Germans had entered the region had been sent to Paris. See also FO 371/8810 C4500/4500/18 Secret Intelligence Service Report on Reactionary Movements in Germany, 6 March, 1923 which, in discussing the different movement's roots, claims that the Orgesch and Oberland sent about 60,000 men from Western and Northern Germany into Upper Silesia. This far exceeds any other figures on this subject that were being bandied about even then.

15. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany pp. 256-257. See also Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p. 185, pp. 191-193, p. 203, pp. 226-232. And APWO 46/57 pp. 59-62 9 May 1921 records that other large Freikorps units were being formed including a 2,000 strong unit known as the Beckendorf Freikorps. There was also the Rosenberg Freikorps, and another Freikorps which had been formed by Lieutenants Weise and Schlesser at Nysa (Neisse). This equipped itself by seizing an arms depot belonging to General Nollet's inter-Allied control Commission. Several armoured trains were recommissioned and convoys of machine guns, rifles and munitions were arriving daily by rail and road. In From Versailles to Locarno (pp. 69-72) Cienciala and Komarnicki address the German military intervention from the Polish perspective.

16. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p. 229


18. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p. 236. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany p. 229-230, p. 232. Tooley suspects that Hauenstein, an ex-Sergeant with the Freikorps Lowenfeldt who joined the early Nazi party in 1922, was exaggerating in an attempt to 'gild his unit's record' in Upper Silesia.
19. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p.231. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany p.231: 'By the late 1920's participation in the Upper Silesian episode had become a kind of litmus test for patriotism, a proof of devotion to an increasingly exclusive version of Germandom'.

20. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p.231, Note 170. Tooley, National Identity and Weimar Germany pp.230-231. Von Seeckt intended to use the Freikorps in conjunction with the Reichswehr only if there was an invasion by the Polish Republic.

21. Daily Express 6 May 1921. The German Cabinet had considered and decided against a request to despatch regular troops into Upper Silesia. Tooley (National Identity and Weimar Germany p.256) notes that Von Seeckt and Prince Hatzfeldt met just hours before the Germans received this threat and decided that direct military intervention against Poland was inadvisable. DBFP Vol.XVI No.40 p.61 Kilmarnock to Curzon 8 May 1921: The British Minister noted that the crisis exercised an adverse effect on opinion favouring acceptance of the Allied ultimatum and that it was 'strengthening the hand of reactionary circles which hope for a refusal'.

22. PRO FO 371/5897 C9229/92/18 Percival to Curzon 5 May, 1921.


24. D.G. Boadle, Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy 1918 - 1922 (The Hague 1973) p.152. The pressure of public opinion, which had been outraged by the Allied occupation of the Rhineland towns in March, prevented the German Government from making the Allies an offer on reparations. Carl Bergman, The History of Reparations (London 1927) p.74. See also DBFP Vol.XVI Chap.III 'Reparrations by Germany: Events Leading to the Allied Ultimatum to Germany, January 1 - May 5 1921'.


27. DBFP Vol. XVI No.36 pp.58-59 Curzon to Hardinge (Paris) 6 May 1921. See also ibid No.38 pp.59-60 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921.

28. PRO FO 371/4899 C9696/92/18 6 May 1921. Crowe's record of an interview with the German Ambassador on the Upper Silesian crisis.

29. APWO 46/57 pp.56-58, 7 May 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5896 C8574/92/18 Short Summary of the Secret German Armed Organisation in Upper Silesia 20 April 1921.

30. DBFP Vol.XVI No.39 p.60 Percival to Curzon 7 May 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes
31. APWO 46/47 pp.56-58, 7 May 1921 and ibid pp.59-62, 9 May 1921. Waite *Vanguard of Nazism* pp.228. Draws attention to the former Baltikum employed in Upper Silesia as 'mine labourers'. See also PRO FO 371/8810 C4500/4500/92 Secret Intelligence Report on Reactionary Movements in Germany 6 March 1921.

32. Tooley, *National Identity and Weimar Germany* p.256; Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* pp.65/67. The authors cover the background to this tacit agreement on Upper Silesia.

33. HLRO F/54/1/25 D'Abernon to Davies 14 May 1921. See also CCA HDLM Acc Box 3 (Transcript) HAL Fisher Diary, Tuesday 19 May 1921, which records that in Cabinet, Curzon had stated, 'The Germans know that we are their only friends'.

34. DBFP Vol.XVI No.66 p.88 Briand to Lloyd George 14 May 1921. In a lengthy letter discussing Upper Silesia the French Premier wrote; 'Il est d'ailleurs pour les Allies de ne pas confondre le problème silésien avec celui des réparations, ne fut-ce que pour montrer la fausseté des allégations allemandes touchant des promesses secrètes de contrepartie qui leur auraient été faites a cet égard'. See also ibid No.93 pp.113-118 Curzon to French Ambassador May 20 1921 for Curzon's reply that; 'The suggestion that secret promises have been made to the German Government to compensate them in Silesia for their acceptance of the demands recently addressed to them from London is not understood'. And PRO FO371/5918 C15154/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 25 July 1921 discusses views in the French press refering to the recent revelations in The Manchester Guardian regarding the 'assurances given to Germany by Lord D'Abernon in May, that he promised Germany a favourable solution of the Upper Silesian question'. Morgan (*Assize of Arms* p.42) knew D'Abernon in Germany then, and described him as 'the apostle of appeasement'.

35. HLRO F/54/1/26 D'Abernon to Hankey (Secretary to Cabinet) 26 May 1921. Enclosure: Page of D'Abernon's Diary, 26 May 1921. Reports favourably on the installation of Wirth as Chancellor. It concludes that; 'Just at this moment the Germans cannot get too much English advice and we are quite extraordinarily popular and influential'. See also PRO WO106/1491 No.262 Intelligence Report 18 June 1921. Translation of a confidential report on a meeting of the Reichstag Committee for Foreign Affairs discussing 'The Upper Silesian Question'. At the meeting Stresemann had said that he felt that D'Abernon's promise was not definite enough for him to take his centre-right Völkspartei into Wirth's Coalition. Had he done so it would have given the Cabinet much greater weight. See also *DBFP* Vol.XVI No.627 p.680 D'Abernon to Curzon 24 May 1921.

36. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* p.231 Note 170. In a speech to the Reichstag in 1926 Wirth admitted that the Government had supplied equipment and paid money to the volunteers. In 1931 he told the *Schlesische Volkszeitung* that it was 'by virtue of his own instruction and recommendation that the volunteers had been organised and equipped'.

37. *DBFP* Vol.XVI No.110 p.137 Note 3. This records Hoefer taking over on 22 May 1921. See also Tooley, *National Identity and the Weimar Republic* p.256. which
records Wirth and the Defence Minister Gessler meeting Hoefer on 18 May to appoint him as their military commander. But Waite (*Vanguard of Nazism* p.229) reveals that Hoefer had in fact already been picked by the Freikorpsführers as their commander in chief, citing as his source *Histoire de L'Armee Allemande*, II p.191.

38. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* p.174. The German press had been urging a similar type *coup d'état* on the Berlin Government.


The Polish formal demands were:

- The insurgent forces be recognised as an army of occupation.
- The Poles take over the administration in the area they occupied.
- That they assume control of the railways.
- That the Commission formulate new proposals for partition of the frontier.

40. *Ibid.* Korfanty stated the workers would resume work the next day and, if given some pretext, he would persuade the insurgents to lay down their arms. Amongst his suggestions and conditions were:

- No German force of whatever description be used against them.
- Polish officials be given control over districts they occupied.
- Railway service to be resumed with Polish assistance.
- Commission to request the Supreme Council settle Upper Silesia question at once.

Cienciala and Komarnicki (*From Versailles to Locarno* p.65) cite Polish sources which claim that a preliminary agreement on a provisional demarcation line had also been signed at the meeting with General Brantes.


42. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.52 pp.72-73 Percival to Curzon 11 May 1921. See also PRO FO 688/10/50 No.301 Max Muller to Curzon 11 May 1921 Enclosure: Extract *Kurjer Warszawski* 11 May 1921 Declaration of the Prime Minister on the Upper Silesian Question in Sejm 10 May 1921. Witos ended his speech saying that he was able to inform them 'that an understanding was arrived at yesterday between the leaders of the insurrection and the inter-Allied Commission in Opole'. And in FO 371/5899 C9790/92/1813 May 1921 Percival denies Korfanty's reported statement that a fixed line of demarcation had been agreed to.

43. PRO FO 371/5898 C9445/92/18 Percival to Curzon 9 May 1921; and *ibid* FO 371/5898 C9789/ 92/18 Percival to Curzon 12 May 1921.

44. PRO FO 371/5909 C9789/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Lindsay 14 May 1921. Craig pointed out that it would not be the insurgents in the occupied rural areas who starved, but the Germans who were living in the besieged towns. See also FO 371/5909 C11582/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 25 May 1921. Craig recounts more difficulties: 'Our chief trouble now is to get the supplies out of the Germans. They are starving their own people in the towns on the off-chance that they might be doing the insurgents a bit of harm'.

Chapter 4 - Notes
45. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.49 pp.69-70 Percival to Curzon 10 May 1921; and *ibid* No.86 pp.104-106 Percival to Curzon 18 May 1921.

46. *Ibid*, No.56 pp.76-77 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921 and *ibid* No.58 p.78 Hardinge to Curzon 13 May 1921. The Conference of Ambassadors discussed the proposed agreement with Korfanty. Hardinge described it as a complete capitulation to the insurgents. If they went ahead with it, the Germans would also be entitled to enter the plebiscite area.

47. *Ibid*, No.56 pp.76-77 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921 and *ibid* No.77 pp.96-97 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. See also *ibid* No.88 pp.107-110 Curzon to Cheetham 18 May 1921. The French Ambassador claimed that 'General Le Rond had received specific orders from Marshal Foch not to authorise any movement of violence which might embroil the French forces with local population'.

48. PRO FO 890/7 Newton (Krol Huta) to Percival 17 May 1921. See also FO 890/11 Villiers-Lemming to Percival 18 May 1921. Villiers-Lemming believed that; 'The honour of England is at stake, as much as in the days of the violation of Belgium'. But in a private letter to Ottley (FO 371/5909 C11582/92/18 25 May 1921) Craig wrote that; 'There are many [British] officers who are real friends to the French and who believed that the Poles in Upper Silesia had a claim to more consideration than we think they got'.

49. PRO FO890/8 Beal to Stuart 14 July 1921; FO 890/10 Diary of Captain H.de C. Toogood; FO 890/6 Minute by Watts re. Instructions to Colonel Crichton in Katowice regarding requests for help by German Silesians.

50. PRO FO 890/11 Statement by Villiers-Lemming on events in Rybnik, including the funeral of 16 Italian soldiers, 8 May 1921. See also HLRO F/25/1/34 Hankey to Lloyd George 25 May 1921, Enclosure: Private letter from a controller in Bytom to General Malcolm 21 May 1921.

51. PRO FO371/5905 C19592/9218 (Copy of private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921. See also *DBFP* Vol. XVI, No.77 pp.96-97, Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. Bond resigned because the French military commanders stopped the inter-Allied artillery being fired on the insurgents.

52. PRO FO 371/5904 C10767/92/18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921. Enclosure: Statement by Mr. J. Willmott to Lt. Col. Tidbury 13 May 1921. Willmott sought refuge with the Polish insurgents outside Lubliniec after escaping from a hostile German crowd. Both he and a French colleague were given passes into Poland. They travelled to Warsaw, arriving at the British Legation there on 9 May, 1921.

53. PRO FO 371/5909 C11582/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 25 May 1921.

55. *Ibid.* F.W. Oertzen, *So This Is Poland* (London 1932) p.99. There is no indication in British records supporting this publication's claim that 'seventeen senior British officials of the international administration resigned and went home'. It is mentioned here because this source is Nazi propaganda but cited in several serious works on the subject.

56. PRO FO 371/5905 C10592/92/18 Private letter Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921.

57. Although there is a truth underlying most of Hutchison's claims and statements, they must be regarded with great caution. He had a complex and erratic character. An author, journalist, artist and inveterate self-publicist with good political contacts, he wrote several books which generally exaggerated his own role in the events. He served with the Commission for just six months. See his interesting obituary in *The Times* Friday 5 April 1946.

58. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.48 p.69 Percival to Curzon 10 May 1921. Percival reported that 5,000 Germans from Kluczbork intended attacking Olenso that night and that the Poles there had threatened to retaliate by killing all of the Germans there if they did. See PRO FO890/10 Diary of Capt. Toogood 9-10 May 1921. Despite Hutchison's claims (*Footslogger* pp.289-292) he only signed the local armistice as a witness. It was Toogood (Olenso's District Controller) and the District Controller of Kluczbork who negotiated the agreement defusing the situation.


60. PRO FO 371/5908 C11227/92/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 26 May 1921; Enclosure: Statement by Director of Communications W.D. Cruickshank, regarding Hutchison's attitude re. British Section of the Commission, 23 May 1921.

61. PRO FO 371/5899 C9834/92/18 Major J. Elsdale Molson M.P. to Harmsworth (Under Secretary of State Foreign Office) 12 May 1921. Major Clarke rejected Hutchison's allegations. As did Colonel Tidbury - see FO371/5902 C10431/92/18 18 May 1921. See also FO 371/5908 C11227/92/18 Bourdillon to Wigram 26 May 1921 for statements alleging all sort of alleged petty misdeamours by Hutchison. These were compiled in Opole and forwarded to the Foreign Office.


63. *Daily Express* Wednesday 4 May and Friday 6 May 1921.

64. *The Daily Telegraph* Friday 6 May 1921.

65. PRO FO 371/5905 C10592/92/18 (Private letter) Craig to Ottley 6 May 1921.


Chapter 4 - Notes
68. PRO FO 890/10 Toogood to M. Le Prefret 12 June 1921. See also FO 371/5916 Cl4411/92/18 Parliamentary Question 12 July 1921 in which Lieutenant Colonel Guinness M.P. asked if French press reports to the effect that Cockerell had been captured by the Poles, wearing a German uniform and carrying papers in the name of Pannitz, were true.

69. PRO FO 371/5912 C12765/92/18 Stuart (Opole) to Curzon 16 June 1921 Enclosure: Lieutenant Colonel Pepys Cockerell 12 June 1921.

70. Two of Bodzanowice's local landowner's sons were in Cockerell's party.

71. Daily Express Thursday 12 May 1921.

72. PRO WO106/1492 has a collection of contemporary press cuttings on the subject.

73. Daily Mail Monday 9 May 1921.

74. The Times Thursday 12 May 1921.

75. Daily Express Thursday 12 May 1921 and The Daily Telegraph 12 May 1921.

76. Ibid.

77. PRO FO 371/5898 C9445/92/18 Percival to Curzon 9th May 1921.

78. PRO FO 371/5899 C9790/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 13 May 1921.

79. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p.229.

80. DBFP Vol.XVI No.76 p.96 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921.

81. PRO FO 371/5904 C10745/92/18 23 May 1921. Memorandum by Major Ottley.

82. The Manchester Guardian Tuesday 24 May 1921.

83. DBFP Vol. XVI No.112 pp.139-140 Curzon to Percival 24 May 1921. Keatinge denied the reports (ibid No. 117 p.144 24 May 1921) but Percival decided to recall him and Bennet 'for a few days so that a stop may be put to these rumours'. Four days later Percival reported (ibid No.132 pp.154-155 28 May 1921) that the German press had now published a denial that British officers had taken part in fighting against the insurgents,

84. Ibid, No. 91 pp.111-112 Cheetham (Paris) to Curzon 19 May 1921.

85. PRO FO 371/5897 C9223/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 4 May 1921.

86. PRO FO 688/10/50 No.232 Max Muller to Curzon 7 May 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes
87. PRO FO 371/6817 N5770/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon Enclosure: *Summary of Events in Poland for the week ending 11th May 1921*. The Związek Demokracji was a party of the political left.

88. *Ibid.* The Warsaw press reported that the administrators in the government's different departments were holding meetings and passing their own resolutions supporting the insurgents - see PRO FO 688/10/50 draft tele. No. 237 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1919.

89. *Ibid.* This was a newspaper sympathetic to the *Klub Pracy Konstytucyjnej* (KPK). Another, the *Kurjer Warszawski*, a newspaper sympathetic to another centre right party the *Narod Zjednoczenie Ludowe* (NZL), hoped that the representatives of the political parties supporting the Government's position really did, 'and that they would do their utmost to check the present insurrection'.

90. *Daily Express* Thursday 5 May 1921 reported that crowds shouting 'Down with England!' had besieged the British Legation in Warsaw. Max Muller had refused to meet them. Police were called to clear the crowd away when they tried to force their way into the Legation's forecourt. They wanted to present a petition complaining about the conditions under which the plebiscite vote had been held and to advance their demands over the shape of the final settlement. In his report to Curzon, Max Muller reported that this crowd (see PRO FO 688/10/50 No. 286 (Draft) 3 May 1921) consisted of 'six delegations in all, accompanied by crowds largely composed of students'. The petition, from the Executive Committee of the Union of Polish Socialists, was accepted by 'one of the servants'.

91. *Ibid*, No. 233 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921. Enclosure: *Robotnik* (founded by Piłsudski in 1894) article published May 7 1921. This attributes the failure of the diplomats to win support for Poland 'to the subservient tone introduced during the days of bowing and scraping'.

92. Saphiea had hoped to put Poland's case to the Foreign Office and the British Prime Minister before any final decision was taken. Max Muller informed Curzon (*DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 18 p. 42 13 April 1921) about Sapieha's proposed trip to London, Paris, and Rome, explaining that he thought that the real reason for the trip was the attacks on Sapieha and the administration - the opposition accusing them of incompetence and neglect of national interest. But Curzon informed Max Muller (*ibid* No. 19 p. 42 18 April 1921) that it would be 'highly improper' for either he or the Prime Minister to receive Polish representations on Upper Silesia. Crowe had already refused a German request on 14 April - see PRO FO 371/5895 C7946/92/18. Max Muller explained to Curzon (*DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 21 pp. 43-44 21 April 1921) that he had argued why the Foreign Office will not discuss the matter with the Polish representatives, but he added that, 'There is unfortunately an irradicable impression here that in this matter [Upper Silesia] His Majesty's Government are prejudiced against Poland in favour of Germany and therefore refusal to receive Germans as well as Polish delegations will, I am afraid, hardly be regarded as 'proof of impartiality' either'. Sapieha did visit London and a minute by Crowe dated 2 May 1921 (see PRO FO 371/5986 C8882/92/18) on his conversation with the Polish Foreign Minister recorded that Sapieha hoped that Lloyd George would listen to his
views on Upper Silesia before coming to a decision. But Crowe informed him that the Prime Minister was busy with other matters and that he would first have to read the Commissioners' recommendations. A memorandum by Vansittart (FO371/5898 C9544/92/18 5 May 1921) indicates that Sapieha's source of information in the Supreme Council was Count Sforza. Minutes by Gregory (Head of the Northern Department) and Curzon, indicate that Sapieha was seen by Curzon but he had refused to discuss Upper Silesia with him.

93. Daily Express Wednesday 4 May 1921. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki, From Versailles to Locarno pp.64/65.

94. Prince Eustace Sapieha was born a British subject. His father had been an officer in the British 5th Dragoon Guards. He was a landowner in Austrian Galicia and in Gorodno, Lithuania. His upbringing was typical of the Polish aristocracy, including higher education in Switzerland. Unlike some of his fellow Polish professional diplomats, he carried no unsavoury baggage from having had previous appointments with the Austrian Foreign Ministry. In fact, he was regarded by the British establishment one of their own, and had served as Minister in London before his appointment as Foreign Minister in June 1920 - details on London appointment in PRO FO 608/61 13319 Wyndham to Curzon 21 June 1919.

95. PRO FO 668/19/50 No.233 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921, Enclosure: Robotnik article 7 May 1921.

96. Ibid. No.302 (Draft) Max Muller to Curzon 10 May 1921. See also ibid 11 May 1921. An article published on the 7 May edition of Paderewski's Rzeczpospolita, pointed out that whilst; 'In the days of our slavery, hostile manifestations against the representative of one of the partitioning Powers on the territory of another of these Powers had a certain charm and even an importance as a struggle with two of our enemies, but transfer such practices to the present state of affairs...is both improper and positively harmful and can be interpreted to us as a symptom of immaturity'.

97. DBFP Vol. XVI No.35 pp.55-56 Max Muller to Curzon 6 May 1921. Max Muller met Piłsudski at an operatic event in Warsaw where they talked at length about Upper Silesia. After Piłsudski had blamed Britain for what was happening there, Max Muller asked him to prevent members of the Polish military forces involving themselves. Piłsudski, however, repeated an earlier claim made by the Deputy Foreign Minister namely, that the Government was in no position to act against the overwhelming feeling of the country.

98. Ibid. No.40 p.61, Kilmarnock to Curzon 8 May 1921.

99. Daily Express Thursday 5 May 1921. A report from Berlin the day before claimed that 85,000 regular Polish troops were concentrated on the Polish-Upper Silesian frontier. See also PRO FO371/5897 C9195/92/18 4 May 1921 a telegram from the United German Political Parties of Lubliniec to Curzon who complain that; 'The largest part of the Kreis of Lubliniec has been occupied since yesterday by Regular Polish troops who are mostly dressed over their uniform (which is absolutely
correct*).'. And *ibid* C9228/92/18 Percival to Curzon 5 May 1921. Inter-Allied troops have been ordered to resist any incursion by the Polish Army. *Translators note.

100. PRO FO 331/5897 C9223/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 4 May 1921. German Chargé d'Affaires in Warsaw raised this in an interview with Max Muller. The Germans were highly sensitive to the fact that (in their interpretation), they had lost Poznania and other areas in West Prussia through a Polish insurrection.


102. PRO FO 371/5898 C9617/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921 and WO 106/1492 No.369 British Military Mission in Warsaw to War Office 9 May 1921. See also *DBFP* Vol. XVI, No.47 pp.68-69 Max Muller to Curzon 9 May 1921. Before the insurrection, General Szeptycki had told Max Muller that he dared not increase the number of troops on the border, because it aroused the suspicions of the Germans and the Allied governments, who feared it might be a build-up for an invasion. To avoid desertions to the insurgents in Upper Silesia, Pilsudski had ordered that only Galicians and no Poznanians would be stationed there.

103. PRO WO106/1492 No.372 Military Mission Warsaw to DMI 10 May 1921.

104. *Ibid,* G294 General Carton de Wiart to DMI 11 May 1921.


106. PRO FO 371/5898 C9366/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 7 May 1921, Enclosure: Polish Government Press Release on Silesia; FO 371/5901 C109180/92/18 9 May 1921; FO 371/5899 C9667/92/18 9 May 1921; FO 371/5900 C9898/92/18 11 May 1921, Enclosure: Speech in the Sejm by Prime Minister Witos on 10 May 1921.


108. PRO FO 371/5897 C9159/92/18 5 May 1921. File Index Minute by Waterlow recommending that, to avoid having 'a second Zeligowski on our hands,' the Foreign Office should:
- Attempt to have British troops returned to Silesia.
- Have the Ambassadors demand that Poland close its frontier.
- Hand-over the uncontested plebiscite areas to Germany and Poland.
Apart from localising the problem, Waterlow suggested the measure would also release the large security presence in Opole for more active duties and the current administrative staff could be reduced because fewer district controllers would be necessary. Crowe also suggested 'that Korfanty be if possible arrested and adequately dealt with'. Curzon thought all this was 'A very good idea. Let us try it'. See also *DBFP* Vol.XVI, No.36 pp.57-58 Curzon to Hardinge 6 May 1921.

110. These communications are fully documented in DBFP Vol. XVI No's 38, 42, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53, 55. The file index minutes, which are not published, reveal how frustrated the London officials were with Hardinge and the French - see also PRO FO371/5898 C9374/92/18 and PRO FO371/5899 C9758/92/18.

111. DBFP Vol.XVI No.39 p.60 Percival to Curzon 7 May 1921. These estimates were sent at Curzon's request - see ibid No.34 p.55 Curzon to Percival 6 May 1921.

112. PRO FO 371/5899 C9669/92/18 6 May 1921. Ottley Memorandum on Visit to Military Intelligence Re. British Troops for Upper Silesia. General Thwaites stated:
   - Our home obligations were of far greater importance than any obligations we might have assumed under the Peace Treaty from a military point of view.
   - That four battalions of infantry would be lost in proportion to the number of Poles alleged to be in revolt.
   - That their position would be very precarious in the event of the Germans taking military action against the Poles.

113. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 38 pp.59-60 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921. See also ibid No.45 pp.65-67 Hardinge to Curzon 9 May 1921.

114. Ibid.

115. PRO FO 371/5899 C9857/92/18 9 May 1921. Crowe Memorandum on visit from the German ambassador who had read that the Allies would be 'allowing Germany to occupy line of the Oder, whilst handing over southern and eastern districts, including the industrial area, to Korfanty's Poles'.

116. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 55 pp.75/76 Curzon to Hardinge 13 May 1921.

117. Charles Hardinge Old Diplomacy: The Reminiscences of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst (London 1947) p.253. Hardinge also thought that Lloyd George imagined himself to be tactful and understanding with foreigners, whilst in reality he was hopeless with them.

118. Ibid., p216. These were over detrimental official reports about the Gallipoli and Mesopotamian campaigns published in June 1917. Curzon was sent by the War Cabinet to suggest to Hardinge that he could 'ease the situation' by resigning.

119. DBFP Vol.XVI, No.38 pp.59-60 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921. See ibid No.45 pp.65-67 Hardinge to Curzon 9 May 1921. Also ibid No.54 pp.74-75 Max Muller to Curzon 11 May 1921.

120. PRO FO 371/5899 C9758/92/18 12 May 1921 (DBFP Vol. XVI No.53) for unpublished minutes by Foreign Office officials.

121. DBFP Vol. XVI No.38 p59 Hardinge to Curzon 7 May 1921. Although the French were unequivocal in refusing linkage between reparations and Upper Silesia, they had established their own linkage to the extent that in Le Rond's recommendation,
they had included the Polish Government's offer to pay Germany's proportion of reparations for Upper Silesia. This was another reason for not agreeing to the plan.

122. PRO WO 106/1492 G294 Carton De Wiart to DMI 11 May 1921.


126. PRO WO 106/1492 G294 Carton De Wiart (Warsaw) to DMI (War Office) II May 1921. 'Percival's estimate of the troops we should have to send to restore order I consider ridiculous. The appearance of four battalions, I am sure, would be enough to quieten things... I do not want to criticize his estimates. but he greatly flatters the military qualities of the Poles and the Germans of today'.

127. DBFP Vol. XVI, No.50 pp.70-71, Curzon to Hardinge 10 May 1921. See also ibid No. 51 pp.71-72 Curzon to Hardinge 10 May 1921.

128. Ibid, No. 53 pp.73-74 Hardinge to Curzon 11 May 1921.

129. HLRO F/13/2/20 Curzon to Lloyd George 13 May 1921. 'I am so appalled at the French and Silesian situation & attitude of France - and so shocked at reluctance of Hardinge to deal with the matter effectively that I have spent the night in concocting a draft telegram which I would like to bring down to you in the morning before your speech in the H. of C'.

130. DBFP Vol. XVI No.55 pp.75-76 Curzon to Hardinge 13 May 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5905 C10826/92/18 13 May 1921; Copy of Hardinge's Aide Mémoire to Briand which relays Curzon's message to Briand practically verbatim.


132. A.J.P. Taylor (ed.) Lloyd George - A Diary by Francis Stevenson p.216 13 May 1921. 'It was a remarkably able speech - he was never in better form - full of the most sparkling passages and trenchant phrases. But I am afraid it will cause some trouble!'


134. CCA HDLM Acc; 800 Box 3 Transcript H.A.L. Fisher Diary 13 May 1921.


Chapter 4 - Notes
137. HLRO F/54/1/25 Private letter D'Abernon to Davies 14 May 1921.

138. PRO FO 371/5908 C11420 Geddes to Curzon 19 May 1921. Enclosures: Department of State Press Release - Communication From Polish Minster Washington 11 May 1921; Reply by Secretary of State 14 May 1921. The reply states that the boundary disputes are 'a matter of European concern, in which, in accord with the traditional policy of the United States, this Government should not become involved'. See also FO 371/5901 C10240/92/18 Geddes to Curzon 18 May 1921. This confirms London's instructions to request the United States Government to participate in 'early meeting of Supreme Council and that the support of United States government may be counted upon in endeavour to bring about satisfactory solution of this serious question'. It was followed up by agreements to supply information and liaise with the American Embassy in London.

139. Ibid, C10247/92/18 Geddes to Curzon 18 May 1921. An exception to this unanimity was the New York Tribune.

140. PRO FO 371/5904 C10636/92/18 Russell to Curzon 21 May 1921. Report on the Swiss press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of Friday 13 May 1921.

141. PRO FO 371/5905 C10895/92/18 Graham to Curzon 23 May 1921. Reports Netherlands's press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of 13 November 1921.

142. Ibid, Enclosure: translation of article from Rotterdamsche Courant dated May 18th, 1921 (evening edition) entitled 'ENGLAND and FRANCE'.

143. PRO FO 371/5901 C10275/92/18 Ornally to Curzon 15 May 1921. The rising in Upper Silesia had produced a coal famine in Austria. Its press was unanimous in condemning the Poles. They feared that the Hungarians might imitate them and refuse to honour treaty provisions regarding West Hungary and the Pecs district.

144. PRO WO 106/1492 WL783 Prague radio intercept May 15 1921.

145. PRO FO 371/5904 C1068/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 21 May 1921. Review of the Italian press reaction to Lloyd George's speech of Friday 13 May 1921. The day before the speech the Tribuna deplored 'that this loss of Italian lives should be made to serve a political end by influencing Italian opinion against Poland in a matter which calls not for passion but for equity'.

146. PRO FO 371/6817 N6257/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 25 May 1921 Enclosure: Summary of Events in Poland for week ending May 25, 1921. The Narod also stated; 'Polish independence was a right which Poland had won, and not a gift which had been graciously bestowed upon her'. See also FO 371/5901 C10292/92/18 Wroblewski to Curzon 18 May 1921 who responded to Lloyd George's speech by pointing out that his statement about Polish troops fighting for the Russian, German and Austrian armies 'will be read in Poland with a feeling of deep wrong. The fact that the youth of Poland, torn in three parts as a result of the partitions, was forced to fight on the side of Poland's oppressors against one another will remain a page of tragedy on the records of modern civilisation'.

Chapter 4 - Notes
147. PRO FO 371/6813 N5945/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 1921, Enclosure: Summary of Events in Poland for week ending May 18, 1921.


149. PRO FO 371/5903 C10550/92/18 Scrivenor to Curzon 20 May 1921, Enclosure: Prime Minister Witos's Speech May 18 1921 - Position of the Polish Government with Regard to Mr. Lloyd George's Speech. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki From Versailles to Locarno p.69.

150. PRO FO 371/5900 C9881/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 13 May 1921; and ibid C9926/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 14 May 1921. Max Muller had been assured that the determining factor in the vote was Prince Sapieha's failure to see Lloyd George in London. See FO 371/6813 N5945/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 1921, Enclosure: Summary of Events for the week ending May 18, 1921. See also FO 371/6813 N5947/117/55 Max Muller to Curzon 18 May 1921, Enclosure: 'Press Interview Given by Sapieha in Warsaw'. Max Muller notes that during the interview, whilst praising France, Sapieha did not mention his treatment in Britain. His resignation on 19 May 1921 was a loss to British interests because he was regarded as sympathetic to their views. But it was a very one-sided relationship and the Foreign Office did little to help him. Max Muller's concern was that Sapieha 'has at least some courage and knowledge of affairs. Moreover, his disappearance would almost certainly wreck whatever hope there may be of an admirable settlement of Vilna question'.

151. PRO FO 371/5900 C9935/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 15 May 1921.


153. PRO FO 371/5900 C9935/92 Max Muller to Curzon 15 May 1921.

154. PRO FO 371/5900 File Index Minutes 15 May 1921. In asking for British troops to be sent, Crowe reminds Curzon that; 'After all, we are really bound under the treaty to meet the obligation of taking our share in keeping order in the plebiscite area. I would deprecate our taking this obligation too lightly'.

155. PRO FO 371/5905 C10826/92/18 Aide Mémoire handed by Lord Hardinge to M. Briand on May 13 1921. This was a re-working of Hardinge's instructions from Curzon which the Foreign Secretary had drafted with Lloyd George earlier that day - see DBFP Vol.XVI No.60 p.80.

156. DBFP Vol.XVI No.66 pp.85-89 Briand to Lloyd George 14 May 1921. There was an English translation prepared for the Cabinet - see PRO FO371/5902 C10444/92/18 14 May 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes

158. Ibid. No. 66 pp. 85-89 Briand to Lloyd George 14 May 1921.

159. PRO FO 371/5907 C11166/92/18 Minute by Waterlow responding to Briand's memorandum to Lloyd George 14 May 1921.


161. Ibid.

162 Ibid. No. 63 p. 83, Hardinge to Curzon 14 May 1921. See PRO FO371/5900 C9949/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 14 May 1921. Report on Briand's domestic and foreign press conference at which he read out a long statement of his views on Lloyd George's 13 May speech. See also *ibid* C9900/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 15 May 1921: contains a further press statement by Briand made the previous evening.

163. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 70 p. 90-91 Curzon to Cheetham 16 May 1921. Briand was to be reminded of the agreement reached at San Remo (April 18 - 26, 1920) whereby no coercive action, such as the invasion of German territory, was to be undertaken unless in concert with the other Allies.

164. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* p. 228.

165. Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p. 67. See also *DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 97 p. 121 Percival to Curzon 22 May 1921.

166. PRO FO 890/10 Diary of Captain Toogood 12 - 19 May 1921.

167. PRO FO 371/5903 C10550/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 20 May 1921 Enclosure: Prime Minister Witos's Speech May 18 1921.

168. PRO FO 371/5901 C9982/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 13 May 1921. Bourdillon also notes that the British and Italian officials were frequently shot at and constantly threatened within the occupied area.

169. PRO FO 371/5904 C10677/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 18 May 1921, Enclosure: 'Report by General Duncan, Military Attache Rome, to Ambassador 17 May, 1921'. Marinis had also informed the Italian General Staff that in the event of full-scale fighting between the Poles and Germans, he proposed adopting a neutral attitude.

170. PRO FO371/5901 C9982/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 13 May 1921. See also FO371/5926 C19093/92/18 Coal Production Figures May-August 1921.

171. PRO FO 890/16 pp. 20-23 *Report on the Upper Silesian Commission's Department of Food Control 1919-1921*, 31 July 1922. This describes the problems during the insurrection. On the advice of the newly constituted German Silesians' *Politische*
Leitung or Council of Twelve (political and trade union representatives headed by Father Ulitzka) the German Silesians hoped to establish, in Craig's words, 'such a state of desperation in the towns that the Selbstschutz would be warranted in opening an attack for the relief of the towns'.

172. PRO FO 371/5900 C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921.


174. PRO FO 371/5906 C11052/92/18 Craig to Ottley 19 May 1921. 'Some towns face famine already. Blame for the food impasse attaches to both the insurgents and the German authorities but chiefly to latter who have admittedly adopted a policy of starvation'.

175. PRO FO 371/5900 C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921. See also ibid C9988/92/18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921. Le Rond had asked the Commission to send the Polish Consul General in Opole to meet Korfanty (in Bytom) and request him to hasten the demobilisation of the insurgents.

176. PRO FO 371/5901 C10113/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 May 1921.

177. Ibid. The officers responsible for the attacks on the Italian troops had been cashiered and dismissed.

178. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 43 pp.63-64 Percival to Curzon 8 May 1921. On 11 May Percival informed Curzon (ibid No.52 pp.72-73) that Le Rond has accepted the Polish insurgents offer. Two days later, however, Percival informed Curzon (ibid No.56 pp.76/77) that the Commission had made a public statement on 12 May to the effect that it would not in the future negotiate with Korfanty. When the Commission sent the Polish Consul General to speak to Korfanty, Percival had 'declined to be a party to sending an emissary on behalf of the Commission' - see FO 371/5900 C9988/92/18 Percival to Curzon 13 May 1921.

179. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism p.228.

180. PRO FO 371/5901 C10143/92/18 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921. This records that 'Note addressed by Polish Committee [C10113/92/18 Percival to Curzon 16 May 1921 above] is being treated as not having been received'.

181. PRO FO 371/5900 C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921.

182. PRO FO 371/5900 File Index Minutes 14 May 1921. Curzon turned down Waterlow's suggestion that they publish Percival's telegram - see DBFP Vol. XVI No.56 pp.76-77 13 May 1921; and ibid No.69 pp.90-91 Percival to Curzon 16 May 1921.

183. PRO FO 371/5904 C10525/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May 1921.

184. PRO FO 890/10 Diary of Captain Toogood 18 May 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes
185. PRO FO 371/5900 C9902/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921.

186. Ibid. Also ibid C9938/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May, 1921. Le Rond stated that in the event of Reichswehr forces arriving there in large numbers he would concentrate the French troops in Opole and Gliwice. See also PRO FO 371/5902 C10517/92/18 Percival to Curzon 21 May 1921 re. Prince Hatzfeldt's resignation.

187. Ibid, C9978/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 16 May 1921.

188. PRO FO 371/5901 C10143/92/18 Percival to Curzon 17 May 1921.

189. PRO FO 371/5904 C10625/92/18 Percival to Curzon 20 May 1920. This account of the situation contains a 36-page Appendix giving details about the insurgents, their actions and the Commission's affairs.

190. PRO FO 371/5902 C10467/92/18 Percival to Curzon 21 May 1921. Curzon replied (ibid 22 May 1921) and confirmed that there was no truth in the report that Lloyd George had demanded the replacement of General Marinis.

191. PRO FO 371/5905 C10827/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 25 May 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 128 p.151, Curzon to Percival 27 May 1921 thanking him for his services and promised that a new commissioner plus replacement officials would soon be appointed.

192. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe 1 June 1921, Enclosure: 'Report by Correspondents of the Times and the Morning Star prepared for Max Muller 30 May 1921'. This was prepared at Max Muller's request.

193. PRO FO 371/5905 C10827/92/18 Bourdillon to Curzon 25 May 1921.

194. PRO FO 371/5908 C11304/92/18 Note from Waterlow to Curzon 30 May 1921. See also FO 371/5907 C11219/92/18 Tidbury to Curzon 30 May 1921 informing him that Percival's health necessitates his immediate departure to Czechoslovakia for rest and recuperation. Another signal (ibid Hawker to Curzon 30 May 1921) followed claiming that Percival had asked him (Hawker) to take over as Commissioner from that day.

195. PRO FO 371 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe 1 June 1921.

196. DBFP Vol. XVI No.32 p.54 Kilmarnock to Curzon 6 May 1921.

197. PRO FO 371/5899 C9857/92/18 Crowe Memorandum - Conversation with German ambassador 9 May 1921.

198. DBFP Vol. XVI No.59 p.79 D'Abernon to Curzon 6 May, 1921. Wirth said that; 'As a fellow Deputy [in the Reichstag] he knew Korfanty well and Korfanty was as obstinate as a bull. Nothing would stop him but force'.

Chapter 4 - Notes
199. PRO FO 371/5897 C9296/92/18 File Index Minutes 7 May 1921. See also FO 371/5899 C9758/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon 11 May 1921. Minute by Crowe who thought, 'The likelihood was small as the opposition comes from the Chief of the General Staff himself to whom the argument of our obligations under the treaty and the responsibilities for keeping order in the plebiscite area does not appeal'.

200. PRO FO371/5900 File Index Minutes. Note by Crowe dated 14 May 1921.

201. Ibid, Minute by Curzon 14 May 1921.

202. Ibid, Minute by Crowe 15 May 1921.

203. Ibid.

204. Jeffery, The Military Correspondence p.175 Wilson to Rawlinson 18 May 1921. This has to be seen in context. Thirty seven soldiers, police and civilians had recently been murdered in Ireland in one week. Wilson did not approve of Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on May 13 either, observing in his diary about 'the mess Lloyd George had got into by his idiotic speech last week about Silesia,' and forecasting that he would now want 'to send some troops there to get him out of the mess' - see IWM DS/Misc/80 Reel 9, Sir Henry Wilson's Diary 18 May 1921.

205. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson Vol.2 p291. This contains Wilson's diary account of these exchanges with Curzon.

206. DBFP Vol. XVI No.84 p.103 Curzon to Cheetham 18 May 1921. See ibid No.90 p.111 Cheetham to Curzon 19 May 1921. Foch had said this to Sackville West who was the British Secretary at Versailles. See also IWM HHW2/12G/33 Sackville West to CIGS 19 May 1921. Wilson had contacted Foch by telephoning Sackville West.

207. PRO FO 371/5902 File Index Minute by Curzon dated 19 May 1921 and related to DBFP Vol. XVI No.90 p.111.

208. PRO FO 371/5902 C10459/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 21 May 1921.

209. Ibid, C10371/92/18 Curzon to Buchanan 21 May 1921.

210. PRO FO 371/5904 C10627/92/18 Buchanan to Curzon 23 May 1921.

211. PRO FO371/5902 C10510/92/18 Curzon to Cheetham 23 May 1921. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland p.224. See DBFP Vol.XVI No.785 p.884 Robertson to Curzon 25 May 1921; the British High Commissioner on the Rhine complained about first learning of the removal of all of his infantry battalions from the German press. See also Jeffrey, The Military Correspondence pp.268 Wilson to Worthington-Evans 23 May 1921. Foch replaced the four British battalions detached from Cologne by placing four French battalions under General Moorland's command.

Chapter 4 - Notes
212. *Ibid.* pp.268-269, Wilson to Sackville West 25 May 1921. See discussion in CCA HDLM Acc 800 3 (Transcript) H.A.L. Fisher Diary, Thursday May 24 1921. 'A French alliance proposed by Winston and supported by A.C. [Austen Chamberlain] opposed by A.J.B. [Balfour], Curzon, and P.M. Worthington-Evans opposed sending battalions to Silesia, P.M. insists; no danger of conflict with French. We decide six battalions instead of four'. Boadle, *Winston Churchill and the German Question in British Foreign Policy* pp.158-160, considers this meeting and its overall context in Anglo-French relations. Churchill believed that giving the French the security that they desired would be repaid by them taking a more relaxed view on concessions to Germany. A half-hearted offer was eventually made by Lloyd George at Cannes in January 1922. The Locarno Treaty was negotiated in 1925.

213. PRO FO 371/5903 C10573/922/18 Percival to Rhine Army H.Q. 22 May 1921. An officer from 12 Squadron, Royal Air Force, stationed near Cologne visited Opole to see if they could contribute to the operation. Despite the Germans and, to a lesser extent the Poles, using aircraft, 12 Squadron remained in the Rhineland.


216. *Ibid.* There were also two field artillery batteries, a company of field service engineers, four tanks plus the usual detachments and services such as motor transport, field hospital and so forth. APWO 46/111 6 July 1921 provides a complete breakdown of the British force and their locations in Upper Silesia.


218. *Ibid.*, p.230. See also PRO WO 106/977 GOC BAOR to War Office 18 June 1921. This is a complete list and date on which all British Army units entrained and arrived in Upper Silesia, also initial locations. For the strength of Allied Forces in Upper Silesia before and after reinforcement in September 1921 see FO 371/5927 C3345/92/18 Sackville West to Hardinge 16 September 1921, Enclosure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>September Reinforcements</th>
<th>September 1921 Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21 August 1921</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>9,691</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>4,033</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


220. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker (Opole) to Wilson 12 June 1921.

221. IWM HHW2/60/5 Wilson to Heneker 17 June 1921.

222. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe 1 June 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes

224. PRO FO 371/5911 C12400/92/18 Max Muller to Crowe 1 June 1921.

225. IWM HHW2/60/2a Dillon to Wilson 10 June 1921.

226. IWM HHW2/60/3 Notes on Present Situation for British Officers, 3 June 1921.


228. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June 1921.

229. IWM HHW2/60/1 Heneker to Wilson 1 June 1921.


231. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* p.229. Heavy fighting was taking place from 18 May. The German offensive began 21 May culminating in the storming of the Polish positions on 23 May. For a highly romanticised account see von Oertzen, *So This is Poland* pp.100-103. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* pp.71-72 for a factual account.


234. Cienciala and Komarnicki *From Versailles to Locarno* pp.70-72. See also PRO FO 371/5905 C10875/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 20 May 1921. And FO 371/5905 C10884/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 22 May 1921. On 14 and again on the 20 May 1921 General Nollet's Inter-Allied Control Commission ordered disbandment of the volunteer levies.

235. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* p.230. The monument erected in 1933 is buried in dense undergrowth in a wood. The plates and insignia have been removed. An adjacent 40,000 capacity amphitheatre, built between 1934 and 1938, is in good condition.


237. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June, 1921. This explains the close cooperation. Hoefer even had a liaison officer attached to Heneker's staff.

238. *DBFP* Vol. XVI, No.111, No.115, No.126, No.127; and *ibid* No.113 pp.140-141, Curzon to Hardinge 24 May 1921. See also *ibid* No. 129 p.152, Percival to Curzon 27 May 1921.

239. PRO FO 371/5902 C10388/92/18 Percival to Curzon 19 May 1921. The inter-Allied troop dispositions on 18 May 1921 were as follows:

Chapter 4 - Notes
### Gliwice
- 1 Battalion (*Italian*)
- 6 Companies
- 1 Sqn. Cavalry
- 4 Batteries
- 4 Armoured Cars

### Bytom
- 5 Companies
- 1 Battery

### Opole
- 1 Battery (*Italian*)
- 2 Battalions
- 1 Sqn. Cavalry
- 3 Tanks
- 4 Armoured Cars

### Ratibor
- 2 Battalions (*Italian*)
- 4 Armoured Cars

### Tarnowski Gory
- 3 Companies

### Kožle
- 2 Battalions (*Italian*)
- 1 Battery (*Italian*)

### Katowice
- 7 Companies
- 3 Tanks

### Mysłowice
- 1 Company

### Dąbrowa Mała
- 1 Company

### Zabrze
- 2 Companies

### Pyskowice
- 1 Company

### Strzelce
- 2 Companies

### Toszek
- 1 Company

### Rybnik
- 2 Companies

### Nicolów
- 1 Company

### Pszczyna
- 1 Sqn. Cavalry

**Note:** Units French unless otherwise stated.

Italian Battalions = 500 men

" Companies = 100 men

French Battalions = 1,000 men

" Companies = 200 men

Most French units were therefore engaged protecting the German Silesian civilians.

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240. PRO FO 371/5900 C99/92/18 Percival to Curzon 15 May 1921.


244. *Ibid.* The message the Polish Consul General telephoned from Bytom on Korfanty's behalf was 'we are prepared to show our submission to decision of allied powers by restoring administration of occupied territory to Inter-Allied Commission....that the Commission determine the manner in which this restoration should be carried out, and that it should be supervised on the spot by representatives of the Commission....without delay..'.


246. IWM HHW/60/1 Heneker to Wilson 1 June 1921.

247. S.P.G. Ward, *Faithful - The Story of the Durham Light Infantry* (London 1962), p.450. On arrival, the Battalion commanded by Lt. Colonel Morant, consisted of just 12 Officers and 355 other ranks. See PRO FO 688/10/50 Max Muller to Dabski. Hoefer was told that if he did not withdraw, then the French forces would abandon Gliwice. See also FO 371/5909 C11782/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 6 June 1921.
Berlin ordered Hoefer to evacuate the area. He had justified the advance by calling it a 'rectification of the line'.


249. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 8 June 1921. This records other instances of leaflets being dropped on British troops by aircraft. FO 371/5913 C13277/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 24 June 1921 Enclosure 3 to No.1: Proclamation dropped from a Polish aircraft.


251. Ibid.


254. PRO FO371/5913 C13276/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 17 June 1921. Enclosure: Diary of Events 11-17 June 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.173 pp.194-199 Stuart to Curzon 11 June 1921 which reports that 'our troops are most undesirably associated with insurgents and that all faith in our impartiality will be quickly destroyed'. On the other hand, Heneker wrote that 'some of our Irishmen have been egging the Germans on to attack the Poles in order to watch a good fight' - see IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June, 1921. For other related material see PRO FO 371/5912 C12769/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 17 June 1921, Enclosure 1 to No.1: Colonel Hawker's Report on the Occupation of Łąbkowy by Allied Troops 11 June 1921 and Enclosure 3 to No.1 Supplementary Report by Major Mac Vey 11 June 1921.

255. Ibid, Enclosure 3 to No.1: 11 June 1921.

256. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June 1921. Heneker reported that he had also issued a strict reminder to his troops about why they had been sent to Upper Silesia. PRO FO 371/5911 No.190 Stuart to Curzon 11 June 1921: Heneker had sent Gratier a definite demand that he be allowed to bring Wauchope's Brigade back to the Strzelce-Ujazd line and to have them under his own command by June 14. WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 11 June 1921.

257. IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June 1921. DBFP Vol. XVI No.173 pp194/199 Stuart to Curzon 12 June 1921. This more fully explains why there was a delay in implementing the phased withdrawal.

258. Ibid. On 8 June, the insurgents had sent another statement, this time signed by Korfanty, of their intent to withdraw but with these formal conditions appended. The Commission had already agreed not to use the plebiscite police east of the 'Korfanty Line' - see PRO FO 371/5911 No.190 Stuart to Curzon 11 June, 1921.

Chapter 4 - Notes
PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 7 June 1921. Hoefer came to meet Heneker who warned him that if his followers kept attacking, then the Ruhr valley would be occupied by the Allies. See also FO 371/4912 C12769/92/18 17 June 1921 Enclosure 4: Report on a Meeting between the Inter-Allied Administrative Commission (Upper Silesia) and Representatives of the Politische Leitung June 13 1921. This body was entirely advisory in its relations with Hoefer and could not dictate to him. However, they supported Hoefer's pledge not to surrender a yard of ground - see Enclosure 5 Memorandum by the Politische Leitung. Further meetings between Heneker and Hoefer are recorded in DBFP Vol. XVI, No.181 pp.204-20 17 June 1921 - meeting on 14 June 1921, in WO 106/1491 16 June 1921 - meetings on 15 and 16 June 1921 and in FO371/5913 C13277/92/18 Diary of Events 18 -23 June 1921 - meeting on the 19 June, 1921. This Diary also records a conference held on 22 June 1921 between General Hoefer, Politische Leitung, and representatives of the German Government parties sent to Upper Silesia to advise them.

PRO FO 371/5911 No.190 Stuart to Curzon 12 June 1921. After Heneker had told Stuart about Gratier's hectoring attitude to the Germans during their interviews with Hoefer, Stuart succeeded in getting Le Rond to agree to his request that in future only the British military staff handle negotiations with the Germans. See also WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 15 June 1921.

DBFP Vol. XVI No.164 p.184, Stuart to Curzon 7 June 1921. See also ibid No.167 pp186/188, Hardinge to Curzon 9 June 1921 and IWM HHW2/60/3 Heneker to Wilson 12 June 1921.


DBFP Vol. XVI No.171 p192 Max Muller to Curzon 11 June 1921. Max Muller had already been attempting to elicit an invitation from the Polish Government for an inter-Allied mission to check the frontier. In PRO FO 371/5912 C12854/92/18 21 June 1921 Max Muller records the inter-Allied Mission's departure. For the 'Report on Closing of Upper Silesian Frontier' by Lieutenant. Commander Rawlings - see PRO FO 371/5914 C13567/92/18 29 June 1921, Enclosure 1. See also ibid Enclosure 2: 'British Military Mission to Legation' dated 25 June, in which Lieut. Colonel Clayton rejects British claims that Polish Army units were operating in Upper Silesia.

IWM HHW2/61/1 Grogan to Wilson 25 June 1921.

PRO WO 106/1491 CW784 Berlin radio intercept 4 June 1921: Propaganda message being sent in English language to 'The World' New York. It describes how Korfanty is fast losing control of Upper Silesia. It is now a hot-bed of Bolshevik hordes. Inter-Allied Commission is now apparently less able than ever to re-establish order. It goes on to describe the ruin of 'a totally collapsed industry', also the 'state of anarchy' and how the insurgents 'carry red flags and consider themselves heralds of the coming Soviet republic'. Playing on the Western fears of communism worked very successfully for the German propagandists.


269. PRO FO 371/5915 C14334/92/18 Diary of Events, 24 June 1921. See also FO890/10 Diary of Captain Toogood 19 - 25 June 1921, provides some examples.

270. PRO FO 371/5914 C13800/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 1 July 1921. Enclosure: Map Showing Lines of Withdrawal of Polish Insurgents and German Self-Defence Forces from the Upper Silesian Plebiscite Area.

271. Ibid.


274. PRO FO 371/5912 C12811/92/18 Kilmarnock to Curzon 21 June 1921.

275. Ibid, C12769/92/18 (DBFP Vol. XVI No.181) unpublished minutes by Waterlow dated 23 June 1921. Although Curzon was also dubious, Crowe, however, thought that 'continued firmness with the Germans will not do harm'.


277. Ibid.

278. PRO FO 371/5915 C.P.3121 Secretary of State for War to Cabinet Memorandum on the Military Position in Upper Silesia by Chief of the Imperial General Staff, 8 July 1921. See also FO371/5919 C15323/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 23 July 1921. Enclosure: Breslaur Morgan Zeitung Friday 1 July 1921. This published Hoefer's proclamation thanking Selbstschutz members who had arrived 'from every part of the Empire...to protect the German Upper Silesian land'.

279. DBFP Vol. XVI, No 214 pp.236-237 Memorandum by the Chief of the General Staff on the Military Situation in Silesia, 8 July 1921. See also PRO WO 106/977 Grogan to Wilson 1 July and ibid 4 July 1921, reporting that the French military command were expecting a prolonged stay in Upper Silesia, probably motivated Wilson to once again call for a British withdrawal.

280. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 181 pp.204-207 Stuart to Curzon 17 June 1921.
281. BWM BWArch 2nd Battalion Digest June 8 1921. 'Sgt. Selvester of D Company was wounded when out with a reconnoitring party, and died shortly afterwards'. It was first thought that he had been shot by the Poles but it was later established that it was a German shot that had killed him.

282. IWM H2/61/1 Grogan to Wilson 25 June 1921. 'The coldness of the weather, the absence of the excitement of fighting and the imminent beginning of the harvesting season, are all factors which tend to damp the military ardour of the combatants and to encourage desertions'.

283. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 8 July 1921. See also FO 371/5915 C14012/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 7 July 1921.

284. IWM HHW2/60/7 Heneker to Wilson 6 July 1921.


286. Ibid, 14 July 1921. See also Ibid 29 July 1921 which reports that Sergeant Wakenell died as a result of his wounds and was awarded croix-de-guerre by Le Rond.

287. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 6 July 1921. See APWO 46/111 for a complete breakdown of location of British Forces in Upper Silesia on 6 July 1921. And FO/5921 C15985/92/18 Cabinet Paper 3199 5 August 1921 Appendix I: The Military Situation In Upper Silesia provides a distribution of all the Allied forces in Upper Silesia on that date.

288. Heneker enjoyed living there so much that even when deputising on the Commission for Stuart, who had frequent absences in England, rather than remain in Opole he travelled in from Turawa each day.

289. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 6 July 1921.

290. Ibid. 14 July 1921.

291. IWM HHW2/60/7 Heneker to Wilson 6 July 1921.


293. Ibid. Heneker to War Office 14 July 1921. Lequis had been involved with the 'pacification' of Berlin in December 1918, after Ebert and Groner had agreed to re-impose order - see Wheeler Bennett The Nemesis of Power p.28.

294. PRO WO 95/123 G23/1/1 13 July 1921. British Silesian Force Defence Scheme. Drawn up by Lieut. Colonel Dillon, this plan accepted that both these eventualities were unlikely for the present.
295. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 14 July 1921. See also ibid 19 July 1921 and DBFP Vol.XVI No.234 pp.256-257 Stuart to Curzon 20 July 1921. In a memorandum Ottley describes the French troops as agents provocateurs - see ibid No.236 pp.258-259.

296. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 19 July 1921.

297. Ibid, 28 July 1921.

298. PRO FO 371/5916 C13745/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 18 July 1921.

299. PRO FO 371/5917 C14775/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 18 July 1921.

300. PRO WO 106/1491 Heneker to War Office 21 July 1921.

301. Ibid. This includes a cutting from the Daily Express Wednesday 27 July 1921 reporting that the Poles were ready to rise up again.

302. Ibid. Heneker to War Office 21 July 1921. The British and the Italian troops were withdrawn from these inter-Allied 'flying columns'.

303. PRO FO 371/5919 C15573/92/18 Diary of Events 26 July 1921. Twenty German prisoners were released after the French guards were attacked. See also FO371/5923 C16883/92/18 Diary of Events 4 August 1921 recording that 200 Germans attacked the Geimendewache [Communal Police installed in the ex-occupied area after the withdrawal] to release German prisoners. Two Geimendewhache were killed. On 6 August, over 300 Germans entered the village of Stara Kuznia and arrested five Poles in retaliation for French raids and arrest of Germans. On 8 August, British troops were attacked at Bodzanowice and forced to surrender their German prisoners and the arms that they had captured. On 14 August, a bomb was thrown from a train at a French patrol near Gliwice.

304. PRO WO 106/1491 General Staff Intelligence, British Silesian Force Report No.199 15 July 1921. Ex-insurgents had been plundering the district. The locals wanted the bandits sent back to Upper Silesia. See also ibid H.38 Heneker to War Office 8 July 1921. This reports fighting between Polish insurgents recrossing into Poland with loot taken in Upper Silesia, being stopped by Polish Upper Silesians who were attempting to prevent them taking it out of the area.

305. PRO FO 371/5917 C14946/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 21 July 1921. See also IWM HHW2/61/8 Grogan to Wilson 31 July 1921, Enclosure: Report on Situation in the Regions in a State of Siege by General de Brantes, 25 July 1921. This provides a good insight into how the French forces saw the post-insurrectionary problems - not least the problem posed by the German armed bands.

306. DBFP Vol.XVI No.242 pp.263-264 Cheetham to Curzon 22 July 1921. See also ibid No.247 pp.268-270 Curzon to Cheetham 23 July 1921; and ibid No.248 p.270 D'Abernon to Curzon 24 July 1921.
307. Hardinge, *Old Diplomacy* pp.258-259. The details are covered comprehensively in the published *DBFP* Vol.XVI Chap.II. The governments had really stumbled into this and the crisis further complicated the establishment of the Supreme Council meeting to discuss Upper Silesia's future. Hardinge was recalled from holiday to deal with the crisis and make the face-saving proposals that defused the situation. The proposal to send another French Division to Upper Silesia was purely political. Sackville West reported (IWM HHW2/12G/47 29 July 1921) that neither Foch nor Weygand had been consulted about it. Gadja believed (*Postscript to Victory* pp.131-133) that this cost Britain several vital concessions on details over the place, time and proceedings of the Supreme Council meeting in Paris 7 - 13 August 1921 - see Chapter 5.

308. PRO FO 371/5927 C3345/92/18 Sackville West to Hardinge 16 September 1921. Enclosure: *State of Allied Forces in Upper Silesia Before and After Reinforcement*. See also WO 106/1491 No.270 Rhine Army to War Office *Summary of Military Events Seven Days Ending 24, August 1921*. Notes that the 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers arrived at Tarnowski Gory on September 6 and the 2nd Battalion Inniskilling Fusiliers arrived in Opole on September 7.

309. PRO FO 371/5921 C15985/92/18 Cabinet Paper 3199 *The Military Situation in Upper Silesia* by the Secretary of State for War 5 August 1921. See also *DBFP* Vol.XV No.102 British Secretary's notes of an Allied conference in Paris, 12 August, 1921 and IWM HHW2/60/10 Heneker to Wilson 22 August 1921.

310. PRO FO 5921 C15900/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 6 August 1921. See also *ibid* C16009/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 8 August, 1921. This was assuming that they could not use either the Poles to help them contain the Germans, or conversely, use the Germans to contain the Poles. If the decision on the frontiers was delayed then they the Allies must either send out 60,000 to 70,000 troops or simply withdraw from the region.

311. PRO FO 371/5915 C14261/13/7 11 July 1921: Parliamentary question about the future of Upper Silesia. The Prime Minister admitted that the date of the next Supreme Council meeting was uncertain.


313. PRO FO 890/8 BC/20 Tidbury to Beal 31 July 1921. Tidbury stated that he had heard from 'various sources about Polish officers and Polish regular Army units in the town of Lubliniec,' and he asks why Beal had not reported this. Beal replied that this is because there was no truth in the reports - see *ibid* Beal to Tidbury 3 June 1921.

314. PRO FO 371/5915 C14109/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 5 July 1921.

315. PRO FO 371/5914 C13596/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 29 June 1921. Enclosure: *British Report to Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs about the Conditions of Prisoner's at Kattbus, 31 May 1921*. 

Chapter 4 - Notes
316. PRO FO 371/5911 C12502/92/18 Stuart to Waterlow 12 June 1921.

317. PRO FO 371/6839 N7068/6582/55 Max Muller to Curzon 15 June 1921. The officer was Lieutenant Iwanicki who was found guilty and executed. The Passport Office in Warsaw was described as being run independently by 'our well known friend Lloyd George'.

318. PRO FO 371/5913 C13103/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 22 June 1921.

319. PRO FO 371/6818 N7606/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon Summary of Events week ending 28 June 1921.

320. DBFP Vol. XV No. 92 p. 630, British secretary's notes of an Allied conference held in Paris 9 August 1921.

321. IWM HHW2/10/8 Heneker to Wilson 11 September 1921.

322. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 236 pp. 258-259 Memorandum by Major Ottley on the Silesian situation, 20 July 1921.

323. It is fair to add that many Polish people also saw the French support as exploitative - see PRO FO 371/5917/92/18 D'Abernom to Curzon 23 July, 1921.

324. IWM 72/116/3 Papers of Major Ball circa 30 July, 1921.


326. PRO FO 371/5916 C14506/92/18 D'Abernom to Curzon 15 May 1921.
Chapter 5

Referral to the League of Nations,
The Decision and Hand-Over.

By mid-1921, Anglo-French differences over their future relations with Germany were most vividly illustrated in the impasse over Upper Silesia. From a British political quick-fix to induce Germany to sign the Peace Treaty, the Upper Silesian plebiscite and the Polish supporters' refusal to be reincorporated in Germany had elevated the future of this industrial region into one of the most crucial issues governing Anglo-French relations, even threatening the future of the Entente itself. Tacit Anglo-German and Franco-Polish understandings over the territory, continuing French insecurity, the need for European economic revival, an agreement on reparations, and Germany’s future as a democracy, were amongst the many issues turning the Supreme Council’s forthcoming decision on Upper Silesia into one of broad international concern.

For Poland, struggling to rebuild a national economy after 150 years of partition and its recent experience of devastating warfare, Upper Silesia’s coal mines and its industries would be a vital acquisition. But Germany was passionately interested in retaining the region’s resources in order to rebuild its own economy. The provisions of the Versailles Treaty prevented either side from taking unilateral action. However, the Treaty’s only real guarantee was continued co-operation between Britain and France, something the German Foreign Office was constantly working to undermine by manipulating factors such as reparations to create tensions within the Entente. While the French stuck to what can only be described as a rigid interpretation of its provisions, in Britain, even before the signing of the Treaty, the first whiffs of appeasement had
become apparent. This had grown apace and now, two years later, Upper Silesia’s future degenerated into a battle of wills between Paris and London.

Viewing this from the sidelines were the recently appointed officials to the new League of Nations. Though always recognising that the redefinition of the Upper Silesian frontier was ultimately a Supreme Council responsibility, several of them felt that it was just the type of problem the League had been set up to deal with. Some also saw in it an opportunity to raise their organisation’s profile and demonstrate to a sceptical world just how their new institution could find a solution where the present parties could not.¹

This concluding chapter describes the latter stages of the Upper Silesian plebiscite saga, including the efforts made by the League of Nation’s officials to have the border question referred to them. It analyses British, French and Italian reactions to the Opole Commissioners’ recommendations and examines the limited extent to which the British were prepared to compromise over awarding the majority of the industrial district to Germany. The background to the Supreme Council’s referral of the dispute to the League of Nations is also examined, as are the difficulties which the League encountered in setting about its task. Reactions in Germany and Poland to the League’s decision are analysed, as is the effect of that decision on the League’s credibility in British governing circles. Finally, although the chapter deals mainly with the final stages of the plebiscite saga within an international context, nonetheless it also describes economic conditions in Upper Silesia as well as aspects of life for the soldiers and officials awaiting the decision and then the inter-Allied Commission’s orders to disengage.

The Opole Commissioners’ recommendations (see Map 4 p.262) had arrived in London on 4 May 1921 - too late to be considered by the London Conference which was then underway.² In the Foreign Office, officials took the opportunity to analyse them, but during the course of this third insurrection and its immediate aftermath yet another
problem arose – difficulty in getting the French to agree upon a date for another Supreme Council meeting to discuss them. Both Warsaw and Berlin had been pleading for a final decision on Upper Silesia’s future. The Commissioners and Allied military commanders in Upper Silesia had echoed their pleas. But while the Silesians were gathering in what was a bumper harvest under the blazing mid-July sunshine, relations between France and Britain deteriorated still further. Visiting the troops in Upper Silesia, the DMI, General Thwaites, found support for his belief that to avoid the British force becoming embroiled in any renewed conflict, the Supreme Council would have to make up their minds well before all the harvest had been gathered in. He estimated they had about six weeks to reach a decision, implement it, then evacuate Silesia before the fighting resumed. But however much this hurried course of action appealed to Thwaites and Sir Henry Wilson (who wanted the British troops out immediately), the Foreign Office’s attempts to initiate another Supreme Council meeting constantly foundered on differences between Paris and London.

These differences were encapsulated in the recommendations that had been received from Opole. Following hints from London, Percival had joined Marinis in grudgingly awarding a few mines and some coal reserves to Poland. And as we have seen, Le Rond had gone much further, recommending that the whole of the industrial area be awarded to the Poles. With the Commissioners’ recommendations now in place, the British, Italian and French officials now concentrated on shaping their own ideas and their governments’ policies into proposals which they thought might win acceptance at the next Supreme Council meeting. In the Foreign Office, it was noted that the three Commissioners’ only point of agreement was that neither they nor their governments wanted the core-manufacturing district (the industrial triangle), to be partitioned. And whilst the British later derided Le Rond’s proposals, it is interesting to note that at least two senior Foreign
Office officials recognised the validity of the French Commissioner's arguments. Commenting on Le Rond's views, Waterlow observed that whilst it was not difficult to find flaws in General Le Rond's case ... it cannot be denied that, from the point of view of the intention of the Treaty, it has theoretical strength, which makes it necessary that we should be very sure of our ground in making any attempt to set it aside.  

Crowe was also 'much impressed with the force of General Le Rond's arguments'. He agreed that the Treaty envisaged partitioning Upper Silesia on the basis of each separate commune's vote. However, he pointed out that the Treaty had not differentiated between the size of these communes nor allowed for the vast disparity in the number of residents within each of them. This meant that adopting Le Rond's line would force many thousands of Germans into Poland – creating what Lloyd George had feared would be another 'Alsace-Lorraine'. On the other hand, retaining the industrial towns for Germany would involve awarding Germany 'a large majority of communes who have voted for Poland'. Therefore, to avoid violating the Treaty's fundamental principle of self-determination, Crowe suggested

If His Majesty's Government want to insist on saving the important industrial district round the three German towns (Bytom, Krolewska Hutta, Katowice) for Germany [it would be best to] join the industrial area to the German territory west of the Oder by a small corridor... No doubt this would constitute a geographically awkward German salient... but, economically, such an argument would, I think, be defensible.  

It is difficult to judge whether or not Crowe's scheme to run a corridor through the Toszecko-Gliwice district to the industrial district was satiric comment or a serious proposal. If serious it was an advance in British thinking. All of the schemes developed

Chapter 5
by his junior officials had contrived to restrict the Polish award to the Pszczyna and Rybnik districts. If it was satirical, then this was lost on Ottley, who regarded Crowe’s proposal as practical provided the communications to the industrial triangle remained in German hands. However, after excluding the territory around the canals, roads and railways linking the industrial district to Germany, almost half the Polish vote still remained outside Poland. Despite this, Curzon approved the proposal. Therefore, by adopting what Ottley described as the ‘Crowe line’ (which approximated the ‘British Delegation Line’ in Map 7 p. 422), the Foreign Office quickly established Britain’s compromise position should the Supreme Council reject the Percival-Marinis line.

A similar review was undertaken in Rome. But whereas the British had not announced their conclusions, the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Sforza, gave the British and French ambassadors a memorandum outlining his own proposals. These had already appeared in the Italian press three days earlier. Sforza rejected his own commissioner’s advice and instead proposed dividing up Upper Silesia’s population and territory in a manner directly proportionate to each side’s share of the total plebiscite vote. He sketched two formulas for this (see Map 6). Since both violated the British and French governments’ fundamental axiom on the industrial triangle’s indivisibility, Sforza’s initiative generated a great deal of resentment in London, Paris and, of course, Berlin. In Warsaw, some Polish optimists regarded it as qualified Italian support. But in Upper Silesia, Marinis opposed the proposals and, not wanting to undermine Wirth’s professed policy of Erfullung, the Italian ambassador in Berlin also played them down. Under the plan Poland would receive 90% of Upper Silesia’s coal reserves, most of the coal mines and all other minerals mined there. Ottley claimed that anyone who proposed partitioning the industrial triangle could not be aware of how industry worked or have any interest in Upper Silesia’s future. But Rome’s proposal was still-born. The Giolitti-Sforza
Map 6 Italian Foreign Minister's Proposals 24 May 1921

Chapter 5
government only lasted a few more weeks and when the new Foreign Minister, Marquis della Torretta (who had worked with Le Rond on the Polish Commission and the Eastern Frontiers Committee in Paris) was appointed, Sforza’s proposals disappeared from public view. Paradoxically, the final League’s solution (see Map 8) closely matched Sforza’s initiative. The long road leading to this solution had started in Paris on 24 May; the day the Chamber of Deputies had endorsed Briand’s foreign policy.

Though Prime Minister of a government supported by the conservative Bloc National, Briand had come to office quietly intent on international reconciliation. This was a delicate political balance. Experienced in the vagaries of the Third Republic’s political system, Briand had insisted that the Deputies endorse this policy before he took any major decisions. Three days later the British ambassador, Lord Hardinge, reminded Briand that he had promised to call a Supreme Council meeting when that debate had been concluded. At this time (27 May), Briand believed that the Upper Silesian crisis had eased and that a resolution of the frontier issue was far less urgent. Regarding the Commissioners’ recommendations, Briand simply dismissed them, telling Hardinge that the necessary political, juridical and ethnographical knowledge that was required to adjudicate in such matters went far beyond the competence of military officers. The Commission had also been unable to reach a unanimous agreement because its members had been influenced by local prejudices. Briand suggested that before the Supreme Council discuss Upper Silesia, a commission of experts (diplomats, engineers and lawyers) ought to meet in Paris to review matters and draw up a report. Allowing time for this to be done, he estimated that there could be a meeting of the Supreme Council on about 5 June. This would also give British troops time to complete their deployment. Meanwhile, should Curzon approve, these technical experts could meet in Paris to compile their submission for the Supreme Council.
Responding, Curzon suggested that Briand’s proposal be discussed at a preliminary meeting of the Supreme Council; and he observed that should these experts ever meet, then Upper Silesia appeared a far more appropriate location for their enquiries than Paris. The French pointed out that in Upper Silesia the technical experts might be corrupted by the same local influences that had affected the Commission. However, for the time being, they conceded the point. The preliminary Council meeting was another matter. Apart from the difficulties involved in assembling so many busy ministers at short notice, the French Government felt that a preliminary meeting was unnecessary. They claimed that the public opposed such frequent meetings, they inflamed the press, provoked criticism and, in Upper Silesia’s case, the speculation that was generated could lead to further disturbances in Poland and Germany. France instead proposed that each country send three experts to Upper Silesia with instructions to prepare a report based ‘on the terms of the Treaty and the results of the plebiscite by communes, taking into account geographical and economic conditions’. On receipt of the experts’ report, which was to be presented within a fortnight, a Supreme Council meeting would be held to discuss its findings.

The British did not reject Briand’s attempt to set the plebiscite commissioners’ recommendations aside for it appeared to be that, in essence, he was only searching for the same elusive consensus which the reviews conducted in London and Rome had also sought. Nevertheless, having been alerted to Percival’s resignation, the British officials saw in Briand’s proposal an opportunity to get rid of Marinis and Le Rond as well. Curzon also suspected that Lloyd George wanted to accommodate Briand for wider political reasons such as Anglo-French differences over Greece and Turkey.

Writing to the Prime Minister on Curzon’s behalf, Crowe welcomed Briand’s attempt to obtain ‘the opinions and advice of a fresh body of men’. Nevertheless,
explained Crowe, setting up experts independently of the Commission might prove to be
difficult. Instead, he suggested that the most important part of Briand’s plan would be
fulfilled if the three military commissioners were replaced by civilian administrators. A
rejuvenated Commission could re-examine the issues and might succeed in producing a
unanimous recommendation. Even if unanimity was impossible, the solutions emerging
from their review could perhaps be referred to arbitration. 31

In Geneva meanwhile, Philip Baker, a young but influential League of Nations
official, was thinking along these very same lines. 32 But in concluding his note to Lloyd
George, Crowe had cautioned that ‘the League of Nations would have to be excluded for
many reasons, one of which is the necessity of carrying the United States with us’. 33 At
the time, Curzon was seeking American support for British policy in Upper Silesia. 34
Apart from having refused membership, for domestic political reasons Washington could
have nothing to do with the League. Yet within a few days of Crowe writing to Lloyd
George, Briand’s proposal that a commission of experts review matters fell temporarily
into abeyance. This was because the news of Percival’s resignation had signalled a series
of violent attacks on him in the French press. Condemning his ‘pro-German activities’,
the press blamed his ‘obstructive attitude’ over negotiating with Korfanty for prolonging
the insurrection. Some even suggested that his illness was simply a diplomatic pretext for
London withdrawing him. 35 Similar allegations had been made earlier in a note which the
Quai d’Orsay sent to the Foreign Office. 36 Suspecting the French Government’s collusion
in these attacks, Curzon informed Paris

that the careful and sympathetic consideration which we have given M. Briand’s
proposals has been ill requited by the re-iteration of these insinuations against
Colonel Percival. It is possible that some practical form may eventually be found
for the suggested body of experts, but in the circumstances I prefer to postpone further discussions...  

This brought this first phase of each of the three Allied governments' appraisal of the commissioners' recommendations to a close. While Sforza remained at the helm, Rome was willing to shift from their commissioner’s minimalist stance. Paris claimed it wanted to throw over the Commissioners’ recommendations and restart the evaluation, this time using qualified specialists. London wanted to see all three Commissioners replaced and, if necessary, by way of compromise, was willing to concede agricultural territory around Tarnowski Gory and Lubliniec. But over the following weeks, British attention became focussed on keeping apart the Selbtschutz and the Polish insurgents in Upper Silesia.

Curzon planned on raising the question of replacing the Commission when he next met Briand. Hardinge, however, pre-empted him. After receiving a series of pessimistic reports from Sir Harold Stuart, who had been appointed as the new British Commissioner in Opole, Curzon resumed complaining to the French about the delay to the Supreme Council meeting. A bi-lateral meeting was therefore arranged with Briand in Paris on 18-19 June. Prior to leaving London, Curzon received a note from Lloyd George concurring with the suggestion that Commissioner posts should be reserved for civilians. Reasoning that a solution to the Upper Silesian situation could never be reached while such a ‘bigoted Polophile[sic]’ as Le Rond controlled the Commission, Lloyd George endorsed Curzon’s proposal to urge the French to replace him.

Whilst the British were anxiously attempting to arrange a Supreme Council meeting, they were also taking good care over who would attend. Curzon wanted to maintain the principle that territorial settlements were the exclusive preserve of the principal Allied and Associated Powers (Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and United States). When the British Minister in Brussels, sought permission to give the Belgian Foreign Minister a
copy of an Upper Silesian briefing paper that had recently been issued to the United States’ ambassador in London, this was refused and he was warned not to discuss the subject with Belgian ministers. The Foreign Office was anxious to prevent France rallying support from countries such as Belgium, whose governments also legitimately viewed Upper Silesia’s future as affecting their own country’s security. However, this subject was not raised when Curzon finally managed to discuss Upper Silesia with Briand in Paris.

Although the French Premier would not budge on the important points and much of what he did agree to later unravelled, the French press regarded the meeting as beneficial to the Entente’s relations. With regard to Curzon’s immediate concerns over ending the insurrection, Briand refused to contemplate using military force to recover the industrial area from the insurgents. Like Millerand who had rejected Hardinge’s query, Briand also adamantly opposed reconstituting the Commission on a civilian basis. Nevertheless, he agreed with Curzon’s proposal that the present commissioners should be asked to review their recommendations to see if they could compile an unanimous report, either by themselves or with the help of technical advisors. Should the Commission think this unlikely, the British Government would consider referring the matter to a commission of technical experts (such as Briand had proposed earlier), sitting either in London or Paris. Finally, Briand agreed to the Supreme Council meeting in Boulogne to settle the Upper Silesian question sometime after 10 July. Despite the limited gains, at a Cabinet meeting on 21 June, Lloyd George congratulated Curzon on his ‘successful mission to Paris which had done so much to improve relations between the two countries’.

In Opole, Marinis had wanted immediate compliance with Curzon’s request that the Commission review their recommendations on Upper Silesia, but Stuart and Le Rond feared that either London or Paris would leak any decision they arrived at, re-igniting the

Chapter 5
insurrection. Stuart confirmed that the question would be discussed when order had been restored. This drive towards a consensus was severely damaged when London received a report from Paris about Briand having told the Chamber of Deputies that he believed the whole Upper Silesian industrial area should be awarded to Poland. Curzon well understood that the Bloc National and other French nationalists were demanding this but in their meetings Briand’s conciliatory attitude, particularly over this frontier issue, had given Curzon grounds to hope that some compromise would be achieved. Curzon’s hopes were further dashed when Stuart telegraphed informing him that after reviewing the Commission’s previous recommendations on Upper Silesia’s frontiers and studying some new proposals, the Commission felt that

there is no probability of them reaching a unanimous decision on the question of the frontier between Germany and Poland. They consider on the other hand that local conditions require that the position of uncertainty... should be terminated as soon as possible. And they therefore trust that decision of Supreme Council will be given at an early date.

Each of the commissioners had been well aware of his government’s intentions regarding the disposal of the industrial triangle. For all three of the commissioners to have reached an agreement had required two to disregard their own Foreign Minister’s wishes. Since their independent status had long-proved to be only nominal, this had always been unlikely. In fact, all three commissioners had simply continued advancing their own government’s viewpoint. Although completely disagreeing with them, Marinis had advanced Sforza’s recent proposals. In Stuart’s case, the British Commissioner altered the Percival-Marinis line to one closely resembling the compromise line recently drawn up by the Foreign Office. Le Rond stuck to his guns. The inescapable conclusion was that since these divergent aims were being formulated at the highest level, the whole
issue really had to be negotiated within the Supreme Council itself – something that had
been long apparent, if not to Curzon, then to most of his officials and advisers.57

Apart from the continued concern over Upper Silesia’s security, pressure for an
early Supreme Council meeting was mounting from other sources. Berlin was hinting that
the prolonged insecurity and failure to see any tangible reward for its compliance, could
cause the Wirth Cabinet to fall.58 On a practical note, the thrust of British diplomacy was
about to be diverted towards the forthcoming Washington Conference.59 This made the
settlement an urgent matter. But just when all the other parties to the dispute were united
in demanding an immediate decision, the French started prevaricating again – insisting
that the proposed commission of technical experts meet in Paris first, and questioning the
wisdom of holding a Supreme Council meeting before an additional French division had
been deployed to secure the unruly areas in Upper Silesia (see Chapter 4).60 From this
point onwards, published British official documents relating to Upper Silesia concentrate
on this aspect of the Anglo-French exchanges to the exclusion of all else. It is sufficient
to say that whereas the British were willing to accept Berlin’s assurances about German
behaviour in Upper Silesia, the French were not. Prior to discussions on Upper Silesia’s
future, the French wanted the region under much firmer military control, and they insisted
on calling in technical experts beforehand.61

Of course, unlike the more experienced British diplomats and senior officials
involved in handling the Upper Silesian problem, a violently pro-German adviser such as
Ottley never for a moment regarded Briand’s request for expert consultation as a genuine
search for compromise. Now, like Ottley, several of the Foreign Office officials also
suspected that Briand was playing for time, hoping that the Wirth Cabinet would fall, the
reparations payments be renounced and France provided with an excuse to march into the
Ruhr valley and further destabilise Germany.62 However, these suspicions overlooked the

Chapter 5
fact that Briand had staked his political life on maintaining Allied unity; that after the withdrawal of German forces from Upper Silesia, a renewed build-up of the Selbstschutz (which by September saw over 44,000 Silesians and other Germans in its ranks) had taken place, and that the French administration’s reliance on expert opinion was partly attributable to their different cultural approach to government: ‘specialists’ flourishing in the French civil service whereas it was ‘generalists’ who tended to rule from Whitehall.63

Perspectives differed elsewhere. In Poland, it was the British and the Italians who were regarded as the guilty parties delaying the Supreme Council’s meeting. Believing Sforza had favoured Poland’s cause before falling from power, some Polish newspapers accused the Italians of dragging out the decision on Upper Silesia until he had gone.64 The left of centre Narod claimed that it was Britain’s failure to allow Briand’s request for an investigation by experts, which was obstructing the decision-making process.65 Three weeks after the insurrection ended, Curzon finally acceded to Briand’s request that a Committee of Experts be appointed to draw up a report on Upper Silesia for the Allied leaders. Doubting the experts’ ability to reach a unanimous recommendation, Curzon nevertheless promised that provided Briand summoned the Supreme Council, Britain would send three experts to the Committee.66 Briand agreed; the Committee of Experts met in Paris on 28 July and a Supreme Council meeting was scheduled for 8 August.67

The Polish press also blamed Anglo-French differences for encouraging a spate of German attacks on French troops in Upper Silesia.68 But writing to Wilson at the end of July, Grogan (who sent the most balanced of the British reports from Upper Silesia) felt both sides were using terror as a political instrument. Nonetheless, his intuition told him that ‘Upper Silesians as a whole, would view with great relief even a moderate decision of the Supreme Council’.69 In Berlin, D’Abernon also detected signs of compromise amongst ‘leading Poles’ there. Claiming that they now appreciated the urgent need to
define their frontiers, he quoted one of them as having described Poland as being 'like a man without a skin'.

Poland's industry and commerce had been placed in an intolerable position by the German trade embargo and the multiplicity of fiscal matters which were accelerating the depreciation of the Polish mark. The embargo on Polish trade was a particularly powerful weapon for the Germans, and its dire consequences were raised repeatedly by the Warsaw Legation's commercial department. After visiting Poland on behalf of the Bradford Chamber of Commerce (who sought to recover pre-war debts of £500,000 from Polish textile manufacturers), the town's M.P., Colonel Willey, communicated with the Foreign Office to emphasise the danger that the embargo posed for British commercial interests. Since it was plain that it would remain in place until the frontier was settled, he urged an early decision over Upper Silesia's future. But despite pleas from Poland and from German manufacturers to relax some aspects of the trade embargo, the German Finance Minister was reported to have stated:

Politically we are in a weak position with regard to Poland, but we are quite strong economically. Therefore we are not going to make any separate arrangement for economic matters for, from that moment we should be bound hand and foot as far as these political questions are concerned.

The drawn-out saga of Upper Silesia was also being reported as having a detrimental effect on morale in Poland. When interviewing leading Polish politicians, a Dutch correspondent reported that several of them had stated quite openly to him that any frontier would be better than no frontier at all. D'Abernon was also reporting that his sources were claiming that Warsaw's Poles had become very disenchedanted with the Upper Silesian troubles. According to one source, if Poland received favourable access to its materials and products, and a say in running Upper Silesia's affairs, about 120 of the
Polish deputies would accept partition of the industrial area. D'Abernon thought that this information could perhaps be employed by the negotiators and suggested that some obscure economic clauses, 'whose value cannot easily be appraised', might be employed to help the Germans to accept partition. Commenting, Max Muller admitted that tensions were being created by the troubles and that the trade embargo was a problem, but he denied that the Poles were ready to sell out Upper Silesia. This repudiation by the man on the spot makes D'Abernon's second-hand information appear to be little more than wishful thinking on the part of Berlin.

As the date of the Supreme Council meeting approached, the British sought to keep the lid on the situation in Upper Silesia by urging the Germans to ignore the many 'provocations' being perpetuated by the French. Rosen stressed to D'Abernon that he was doing everything he could in order to keep Upper Silesia quiet. In London, the Foreign Office was flooded with official and unofficial reassurances about the German Silesians' good behaviour and denials about a planned uprising should the decision of the Supreme Council go against them. Wild rumours were also much in circulation. For example, D'Abernon suggested that if Poland won most of Upper Silesia, Korfanty was planning to form a new independent state with Posen and part of Galicia, in order to avoid exploitation by Poland or the French. On 31 July, the German and Prussian Governments appealed to Upper Silesians and Germans to avoid any 'thoughtless action which would endanger the unbiased and just decision which we claim'. However, speaking in Bremen just two days later, after first astonishing the Poles by attributing their country's rebirth to Germany's wartime sacrifices, Wirth went on to attack the 'political passion and unbridled arrogance' ruling in Warsaw.

Not to be outdone, sources close to Ludendorff (whose star was now rapidly descending), relayed his sanguinary prediction that 'whatever the outcome of the
Supreme Conference [sic], there will be a German and Polish rising, France will join in and Germany will have no other recourse but to appeal to Soviet Russia for help'. In fact, by mid-1921 Soviet Russia had its own internal political difficulties. These problems reflected back on to Lloyd George. His long pursuit of a recently signed Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement had not only annoyed the French but also alienated many Conservative members of his coalition and he was under continual attack by the Northcliffe press. A violent article suggesting Lloyd George was now the most distrusted man in the world, was published by *The Times*. Commenting on this from Warsaw, the Rzeczpospolita noted that should these press attacks continue, then 'Briand may perhaps be able to settle the problem with another politician [rather] than with the open enemy of Poland'.

Witnessing the breakdown of confidence in the Powers' ability to deliver a just settlement in Upper Silesia, on 22 June Philip Baker had written to his superior, the League's Secretary-General, Sir Eric Drummond. Believing Upper Silesia to be an issue affecting world peace, he suggested that it was within the League's remit to deal with it. He informed Drummond that his colleagues within the Secretariat were generally favourable. The French, he thought, would not resist this suggestion. It was simply a matter of getting the British to support the proposal. However, Baker felt that Lloyd George would not be persuaded if the suggestion came directly from the League. He discussed this with one of the League's Italian officials, Bernardo Attolico, who had agreed that it might be possible to get the Italian Government to make the proposal. He realised that fixing a frontier acceptable to both parties would not be easy; nevertheless

I think they [France and Britain] have stirred up forces in Poland and Germany that they cannot now control, and which any force that the Supreme Council may be willing to use against them will not frighten. I believe the answer, and the only answer, lies in the application of the Covenant.
Baker's correspondence (unavailable to Joseph Harrington in 1978) suggests that Drummond was reluctant to interfere in Upper Silesia because the Peace Treaty specified that Poland's boundaries were to be determined by the Allied Powers. But by mid-July Baker had become convinced that, despite the ending of the insurrection, without a League solution there would be war. Of course, there was also a large element of opportunism in his motivation. Baker was passionate about the League and he was not alone in his impatience to show the world what he believed it could do. He had a wide range of political contacts and his political base in Britain included the radical-liberal members of the Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions. It has to be said that this committee was not very well disposed towards Poland, especially over Upper Silesia. On 20 July, Baker wrote to Arthur Henderson, the Labour Party leader, to draw his attention to the League's recent successful mediation between Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands. He pointed that if only the same methods could be applied in other disputes, and especially these which affect the great Powers, we should very soon see the authority of the League established and an entirely new international atmosphere created.

That same day, Baker sent a note to his friend Lord Robert Cecil whom, as Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 1919, had helped to draft the League's Covenant. They had already discussed an initiative on Upper Silesia. Cecil had warned him that the attitude of the British Government, its diplomats and its officials towards the League, verged on 'semi-hostility'. This was another reason why Baker believed that Lloyd George was the only person capable of referring the dispute to the League. He wanted Cecil to galvanise Drummond into supporting the plan and for him to prepare the ground in Whitehall. Another distinguished figure canvassing on behalf of the League was the
former Foreign Secretary, Arthur Balfour, who had often suggested a League solution to the influential Cabinet Secretary, Maurice Hankey.95

As we have seen, apart from persuading Lloyd George on the merits of a League solution, Baker’s scheme also hinged on Attolico convincing the Italians that the League could help resolve the impasse. Writing to Attolico on 21 July, Baker emphasised how entrenched the respective positions had become. In Germany, all aspects of political discourse were dominated by Upper Silesia, yet it appeared that the Poles were unlikely to accept any line ‘not outrageously in their favour’.96 Referring back to Lloyd George’s 13 May speech and his threat to allow the Reichswehr to move against the Polish Silesians, Baker thought that it had been a long time since the Prime Minister had ‘shewn so much determination to take a public stand on any matter of international politics’.97 After outlining to Attolico how he believed the League should handle the matter, Baker concluded by noting that, provided the League maintained impartiality, the process would attract such immense publicity ‘it would be almost impossible for the Parties to refuse its verdict’.98 Baker closed by stressing that this successful outcome could only be achieved by the British and Italians co-operating. And, should the Italians propose a referral to the League at the forthcoming meeting of the Supreme Council, he believed

It would be a great new geste for the Italian Government to make, and I imagine would greatly strengthen their position in Italy... From the League point of view it would have the advantage that it would permanently establish the authority of the [League] Council and the League in general, and it would certainly induce Germany to apply for admission at once.99

There is no indication whether the British Foreign Office was aware of this League initiative. With Sforza gone, its reports indicated that Rome was once again backing the Percival-Marinis line.100 By the end of July, however, it seemed clear that sections of the

Chapter 5
Italian press were advocating that Italy should adopt the role of mediator at the Supreme Council meeting in Paris. A few days later the Italian Government's commitment to the Percival-Marinis line seemed far less assured. Unaware of any other reason for this, Crowe commented that

It becomes more and more clear that there is no real change in Italy's attitude. She continues to profess the utmost readiness to support the British view but in fact Marquis della Torretta like Count Sforza before him, keeps in with the French.

By this time, the meeting of the Committee of Experts, which had commenced in Paris on 28 July, was drawing to an inconclusive ending. The British experts who had been sent had not been selected to bring any fresh thinking to the problem. The lawyer, Sir Cecil Hurst, worked for the Foreign Office. The diplomat was Curzon's Private Secretary, Charles Tufton, who was accompanied by Waterlow. The engineer was Major Clarke, the Commission's Economics Department official responsible for Upper's Silesia's mines. They were accompanied by Ottley. Clarke's sympathies were entirely with the mine-owners and the German managers. As head of the Central Department, Waterlow's concerns were also with Germany, whilst Hurst, who was not enjoying the exceptionally warm weather in Paris, thought the whole Silesian business was 'very tiresome!'. Shortly after beginning their deliberations, the Committee of Experts had been joined by the three inter-Allied Commissioners who had arrived from Opole to address the meeting of the Supreme Council. Having reviewed the recommendations themselves and got nowhere, they had even fewer fresh ideas than the 'experts'.

In any case, the extent the British experts could manoeuvre in settling the frontier issue had already been circumscribed. A Foreign Office memorandum, examining the frontier and all other current proposals, had been prepared beforehand for the British experts. Briefly, because the Upper Silesian plebiscite area was 'not an indivisible
constituency', the memorandum correctly rejected Germany’s claim to the whole region. On the other hand, the memorandum discounted both Sforza lines because ‘they cut the middle of the industrial triangle in a manner condemned as impossible by all experts’.

And because he employed the *Kreis* instead of the commune as his unit for measuring the vote, Le Rond’s solution was also deemed invalid. However, when describing the merits of the Percival-Marinis line, the memorandum stood two of these last three points on their head. It claimed that the industrial triangle was indivisible and that all of the ‘Polish communes’ adjacent to the ‘German towns’ were in fact suburbs and that they must share the towns’ fate. Regarding the British experts’ compromise position should the Percival-Marinis line prove unacceptable, Curzon stipulated that the ‘Crowe Line’ (see ‘British Delegation Line’ on Map 7) fully accorded with the Treaty’s provisions. This was the maximum that Britain would grant Poland.107

On 5 August, Tufton reported to London that at that morning’s meeting the experts had recognised that any agreement on a frontier line was impossible. For the French experts the question of whether or not the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts could be separated from the industrial triangle was the main stumbling block.108 Although a slight German majority existed within the industrial triangle, the large Polish majority in the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts meant that, taken as a whole, there was a Polish majority across the whole industrial area. Simple arithmetic dictated that to justify awarding the complete industrial area to Poland (including the industrial triangle), the French required that the whole area be considered together. Conversely, to justify awarding the industrial triangle to Germany, the British required that the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts be awarded to Poland separately. As later events proved, the truth was that Upper Silesia’s whole south-eastern area was one vast industrial zone. Apart from the manufacturing plant and the mines, there were so many additional interdependent

Chapter 5
Upper Silesia
Plebiscite Area
1920 - 1922

Added on to the original plebiscite area.

The Industrial Triangle.
The Industrial district including coal reserves.

Map 7 French and British Proposals at Paris Conference 8 - 13 August 1921
factors (communications, public utilities, labour and organisation), that the industrial area could not sensibly be split into convenient parts.\(^{109}\)

For the British forces in Upper Silesia, these were the concerns of the politicians. They preferred service in Cologne to a long winter’s service in Upper Silesia, and the announcement of the imminent meeting of the Supreme Council had been more than welcome.\(^{110}\) In Stuart’s absence in Paris, Heneker had been appointed deputy British Commissioner with Kennedy acting as the British military commander.\(^{111}\) Although the battalions’ headquarters were generally located in the nearest schloss, the British troops spent most of their time living in and patrolling around ‘small rather dirty and very dull villages’.\(^{112}\) Temperatures were well above 92 degrees Fahrenheit, forest-fires were commonplace. The 14th Hussars had a particularly trying time patrolling the long open border with Poland.\(^{113}\) Stuart had recognised how difficult the conditions were and he had negotiated a pay increment for the British troops from the Treasury. However, on discovering that this would come out of the Army’s existing budget, Wilson cancelled it.\(^{114}\) Curzon had earlier refused British soldiers and officials permission to accept a commemorative medal struck by Le Rond in his role as President of the Commission.\(^{115}\)

But the British officials’ antipathy towards the French troops was not shared universally. For example, the Durhams had to participate in the French-controlled inter-allied flying columns frequently sent into rural areas ‘to show the flag’, round up undesirables and requisition any arms that they had discovered. Grogan reported that the manner in which the French troops treated the German-speaking population was alienating the British troops from their allies.\(^{116}\) That said, the Durhams’ regimental history stresses that the Battalion ‘resolutely refused to be drawn into taking sides against the French’.\(^{117}\) The Leinsters’ regimental history also laments the ignorance and misrepresentation about this aspect of service in Upper Silesia by people who were not present and by many ‘who
should know better'. Its author claims that the British and French officers and men identified with each other and for their part, the British 'regarded them as very fine soldiers'.

As we have noted, the French troops were increasingly subjected to violent attacks from German Stosstrupps (shock troops). French press reports about attacks on their soldiers were one of several factors driving French politicians to seek ever-tougher measures against Germany. Urban clearing operations conducted by the French troops after the insurrection, had forced Selbstschutz members from outside Upper Silesia back to the German estates as agricultural workers or forest guards. But some of their military formations remained armed, hidden away in the forests. The Stosstrupps themselves were generally recruited from amongst German refugees concentrated in Gliwice and Zabrze. After the insurrection, neither the German refugees there, nor the many Polish refugees inhabiting a camp near Pszczyna, had returned home because they feared being killed by their neighbours. There was also some Polish dissatisfaction with French officials who had led them to believe that by voluntarily ending the insurrection, they would strengthen their claim to the industrial districts. They also felt that they had not received sufficient support from the French in the Commission and abhorred having German officialdom re-imposed on them. Like the Germans, the Silesian Poles had also retained their military cadres and continued giving their young men military training.

One French military report on Upper Silesia identified unemployment as a major cause of disaffection at this time. Because unemployment hit the working classes hardest, it mainly affected Polish-speaking Silesians. The report attributed the lack of work to a decrease in business, employers refusing to engage ex-insurgents, and the ending of compulsory military service in Germany. The latter being blamed for pitching three extra classes of young men onto the labour market. The report also noted the manner in which
Communists were using the present difficulties to mount a particularly violent campaign against the employers, though not against the Entente, Commission or the inter-Allied troops.\textsuperscript{121} Heneker himself identified unemployment as a potential source of trouble for the Commission. The British force commander did not doubt that the general insecurity, political dissension and a lack of raw materials all contributed towards unemployment, but he believed that it was principally due to the German Government's unofficial ban on trade with Poland. In a report to London he claimed that all of the Silesian manufacturers were willing to meet orders from Poland

which they have to a great extent already received but cannot execute owing to the refusal of export licences. These orders appear sufficiently large to make a considerable difference to the number of workmen employed in the industrial area and consequently to preservation of order.\textsuperscript{122}

Ironically, it had been the Foreign Office (at Percival and the Berlin Embassy's behest), which had blocked Le Rond's attempt to wrest control of Upper Silesia's imports and exports from the German Government a year earlier.\textsuperscript{123}

All of this was overshadowed by expectations over the Supreme Council's decision. As the date of the meeting in Paris approached, posters appeared all around the larger towns announcing that the final decision would soon be taken. The inter-Allied troops were confined to barracks and placed on standby. Grogan hoped that local disorders would be avoided by a speedy promulgation of the final decision and the partition decree that he expected.\textsuperscript{124} Responding to press speculation that the whole industrial area would be placed under international control, Prime Minister Witos told the Sejm that Poland would accept no temporary solutions.\textsuperscript{125}

The British delegation arrived in Paris on Sunday, 7 August. That evening Lloyd George met Briand privately to explore some means whereby Upper Silesia could be
handled without either of them striking an irrevocable position. Two things were clear from the outset. First, Briand did not want to break the Entente. Secondly, French public opinion would not permit him to go very far towards meeting the British position. To avoid an immediate deadlock and give them both time to discover some private basis for an agreement, the two leaders decided that after they had heard from the various experts and listened to the three Commissioners, they would find some excuse to refer the whole question back to the Committee of Experts. Once they had reached a private agreement, its details would be communicated to the experts who could then present it to the Council as an agreed report.\textsuperscript{126} The thinking was that Briand could more easily make concessions ostensibly on the advice of the experts, rather than be seen having them forced on him by Lloyd George.\textsuperscript{127} The two leaders adhered to the first part of their agreement, but their inability to strike a deal required them to modify the plan’s outcome.

The official meeting of the Supreme Council began the following afternoon and ran until Saturday 13 August. Apart from one day devoted to questions about the Allied differences over Greece and Turkey, Upper Silesia was the sole topic of debate. Records of the official sessions are published in the official British documents.\textsuperscript{128} Campbell has described these public sessions as ‘five days of difficult and often bitter negotiations’.\textsuperscript{129} But Hankey in fact assessed these discussions as no more than mere adjuncts to Briand’s and Lloyd George’s private conversations. He also recorded that, despite the profound differences of principle involved, the cases were presented ‘in terms of great moderation and admirable temper’ and that ‘the tone of the Conference was admirable throughout’.\textsuperscript{130} In the light of this evidence, Campbell’s interpretation needs to be modified.

Cecil Hurst presented the British case. Stuart also spoke. Despite the fears that had been expressed to the contrary, at this point, the British line appears to have been generally supported by both the Italians and the Japanese.\textsuperscript{131} These British experts
contended that the industrial towns and the large German populations they contained should not be given to Poland. At the same time, they admitted that connecting these Germans to the ‘German mainland’ would necessitate incorporating some ‘Polish communes’ into Germany. Hankey noted the most telling point made against the British case. This came from a French delegate who pointed out that while ‘the British scheme only gave 155,000 out of 500,000 Poles in that part of Upper Silesia to Poland, it gave 607,000 out of 687,000 Germans in that part of Upper Silesia to Germany’. 132

As pre-arranged, Lloyd George and Briand had the question referred back to the experts for re-examination. 133 The net result of the experts’ deliberations and of the British and French leaders’ private bilateral conversations, was that the French would push their north-south line back to Zabrze, but no further - see Map 7 (p.422). This proved to be unacceptable to Britain both on ethnic and economic grounds. 134 On the fourth day of the talks (11 August), Lloyd George met Briand three times but with no real results. These later sessions were given additional urgency due to developments over the current British negotiations with De Valera on Ireland requiring Lloyd George to leave Paris for London at noon the following day. After one last inconclusive private meeting, the British sent the French their final proposal. 135

The situation changed dramatically, however, when Lloyd George and Curzon met the Italians over dinner that evening for separate talks. Not long after they had started Torretta the Foreign Minister, stated that it was his view that the case should now be submitted to the League of Nations or someone else for arbitration. Claiming that ‘the British Government had always been willing to refer the question to the League if they could not reach agreement’, Curzon concurred immediately. And just as Baker had hoped, without much further discussion, both sides agreed that this idea be put to the French. 136
Attolico delivered the news to Geneva by telephone the following morning.137 Drummond’s hastily drafted reply promised that ‘the League Council would secure an amicable and satisfactory solution’.138 The same morning (12 August) the French Cabinet met and formally rejected Britain’s ‘final proposal’. According to the published British documents, Lloyd George and Briand immediately conferred and the moment the British Prime Minister proposed referring Upper Silesia to the League, Briand jumped at the offer.139 Hankey thought that Briand appeared grateful to have found a way out of the impasse justifying his political climb-down, and at a hastily convened meeting of the Supreme Council ‘the proposal was favourably registered amid general goodwill’.140 Reminding the meeting of the dangerous situation still existing in Upper Silesia, Lloyd George asked that the League Council be urged to complete its work quickly. He then departed for London leaving Curzon and the Supreme Council to sort out the details.141

Whilst the British Prime Minister was famed for ad hoc decision-making and was anxious to get away from Paris, it has to be said that even for him, the speed and alacrity with which he seized on Toretta’s proposal suggested some forethought – as did Briand’s own apparently ready acceptance of it the following morning. Upper Silesia’s referral to the League Council matched Baker’s prescription much too closely to be a coincidence. What is noticeable about the official version of the meeting with the Italians is that it was Curzon who responded to Toretta’s suggestion. The Foreign Office files contain no documentary evidence confirming Curzon’s claim that Britain had kept a League option in mind – quite the contrary in fact. But this is not too unexpected. At that time all the League business with Britain was transacted through a Foreign Office official working in Hankey’s Cabinet Office.

If such a plan existed, the place to find it was either there or in Downing Street. The evidence in fact suggests that it was Hankey who persuaded Lloyd George to refer
the question to Geneva. Before the Cabinet Secretary had (in his words), 'put the
suggestion of reference to the League before responsible Ministers and Departments', he
had twice met Drummond to clarify what procedures the League Council would adopt to
resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{142} And Hankey's diligence to his work also reveals that within at least a
couple of hours of the British and the Italians agreeing to propose Upper Silesia's referral
to the League, Lloyd George obtained Briand's agreement to it as well. This is deducible
from a telegram Hankey sent to Balfour that same evening. It informed Balfour that 'the
Supreme Council have decided to refer the Upper Silesian question to the League of
Nations' and requested that he break his holiday in Switzerland to represent Britain on
the League Council.\textsuperscript{143} This helps explain the officially recorded outburst of \textit{concorde}
in Paris the following morning before Lloyd George returned to London. There is also one
further indication that Lloyd George had travelled to Paris with referral to the League as a
final option. Meeting him off the train from Paris, the deputy Cabinet Secretary, Thomas
Jones noted that:

\begin{quote}
He [Lloyd George] was in good form describing the way he had pulled off the
reference of Upper Silesia to the League of Nations – the P.M. has kept it up his
sleeve until the last minute. He was immensely pleased with the dramatic
character of the whole procedure.\textsuperscript{144}
\end{quote}

Whichever way Lloyd George presented the decision, there was no denying how much
it meant to Baker and the League's supporters. The League was doing vital humanitarian
work in Eastern Europe, but on the political front the opposition from the United States
had made the governments who were League members even more reluctant to use its
services.\textsuperscript{145} This breakthrough explains why in his history of the League, F.P. Walters
describes the referral a 'a red-letter day in the League history'.\textsuperscript{146} Writing to Cambridge
academic Lowes Dickinson (the originator of the idea of a post-war League of Nations),
Philip Baker described the decision as 'a great triumph'. Repeating that term, he urged Cecil that he should 'so inculcate any press people he met'. And leading by example, he wrote to the editor of the Daily News, describing the referral as 'the biggest thing that has yet happened to the League'. Baker told him that

'It is a definite acknowledgement by the Supreme Council that their methods have failed and that they are obliged to resort to ours. I wish that they had brought it two months ago... However, the great thing is that it has been brought, and I am quite certain that in some way or another we shall be able to achieve a result that will be accepted.'

Cecil also viewed it as 'a good thing' that it had been 'done in such a way as to have the appearance of “passing the brick” to the League'. He urged Drummond to ensure that he only appointed really first rate people to the commission to whom the question would be referred. However, within a few days of receiving this advice from Cecil, Drummond found himself scraping around to find a suitable team.

The referral had taken the British press completely by surprise. Learning that Lloyd George was leaving Paris, some of the journalists there had sent in copy announcing that the talks had broken down. But as Campbell has noted, outwardly these negotiations had appeared ‘difficult and often bitter’. Reporting on them to Wilson, Sackville West had remarked that the Foreign Office officials talked about the French ‘as if it were they who had been the enemy’. When Lloyd George told his Press Secretary about the decision to refer Upper Silesia to the League, Riddell thought he was joking. And when, in turn, Riddell broke the news to the press, he found journalists laughing out loud in disbelief. The German press was also surprised by this turn of events. The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung saw the decision as an admission that Upper Silesia was now an international question. The Berliner Tagblatt's optimistic interpretation was that the French were
abandoning their Polish obligations. Others were encouraged by what they saw as the loosening of the Entente. A few were cautious, correctly predicting that the Rybnik and Pszczyna districts would now be lost. The Centre Party’s journal *Germania*, however, did not expect the League Council to support France over matters involving Britain. *Vorwärts* regarded it as a success for French procrastination, but felt confident that ‘one can assume from the steadfast attitude of Lloyd George that he is sure of his ground’. Only the left-wing *Freiheit* struck a discordant note, attacking the bourgeois press for ascribing Britain’s attitude towards Germany as one of ‘friendliness’. It instead claimed that only ‘Economic and Capitalist motives have really decided English policy’.157

In Warsaw, the *Kurjer Poranny* agreed with this view, accusing the British of not considering their honour, ‘only pecuniary gain’. The general feeling across Poland was hostile: that the decision was contrary to the terms of the Peace Treaty. British control of the League Council was taken for granted and this further delay gave rise to even more discouragement. But apart from varying degrees of press abuse directed at the British and Italian governments, officials in the British Legation in Warsaw reported that the decision had been received ‘more calmly than might otherwise have been imagined’.158

In Upper Silesia itself, the political effect was quite far-reaching. Denied significant military reinforcements in what would now be an extended period of occupation, the Commissioners took several measures aimed at preventing further disturbances. Whereas all formal contact with the population had previously been through the district controllers, the Commissioners now agreed to liaise with ‘satisfactory leaders’ appointed by the German and Polish communities.159 Responding to Heneker’s linking of the German trade embargo on Poland with unemployment and the possible generation of renewed Upper Silesian disturbances, Curzon waived his previously firm opposition to the Commission controlling Upper Silesia’s exports.160 And in a bid to reduce the incidents between

Chapter 5
French military forces and the German-speaking population, the inter-Allied 'flying columns' were curtailed. Meanwhile, the British and Italian forces had gone even further by deliberately ignoring the proliferation of arms. On 5 September, the state of siege (martial law) was lifted across Upper Silesia. This in itself did not halt the shootings, the raids or the attacks on French troops over the six crucial weeks the League spent in investigating and preparing its recommendations for the Supreme Council. What it did do, however, was to reduce the amount of direct contact between the military and civilian population and maintain the air of a general, if uneasy peace.

For the League, arriving at these recommendations and the reception they received from the British political establishment, was not an easy one. One key to understanding why the British so willingly referred the Upper Silesian dispute to the League Council had been the new institution's handling of the Aaland Islands dispute. Sovereignty rested with Finland, but the island's population had voted overwhelmingly to transfer it to Sweden. The League had sent a three-man commission to investigate and in June 1921 the League Council endorsed their commission's judgement that a minority had the right to fair and just treatment within the state: but it could not be permitted to separate itself from the country of which it was part, and incorporate itself within some other state because it desired to do so. Such a doctrine would lead to international anarchy. This thinking precisely matched the British Government's view of Upper Silesia. They had reason to hope that the League Council would repeat that judgement here.

Cienciala has advanced the view that Lloyd George assumed that with Italian support, the French would be outvoted in the League Council. However, Hankey had thought that Britain's view on Upper Silesia was so overwhelmingly fair and correct that any impartial tribunal would to find in Germany's favour. Corresponding with Drummond

Chapter 5
after the League Council’s recommendations had been published, Hankey made it crystal clear that he had only advocated a League solution because in their earlier discussions Drummond had given him

the clearest possible impression that if it was referred to the League, they would deal with it precisely as they did with the Aaland Islands dispute; that is to say they would appoint a perfectly independent and impartial tribunal which would be altogether above suspicion and which, after hearing both sides of the case, would give a judgement.¹⁶⁴

Drummond had intended forming just such a tribunal, but he found it impossible to settle on anyone of sufficient authority at such short notice who would be acceptable to all the interests involved.¹⁶⁵ This problem was compounded by some foreign ministers’ fears that the enquiry’s outcome would upset the Germans or one of the other Powers, and they reputedly pressurised their nationals into not participating. Even the diplomatic corps was not exempt.¹⁶⁶ For example, Drummond wanted the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, Quinones de Leon, who was also Spain’s representative on the League Council, to act as the League’s rapporteur.¹⁶⁷ As rapporteur, Quinones would have presented an ‘objective assessment’ of the case to the League Council. It would have then appointed the independent commission which Drummond was trying to assemble, to assist the rapporteur in finding the necessary solutions.¹⁶⁸ But pressure from Berlin on Quinones caused the Spanish Government to refuse him permission to accept the role.¹⁶⁹ This, together with Drummond’s inability to find suitable commissioners, and then a demand by Balfour and several other Council members for the matter to be dealt with using the League’s own resources, forced a change of plan.

The League Council itself comprised four permanent members (the Allied and Associated Powers) and four non-permanent members (elected by the League Assembly).
The four non-permanent members at this time were China, Belgium, Brazil and Spain.\textsuperscript{170} It was decided that the President of the League Council, Viscount Ishii of Japan, would present the report and the idea of appointing another \textit{rapporteur} and three independent commissioners was abandoned.\textsuperscript{171} Instead, the Council decided that its four non-permanent members would form a sub-committee, investigate the dispute and then recommend the line that the new frontier should take. These recommendations would be discussed by the whole League who would make the final recommendation to the Supreme Council - the only body that could implement it.\textsuperscript{172} This was the very procedure commended to Balfour by the Foreign Office as being most in accord with British interest; which were that the League should reach a speedy conclusion. Sir Cecil Hurst thought that this procedure would save between one and three months time.\textsuperscript{173} But the Foreign Office's recommendation was at odds with Downing Street's expectation of a outside tribunal or some form of arbitration.\textsuperscript{174}

Hankey immediately expressed his concern to the Foreign Office about the danger of undue French influence inherent in these procedures; especially over the League Council's wish to employ its own technical experts.\textsuperscript{175} Baker was also unimpressed by the procedure. He believed that the method used to arrive at the new frontier not only had to be seen to be fair but must also be authoritative. Whilst he felt that the non-permanent members might provide an impression of impartiality, Baker felt that their authority 'would not very greatly impress the world, still less the popular imagination of the German people'. He also thought that the short time-scale precluded a proper study of the problem and feared that observers would quickly learn 'that the bulk of the work will have been done by the Secretariat and merely accepted and approved by the League Council'.\textsuperscript{176} Baker's pessimistic forecasts were not unfounded and some of them were
repeated later by Hankey and Lloyd George's former foreign policy advisor, Philip Kerr - by now the editor of *The Daily Chronicle*. 177

The League Secretariat appointed two experts who had previously worked with them. 178 And though not yet officially involved in the procedures, Balfour and the other representatives of the League's permanent members also prepared themselves - though not necessarily from their own government's briefings. 179 A few days after the referral, Stuart and Major Clarke (Ottley was fatally ill), visited Balfour in Switzerland to deliver briefing papers and instruct him over the frontier line the Foreign Office wanted him to secure. Balfour, however, just like the League's French representative Léon Bourgeois, who was anxious to avoid having his hands tied by direct instructions from Paris, wanted to maintain his independence. Therefore, after giving the experts a polite hearing, Balfour thereafter maintained his distance from all the British experts who arrived in Geneva to advise him. 180 Gajda is probably correct in viewing Balfour's independent attitude and his influence on the other representatives as the greatest factor involved in the League reaching a decision which all parties could, to some degree or other, accept. However, he appears to have been highly influenced by the views of Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister, Eduard Beneš.

In conversations with Balfour, Benes had cited parallels between Upper Silesia and the similarly industrialised neighbouring Duchy of Cieszyn. The Supreme Council had recently awarded what was generally acknowledged to be ethnically Polish territory there to Czechoslovakia solely on economic grounds. Beneš told Balfour (somewhat illogically and disingenuously), that if Cieszyn could be successfully partitioned then this suggested that a frontier could be cut through Upper Silesia's industrial triangle without too much economic disruption. 181 Balfour wrote that in Beneš's judgement
either the so-called French or the so-called Anglo-Italian solution would leave behind it permanent sources of discontent; and that the only path by which final peace could be reached, was one which declined to over-estimate the important but, after all, only very recent effects of industrial development, and, basing itself on more fundamental considerations, left industry to readjust itself to the new conditions. 182

From the outset, the League Council had interpreted the Peace Treaty’s Upper Silesian Articles as giving primary consideration to ethnographic factors. 183 Therefore this advice from Benč to Balfour further strengthened this intention. As we have already seen, an ethnographic frontier would require the much-coveted industrial triangle to be divided. Hoping to minimise the inevitable economic disruption that an ethnically based partition would cause, the League employed its two recently appointed experts to develop schemes that would mitigate the consequences. To arrive at the new frontier, the sub-committee (guided by members of the League Secretariat), fixed it by dividing the territory in proportion to the votes cast for each side. To reduce the large minorities this created, and accommodate problems caused in certain districts by geography and by particular economic conditions, ‘certain non-mathematical considerations’ had to be introduced to modify the line which the sub-committee had arrived at. 184 The final line that emerged gave the Germans 22,000 less than the number who voted for them, and the Poles 22,000 more. But Drummond’s attempt to rectify even this discrepancy by giving the town of Lubliniec to Germany, was opposed by Balfour who believed that the railway junction there should go to Poland. 185 Superficially, these numbers appear equitable but one must bear in mind that within the ratio of voters the League’s sub-committee was working to, over 25% of the German votes had been cast by outvoters who, by definition, did not reside in Upper Silesia. 186

Chapter 5
By late September, most of the measures that the League would recommend had already been leaked from Geneva. The reactions to them in London and Berlin are described in various publications and therefore require little elaboration here.\footnote{187} Balfour reported most developments to the British Cabinet even before the League Council had discussed them. Apart from the frontier line, there were to be regulations ensuring free movement of goods across the frontier and the continued use of the German mark throughout the region. Poland had to maintain its provision of coal to Germany at home market prices for several more years. German capital was to be saved from any Polish expropriation for fifteen years. Schemes related to the protection of the respective minority populations were also likely to be developed. Even the dismissal of German foremen would be prohibited. Balfour claimed that once the new frontier was in place it would be evident to everyone that, although Poland had gained territory and population, the economic regulations would considerably favour the existing German owners.\footnote{188}

With such authoritative information about the League Council's recommendations leaking out of Geneva, one might question Lloyd George's real commitment to German interests; why did he never react to the reports circulating about the League's proposals? There may be a clue in his House of Commons speech of 16 August. Reporting Upper Silesia's referral to the League, he appeared to suggest that any understandings or promises had ended the moment that Upper Silesia became the League Council's business.

Now that it has been referred, the whole question goes there, and not a part of it. What I mean is that they [the League Council] are not bound in the least by any proposals or counter-proposals made either by the French or the Italians, or by ourselves... On the other hand the Germans are not bound by any proposals made...
by the Italians or ourselves, and the whole question will be dealt with on the basis of the Treaty. 189

It is also possible that Lloyd George never knew how the League’s recommendations were developing until too late in the day. Hankey, who had recommended the referral to Lloyd George and therefore had an interest in the outcome, was on holiday during the main recommendation’s formulation. In late September, when Balfour had reported the League’s likely decision to London, the Prime Minister too was on holiday at Gairloch in Scotland - an inaccessible location with very poor communications (thirty miles to the nearest railway and the only telephone one mile distant in the Post Office). Lloyd George’s holiday was overtaken anyway by urgent discussions on such matters as unemployment, national expenditure and new talks with Sinn Fein. 190 Back in London, with Balfour reporting directly to the Cabinet, Curzon took little interest in the League discussions.

In the Foreign Office, officials politely rebuffed German notes that arrived pleading for Britain to intervene to prevent the industrial triangle’s partition. Germany’s Foreign Minister wrote to Curzon on 6 October, to complain that the proposals taking shape in Geneva were ‘contrary to what Mr. Lloyd George has been trying to bring about’. He claimed that handing over two-fifths of Upper Silesian territory to the Poles would create an extremely difficult economic situation in Germany and undermine the Government’s work for a better understanding with Britain. He hoped that Britain was not withdrawing its assistance and asked Curzon to pass these comments on to the Prime Minister. 191 Curzon’s reply sympathised with Rosen’s anxiety but claimed that from the moment the Supreme Council had sought the League’s advice, he had refrained from any intervention in the process. 192 He also wrote that he had no knowledge of its likely recommendations - which was untrue. Two days earlier, a copy of Balfour’s note anticipating the

Chapter 5
recommendations had been forwarded to the Foreign Office and been commented upon by Curzon. In D’Abernon’s opinion, Rosen’s warning that the German Government would fall (and British influence be eliminated) if Poland gained any part of the industrial triangle, was ‘perhaps too tragic a view’. Coming from someone who had spent the past five months dangling British support on Upper Silesia in front of the Germans, this comment may appear highly complacent. It stemmed from D’Abernon’s belief that anything awarded to the Poles now would prove to be only temporary. He expected that for Poland ‘political bankruptcy in some form or another’ was just around the corner and that Germany and Russia would repartition the country as soon as those two powers grew strong again.

When the League Council’s finalised recommendations were forwarded to the Supreme Council in Paris on 12 October, their content was widely known. Even before Briand had received the League’s decision, the Daily Express went ahead and published the proposals. The solidly German voting areas around Opole and west of the river Oder were to be returned to Germany. The Polish voting districts of Pszczyna and Rybnik were awarded to Poland. In and around the industrial triangle, Gliwice, the Toszecko-Gliwicki district, Zabrze, Bytom and a small part of the surrounding area were given back to Germany. The remainder of the Bytom district went to Poland, as did Krolewska Hutta and Katowice. In the north, parts of Tarnowski Gory and Lubliniec also went to Poland with Kluczbork and Olenso returning to Germany (see Map 8). All the economic measures Balfour had predicted were to be included in a German-Polish Convention designed to maintain the region as a single economic unit for fifteen years. An ‘Upper Silesian Mixed Commission’ composed of a Pole and a German under a neutral chairman, would execute the Convention. An ‘Arbitral Tribunal’ comprising two lawyers under a neutral president would resolve disputes arising from the Convention.
Map 8 International Line after League of Nations Judgement until 2nd World War
League Council also suggested that the 1919 minorities treaty already signed by Poland should be extended to the areas of Upper Silesia awarded to the Poles.\textsuperscript{200}

In a press interview, Balfour defended the League's recommendations. He said that while there would certainly be inconveniences, these would be diminished by the regulations being introduced. Balfour also claimed that the League Council had enjoyed complete independence and that the decisions taken had been unanimous.\textsuperscript{201} One newspaper was surprised to note that Balfour had agreed to the League's decision without consulting his Government.\textsuperscript{202} Asked to comment on Berlin's negative reaction, Balfour said that 'nothing could be more suicidal to Germany than to try and wreck the whole scheme'.\textsuperscript{203}

News of the decision had created political and emotional turmoil in Berlin. Reuters reported Wirth describing the League's decision as a miscarriage of justice that could only prejudice Germany's policy of an honourable fulfilment of her obligations to the Entente. Germany's monarchists and ultra-nationalists who wanted to maintain an attitude of 'obstructive resistance' to the Allies, were claiming that Wirth's so-called policy of 'subservience' had failed and they were threatening to bring the Government down. However, Wirth hung on, pinning his hopes on the Supreme Council easing the recommendations.\textsuperscript{204} But there was little hope of this. Both Briand and Lloyd George had undertaken to accept whatever the League decided and could not easily reject this – although Briand apparently tried to have the transitional economic measures nullified.\textsuperscript{205}

This news about the League's decision coincided with a further collapse of the German mark. Berlin attributed this to the Upper Silesian crisis accentuating the various political influences already at work as well as anticipation about the fall of Wirth's Cabinet. Commenting, the Daily Express claimed that this political crisis had nothing to do with Upper Silesia. The German Government was politically weak and frightened to
control spending in a country still enjoying enormous private wealth. Instead, the German Government had resorted to the printing press which had resulted in one long economic boom accompanied by endemic inflation. In fact, Germany’s economic problems were far more complicated than the Daily Express was making them out to be. For example, there had been an unprecedented world-wide speculation in German currency which had compounded the problem. Even the economist J.M. Keynes, whose famed critique of the Peace Treaty had done much to discredit Poland’s claim to Upper Silesia, had dabbled in this – losing over £21,000 in the process.

There was of course little sympathy for Germany in France. Commenting on German public opinion, Le Temps thought it ‘perfectly natural’ that having heard so many polemical speeches about Germany’s need for Upper Silesia’s industrial triangle, that there should be ‘an explosion of rage and hatred’ when part of it was taken from them.

Because it was not possible in August to reconcile French and British policies it was thought on the other side of the Rhine that the League of Nations would take into consideration the policies adopted by the Government in London. They never considered for a moment that the Council of the League has sufficient moral independence to judge on lines of absolute equity.

Apart from some critical views by the Downing Street-controlled Daily Chronicle about the manner in which the decisions had been reached, mainstream British public opinion was generally non-committal about the League Council’s recommendation. Dissent was restricted to the radicals, liberals and socialists who seized on the award as proof of the impossibility of Germany paying any more reparations. But The Morning Post’s leader of 17 October warned that whilst the Germans would try to convey this impression, it would be false. The reality was that Germany’s overwhelming economic
interest in Upper Silesia was retained for another fifteen years. It was not political control
of this territory that counted, but economic control of the industries and the mines.

If Germany has these in her hands and Poland is forbidden to take any measure to
divert the trade into Polish channels, the shell of these districts may go to Poland,
but the kernel of the nut will remain with Germany. Germany will continue to
draw the wealth of Silesia into her coffers. Silesian minerals will still be at the
disposal of the German industrial system.210

The paper also attacked Lloyd George’s Polish policies. It found that they all appeared to
be aimed at strengthening Germany and noted that, whilst the Allies wanted Poland to be
a strong balance against Germany in the East, and to act as a barrier between Russia and
Germany as well, then

with Poland forbidden to protect her new industries, just as she was not permitted
to rule her minorities or control her only outlet to the sea, it would appear that the
country was being thrust – much against her will – under Germany’s economic
domination.211

In Cabinet, various ministers expressed concern over the partition of the industrial
triangle but Balfour’s involvement had made the decision ex cathedra. Balfour had
promised Drummond that he was ‘ready to speak anywhere in defence of the Upper
Silesia solution including, if necessary, the House of Commons’.212 With such heavy-
weight support for the decision, with Lloyd George under constant domestic political
pressure, with the Washington Conference looming and a multitude of other national and
international problems demanding attention, Cabinet members critical of the solution
were disinclined to provoke a deeper split in the British Government’s ranks than already
existed. Official British recrimination was, therefore, necessarily conducted in private and
mainly directed at the procedures the League had employed to reach their decision. For
example, Philip Kerr told D’Abernon that the Upper Silesia decision had not been well received in British political circles; nobody believed that it would work and that it had discredited the League. Replying, D’Abernon lamented his sudden (but temporary) loss of influence in Berlin, but thought it best to keep quiet and not draw attention to it.

After studying Britain’s reaction, Drummond complained to Kerr about The Daily Chronicle’s repeated attacks on the League’s decision. But Kerr replied (much as Baker had done earlier) that outside the League Council, nobody really knew who had made the Upper Silesian recommendations. He claimed that this was because everyone realised that the League Council’s non-permanent representatives were all diplomats, incapable of judging the political and economic factors that had been involved in making the decision. He believed ‘public opinion would never trust the League of Nations if it settles questions involving the peace or war of the world in that kind of fas[h]ion’.

But the person who had real grounds for attacking these procedures was Hankey. As we have seen the Cabinet Secretary had sold Lloyd George the idea of referral to the League. At a chance meeting with Baker in Victoria Railway Station on 22 October, Hankey seized the opportunity to air his grievances. When Baker returned to Geneva, he relayed Hankey’s views to Drummond who wrote asking Hankey to send the ‘somewhat violent letter’ he had already been preparing for him. This duly arrived, and there can be little doubt that Lloyd George shared the views expressed in it. Hankey objected to the procedure, the participants and the manner in which the question was handled. He had been ‘bitterly disappointed’ to learn that the agreed procedure had been discarded. He attacked the integrity of the non-permanent members’, claiming that the Belgian was a notorious Francophile and implying that since ‘of the remainder, two were Dagos and one a Chink’, they were debarred them from making any judgement. Because ‘both the Dagos were Ambassadors in Paris who naturally, neither wished to lose their

Chapter 5
jobs [n]or have them made disagreeable’ they too must have been susceptible to French pressure. As for Balfour, Hankey gathered that Drummond ‘had squared him’ earlier. He also complained about the League’s failure to consult any of the British, French and Italian experts such as Stuart and Clarke in Geneva. In Hankey’s opinion, the experts employed by the League could not possibly have had the knowledge or the experience which the Allied experts possessed. He had never heard of an arbitration process that failed to listen to all sides, yet the representatives of the German and the Polish governments had also been ignored. Given the defective procedure adopted, the decision which they had arrived at could have been much worse. Nevertheless, he still expected the solution to prove unworkable, sowing the seeds of a future war.

Luckily, British public opinion is not very interested in Upper Silesia and the friends of the League have secured a fairly good press here... As it is, I feel that it has shaken confidence and I have the gravest doubt as to whether anyone in the official world here will again feel inclined to take the initiative in referring important questions to the League. 220

The importance of Hankey’s views on the League should not be under-estimated. His position in the governments of five successive British Prime Ministers, meant his personal views must have been influential throughout the League’s existence. However, as we have already seen, many of his remarks were without foundation. The difficulties in forming a commission have been stated above. In supporting the idea that non-permanent members should investigate the dispute, Balfour had not followed Drummond’s but the Foreign Office’s advice. With regard to the Polish and German representatives in Geneva not being heard, first, the League was not conducting arbitration and, second, the British themselves had long refused to meet and discuss the problem with the representatives from either Warsaw or Berlin. In fact the Poles had
spared the League Council an awkward procedural problem by waiving their right as a League member to address the Council.\textsuperscript{221}

Replying to Hankey, Drummond therefore defended the integrity of the four non-permanent members. He was very sure that the French had not pressurised Hymans and Quinones, the two members whom he believed in and rated the most highly. He believed that all four of the Council’s non-permanent representatives had treated the case ‘solely according to the terms of the Peace Treaty’.\textsuperscript{222} As to their failure to consult the Allied experts, Balfour had partially explained this in a letter to the Cabinet on 29 September.\textsuperscript{223} Drummond expanded on this, stating that the Allied experts had been deliberately ignored because the League had wanted to avoid recreating the atmosphere prevalent in Paris in August where the situation had reached

\begin{quote}
  a point where Upper Silesia seemed likely to cause a definite breach between England and France, with, to my mind, incalculable results for the peace of Europe...In these circumstances the question was referred to the League, and you got a recommendation within six weeks. Of course, this recommendation has not been popular in various countries... but I know that the decision was not based on either motives of opportunism or expediency.\textsuperscript{224}
\end{quote}

Drummond believed that the Upper Silesian decision had ‘eliminated a factor which has been disturbing both the economic and political life of Europe for far too long’ and that it would now ‘allow British and French relations to regain a certain amount of harmony’. For this reason alone, he was convinced that the League’s work could be adequately defended.\textsuperscript{225}

But the one place where the Upper Silesian decision could not be defended was Berlin. On 22 October, two days after the Ambassadors’ Conference had sent Germany official notification of the Upper Silesian decision, the German Government tendered its
What had been held out to Wirth as the reward for his Erfullung policy, had been denied to him. The parties of the Right, such as Stresemann's Volkspartei (People's Party), benefited from the country's disappointment and rushed to reject the Upper Silesian decision. Their rejection prevented the formation of a much broader coalition than the weak centre-left group that had comprised Wirth's first Cabinet. Some British political observers felt that the Entente had made a great mistake in failing to give Wirth some tangible reward for his apparent co-operation with the Allied demands. But whatever the case, none of the centre-right parties would help form a new administration and Wirth's weak coalition was returned to power once again on 26 October. An Allied ultimatum for a German commissioner to be appointed to help negotiate Upper Silesia's transitional economic arrangements with the Poles had forced their return. When the new Cabinet met the only significant sacrifice had been that of Foreign Minister, Rosen. The Cabinet's first action had to be a de facto acceptance of the Allied conditions. A note handed in to the Ambassadors' Conference the following day, stated that

The German Government acknowledges receipt, with deep disappointment, of the Supreme Council's Note of Oct. 20th. It sees in this economic and territorial dictate not only an injustice to the defenceless German people, but an injury to the Versailles Treaty of which the decision made at Geneva and subsequently accepted by the Allied Powers is a violation.

In Poland, after disappointment at the referral to the League, the public's interest in Upper Silesia had been revived in early October by increasing press speculation over what the League's recommendations might be. The Kurjer Polski cautiously forecast a decision sympathetic to Poland. Several journals optimistically predicted the first Sforza line (Map 6 p.406) as the new frontier. Significantly, none expected the Polish claim to be met in full. Pursuing its anti-British line, the Kurjer Poranny predicted that there
would be no justice from the ‘Geneva Department of the London Foreign Office’. Coincidentally, in London, Take Ionescu, Rumania’s Foreign Minister, had just been arguing the case for better Anglo-Polish relations — though admittedly in not very flattering terms to Poland. He told Curzon that he considered

The Poles were in many respects the most childish, the most stupid and the most difficult [people] to deal with in Eastern Europe. They had a complete lack of political experience and they did not appear to have a single man who deserved the name of a statesman. At the same time their existence as a nation was essential to the stability of Europe.

These sentiments were, of course, very much in keeping with Curzon’s and the Foreign Office view of the Poles. Ionescu also confirmed for London rumours that Warsaw was tired of Upper Silesia and wished for a settlement of some sorts. That said, rumours about the decision abounded. One persisting in the Polish press alleged that the British Government were displeased with the League’s forthcoming decision and was trying to have it amended. The Kurjer Warszawski published an interesting report about a German attempt to retain Upper Silesia’s industrial area in exchange for granting Poland large trade credits and a favourable German-Polish commercial treaty. Reporting the same story to London the previous month, D’Abernon had deemed it ‘outside practical politics’. However, once the first real news about the League’s decision broke, it was quickly apparent that, even if they were not entirely content with the outcome, the Polish Government were relieved that it had not been worse.

On 6 October, Max Muller was able to report that as far as the League’s recommendations were known, ministers, officials and ‘the intelligent public’ had received them if not with enthusiasm, then reasonably well enough. He added that the general tone of the Polish press was one of ‘resigned acceptance.”
moderate *Kurjer Polski*, even described the recommendations as 'a laudable effort to find a solution'.\(^{237}\) That said, there was no shortage of opposition. Dissent came mainly from the right: the most vociferous criticism being published in the *Narodowa Demokracja* newspapers. Their claim that the recommendations had provoked intense indignation throughout Poland and Upper Silesia is questionable.\(^ {238}\) Nevertheless, even the socialist *Robotnik* felt able to criticise the recommendation on nationality grounds – complaining that over 700,000 Poles would still be forced to endure Prussian domination. The left of centre *Kurjer Poranny* agreed, describing the decision as a ‘political and geographical monstrosity’ bearing no resemblance to the plebiscite results.\(^ {239}\) More pertinent was the *Rzeczpospolita*’s description of the economic arrangements as being ‘a glaring violation of the Treaty of Versailles’ – which was true (a point also made by Berlin a few days later).\(^ {240}\) The conservative *Rzeczpospolita* had also been consistent in its opposition to any form of international control over the territory.\(^ {241}\) It is true that members of the Ambassadors’ Conference, acting for the Supreme Council, also had worries about the validity of the transitional economic arrangements. Crowe agreed that it was theoretically possible for the German or the Polish governments to reject the decision on these grounds. Whilst he thought it unlikely that Poland would scupper the deal, Crowe thought it possible that the Germans might be so ‘blind to their own interests’ as to reject it.\(^ {242}\) But, as we have already seen, even if most Germans favoured rejection, the Allied military threat to the Ruhr was a very effective deterrent against them taking action.

Unlike the Germans, the political leaders in Poland did not join in this opposition to the League’s recommendations. As early as 17 October, the leaders of all the Polish parties represented in the Sejm informed Skirmunt, the Foreign Minister, that they approved of the Allied decision in principle. The following day, Skirmunt announced that Warsaw intended to secure the peaceful adaptation and enforcement of this decision and...
expressed the hope that the ‘negotiations with Germany over economic co-operation in the industrial area may in the long run have a beneficial effect on the relations of the two countries’. Skirmunt’s statement of intent was confirmed on 26 October when the Sejm unanimously accepted the Allied decision.

Introducing a resolution by his government, Witos first admitted that the division of Upper Silesia was not the occasion for rejoicing and that the rights of the Polish nation had not been fulfilled. Nevertheless, he believed that the League’s work had clearly been based on considerations of justice. He pledged that the nation would take all measures necessary to secure the safety of the Polish minority outside Polish Upper Silesia, while at the same time, observing all of its obligations towards the national minorities within it. Poland’s premier then added that the Polish people intended to collaborate in the economic reconstruction of Europe and accepted the decision of the Supreme Council as one of the bases for this work... Having fixed her frontiers on the East and West, Poland wished to follow the path of peaceful labour and was fully confident that this desire would receive the support of the civilised world.

In reporting this, Max Muller added that in the country ‘the attribution of part of Upper Silesia to Poland is seen as an event of historical importance in the life of Poland’; the press and public had generally endorsed the action of the Sejm and the government.

Indeed, as details of the economic recommendations became better understood in the days and weeks following this endorsement, a gradual reappraisal of Britain’s role in forging the settlement emerged in the Polish press. The Rzeczpospolita paid tribute to the League, stating that ‘the manner in which it had done its work...inspired the greatest respect and left no doubt as to its good faith’. The paper also regarded the decision as justification of Paderewski’s and Dmowski’s wartime policies, all of which had been
THE SILESIAN GOOSE; OR, THE JUDGMENT OF GENEVA.

League of Nations. "There now; I've given you each a fair share."

German and Polish (together, bitterly) "He's got all the stuffing!"
based on co-operation with the Allies—a remark aimed at Piłsudski’s ‘collaboration’ with the Central Powers. By early December the centre-left Kurjer Polski was claiming that British policy now appeared to be less hostile towards Poland. This was attributed to Balfour’s influence. Finally, in what was probably the most remarkable turn-around, the Rzeczpospolita devoted a leading article to the history of Britain’s attitude on the Upper Silesian question. Admitting that British actions in the plebiscite area had been dictated solely ‘by a desire to see fair play’, the writer concluded that Britain’s motives over the period in question should now be generally regarded as credible.

Had this been a government-controlled newspaper, the sceptical reader might well have associated this revisionism with attempts to attract British capital into Poland and Upper Silesia. This was partly the case. One cannot ignore the fact that many Polish leaders feared that the exploitative nature of French financial interest in Poland was helping France establish a monopoly situation. There was also a well-founded suspicion that French co-operation would last only until Russia was powerful enough to replace Poland as their counter-balance to Germany.

Lt. Commander Kenworthy M.P. was one public figure later involved in an attempt to introduce British financial expertise into Polish Upper Silesia. Touring the region shortly after the frontier had been referred to the League, he had reported to Lloyd George that every British officer and British official stationed in Upper Silesia is convinced that the handing over of the Industrial Triangle to Poland would mean the ruin of the province and would be a crime of the first magnitude.

This heavily slanted report was just one of literally dozens of letters and petitions which had flooded into the Foreign Office and Downing Street shortly before the League’s recommendations were announced. These reflected how much the indecision had affected
conditions in Upper Silesia itself. Nearly all pleaded for Lloyd George to prevent Upper Silesia’s partition. For example, one petition forwarded to Lloyd George by the German voters in Olenso and in Kochanowice (in the Lubliniec district), had been raised on their learning that the British Delegation’s final line in Paris (Map 7 p.422), had allocated them to Poland.\textsuperscript{254} They were currently in the British military sector and this ‘betrayal’ shook their confidence in ‘England’ and generated local unrest.

There was an increased incidence of disturbances in rural areas after the decision was announced. The forested area around Dobrodzien and in the north of the district, contained what Heneker described as ‘unruly German Silesians’ who were armed. Trouble arose when a local Polish leader was murdered. Suspects were detained but the Selbstschutz threatened to set them free.\textsuperscript{255} The Leinsters were sent to the area and Heneker told Count Praschma, the Commission’s new German representative, to inform local leaders that if the situation did not improve, he would send five more battalions and ‘hunt down and shoot the Germans responsible for the trouble’.\textsuperscript{256}

Kluczbork was another town that had posed major problems for the inter-allied forces. With its overwhelming German population able to provide cover, the town often acted as a sanctuary for fugitives.\textsuperscript{257} But the most disturbed rural area was in the Italian zone around Raciborz. A large tract of forest on the east bank of the Oder was infested with bands of robbers who emerged at night to plunder and harass the nearby inhabitants of the opposite persuasion. This caused the different communities around it to exhibit a high degree of mistrust towards each other. Polish miners would not allow the German administrators to return to Rybnik’s mines and the Germans in Raciborz district would not permit Poles to return to their homes there.\textsuperscript{258}

In addition to ‘normal’ levels of crime in and around the industrial towns, the mixed nature of the communities there still gave rise to isolated outbursts of political violence.

Chapter 5
The British experienced particular difficulties sharing the policing of Bytom district with the French. After four French soldiers were maltreated in Krolewska Hutta one evening, the French company sent to restore order on the streets had bayoneted several Germans. As we have seen, Heneker considered that much of the existing discontent derived from a lack of work. His reports to London emphasised that unlike everywhere else in Germany, where there was full employment, the Upper Silesian factories were experiencing difficulty remaining open. Some were working a three-day week. Also, it remained to be seen how effective the new powers granted to the Commission to override Berlin and issue its own export licenses, would be in creating jobs. Heneker concluded

So long, however, as the fate of Upper Silesia is uncertain, industry will be severely handicapped, for the manufacturers hesitate to take, and the merchants to give, orders for goods which the turn of political events may make it impossible to deliver.

As the League's deliberations progressed, Le Rond, Stuart and Marinis had each returned to their posts in Opole. The British again expressed concern over whether or not the French troops would oppose any Polish insurrection. In London, the Army Chiefs stressed to the Foreign Office that, provided Heneker's hands were not tied by political constraints, the Commission had enough Allied troops to handle any situation once the decision on Upper Silesia was announced. Heneker had decided that he would quash any disturbances immediately they occurred, encouraging the Italians and the French to do likewise. The War Council was adamant that when the troops were withdrawn this time, under no circumstances would they return. Although both Marinis and Stuart anticipated violent demonstrations or even a general strike when the decision was announced, the French did not expect any trouble. Nevertheless, the Commission once again banned public demonstrations, arranged to maintain transport in the event of a
railway strike and took measures to monitor 'Comintern activity'. On 14 October, the first accurate accounts of the League's recommendations appeared in the Upper Silesian press. 265 Stuart issued his staff a memorandum stating that all British officials will not only themselves loyally accept the decision but they will, if the opportunity offers, advise the inhabitants of Upper Silesia, of both parties, to recognise it as being an independent conclusion, reached after careful and exhaustive research. 266

From this distance in time and with the great gift of hindsight, it seems remarkable today that the British Commissioner should have to warn his officials not to criticise an Allied decision or openly sympathise with a section of the population.

Not surprisingly the League's recommendations provoked bitter disappointment amongst the German Silesians. Rumours circulated that the decision would be resisted. 267 From Opole, Grogan reported that whilst the local German press had called for energetic protest, the Polish press had advised 'moderation and resignation and acceptance of the new frontier line'. 268 It was quickly apparent that the French had been correct and that the decision would not be resisted in Upper Silesia. Reviewing the award, Stuart granted that it was possible that stricter compliance with the Treaty would have been even more unfavourable to Germany than the League's recommendations. But, he cautioned:

I am afraid, however, there is a feeling in Germany that England has betrayed her, and this feeling that she has not received justice even under the terms of the very hard Treaty she signed may have a serious effect upon the German political situation both now and in the future. 269

Major Clarke, who had very close relations with the Upper Silesian mine owners and industrialists, agreed. He believed that the decision had left very little of value to Germany in the industrial triangle. 270 On 26 October, Wirth, in his speech to the
Reichstag announcing the composition of his new Cabinet, had emphasised the scale of the German losses to Poland in Upper Silesia. They were, he claimed:

- **Coal Mines**
  - 49 to Poland (34.6 million tons)
  - 12 to Germany (7.1 million tons)

- **Zinc and Lead Mines**
  - 12 to Poland (266,000 tons)
  - 6 to Germany (39,000 tons)

- **Blast Furnaces**
  - 22 to Poland (400,000 tons)
  - 35 to Germany (157,000 tons)

- **Silver Production**
  - 2,000 grams of silver annually valued at 15 million gold marks to Poland.

That said, when signing the Peace Treaty, Germany had agreed to renounce 'all rights and title over the portion of Upper Silesia lying beyond the [new] frontier line'. The transitional economic arrangements that the League Council had proposed (whereby German private capital was effectively protected and granted control over its own activities for a further fifteen years in what was to be another sovereign country) were therefore particularly generous. Nevertheless, as Clarke was quick to point out, this was not how the German mine owners and industrialists viewed the situation.

They state that they had been manoeuvred into such a position that if they co-operate with the Convention, they fatten a beast for somebody else to kill at the end of a certain time. If on the other hand, they refuse to co-operate in the Convention, they will be unable to pay Reparations and the French will occupy the Ruhr.

Even then, they argued further, before the next fifteen years were up, France was bound to occupy the Ruhr under some pretext or other. Thus, the disaster could not be avoided. Strangely, given his long opposition to Polish aspirations in Upper Silesia, Clarke did not think that the League’s scheme was hopeless. If the League appreciated the scale of the
industrial problems, if suitable representatives were appointed to negotiate the German-Polish Convention, if the Mixed Commission and the Arbitral Tribunal were run properly - then it was just possible that the ‘many evils inherent in the partition of the industrial area could be avoided’. But, he added

One cannot, however, forget that the two parties to the convention are perhaps the bitterest political enemies who could be found in Europe at the present moment. The Poles have not yet shown any sincere desire to get on with their neighbours; the Germans on the other hand, were smarting under a sense of injustice. This injustice may appear to outsiders to be exaggerated, but it is real to them.²⁷⁴

As for the Polish Silesians, Stuart claimed that they were already preoccupied over the administrative appointments to be made when Upper Silesia’s sovereignty was transferred to Warsaw. They wanted the Polish Republic to fulfil a pledge that had been made at countless public meetings about these posts going to Upper Silesians.²⁷⁵ The Polish Silesian workers did not want to swap one set of colonialists for another. However, it was to be several more months before the territorial transfers could take place. This was because the Conference of Ambassadors had also stipulated that the status quo would be maintained until the German-Polish Convention had been negotiated and signed.²⁷⁶ All of this had been unwelcome news for Stuart who reminded Curzon that on accepting his post in May, he had been told that his appointment would be for about two months.²⁷⁷

The opening of the German-Polish talks was delayed until 23 November because Germany objected to the League’s nominee, the very experienced Swiss diplomat Gustave Ador, as a chair for the negotiations.²⁷⁸ Felix Colonder, a former President of the Swiss Confederation was eventually appointed in his place.²⁷⁹ This appointment had been expedited only after the Commissioners in Upper Silesia had warned their respective Governments that, although the Allied decision had been received there with comparative
18. Grandmother Europe advises Poland not to be sad about not getting a fair share of Silesia: "The bandits have to be satisfied first, that is the millionaires, the bankers and the English industrialists. After that there will be some crumbs for beggars."

19. Irishman to Silesian (Ironically): "Give me your hand brother. Thanks to England's sense of fair play and justice you and I will not remain prisoners in Europe much longer."

Chapter 5
calm, 'there were many dangerous undercurrents which may at any moment gain force and cause a serious disturbance to public order'. One that had already been mentioned by Stuart was the large influx of unemployed persons of both sexes arriving from Poland. Lukaschek, now the openly acknowledged German Silesian leader, had told Stuart that the 'Congress [ex-Russian Partition] Poles regarded Upper Silesia as the land of milk and honey'. Lukaschek explained that these migrants worked for a much lower wage than either Silesian Germans or Poles, and that some, such as the domestic servants, willingly worked solely for food and shelter. They were currently excluded from employment in the mines and factories but, wrote Stuart 'such difficulties could not be dealt with effectively by an expiring government'.

The delay to the negotiations was also unwelcome news for the British Army. They had expected to be out of Upper Silesia before Christmas. In Wilson's opinion, Upper Silesia's referral to the League had been 'simply a sign of the total incompetence, incapacity and impotence' of the politicians. When the delay was announced, Grogan reported that even the French officers were depressed. A few days later Gratier was stunned to learn that he was about to be replaced as the Allied force's Commander in Chief. He told Grogan that it was probably related to his early difficulties with Heneker and because the British commander was in fact senior to him. Grogan however was sure that Gratier, like his staff officers, really attributed it to Le Rond's machinations in Paris. That said, the British soldiers found Gratier's replacement, General Naulin, easier to work with, and the three Allied commanders developed a harmonious relationship which endured through to the final withdrawal.

The news of the League decision had not been accompanied by the disorders that the British and the Italians had expected. There was, therefore, great disappointment amongst the British troops when, after making optimistic speculations about their date of
departure, they learned that they had to remain until the German-Polish negotiations had been concluded. Settling down for what promised to be a very cold winter, their daily routine of ‘supporting the civil power’ was relieved by establishing regular training programmes. Some battalions took this a stage further. After initial training in Scotland, parties of the Black Watch Regiment’s young recruits would arrive to undergo further training in Silesia before being sent off to join the 1st Battalion in India.\textsuperscript{289} The discipline amongst the British troops was good but their health was often a problem. Bronchial infections were commonplace and many men were hospitalised when slight cuts or scratches became inflamed and dangerous. Precautions were taken to keep scabies and skin diseases under control, but Heneker lamented the fact that despite ‘every form of convenience, treatment and care, and supervision’, venereal disease remained his force’s most serious form of wastage.\textsuperscript{290}

During Stuart’s frequent absences, Heneker’s elevation to the Commission also gave him a chance to re-impose some military discipline on its British contingent. The British military commander ‘deplored the incompetence and bad behaviour which had been displayed by the Commission’s British officers, ex-officers and officials’.\textsuperscript{291} He blamed the Foreign Office for appointing them without making proper checks on their background. Just as Percival had done twelve months earlier, during December 1921 Heneker dismissed several officials whose behaviour he considered had lowered British prestige. In a circular issued to each British official, he warned them that ‘drunkenness in public, and the association with women of low type and doubtful morals in public places could not be condoned’. Noting that their ‘correct actions and demeanour’ were vital to the establishment of their impartiality and authority, he pointed out it was the duty of the senior officials ‘to see that their comrades and subordinates behave as British Gentlemen should’. Any misbehaviour would be punished with instant dismissal.\textsuperscript{292}
Wilson had planned to visit his troops in Cologne and Upper Silesia in November, but the visit was cancelled because of his heavy work schedule. Heneker had intended ‘putting him up’ at Schloss Turawa. Since Count Garnier, the owner and the campaigning representative of Upper Silesia’s German landowners lived there as well, this could have created an interesting situation, but one Wilson would probably have enjoyed. Heneker had instead to write to the CIGS to complain about the forces’ frustration at the recurrent delays and Stuart’s desperation to get the British out of the region. He noted Stuart had gained the impression that the French did not want to leave. And when visiting London in December, Stuart told the Foreign Office that he was convinced that the French were prolonging the occupation in order to retain their troops on Germany’s eastern flank. Again in January 1922, he reported German fears that that in order to guarantee reparation payments the French were ready to propose a permanent military occupation of German Upper Silesia.

These allegations about French intentions always left Wilson unmoved. The Geddes Committee Report had reached the War Office at the end of December and, despite the Army’s increased commitments across the Empire, it demanded army savings of £20 million over the following year (27% of projected estimates). This Treasury pressure to cut spending increased Wilson’s already high valuation of Anglo-French military cooperation. He had recently told the Imperial Defence Committee that:

The only power in Europe that has a really powerful and up to date Army and Air Force is France. Seeing the whole continent of Europe is in chaos it is a very fortunate thing that one of the most pacific of all nations has realised the importance of force in carrying out the wishes and orders of the Supreme Council. England was exceptionally fortunate in having such a friend at such a moment.

Chapter 5
Photo 6: Entrance to Schloss Turawa (1996)

Chapter 5
The Army Council discovered that its proposed reduction of 39 battalions and eight cavalry regiments would only save £3 million. Sections of the barracks to be disbanded were to avoid from the decommissioning of all eight Irish Regiments. Wilson opposed the disbandment of the Ulster Regiments but only managed to save one. His savings were for all five Irish battalions serving in Upper Siros.

Cabinet, Wilson gave a clear warning. He acknowledged that the Great War would have made such a deep impression on the British public that the war would have been impossible. On the other hand, High Policy ignored High Strategy and on the other hand, High Strategy is ignorant of High Policy our terrible experiences will be repeated in the not distant future.

Wilson was elected and duly took his seat in parliament. Just five months later, on 22 June, the Irish Republican Army granted him down outside his London home.
The Army Council discovered that its proposed abolition of 28 battalions and eight cavalry regiments would only save £8 million. Sixteen of the battalions to be disbanded were to come from the decommissioning of all eight Irish Regiments. Wilson opposed the disbandment of the Ulster Regiments but only managed to save one. This meant the end for all five Irish battalions serving in Upper Silesia. 299

At this point Wilson himself decided to retire to become an Ulster MP – the British Government’s negotiations with De Valera had been ‘the final straw’. 300 Wilson had been particularly annoyed by Lloyd George’s failure to warn him that at a meeting of British and French Heads of Government in Cannes in January 1922, he would be offering the French a security guarantee against ‘unprovoked German aggression’. This ill-defined promise was designed to induce the French to pursue a less relentless policy against the Germans, support British policies in Europe and attend Lloyd George’s Conference in Genoa, which he hoped would also be attended by the Russians and the Germans. It was this uninformed aspect of Lloyd George’s style of government that profoundly irritated Wilson. Although favouring a military alliance with the French, Wilson was delighted to learn that Poincaré (who had replaced Briand during the talks), had practically walked out on the British Prime Minister. 301 In the concluding paragraph to his last paper for the Cabinet, Wilson gave a clear warning. He had hoped that the Great War would have made such a deep impression on the members of the Government that a repetition of the terrible losses and disasters both during the war and since the war would have been impossible. If on the other hand High Policy ignores High Strategy and on the other hand High Strategy is ignorant of High Policy our terrible experiences will be repeated in the not distant future. 302

Wilson was elected and duly took his seat in parliament. Just five months later, on 22 June, the Irish Republican Army gunned him down outside his London home.
By April, five English battalions had arrived in Upper Silesia to replace the Leinsters, Inniskilling Fusiliers, Connaught Rangers, Munsters and the Royal Irish. They were the 1st Yorkshire Light Infantry, 2nd Cornwall Light Infantry, 1st Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1st Gloucestershire Regiment, 2nd Kings Royal Rifle Company and the 1st Middlesex Regiment (joining the 3rd Battalion which had been serving there since June 1921). This changeover effectively reduced the strength of the British forces because 1,670 men were retained in Cologne pending full military withdrawal from Upper Silesia.

The inter-Allied forces’ remaining period in Upper Silesia was characterised by increasingly severe German attacks and ambushes on the French troops in particular. Because the attacks were invariably related to arms searches instigated by French officials, the British and Italians tended to blame them as the authors of their own misfortune. The two most notorious incidents occurred in Gliwice. Attempting to recover arms seized from their secret weapons dump, armed Germans made a machine gun and grenade attack on the temporary quarters of the French troops guarding them. Two French soldiers were killed and 20 wounded. In the second incident 23 French soldiers were reported killed and ten critically wounded when land mines were exploded beneath them during a search for weapons reportedly hidden in old family vaults in Gliwice cemetery.

Although the French were especially targets, the British did not escape unscathed. At Wirek (Antoniehutte) near Katowice, a British soldier, Sergeant Storer, was murdered by the Poles after being identified as an intelligence agent. This was exceptional. As Colonel H.B. Kennedy pointed out in 1943:

the Germans could not have been more pleasant or tried to do more for the [British] troops... I think it was probably 75% genuine, tho’ the German is always
subservient to anyone who is his master... with the Poles we had very little contact. 308

During the winter of 1921-22, the reality then was that for the ordinary British soldier, service in Upper Silesia was quite uneventful. For the officers, home leave was granted and almost all regimental memoirs mention the hospitality that they received on the large German estates – most especially the horse riding and the hunting expeditions. Amongst Polish historians in Silesia today, it is this perception of Anglo-German friendship that endures and colours their perception of British partiality.

In December 1921, the Boundary Commission completed delimiting the new frontier. 309 The Geneva Convention, then (at 300 pages) one of the longest treaties ever negotiated, was signed on 15 May 1922. By the end of the month it had been ratified in both the Sejm and the Reichstag – the latter draped in black mourning sheets for the occasion. After the formal ratifications were exchanged in Opole on 3 June the territorial hand-over proceeded. Felix Colonder, who had chaired the Convention negotiations, became President of the new Mixed Commission (located in Katowice), and Georges Kaeckenbeek, a Belgian lawyer, became President of the Arbitral Tribunal (located in Bytom). Handing over ceremonies were held at eight of the biggest towns starting with Katowice on 20 June and ending with Opole on 9 July. 310 Edmonds provides an interesting account of the Allied withdrawal, including how British units had to cover the French withdrawal after their departing trains had come under German gunfire. 311

A descriptive account of the ceremony marking Tarnowski Gory’s hand-over to Poland on 25 June, is recorded in the Black Watch’s quarterly journal. 312 During May and June the League Council’s line had become a physical reality on the ground. At the same time, the Polish white and red flag started appearing over the district’s cottages and even over some of the official buildings. As the great day approached, arches and festoons
constructed from fir tree branches, were erected throughout the district. Despite having voted 7-1 for Germany, many of the town’s population also erected them. In the background however, behind these expressions of loyalty, the author of the journal was much more impressed by the sight of the ‘the huge exodus’ of German families and businesses moving themselves over to the German side of the new frontier. 313

The hand-over ceremony itself was a simple affair. A party of about 40 Black Watch soldiers and the Battalion’s pipes and drums marched to the area in front of the Rathaus where the flags of Britain, France and Italy were flying. Drawn up beside them was a Polish brass band accompanied by 50 Polish police. At one o’clock the Commission’s district controller, Major Beresford, and a Polish representative signed the transfer documents. As the Allied flags were hauled down, the Black Watch presented arms. When the Polish flag was raised and broken out, the Scottish soldiers presented arms once again and the Polish brass band played the Polish national anthem. Then, with their rifles shouldered and their pipes and drums playing, the Black Watch marched off the parade, down through the town to the railway station. There they joined their colleagues aboard an awaiting train and departed for Cologne immediately. The journal records that ‘as the train steamed out there were few regrets and some even prophesy that within the lifetime of this generation the German flag will again fly from the Rathaus’. 314

Summary

As the third insurrection ended, all the parties involved in Upper Silesia with the apparent exception of France, sought a speedy resolution to the dispute. Upper Silesian business enterprises were suffering from uncertainty over their future; Britain and Italy wanted their troops out before there was any more trouble; Poland desired the economic gains a decision would bring; and in Berlin, Wirth’s Cabinet desperately needed to show
20. Kocynder reader: "You've twisted as much as possible with your politics but it didn't help you. The plebiscite was about commune voting and Upper Silesia's division. The industry is ours so you Germans can clear off to the main part of Germany."
Germany some return for their much despised policy of Erfüllung. Nevertheless, the Upper Silesian Commissioners’ differing interpretations of the plebiscite results had still to be discussed and decided on by the Supreme Council.

The third and final Polish insurrection had undoubtedly shifted the British position. Having taken no account of the Polish Silesian aspirations prior to it, the British were forced to consider at least the minimum that the Poles would accept. But no matter how many different permutations of territory and the voting results were attempted, British aims and Polish aspirations could never be reconciled. This was because the nub of the Upper Silesian problem was that neither Britain nor France would willingly concede the industrial triangle’s partition: the obvious outcome of a territorial division based on the plebiscite results – flawed as they were.

In June 1921 Britain tried to persuade Briand to call a Supreme Council meeting to resolve the impasse. The French argued, not unreasonably, that no meeting should be held until the insurrection was over and the area brought under strict military control. However, when the insurrection finally ended in early July, Briand suggested that the inter-Allied Commissioners’ military backgrounds meant that they were unfamiliar with political and economic affairs and that this should have disqualified them from making recommendations affecting Upper Silesia’s future. Instead, he proposed that a Committee of Experts be established to re-examine the evidence and make new recommendations to the Supreme Council. This suggestion can be viewed either as a deliberate stalling tactic or else a commendable attempt to reach a consensus. If the latter, and if successful, then its outcome would have carried ‘scientific credibility’, broken the impasse, and permitted France, Britain and Italy to compromise without losing face. Nevertheless, the British were suspicious, believing that France aimed to prolong its presence in Upper Silesia to maintain pressure on the German Government in the hope that Germany would break-up
into its constituent parts. A unilateral attempt by the French to reinforce the inter-Allied force in Upper Silesia with an extra infantry division was regarded as part of this plan.

The British Government supported Sir Harold Stuart's opposition to the arrival of the additional troops. But they did not reject Briand's contention that the Commissioners' limited experience of political and economic affairs had made their recommendations on Upper Silesia's future questionable. In fact, supported by Lloyd George, Curzon used this very argument in an unsuccessful attempt to persuade the French leaders to replace Le Rond. Further delays to the Supreme Council meeting and the Commission's continued inability to arrive at an unanimous recommendation when asked to review their earlier decisions, forced Curzon to concede Briand's Committee of Experts, though in a much reduced form.

The British contribution to this committee, which first met in Paris just a few days before the Supreme Council opened on 8 August, was limited. Whilst the British experts did have extensive knowledge of the subject they remained highly prejudiced against the Poles and were also under instruction to preserve the industrial triangle for Germany. No consensus could have been achieved and none was. This returned the onus on finding what was essentially a political solution back to the Supreme Council, where it had really always belonged.

Briand's political position had been made clear to Lloyd George at their private discussions on the evening prior to the Supreme Council meeting on 8 August. For a long time it had obviously not required any great insight to realise that it would be very difficult to achieve an agreement with the French. This being the case, Lloyd George had arrived in Paris intent, should all else fail, on referring the problem to the League - an idea suggested by Hankey who had carefully checked how the process would work beforehand. There can be little doubt that Balfour and Drummond - the latter probably at
Cecil’s behest, had persuaded the Cabinet Secretary about the merits of the scheme. Philip Baker co-ordinated the campaign with the Italians. Baker and other similarly dedicated young officials in Geneva had been anxious to demonstrate the new organisation’s power to change the world. Upper Silesia was especially attractive to the League because the question had all of the elements that the new institution’s founders hoped it could overcome – an intractable international problem; a threat to European peace and stability; the failure of Great Power diplomacy. Baker believed that settling the Upper Silesian question would prove the League’s worth.

It was also the case that Britain and France, the key players on the Supreme Council, really had no options available without threatening the end of the Entente, something Briand and, for all his bluster, Lloyd George wanted to avoid. The Entente’s demise would have been an enormous diplomatic victory for Germany. What is unclear from Baker’s papers and other British documents, is whether or not Lloyd George and Hankey knew that when they met the Italians on the evening of 11 August, Torretta would initiate the proposal to refer the Upper Silesian question to the League. Taking the great caution with which every other new Upper Silesian proposal had generally been met with as a yardstick, the alacrity with which the League proposal was received would indicate that, on balance, we could say that they probably did know. Given the easy manner in which information leaked from Geneva coupled with a French aptitude for gathering political intelligence, it is also highly probable that Briand was well aware of the League’s efforts. Nonetheless, it was important for both French and British prestige that the suggestion should come from a third party. The Italians provided this service. For, as Stuart later pointed out, despite Lloyd George’s claim to the contrary, neither Italy nor Japan had definitely committed themselves to the British point of view. 316
Internal division had prevented the Supreme Council acting out its customary role as the sole arbitrator of European politics. The League Council therefore had every reason to be delighted with Upper Silesia being referred to them. A successful settlement was bound to raise the League’s prestige as an international authority. The question now was whether they could succeed where the Supreme Council had failed. The advantage the League possessed was that provided its representatives were left to act independently, they were unencumbered by the baggage of British hints and half-promises to Germany and the French desire to maximise damage to Germany. And, since they were working within the terms of the Versailles Treaty, this meant that the industrial triangle could be divided. Unfortunately, thanks to the way the plebiscite area had been originally defined, and the manner in which the League chose to interpret the plebiscite vote, thousands of Silesians who voted for Poland were again denied their choice.

Instead of simply moving the Polish border west to include as many Polish voting communes, voters and their dependants as possible, the League decided to treat the plebiscite area as a single constituency. First, they split the territory in proportion to the total overall votes cast for each side. They then adjusted these totals to equalise the size of the minority of voters that they left each side of the new frontier. Leaving aside the point that the vote was taken by communes, when they started counting voters heads, the League disregarded the fact that Polish voters’ families tended to be larger than the better educated, socially aspiring, German families. This methodology also perpetuated the fantasy that the 180,000 German outvoters and 10,000 Polish outvoters lived in Upper Silesia. This distorted the actual situation on the ground. The Polish voters (and their children) left in the German area were real enough, but over 25% of the voters being counted as German did not live in Upper Silesia. However, by the time the Ambassadors’
Conference had endorsed the League’s recommendations, Upper Silesia’s population had
tired of the struggle and most were ready to accept any half-reasonable settlement.

For Germany, the League recommendations were the great British betrayal,
boosting the nationalist right and undermining Germany’s centre and left parties, whose
leaders were attempting to make the new order work. The hysterical press reaction in
Germany which followed the League’s decision overlooked the highly favourable and
unprecedented economic provisions that the League Council had included to ease the
transition. And while the decision did end the life of Wirth’s first Cabinet, most of its
problems might be more justly attributed to their mishandling of the growing economic
crisis that was of Germany’s own making. What the loss of territory in Upper Silesia did
do was provide Germany with more spurious arguments for evading reparations and gave
the nation’s sense of injustice over the outcome of the war another boost.

In Britain the general public was never much interested in Upper Silesia. This was
reflected in the restricted press coverage following publication of the League Council’s
recommendations and confirmation by the Ambassadors’ Conference. However, the
political left saw the League’s recommendations as confirming the necessity to support
and nurture the fledgling German democratic state. What damage the League did to its
own reputation with the decision on Upper Silesia amongst an already sceptical British
political establishment can only guessed at, for within a few months Lloyd George was
talking to journalists about creating ‘a real League of Nations’. And, in a memorandum to
Drummond in June 1922, Baker reported that the British Prime Minister’s attitude to the
League had grown so hostile that he would soon attack the League ‘principally on the
ground of the Upper Silesian decision’. 318 But whatever Lloyd George’s attitude, the
most hopeful outcome of the League’s recommendations was that they at last permitted
Germans and Poles to start deciding aspects of their own future between themselves.
Chapter 5 - Notes


2. *DBFP* Vol.XV, No.81 p.540 Meeting of Allied Representatives, 2 May 1921. Due to the late arrival of the recommendations, the Upper Silesia discussion was postponed.

3. IWM HHW2/61/7 Grogan to Wilson 27 July 1921. 'Temperature has soared to 92 degrees... hardly any rain for weeks...expecting 'bumper crops'.

4. IWM HHW2/45/24 (Copy) Thwaites to D'Abernon 16 July 1921.

5. IWM HHW2/60/9 Wilson to Heneker 12 July 1921. 'I am personally in favour of getting out now because I am afraid when the Supreme Council or some determining body, decide on the frontiers it matters not whether the decision is fair or unfair, it will be violently opposed by one party or the other and probably by both'.


7. PRO FO 371/5899 C9620/92/18 Minute by S.P. Waterlow on Report of the Upper Silesian Commissioners 4 March 1920. He notes that this minute resulted after a detailed discussion in the Foreign Office between the interested officials, Major Ottley, and Major Clarke who brought the recommendations from Opole to London.


9. PRO FO 371/5899 C9621/92/18 Memorandum entitled Frontier in Upper Silesia by Major Ottley 6 May 1921.


11. *DBFP* Vol. XVI, No.109 pp.135-137 Buchanan to Curzon 24 May 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5904 C1068/18 Buchanan to Curzon 21 May 1921. This referred to an article published in *Il Messaggero*.


13. PRO FO371/6818 N7939/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon Summary of Events, week ending 6 July 1921. In Britain, Germany and in Italy, Count Sforza was considered to possess pro-French attitudes.

14. PRO FO 371/5906 C11067/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 29 May, 1921. D'Abernon claimed that the Italian ambassador 'regards the maintenance of Wirth's policy a
primary interest of whole of Central Europe at present moment'. See also *DBFP* No.109 pp.135-137 Buchanan to Curzon 24 May 1921.


18. Many of the *Bloc National* doubted Briand's nationalist credentials. However, the speech that he made on 24 May, despite being conciliatory towards the Entente, was very well received by most of the deputies - see *DBFP* Vol.XVI No.115 p.142 Hardinge to Curzon 24 May 1921.

19. This had been intimated to Curzon by the French Ambassador in a note delivered on 20 May - see *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.126 p.150 Curzon to Hardinge 27 May 1921.

20. *DBFP* Vol.XVI No.133 p.156 Hardinge to Curzon 27 May 1921. See also *ibid* No.139 p.161 Hardinge to Curzon 28 May 1921. Until Heneker had persuaded them of the necessity to regard the Germans as a defence force, the French regarded Hoefer's men as insurrectionaries.


29. *Ibid*.

30. *Ibid*.

31. HLRO F/13/2/26 Crowe to Lloyd George 27 May 1921.

Chapter 5 - Notes
32. CCA NBKR4/463 Baker to Lord Robert Cecil 20 July 1921. Here Baker repeats an suggestion that he had made to Cecil earlier about having the Upper Silesia dispute referred to the League. David J. Whittaker, *Fighter for Peace: Philip Noel-Baker 1889-1982* (York 1989). There is no information on Upper Silesia in this biography but it provides extensive details of Baker's career. In 1922 Baker added his wife's surname, Noel, to his own to become Philip Noel Baker.

33. HLRO F/13/2/26 Crowe to Lloyd George 27 May 1921.

34. PRO FO371/5901 C10240/92/18 Sir A. Geddes to Curzon 18 May 1921.


36. PRO FO371/5906 C11008/92/18 Translation of an *aide mémoire* communicated by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs - see original in *DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 106.


38. *Ibid*, No. 167 pp. 186-188, Hardinge to Curzon 9 June 1921. Hardinge asked Millerand about the possibility, now that the British had appointed a civilian commissioner, of the French following suit and recalling Le Rond. Millerand refused. However, Crowe's minutes reveal that the question had destroyed Curzon's strategy of introducing Le Rond's removal in exchange for a discussion on the setting up of the Committee of Experts that Briand wanted.

39. *Ibid*, No. 175 pp. 200-201 Curzon to Sir George Grahame 13 June 1921. Curzon warned Grahame that, By communicating our views, however informally to the Belgian Government we should only encourage them in their efforts to take part in discussions of Supreme Council on subject'.

40. HLRO F/13/2/32 Lloyd George to Curzon 16 June 1921.

41. *Ibid*. The Prime Minister was also 'apprehensive of something serious happening quite suddenly which will precipitate one of our gravest crises since 1914. The Germans will not indefinitely consent to keep back their troops, superior as they are in every respect to the Polish rabble'.

42. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No. 197 p. 220 Hardinge to Curzon 25 June 1921. Other Allied countries could join in the discussion in the Ambassador's Conference if the Secretariat (headed by Paul Cambon) decided the subject was a matter of interest to her. If admitted their Ambassador had full deliberate powers. Noticing the Belgian Ambassador's recent frequent attendance, Hardinge had written to Cambon asking him to preclude Belgium from participating in the discussions there.

43. *Ibid*, No. 174 p. 199 Curzon to Sir George Grahame 13 June 1921. Curzon warned Grahame that, By communicating our views, however informally to the Belgian Government we should only encourage them in their efforts to take part in discussion of Supreme Council on subject'.

44. Curzon was accompanied by Hardinge and Sir Horace Rumbold, the British Minister to Poland during the recent Soviet-Polish War.
45. DBFP Vol.XVI No.186 Hardinge to Curzon 20 June 1921.

46. PRO FO 371/5912 C12738/92/18 Hardinge to Stuart 19 June 1921. This describes the meeting between Curzon and Briand.

47. DBFP Vol. XVI No.182 p.208 Curzon to Crowe (For Prime Minister)19 June 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5913 C13168/27/82 Cabinet Meeting, Draft Conclusions, 21 June 1921. The question sent to the Commission ended, 'If the Commission does not think itself in a position to arrive at a joint proposal, does it consider that the addition of Technical Advisers (jurists and engineers) to be chosen by Government and sent to Upper Silesia, would help it in its task and enable it to reach a joint solution?'

48. PRO FO 371/5912 C12738/92/18 Hardinge to Stuart 19 June 1921.

49. DBFP Vol.XVI No.182 p.208 Curzon to Crowe 19 June 1921.

50. PRO FO 371/5913 C13168/27/82 Cabinet Meeting Draft Conclusions 21 June 1921. See also A.J.P.Taylor (ed.) Stevenson Diary p.232 21 July 1921. Perspectives change. Discussing Curzon that day, Lloyd George told Stevenson that 'Curzon simply muddles everything...He went over to Paris a few weeks ago presumably to settle the Silesian question but now it appears to be in a greater muddle than ever'.

51. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 189 p.212, Stuart to Curzon 22 June 1921. See also ibid No.187 p.183 Stuart to Curzon 21 June 1921. The Commission's initial reply was that they did not know if they could reach an unanimous conclusion, they had their own experts on the spot, and that they would not welcome outside experts arriving to fix the frontier until the Commission's own authority had been restored.

52. Ibid, No. 208 p.233 Stuart to Curzon 1 July 1921. Stuart intended raising the matter the following week.


54. PRO FO 371/5914 C13380/92/18 Curzon to Hardinge 27 June 1921. The Foreign Secretary found 'the statement so astonishing, and the cumulative effect so unfortunate', that at first he thought that Briand had been misreported.

55. DBFP Vol.XVI No.217 pp.239-240 Stuart to Curzon 10 July 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5916 C14337 Stuart to Curzon 9 July 1921. This document and its enclosures gives a fuller account of the discussions and contains Headlam Morley's comments on the implication in Le Rond's argument that, where rural and urban areas are inseparable, and the rural population are the majority, then the towns must be sacrificed. Stuart also notes how the Italian Foreign Office appears to have forced Marinis to present the Sforza's case.

56. DBFP Vol.XVI No. 216 pp.238-239 Stuart to Curzon 10 July 1921. See ibid No.224 pp.244-245 Stuart to Curzon 16 July 1921. Here Stuart recommends that,
should the British have to make a real compromise with the others, then a line somewhat similar to Sforza's would perhaps be suitable. See also ibid No.233 pp.238-256, D'Abernon to Curzon 19 July 1921. This reports Marinis' condemnation of Sforza's recommendation.

57. PRO FO 371/5916 C14/92/18 Memorandum by Ottley concerning Briand's Committee of Experts, 12 July 1921. 'The divergence of views is due to diverse fundamental principles and can therefore only be dealt with by the Supreme Council itself'.

58. PRO FO 371/5916 File Index Minutes. Writing about this apparent French procrastination, Crowe observes that 'the danger of all of this is that it might bring down the German Government. One which could be no more conciliatory or more likely to pay reparations is to be hoped for'. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.218 pp.240-241 D'Abernon (Berlin) to Curzon 11 July 1921.


60. Ibid, No. 247 pp.268-270 Curzon to Cheetham 23 July 1921. The French politicians (Foch was not consulted) had taken a unilateral decision to send an additional French division (10,000 men) to Upper Silesia. The Germans had refused to permit the reinforcements transit across their territory. The British supported the German position. The French tried using a delay to calling of meeting of the Supreme Conference to discuss Upper Silesia as leverage. The whole thing became deadlocked. Hardinge was recalled from leave to sort things out and the French infantry division's movement was cancelled.

61. Ibid, No.247 - No.292 passim.

62. PRO FO 371/5916 C14365/92/18 Memorandum by Ottley concerning Briand's Committee of Experts 12 July 1921. This predicts that the French may press to appoint this committee if they are anxious to postpone the settlement. See also DBFP Vol.XVI No.236 pp.258-259 30 July 1921. Memorandum by Ottley on Silesian situation. Here Ottley claims that as part of her policy of repressing Germany, France intended to strengthen and enrich Poland as a potential ally.

63. Ibid, No.245 pp.266-267 Cheetham to Curzon 23 July1921. See PRO FO 890/4 Secret Communiqué No. 56: Reorganisation of Selbstzuschutz 27 September 1921. The interesting aspect of this was that the German Haupt Leitung (Supreme Command) counted every member of the inter-Allied Commission's all-German police force as part of its organisation. See also FO 371/6818 N9009/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon: Summary of Events week ending 3 August 1921. Regarding the Committee of Experts, the conservative Rzeczpospolite, one of the leading and best edited of the Polish newspapers, reported that Briand, 'wished the technical experts to furnish him with further statistics in support of his arguments. Such statistics are stated to be the only weapon capable of dislodging the British Premier from his present standpoint'.

64. PRO FO371/5917 C14978/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 20 July1921.
65. PRO FO371/6818 N8205/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon: Summary of Events week ending 11 July 1921. The Narod, the newspaper of the progressive intellectuals, also asserted that 'The Polish Government has a right to demand a speedy settlement of a dispute which is keeping the country in a state of ferment and hindering its economic construction'.


67. PRO FO 371/5918 C15219/92/18 Kennard to Curzon 26 July 1921.

68. PRO FO 371/6818 N8250/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon: Summary of Events week ending 12 July 1921.


70. PRO FO 59/176 C14985/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 23 July 1921.

71. Ibid.

72. PRO FO 371/6815 N7934/117/55 Lt. Colonel Willey (M.P. for Bradford) to Cecil Harmsworth (Under Secretary of State Foreign Affairs) 29 July 1921. The British manufacturers wanted to:
   a. recover their pre-war debts from the Polish textile manufacturers.
   b. ensure that enough working Upper Silesian coal mines were transferred to Poland to permit Polish textile firms maintain their production to pay them
   c. penetrate the Russian market in partnership with Polish firms who had traditionally supplied that market before the war.


74. Ibid.

75. PRO FO 371/5918 C15286/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 27 July 1921.

76. PRO FO 371/5920 C15614/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 29 July 1921. He believed that too much importance should not be attached to such casual conversations. It was true that many Poles were tired over the prolonged tension created by Upper Silesia. However, they still attached great store in the possession of a large portion of the industrial area, without which they considered that Poland's economic rehabilitation was hopeless.

77. PRO FO 371/5919 C15325/92/18 Curzon to D'Abernon 28 July 1921.

78. Ibid, C15348/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 27 July 1921. See also PRO FO 371/5915 C14149/92/18 Countess Sherr-Thoss to Curzon 27 July 1921.

Chapter 5 - Notes
79. HLRO F/54/1/35 D'Abernon to Hankey 20 July 1921 Enclosure: Private Diary 20
July 1921. This source, who had just returned from Upper Silesia, also suggested that
most attacks on the French originated in squabbles over women and that the place
was over-run with prostitutes. D'Abernon commented that 'in Central Europe a
cocotte is Polish as compulsorily as a chef is French or a jockey English'.

80. PRO FO 371/5919 C15492/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 31 July 1921; ibid
C15493/92/18 1 August 1921; and ibid C15494/92/18 1 August 1921.

81. PRO FO 371/5921 C16216/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 5 August 1921. In this
speech, made in Bremen on 2 August 1921, Wirth said, 'I have asked myself how a
state like Poland, which owes its revival to the blood shed by German soldiers can
pursue its present policy. Poland is penetrating Russian territory to the East, in
Lithuania the frontier is still unsettled, Wilno is an open question, In Galicia a policy
of coercion to the Ruthenes is in operation, and now comes an open effort to
establish a second and worse Alsace Lorraine, because political passion and
unbridled arrogance rule in Warsaw'.

82. PRO FO 371/5921 C15771/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 30 July 1921. See also
CCA HDLM Acc800 Box 3 Transcript of HAL Fisher's Diary 16 July 1921.
Millerand told Fisher that Germany was unlikely to ally itself with Russia because
Russia was in chaos.

83. The Communists had been shaken by the Kronstadt revolt, Lenin was becoming
quite frail, the Russian infra-structure was a shambles, industry was stagnant,
agriculture near ruined, there was general starvation and the revolution was about to
start consuming its own makers. In Britain wages were tumbling, unemployment
passed two million and Lloyd George's government was jettisoning promises
made during the 'coupon' election of 1918. He had failed to revive the international
post-war economy and differences between him and his government's Conservative-
Unionist members over Ireland's 'surrender', had sealed his administration's fate.

1921. An article published in the Times that day also suggested that Curzon's haughty
bearing also made him unsuitable for international conferences.

85. PRO FO371/6818 N9009/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon: Summary of Events week
ending 3 August 1921. It was actually uncertain whether or not Lloyd George would
attend the Supreme Council meeting until just before it took place.

86. CCA NBKR 4/454 (Copy) Baker to Attolico 22 July 1921, Enclosure: Copy of a
minute sent by Baker to Sir Eric Drummond 22 June 1921.

87. Ibid. Baker names Hudson, Gilchrist and Sweetser.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid. See also Harrington, 'The League of Nations and the Upper Silesian Boundary
Dispute' pp.86-101.
90. CCA NBKR 4/454 (Copy) Baker to Signor Attolico 21 July 1921.

91. MMLH LPAC/Box/192 The Labour Party Advisory Committee on International Questions Draft Memorandum on Upper Silesia by Dorothy Frances Buxton, 17 February 1921.

92. CCA NBKR 4/459 (Copy) Baker to Arthur Henderson 20 July 1921.

93. Robert Cecil, The Great Experiment (London 1941)

94. CCA NBKR 4/463 (Copy) Baker to Viscount Cecil 20 July 1921.

95. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol. XXII, Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.

96. CCA NBKR (Copy) Baker to Attolico 21 July 1921.

97. Ibid. Baker added 'In saying that he [Lloyd George] thought it might be necessary to allow the Germans to use their Army he went to the utmost extreme to which he could go. He knew he would offend mortally both the French and the Poles, and his policy, if carried out, would also have involved a complete reversal of his other policy in connection with German disarmament and reparations'.

98. Ibid. The League Council would appoint an impartial committee. It would consist of 'people with a world-wide reputation, whom everybody would recognise as having no interest in the matter'. Baker named Venizelos (Prime Minister of Greece) and Colonel House (President Wilson's representative) as examples. The Committee would produce a report within a month. It would be examined by the League Council (which the Prime Ministers could attend), and the decision taken by a majority vote.

99. Ibid.

100. PRO FO 371/5918 C15487/92/18 Kennard to Curzon 29 July 1921.

101. PRO FO 371/5920 C15502/92/18 Kennard to Curzon 30 July 1921.

102. PRO FO 371/5921 C15695/92/18 Cheetham to Curzon 4 August 1921. See also FO 371/6818 N8205/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon: Summary of Events week ending 12 July 1921. After Sforza left office, unlike most other Polish newspapers, the Narod had shrewdly welcomed Toretta's appointment - noting that 'his sympathy for Poland had been proved repeatedly at the Peace Conference'.

103. PRO FO 371/5918 C14995/92/18 Curzon to Cheetham 25 July 1921. Tufton Waterlow, Ottley and Clarke had each participated in the Foreign Office's review of the Opole Commissioners' recommendations in early May 1921 out of which the 'Crowe Line' had emerged.

104. PRO FO 371/5921 C15855/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon 5 August 1921.

Chapter 5 - Notes
105. CCA NBKR 4/459 Hurst to Baker 28 July 1921. In his reply, Baker disagreed, stating that for the sake of Europe it was not a bad thing that Hurst was 'sweltering in Paris'- see *ibid* 30 July 1921. See also *DBFP* Vol.XI No.143 pp.171-174 Percival to Curzon 26 January 1921, Enclosure 2: *Observations by Messrs. Clarke, Saxton and Mather on the Precis of Reports By Managing Directors of Coalmines, Ironworks, etc, in Upper Silesia.*

106. *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.233 pp.255-256 D'Abernon to Curzon 19 July 1921. Marinis had strongly urged that if Le Rond was to be summoned to address the meeting of the Supreme Council, then all three Commissioners should be heard.


108. PRO FO371/5921 C15855/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon, 5 August 1921. A message from Tufton notes that the French proposal 'could in no way possible be reconciled with the line we were instructed by your Lordship to Uphold, according to which Germany would receive the industrial triangle and Poland the remainder of the mining area to the south'.

109. *Ibid,* C16101/92/18 6 August 1921. *Report of the Committee of Experts appointed to Study the Frontier to be laid down between Germany and Poland in Upper Silesia as the Result of the Plebiscite.*


111. IWM HHW2/61/7 Grogan to Wilson 27 July 1921. This recounts French reaction to the possibility that, as well as being deputy British Commissioner, Heneker would retain his military command as well. This resulted in Colonel Kennedy's temporary appointment as British military commander - a regular occurrence since Stuart was away from Opole fairly frequently.


114. PRO FO 371/5922 C16644/92/18 Heneker to Stuart 18 August 1921. Heneker pointed out the 'extreme disaffection' being expressed over the manner in which British troops were treated much less generously than the French and Italians who had been granted local allowances. In theory, the cost of occupation was to be recovered from Germany and Poland. But the British military authorities worked on the assumption that this would be a much more difficult exercise than it sounded and that they would have to bear the brunt of the costs of occupation themselves. See also IWM HHW2/60/2 Wilson to Heneker, 11 October 1921. Wilson also informs Heneker that he does not want the increment paid because he has failed to get an increase for the troops in Ireland, Constantinople, Mesopotamia and Palestine, all
places where his men in there were having a worse time than the soldiers in Upper Silesia.

115. PRO FO 371/5915 C13915/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 6 July 1921.


119. DBFP Vol. XVI, No. 227 p.249 D'Abernon to Curzon 17 July 1921. See also ibid No.229 p.323 Note 4 Heneker to Curzon 14 August 1921. Heneker notes that a 650-700 strong band of insurgents crossed into the north of the British sector from Poland at night and terrorised the inhabitants. This was dealt with by the authorities on the Polish side of the frontier.

120. IWM HHW2/61/5 Grogan to Wilson 17 July 1921. See also ibid 31 July 1921 Enclosure: Situation Report by General de Brantes to General Gratier, Allied Commander in Chief 25 July 1921. Much of what the ex-insurgents were complaining about resulted from exaggerations Korfanty had made in trying to encourage the more hard-line insurgents to end the insurrection.

121. Ibid.

122. PRO FO 371/5923 C16856/92/18 21 August 1921.

123. DBFP Vol.XI No.21 p.28 Curzon to Derby 22 June 1919.

124. IWM HHW2/61/5 Grogan to Wilson 31 July 1921.

125. PRO FO 371/5922 C16369/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 29 July 1921.

126. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol.XXII, Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.

127. Ibid.


129. Campbell, The Struggle for Upper Silesia' p.381. See also Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After pp.310-311. Like Hankey, Riddell also noted that Briand and Lloyd George had met on the night preceding the opening of the Supreme Council meeting and that, 'Everyone in Paris very excited and the gloomiest apprehensions are expressed regarding the probability of rupture'.

130. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol.XXII, Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.
131. HLRO F/54/1/37 D'Abemon to Hankey 7 August 1921. Pages from his personal diary recording that Frassati, the Italian Ambassador in Berlin, and Marinis both claimed credit for 'bringing Torretta round to sound views on Upper Silesia'. They thought that they had convinced him to adhere 'to the English policy out and out' despite (D'Abemon claimed), the French threatening not to renew a loan to Italy of 40 million francs of treasury bonds shortly due for repayment 'unless Italy stood by France in the Upper Silesian question'. See also DBFP Vol.XV No.92 pp.628-629 British Secretary's Notes of an Allied Conference, Paris 9 August 1921. Le Rond's health had been commented on by both Grogan and Marinis. In Paris, Sackville West described him as looking like 'a violinist in a 4th rate pub' - see IWM HHW2/12G/4G.

132. BLM Balfour 49704 Vol. XXII Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.

133. DBFP Vol.XV No.92 p.639 Appendix Instruction to Experts 9 August 1921.

134. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol.XXII Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.

135. DBFP Vol.XV No.99 pp.693-694. British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers, Paris 9 August 1921 at 6p.m.

136. Ibid, No.100 pp.694-698. Notes of Conversation between British and Italian Prime Ministers 11 August 1921 at 8.15 p.m. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki From Versailles to Locarno p.78. This suggests that the conversation recorded above, implies Lloyd George proposed British support for Italian claims to Albania 'would be his payment in exchange for Italian support of British proposals over Upper Silesia'.

137. CCA NBKR 4/454 12 August 1921. Note concerning Attolico's telephone messages from Paris and the League Secretary's drafted response.

138. Ibid.

139. DBFP Vol. XV No.101 p.690 British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers, Paris 12 August 1921 at 10.30 a.m.

140. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol.XXII, Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921.

141. DBFP Vol.XV, No.101 p.690 British Secretary's Notes of a Meeting between the British and French Prime Ministers, Paris 12 August 1921 at 10.30 a.m. The referral was specifically to the Council of the League of Nations, not to its General Assembly.

142. HLRO F/25/2/35 Hankey to Prime Minister 26 October 1921 Enclosure: (Copy) Hankey to Drummond 21 October 1921. See also Cienciala and Komarnicki From Versailles to Locarno p.78. A year later Hankey prepared a statement claiming that the idea of passing the problem to the League had come from Briand and the Foreign Office - see Keith Middlemas (ed.) Thomas Jones: A Whitehall Diary Vol. I p.202.
143. BLM Balfour Papers 49704 Vol.XXII, Hankey to Balfour 12 August 1921. This letter opens with the words: 'Dear Mr Balfour, Last night I sent you the following telegram - Supreme Council have decided to refer Upper Silesian question to League of Nations and will ask for immediate meeting of the Council..'. There is no mistaking the date because Hankey mentioned that he was writing the letter on the train taking himself and the Prime Minister back to London (August 12).


145. F.P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London 1952) pp.137-139. See also Viscount Duff-Cooper, Old Men Forget (London, 1954) p.160, where the author explains that there was a great deal of public good-will behind the League, but those in power distrusted the people behind it and only paid lip-service to its ideals.

146. Ibid, p.146.


148. CCA NBKR 4/463 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 12 August 1921.

149. CCA NBKR 4/459 (Copy) Baker to H.Wilson Harris 12 August 1921.

150. Ibid.

151. CCA NBKR 4/463 (Copy) Cecil to Drummond 17 August 1921.

152. BLM Balfour Papers 49749 Vol. LXIII, Drummond to Balfour 23 August, 1921.


154. IWM HHW2/12G Sackville West to Wilson 9 August, 1921. From their joint performances, Sackville West surmised that Lloyd George and Briand had already 'fixed the whole thing up' - as, indeed, they had.

155. Riddell, Lord Riddell's Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference p.312, 11 and 12 August 1921.

156. PRO FO 371/5922 C16353/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 13 August 1921.

157. Ibid.

158. PRO FO 371/6818 N9568/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon, Enclosure: Summary of Events in Poland for the week ending 17 August 1921.

159. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 298 pp.321-322 Heneker to Curzon 13 August 1921. The Commission contacted the German leader Lukaschek (who had by now taken over

Chapter 5 - Notes
from the *Politische Leitung*) and the Polish leaders Rymner and Walus. See also *ibid* No. 300 pp323-324 Heneker to Curzon, 13 August 1921; and PRO FO 890/1 No.23 Heneker to Stuart 17 September 1921. In practice it was found that the district controller had to personally keep in touch with public opinion through the German Ausehus and the Polish Rada Ludowa - the organisations through which Lukaschek and Rymer controlled their respective populations.

160. *Ibid*, No.312 pp.333-334 Curzon to Heneker 26 August 1921. This was a highly qualified concession to the Commission. Before it had been granted, Curzon had first consulted D'Abernon. He, in turn, spoke to Rosen, the German Foreign Minister who repeated what the Finance Ministry had said earlier, namely that the unofficial trade embargo was the only weapon left to the Germans and 'was useful in influencing Polish opinion in Upper Silesia towards a rapid settlement' - see *ibid* No.310 p.332 D'Abernon to Curzon, 23 August 1921.

161. *Ibid*, No. 299 pp322-323 Heneker to Curzon 14 August 1921. The British Commander estimated that even if the Commission had between sixty and seventy thousand troops at its disposal and could make systematic drives to disarm the population, there would still have been considerable bloodshed.


163. Cienciala and Komarnicki, *From Versailles to Locarno* p.79.

164. HLRO F/25/2/35/ Hankey to Prime Minister 26 October 1921 Enclosure: (Copy) Hankey to Drummond 21 October 1921.

165. CCA NBKR 4/463 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 13 August 1921. This explains that the League Council meant to deal with the Upper Silesian dispute on similar lines as it had over the Aaland Islands investigation. But from the day after the referral, Baker here reveals the problems the League Secretariat had attempting to enlist 'members of the first rank'.

166. HLRO F/25/2/39 Drummond to Hankey 29 October 1921. Drummond explains the difficulty in getting 'really eminent' people to serve. 'Practically the whole of Europe was concerned in the dispute. Whatever decision was taken it would certainly have been resented in some of these countries; the result being that no Government was willing to allow one of their nationals to serve'. Patricia Gajda, *Postscript to Victory - British Policy and the German -Polish Borderlands, 1919-1925* (Washington 1982) pp.138-139 makes no mention of these problems, attributing the dispensing of the *rapporteur* system as a decision taken by the Council because they considered Upper Silesia 'too explosive for a *rapporteur* to handle'.


169. BLM Balfour Papers 49749 Vol.LXIII Drummond to Balfour 23 August 1921. Drummond described receiving Quinones' telegram as a 'great blow'. See PRO FO 371/5924 C17265/92/18 Howard to Curzon 26 August 1921, Enclosure: Translation from *Epoca*, 23 August 1921, of an article entitled *Spain and Upper Silesia*. See also *ibid* C17385/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon 27 August 192. This reports rumours about German pressure in Spain. And in HLRO F/25/39 Drummond to Hankey 29 October 1921 the League Secretary writes that he knows that 'the German Government made a demarcha at Madrid to take a pro-German line'.


The permanent members were:
- Japan - Viscount Ishii
- France - Léon Bourgeois
- The British Empire - Mr. A.J. Balfour
- Italy - Marquis Imperiali

The non-permanent members were:
- China - M. Wellington Koo
- Belgium - M. Paul Hymans
- Brazil - M. Gastag da Cunha
- Spain - M. Quinones de Leon

171. BLM Balfour Papers 49749 Vol. LXIII, Drummond to Balfour 23 August 1921. Quinones would serve provided that he was not the sub-committee's chairman.

172. CCA NBKR 48/40 Minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of Nations Held at Geneva from August 29 to October 12, 1921 to consider the Question of Upper Silesia. This proces - verbal can also be found in the Public Records Office - see PRO FO 371/5932 C22128/92/18 21 November 1921.


174. FO 371/5925 C18041/92/19 Stuart to Waterlow 6 September 1921. In this document Stuart confirms the Foreign Office's and the British experts' aims regarding the League Council's procedure. 'I am very pleased we gained our two main points at Geneva, viz. examination of the case by a committee of the Council instead of by a single member or an outside tribunal; and the granting of the right of audience to representatives of the inhabitants of Upper Silesia'. (Re. the second point, the permanent members' sub-committee invited a German and a Polish employer and a German and a Polish workman to travel to Geneva to speak to them).


Chapter 5 - Notes
176. CCA NBKR 4/454 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 4 September 1921. Baker was still insisting on a commission to advise the non-permanent sub-committee. He recommended that there should be no publicity given to any of the proceedings that were likely to give an advanced indication of the decision.

177. SRO Lothian Papers (Copy) Kerr to Drummond 17 November 1921. Kerr had moved from Lloyd George's advisor on foreign policy, to become the editor of what was generally regarded as Lloyd George's own press outlet.


179. HLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Secretary Cabinet (Hankey) 29 September 1921.

180. Ibid. Balfour noted how after sending Bourgeois 'personally and unofficially - a copy of the Foreign Office case (with all the anti-French criticisms eliminated ) he [Bourgeois] got quite nervous and seemed to think that he must at once communicate it to the Quai d'Orsay, this bringing down upon the unhappy Council the counter case of his own experts'. Balfour quickly withdrew the document to avoid the Council being compelled to go over all the old ground.

181. Gadja, Postscript to Victory pp.138-139. However, where Gadja writes that 'Lord [sic] Balfour did not accept the Foreign Office point of view', this needs to be qualified. He did accept London's ideas on the procedure that the League Council should adopt. As we have seen (Note 174 above), Stuart claimed that these League procedures were also favoured by the British experts. It should be noted that, by this time, most Foreign Office officials were reconciled to a compromise deal. It was those close to the Prime Minister who were most upset by the League Council's recommendations.

182. PRO FO 371/5925 C18382/92/18 15 September 1921, Enclosure: Letter to Cabinet Secretary from Balfour re. conversation with Eduard Beneš. Beneš was also Czechoslovakia's League representative. He had told Balfour that the frontier problems in Cieszyn were 'very similar to that which had to be dealt with in Upper Silesia' - see also Cabinet Paper C.P. 3306 A minute by Waterlow reveals how he mistakenly believed that Beneš ideas 'doubtless carried little weight with Mr. Balfour when he reflected '.

183. HLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Secretary Cabinet (Hankey) 29 September 1921. The copy distribution list included the Prime Minister.

184. SRO Lothian Papers GD40/17/82 Drummond to Kerr 21 November 1921, Enclosure: pp.35-36.

Chapter 5 - Notes
185. HLRO F/25/2/39(a) 10 October 1921 *Statement by Monsieur Hymans of the Opinion of the *Committee of Four with regard to the Results of the Plebiscite and the Frontier Line*. See also HLRO F/25/2/39 Drummond to Hankey 29 October 1921. *the non-permanent members' sub-committee*

186. The *Daily Express* Thursday 13 October 1921.


188. HLRO F/25/2/25 Balfour to Hankey 29 September 1921. Balfour ended his letter outlining the general tone of the imminent proposals with a 'P.S. I do not think the existing German owners will have much to complain about'.

189. The *Times* Wednesday August 17, 1921.


191. HLRO F/53/3/10 (Copy) Private and Very Confidential. Rosen to Curzon 6 October 1921. Rosen suggested that the Supreme Council could postpone accepting on the League Council's recommendation by insisting that the League Council members travel to Upper Silesia. And, 'if this were not feasible, at least the next meeting of the Supreme Council might be delayed so as to gain time for preparing for a better solution. I think that it would be understood in all countries of the world, no such great political change should be carried out at the present moment'.

192. HLRO F/53/3/10 Curzon to Rosen 19 October 1921. Curzon replied 'The German Government appear to have sources of information on this subject that are not open to me'.

193. PRO FO371/5927 C19350/92/18 Cabinet Secretary to Crowe 4 October 1921 Enclosure: Balfour to Secretary Cabinet 29 September 1921. Waterlow minuted 'I think we had better keep this to ourselves. There is nothing to be said for the sort of compromise that the four [non-permanent members] are apparently about to propose'.


195. HLRO F/54/2/4 D'Abernon to Hankey: page of his diary for 7 October 1921.

196. CCA NBKR 4X/40 Minutes of the Extraordinary Session of the Council of the League of Nations pp.16-24 'Recommendation of the Council of the League Forwarded to the Supreme Council of the Principal of Allied Powers on 12 August,
1921'. See PRO FO 371/5928 C19698/92/18 for an English language translation of the League Council's recommendation of 12 October, 1921.

197. The 'outvoters' comprised 180,000 out of the German total of 707,392 votes - see Chapter 4 of this work.


201. The Cologne Post Sunday 16 October 1921. The interview had been given in London the previous day. Harrington (League of Nations and the Upper Silesian Boundary Dispute' p92) however, cites Balfour's niece Blanche Dugdale's biography (Arthur James Balfour Vol.II. p.674) which claims that Balfour was 'disappointed at the meager[sic] area allotted Germany'. This is at odds with the evidence.

202. The Morning Post Friday 14 October 1921.

203. The Cologne Post Sunday 16 October 1921.

204. Ibid, Friday 14 October 1921; The Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October 1921.


206. The Daily Express Thursday 13 October 1921; The Morning Post Friday 14 October 1921; The Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October, 1921. The latter notes that in the last week of September 1921 some 4,000 million marks were added to the German currency. At face value, this was around double the total pre-war circulation.

207. D.A. Aldcroft, From Versailles to Wall Street (London 1977) p.76. 'The boom's outstanding feature was speculative buying in commodities, securities and real estate and the very large number of transactions were at inflated prices...The financial orgy was made possible by the extremely liquid state of firms as a result of huge wartime profits, relatively easy money conditions and large scale creation of bank credit. A good deal of speculative activity was based on borrowed money.' See also The Daily Chronicle Wednesday 19 October 1921. 'The rapid fall of the mark may, however, have catastrophic effects... For some time German industry has enjoyed a spurious prosperity owing to the fact that the external value of the mark fell faster than the internal, and the difference operated as a bounty on the German export

Chapter 5 - Notes
trade. But the conditions which made this possible were essentially conditions of
disease, not health. An eventual collapse seems inevitable, and it now seems not
unlikely to be a crash, if so, its repercussions will be felt far outside Germany and
will tend still further to delay Europe's business revival'.

208. Elizabeth Johnson (ed.) The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Volume
XVII 'Activities 1920-1922 Treaty of Revision and Reconstruction (Cambridge 1978)
p.131 'Speculating himself...Keynes lost £13,125 of his own money and £8,498
belonging to a small syndicate for which he had invested'.

209. The Temps 13 October 1921 (Quoted in The Morning Post Friday 14 October 1921).

210. The Morning Post Tuesday 17 October 1921.

211. Ibid. The leader also drew attention to the fact that there was no unemployment in
Germany whilst British manufacturing had shut down in the face of low priced
German competition, bolstered by the mark's low exchange rate. It concluded by
remarking that; 'Possibly, if our Prime Minister had been less concerned about the
unity of the Germany and more concerned about the unity of the United Kingdom, he
might have better served the interest and the security of his country'.

212. PRO FO 371/5928 C19761/92/18 Hankey's Notes Cab.78(21) para.2. See also SRO
GD/17/82 (p.12) (Copy) Kerr to D'Abernon 18 October 1921.


214. CCA NBKR4/463 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 14 October 1921. Baker asked Cecil to
persuade Balfour to return from Scotland to take part in any Parliamentary debate
called when the recommendations were published officially.

215. SRO GD40/17/82 (pp.20-23) Drummond to Kerr 20 October 1921.

216. Ibid, (pp.24-26) (Copy) Kerr to Drummond 17 November 1921.

217. NBKR 4/363 (Copy) Baker to Cecil 25 October 1921. Hankey had said that at first
he had objected very strongly to the League's recommendations, but he was now
more or less reconciled to them. What he most strongly found fault with was the
procedure adopted.

218. HLRO F/25/2/36 Drummond to Hankey 24 October 1921. Drummond enclosed a
copy of the letter he had sent to Kerr explaining why he had not been able to follow
his original plan of using a commission or tribunal - see SRO GD40/17/82 (pp.20-
23) Drummond to Kerr 20 October 1921. All of this correspondence was being passed on
to Lloyd George.

219. HLRO F/25/2/35 (Copy) Hankey to Drummond 21 October 1921. Attached to a copy
of this letter which Hankey gave to Lloyd George, is Hankey's annotation dated 26
October. It reads 'Dear Prime Minister, This is a copy of the private letter I wrote to

Chapter 5 - Notes
Eric Drummond about Upper Silesia. I had to allow my wrath to cool before I could write civilly!'

220. Ibid. See also PRO FO 371/5922 C16544/92/1(Draft Copy) Crowe to Balfour 16 August 1921. This informed Balfour that on Drummond's return to Geneva, the League's secretary general would deliver Foreign Office papers to him, together with their arguments. Drummond was an ex-Foreign Office official.

221. CCA NBKR 4/460 M. Askenazy (Polish Delegation) to Viscount Ishii (President of Council) 29 August 1921. Since Germany was not a League member, there was a legal question over whether Germany had a right to speak. It is possible that Poland did not exercise her right to be heard simply to prevent Germany from getting a chance to speak.

222. HLRO F25/2/35 Drummond to Hankey 29th October 1921. In drawing Lloyd George's attention to this letter, Hankey annotated it; 'Prime Minister, This letter from Dummond is very interesting and throws a good deal of light on the Silesia business. 3 November 1921'.

223. HLRO F25/2/25 Balfour to Hankey 29 September 1921.

224. HLRO F25/2/35 Drummond to Hankey 29 October 1921

225. Ibid.

226. The Cologne Post Sunday October 23 1921. The Coalition consisted of the Majority Socialists, Wirth's Centre Party, and the Democrats. It was the differences in the Democrats which forced the resignation. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.352 pp.368-371 Hardinge to Curzon 19 October 1921 Enclosure: Decision of the Conference of Ambassadors and a Draft Letter to German and Polish Delegations, Respecting Upper Silesia. This confirmed the League's recommendations and required that

1. German-Polish Boundary Commission to be established and proceed with the delimitation of frontier.
2. Within six days, Germans and Poles to nominate plenipotentiaries to mixed commissions under a neutral chairman.
3. Within eight days Germans and Poles to nominate one plenipotentiary each under a League chairman to negotiate under a League chairman a general economic and minorities treaty.
4. When sufficient progress has been made in delimitation and in negotiation of the general convention, Germans and Poles to be notified by Plebiscite Commission that they are free to take over their respective territories.

227. HLRO F/54/2/7 D'Abernon to Hankey 26 October1921: pages from his diary 25 October 1921. Apart from D'Abernon's and Hankey's initial reaction, there is little or no evidence in the British documents of any remorse or sense of guilt over letting Wirth down. D'Abernon felt Germany had obtained a very favourable solution

228. The Cologne Post Thursday 27 October 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No.357 p.375, D'Abernon to Curzon 28 October 1921. After his resignation Rosen told

Chapter 5 - Notes
D'Abemon that 'England by her indifference or simplicity at Geneva has rendered a very bad service to Europe as well as to Germany and to herself. No greater blunder has been made in history except that of Germany in 1914. We thought of the Serbian business was merely a local affair, you think the same of Upper Silesia but you are wrong.... Personally I believe England was negligent at Geneva: most people are convinced that she deliberately abandoned the German case which she had defended so ably and eloquently at Paris'.

229. The Cologne Post Thursday 27 October 1921. See also DBFP Vol. XVI, No357 pp.375-376 Hardinge to Curzon 27 October 1921. Informs London of the German Government's reply but that since in accordance with the Allied demands, they were appointing a plenipotentiary, this was being taken as acceptance of all the conditions and stipulations laid down in the Allies' decision.

230. PRO FO 371/6818 N11269/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 5 October 1921 Summary of Events week ending 5 October 1921.

231. PRO FO 371/6818 N11560/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 11 October 1921 Summary of Events week ending 11 October 1921.

232. PRO FO 371/6831 N11289/123/55 (Copy) Curzon to Sir. H. Dering 5 October 1921.

233. Ibid.

234. PRO FO 371/6818 N11560/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 11 October 1921 Summary of Events week ending 11 October 1921.

235. PRO FO 371/5924 C17500/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 30 August 1921.

236. PRO FO 371/5927 C19605/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 12 October 1921. The reports provoked a denial and this was issued through the Polish Foreign Office - see FO 371/ 5929 C20194/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 12 October 1921, Enclosure: 'Max Muller to Skirmunt. The British Minister reported that this 'had produced a good effect'.

237. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 1921.

238. DBFP Vol.XVI No.343 pp.359- 360 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 1921.

239. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 1921.

240. DBFP Vol. XVI No.343 pp.359-360 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October1921.

241. PRO FO 371/5924 C20195/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 16 October 1921.

242. Ibid. No.344 p.360 16 October 1921 by Sir E. Crowe He suggested that if the Germans refused to accept the decision then Poland should still be permitted to occupy the territory it had been allotted.
243. PRO FO 371/5929 C19972/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 18 October 1921. This was before they had received official notification of the decision from the Ambassadors' Conference.

244. PRO FO 371/5930 C21155/92/18 Max Muller to Curzon 29 October 1921, Enclosure: 'Resolution of the Diet'.

245. Ibid.

246. PRO FO 371/6818 N12314/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 1 November 1921 Summary of Events week ending 1 November.


248. Ibid, N12314/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 1 November 1921 Summary of Events week ending 1 November.

249. Ibid, N13593/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 7 December 1921 Summary of Events week ending 7 December.

250. Ibid, N13836/123/55 Max Muller to Curzon 14 December 1921 Summary of Events week ending 14 December.

251. PRO FO 371/6829 N13313/514/55 Max Muller to Curzon 4 December 1921. The Polish Government was anxious to avoid any impression that Silesia was a closed preserve for the French. Poland would welcome British capital to exploit Silesia and was prepared to grant concessions for this purpose. Cienciala and Komarnicki (From Versailles to Locarno pp.82-87) also describes French economic interests in Upper Silesia during this period.

252. PRO FO 371/8133 N4709/579/55 Hoare to Ovey 12 May 1922, Enclosure: An article published in the Rzeczpospolita 10 May 1921, entitled 'Foreign Chevaliers De L'Industrie' and attributed by the British officials to Korfanty. Kenworthy was a prominent British populist-radical, well regarded by the political Left. Early in 1922 he was involved in the establishment of a British company which aiming at taking over ownership of Polish Upper Silesia's privately owned metal industries. But, although registered in Britain the reality was that it would only have had a small British investment, the vast majority of the assets would remain with the existing German owners who feared that the Polish Government would expropriate the businesses later. Kenworthy's partners were a British businessman named Slater (described by Korfanty in the article as a 'London loafer') along with a British freelance agent named Garner who was working for German interests in Upper Silesia. Another leading British figure involved in setting up these 'dummy companies' was Lord Cozens Hardy whose group aimed at securing the private mines for the existing German owners.

253. PRO FO 371/5926 C18806/92/18 Hankey to the Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office 29 September 1921, Enclosure: 'Upper Silesia'. On the tour, Kenworthy was accompanied by a Mr. Garner (see Note 252 above). The agent, named Garner, had
been a member of the inter-Allied Commission for Olsztyn plebiscite. He had then arrived in Upper Silesia to work for Korfanty's Polish Plebiscite Commissariat. When he was dismissed he had contacted Ottley in London and then returned to work for the Germans. Korfanty later described Garner's services as 'limited to the drawing of a salary in pounds sterling' - see FO 371/8133 N47709/579/55 Hoare to Ovey 12 May 1922, Enclosure: The Rzeczpospolita 10 May 1921 Foreign Chevaliers De L'Industrie.

254. PRO FO 371/5925 C17806/92/18 Petition by the inhabitants of Olenso (Rosenberg) and Kochanowica (Kochanowitz) 27 August 1921.

255. PRO FO 371/5923 C16926/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 23 August 1921.

256. Ibid. During this episode of disturbances that Heneker was reporting, attempts to arrest German suspects had been prevented by the town's inhabitants. There had also been disturbances when the Commission had tried dismissing and deporting 1,500 German's deemed to be 'of unsuitable character' but had been recruited into the Plebiscite Police force by the British during the insurrection in May/June (PRO FO371/5918 C1500/92/18 24 July 1921). On 31 July Major Keatinge arrested the murderer of the French Commandant Montalegre, who had been shot at point blank range when British troops had entered Bytom on July 4. He was hidden in a house in Kluczbork - see The Cologne Post Upper Silesian Edition, Tuesday 2 August 1921.

258. IWM HHW2/60/14 pp.62-67 Heneker to Wilson II November 1921. The Durhams and some French troops were sent down to help restore order in the area. See PRO FO 371/5932 C22163/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 21 November 1921. Heneker had asked the German Government representative to tell local Germans to take action over the 'unruly elements' around Raziborz. The population there had threatened to strike if the French troops were not withdrawn. See also FO371/5931 C22104/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 16 November 1921, Enclosure: 'Report on the Refugees in Upper Silesia, August to November' by Lt. Colonel W. Williams, 10 November 1921.

259. PRO FO 371/5929 C19991/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 31 August 1921. Heneker complains about the British district controller having difficulty working with the local German para-military leaders and with the French, who are not aiding him.

260. PRO FO 371/5924 C17598/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 1 September 1921. 'Population in the British zone is absolutely quiet, certain elements amongst the industrial workers in the French zone giving a great deal of trouble. Robbery and intimidation are rife..'.

261. PRO FO 371/5924 C17723/92/18 Heneker to Curzon 6 September 1921.

262. PRO FO 371/5925 C17989/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 9 September 1921.

263. PRO FO 891/1 Report by Colonel Hawker 11 September 1921. General Naulin, who had replaced Gratier, said if opposed by 60,000 armed Germans the idea of armed
resistance was out of the question. The same applied to a Polish armed insurrection, however, he believed that the French had enough influence in Warsaw to bring any Polish Silesian force under control. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No. 339 p.335 Stuart to Curzon 14 October 1921. There are several documents on this subject.

264. PRO FO 371/5925 C18546/92/18 Secretary War Office to Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office 22 September 1921.

265. PRO FO 371/5921 C20026/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 14 October 1921.

266. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 354 pp.372-373 Stuart to Curzon 21 October 1921.

267. Ibid.

268. IWM HHW2/61/18 p.188 Grogan to Wilson 22 October, 1921.

269. PRO FO371/5930 C21068/92/18 Stuart to Crowe 28 October, 1921.


271. Ibid, C20854/92/18 D'Abernon to Curzon 27 October, 1921


274. Ibid.

275. Ibid, C21001/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 28 October 1921. The area of Polish Upper Silesia was 3,182 square kilometres with 973,335 inhabitants. As promised, Warsaw granted it semi-autonomous status and its own parliament but retained control of its foreign affairs and defence. The 1931 census recorded the population as 1,295,000 (92.3%) Poles but only 90,600 were registered as Germans. In a referendum held on 3 September 1922, German Upper Silesia rejected autonomy within the German Federation with 90% voting to remain as an autonomous province of Prussia - see DBFP Vol. XVI No. 412 4 September 1921.

276. PRO FO 371/5929 C20337/92/18 Hardinge to Curzon 22 October 1921.

277. PRO FO 371/5930 C20490/18 Stuart to Curzon 21 October 1921. Stuart wanted to know how long the negotiations would take, He warned that should the Commission continue past the beginning of December he might have to resign because he had urgent private affairs to attend to in England. The Foreign Office copy of the reply, dated 31 October, asks him to stay on because 'his services would be difficult to replace'. He was granted a period of absence.

278. DBFP Vol. XVI No. 359 p.376 Curzon to Hardinge 29 October 1921. Ardor withdrew his nomination, The Germans suspected that he would be biased against them.

Chapter 5 - Notes

280. PRO FO 371/5931 C21862/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 11 November 1921. Referring to the delay, Stuart wrote, 'I cannot conceal from myself any longer the fear that the Allied Governments and the League of Nations do not sufficiently appreciate the importance of speedy action in this respect'. See also *DBFP* Vol. XVI No.366 pp.380-381 Stuart to Curzon 12 November 1921 The Commissioners warned that the delay could be misunderstood and was liable to cause much suspicion and mistrust. There were areas where the Commission's authority was incomplete and the uncertainty about the powers' intentions served to increase the influence of the men of violence. The rapid depreciation of the mark affecting economic activity was also cited and they concluded by pointing out the ever-increasing expense of the whole operation.

281. PRO FO 371/5931 C21862/92/18 Stuart to Curzon 11 November 1921.

282. PRO FO 371/5922 C16634/92/18 Heneker to War Office 15 August 1921.

283. IWM HH2/12G/53 (Copy) Wilson to Sackville West 16 August 1921. He wrote, 'Of course the League of Nations is simply a sign of the total incompetence, incapacity and impotence of the 'Fools'... How the League will get a decision when the 'Fools' cannot I do not know, because the members of the League are only inferior 'Fools' or otherwise they would be superior 'Fools', or else not 'Fools' at all: For 'Fools' read 'Frocks' '.

284. IWM HHW2/61/11 Grogan to Wilson 17 August 1921.

285. IWM HHW2/61/12 pp.168-170 Grogan to Wilson 27 August 1921. See also PRO WO33/1004 *Precis H* p.69 'Military Situation in Upper Silesia August 1921'.

286. PRO WO 106/977 Grogan to DMO 27 August 1921.

287. IWM HHW2/61/17 Grogan to Wilson 15 October 1921. See also IWM HHW2/61/13 pp.172-174 Grogan to Wilson 31 August 1921 for details about Naulin's career.


289. BWA 05: 486 (411) 42 *The Red Hackle* Vol.1 No.4 January 1922. Even the Black Watch Regiment's boy pipers and drummers spent some time under canvas at Opole - see BWA 69: 798 Digests 1 April 1921-31 March 1923. See also Ward, *Faithful - The Story of the Durham Light Infantry* pp.538-539.

Chapter 5 - Notes

291. IWM HHW2/60/20 Heneker to Wilson 28 January 1922, Enclosure: 'To all British Officials of the Inter-Allied Commission in Upper Silesia' 18 December 1921.

292. Ibid. With over two million people unemployed in Britain, this was not a light punishment.


294. PRO FO 371/5929 C1999/92/18 Garnier to Lloyd George 14 October 1921. This letter was from the proprietors and landowners of Upper Silesia requesting that the British Prime Minister receive a deputation from their organisation. It was sent from Schloss Turawa and was signed by Dr. Williger (President of Mining Concerns), Dr. Gotz (Regierungsrat), and Count von Garnier (representing land and forest areas).

295. IWM HHW2/61/19 p.190 Heneker to Wilson 11 November 1921. See also ibid HHW2/60/14 pp.62-67 Heneker to Wilson 11 November 1921.

296. DBFP Vol. XVI No.369 pp.394-41 December 1921. Memorandum by Sir Harold Stuart. See also PRO FO 371/5930 C21681/92/18 Stuart to Crowe 28 October 1921. In this earlier report mentioning the possibility of delay, Stuart wrote that he was 'by no mean sure that my colleagues [Marinis and Le Rond] will be in a hurry to take a step which will deprive them of their offices and emoluments'. Given the German mark's rate of exchange in early December 1921, the pay for each of the Commission's nine 1st Class Officials was ten times that of the President of Germany's pay and allowances. Marinis' pay was eight times higher than the Italian Prime Minister's pay - see HHW2/61/24 Grogan to Wilson 12 December 1921.

297. DBFP Vol. XVI No.371 pp.386-387 Stuart to Curzon 12 January 1922. Stuart claimed that the possibility of such an occupation had been openly discussed amongst the French military officers in Upper Silesia.

298. IWM HHW2/92/29 Wilson addressing a meeting of Committee of Imperial Defence 26 November 1921.

299. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson pp.317-319. The five southern Irish Regiments (Royal Irish Fusiliers, Connaughts, Leinsters, Munsters and Dubliners) plus the Royal Irish Fusiliers were the ones that were finally cut. See also Jeffery, The British Army and Crisis of Empire pp.18-23. This describes the pressures driving down the Army estimates and what was finally achieved.


301. Callwell, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson p.320. It is, however, doubtful if there was ever meant to be any substance behind this initiative. Even after Locarno in 1925, which provided a similar sort of guarantee for the French (and the German) borders, there was never any military discussions about the feasibility of implementation. Of
course, it could be argued that the 'ten year rule' applied. The Cabinet had advised the Army that it was to be assumed in any planning or provisioning that 'the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years'. See IWM HHW2/12g/73 (Copy) Wilson To Sackville West 4 January, 1922. 'It seems to be L.G.'s set purpose to quarrel with the French re Germany, re Russia, re Greeks and Turks, re Feisal, re Washington and submarines. I have always maintained that unless we build an alliance with the French and then build on that 'base' the whole place will go to wrack and ruin. See also DBFP Vol.XIX Chap. 1 Proceedings of the Conference of Cannes and Record of Conversations Connected Therewith July 4-13 1922.


303. PRO WO 106/981 DMO to Sackville West 31 March 1922.


306. The Cologne Post Tuesday 11 April 1922.

307. PRO WO 106/980 G.53/0/9 Heneker to CIGS 26 May 1922, Enclosure: General Report on the British Silesian Force 26 May 1921. Edmonds (The Occupation of the Rhineland p.238) attributed the killing to 'a gang of Polish thugs'. The 3rd Middlesex plus two tanks, were despatched there from Bytom and in conjunction with the police, in two night raids they captured the leader and 35 members of the gang.

308. PRO WO 95/123 General H.B. Kennedy to General Edmonds 15 May 1943.

309. PRO FO 371/5933 C23962/92/18 Lt. Col. Boger to Heneker 19 December 1921. This work had only been done on the map. The letter promised that it would be completed on the ground by 15 January.

310. DBFP Vol. XVI No.403 p.419 Heneker to Balfour 23 June 1921. Provides the reader with the programme of hand-overs to the Polish and German Governments.

311. Edmonds, The Occupation of the Rhineland pp.238-241. See also DBFP Vol. XVI No.406 p.422 Cheetham to Balfour 17 July 1922. The British sought to head-off a French attempt to seek redress from the German Government for German attacks on French and Allied troops during the evacuation by pressing the Allied Military Control Commission in Berlin for a rapid disbandment of the Selbstschutz in German Upper Silesia. Thirteen incidents were cited. See also ibid No.413 pp.429-430, Record of Conversation with German Chargé d'Affaires by Mr. Lampton. The Germans alleged that the French had killed 31 Germans and wounded 17 during the evacuation of Upper Silesia.
312. BWM 05:355 486 (411) 42 The Red Hackle Vol.1 No.7 pp8-9 The Handing Over of Tarnowitz to Poland, 25 June 1922.

313. Ibid. The journal describes how the roads were busy with German families on the move with their belongings. The railway sidings were also full of the furniture vans of retreating Germans' household goods. 'Over the days preceding the handover, the streets of the town had become unusually empty, all life and activity seemed to have departed. The money and brains had largely left the community, and it will not be long before the Poles realise it'.

314. Ibid. The unnamed author of this article in the Red Hackle asked 'Will the Poles benefit by their accession of territory, will they keep up the wonderful German organisation, the magnificent public buildings, hospitals, orphanages, prison and railway system, above all, will the inhabitants who remain be glad of this change. Time alone will show...'.

315. PRO WO 374/51643 Major L.E. Ottley, the Foreign Office's Upper Silesian expert and uncompromising advocate of the German case, had been taken ill in Paris. He had been flown home to London for an operation at a Park Lane hospital (The Times, Monday 15 August - Surgeon's Air Journey) but he died five days later, aged 32. From May 1921, when Foreign Office officials had began searching for the compromise with the French that would lead to a diplomatic solution, Ottley's heavily biased contributions and comments had borne less and less relevance. In other words, whilst the professional officials were shifting their ground, Ottley, the amateur who was passionately committed to the German Silesian cause, could do no other than follow his hardline sentiments.

316. PRO FO 371/5930 C21068/92/18 Stuart to Crowe 28 October 1921.

317. HLRO F/25/2/39(a) Statement by Monsieur Hymans of the Opinion of the *Committee of Four with regard to the Results of the Plebiscite and the Frontier Line, 10 October 1921. *the non-permanent members' subcommittee.

318. CCA NBKR4/463 (Copy) Baker to Cecil, 17 January 1922. See ibid Cecil to Baker, 25 January, 1922. Cecil states that 'The trouble with Lloyd George and Foreign Affairs is that he is such an amateur. He has no fundamental knowledge of the subject as indeed very few, if any, politicians have, but he declines to avail himself of the expert knowledge at his command, and consequently every now and then he makes colossal blunders'. See also NBKR 4/60 Baker to Drummond 11 April 1922.

320. *The Times* 6 March 1923. Stuart had died on 1 March. Bourdillon's report on the Upper Silesia Plebiscite Commission is filed as PRO FO 371/8810 C9145/3961/18 17 May 1923. See also *ibid* pp.93-94. The total cost of the Commission to Upper Silesia was around £7.5 million. Additionally, the Conference of Ambassadors fixed the cost of the British troops at £1.5 million. Taking account of the wealth of the two zones that had been handed over to them, this was calculated proportionally as Germany paying 42% and Poland 58% respectively.
Conclusion

The Upper Silesian plebiscite stands as a monument to what ultimately proved to be the destructive political improvisations Lloyd George practised throughout the Paris Peace Conference. The plebiscite's raison d'être had been to conciliate the new German republic. Nevertheless, it developed into one of the most effective wedges that German diplomacy was able to employ to split the Entente. The granting of the Upper Silesian plebiscite and the actions Britain took in relation to it were amongst the first faltering steps of Britain’s inter-war Appeasement policy. Associated with the 1930’s and the ‘guilty men of Munich’, Appeasement’s roots unquestionably extend back through Locarno to Lloyd George, the Fontainbleau memorandum, and the more conciliatory line Britain started to adopt towards Germany mid-way through the Peace Conference. There were several good political reasons for this change of direction. Amongst these were indications that the British public’s desire for revenge had started to abate. The warnings by the more liberal wing of the British political establishment that if the German government was not given a degree of support, Germany might fall prey to either the Bolsheviks or reactionary monarchists, also began to be heard.

The influential interests controlling Upper Silesia’s capital and resources, and the successive German administrations which poured funds into the German campaign to retain the territory, cannot be blamed for pursuing each and every avenue open to them. After all, Upper Silesia was worth billions of marks to the German economy. A lack of foresight by the Polish Commission in Paris caused several German populated districts within Upper Silesia to be allocated to Poland. This action diluted Poland’s legitimate claim to the region’s coal mines and industries but legitimised Germany’s objections to the annexation of the territory - as stipulated in the Draft Peace Terms. But by granting a plebiscite in this, one of the most important economic regions in
Central Europe, the Peace Conference had inadvertently caused yet another problem. Upper Silesia’s future became entangled in the bitter battle over reparations played out between Germany and the Allies at the innumerable conferences and meetings that lay ahead of them.

Had Germany been crushed and broken up in defeat, as many in France had wanted, or had it been conciliated and welcomed into a new community of nations, as many British and Americans had hoped, succeeding events might have been different. However, like the Upper Silesian settlement, the series of inter-Allied compromises that comprised the Peace Treaty, left most Germans bitter and resentful. They came to believe that they had not lost the war: for many their only regret was in not having won it. Recovering the ‘lost territories’, evading reparations, and preventing the loss of Upper Silesia, became the political objective of all Germans. This failure to either crush or to conciliate created grave tensions between Britain and France over how to deal with Germany. Britain was anxious for Germany to be re-established as the motor of European economic recovery: France was not.

Upper Silesia featured increasingly in these disputes and Germany was not slow to exploit this. Carefully at first, overtly later, the German Foreign Office used Upper Silesia to accentuate the differences between Britain and France. This was not difficult once Britain reneged on its military commitments in Upper Silesia, leaving France with responsibility for most of its administration and policing – something they had not sought. British representatives such as Malcolm and D’Abernon in Berlin, Percival in Opole, and Ottley in London, were cultivated and used by the Germans. Whenever trouble broke out in Upper Silesia, they and most of the other British representatives and officials were quick to criticise the French. When the Germans wanted to make a point, it was invariably made through the British representatives.

Conclusion
Having similar cultural backgrounds, it had not been difficult for the Germans to persuade the British that if complex Upper Silesian industries were transferred to Poland then, as with the ancient world, they would be undermined by the barbarians.¹

British historiography generally views the events surrounding the plebiscite as a series of illicit Franco-Polish conspiracies designed to enhance French security by eliminating the Germans’ economic capacity in Upper Silesia. It usually portrays the plebiscite as a British attempt to ensure ‘fair play’ for the Germans - overlooking the inconvenient fact that, initially, it was a British political device designed to overcome Germany’s opposition to the Peace Treaty. The much wider international aspects of the plebiscite are usually ignored. There is no evidence to support British suspicions or allegations about French complicity in the Polish Silesians’ actions. Whilst French officials and soldiers in Upper Silesia did enjoy seeing Polish gains at the Germans’ expense (for example, the Bytom Agreement), this was only from the point of view of a shared interest in this. And unlike the support of the British officials for Germany, and the British Army’s intermittent participation in policing the plebiscite area, the French actions, including Le Rond’s recommendations to the Supreme Council, were always within the Peace Treaty’s parameters.

Considering the joint sacrifices they had made, and although relations during the war had at times been tense, after the Peace Treaty was signed, Britain adopted a very unsympathetic political attitude towards France. The British believed that Germany was flat on its back and that it would take decades to recover from the war. The War Office procurement plans were put under a ‘ten year rule – an ongoing financial constraint which assumed no major war would occur for that period ahead. But to the French, the German giant was far from dead. It was unscathed by invasion, its industrial base was intact, and it possessed a population of 70 million to France’s 40 million.² France, therefore, had good

Conclusion
reason to fear a third German invasion and it sought to maximise the Treaty’s effect on Germany by demanding that every condition be complied with to the letter. After the Anglo-American security guarantee disappeared in January 1920, they intensified these efforts. Sir Henry Wilson had a high regard for the French military staff, but his view was far from the general attitude adopted by most Army senior staff and by British politicians. Claiming that the war had been fought to rid the world of this type of intimidation, critics labelled the French ‘militarists’. Nevertheless, British politicians and officials still saw some value in the Entente as a mechanism with which to restrain France.

This began to change when the French policy of strict compliance with the Treaty started conflicting with the British advocacy for Germany’s economic recovery. As the acrimony between France and Germany mounted, it seemed certain that a combination of French intransigence and German non-compliance would drag Britain into a French-led occupation of the Ruhr valley, with all the ramifications this would hold for Germany’s economy. To avoid this, and pursuing its goal of German recovery, Britain adopted the role of mediator - a self-imposed remit that quickly extended to the resolution of every Franco-German squabble. Achieving compromise required Britain to restrain French demands. At the same time, it had to encourage German compliance with the Treaty. The problem with this was that Britain was also an interested party over questions such as reparations. Given British self-interest, his tendency towards ‘quick fix’ solutions, and his ability to browbeat lesser negotiators into submission, Lloyd George was particularly unsuitable as a mediator. The upshot was that in defending the Germans’ interests, the British alienated the French - increasing their sense of insecurity. At the same time, attempting to induce the Germans to comply with the Treaty, the British entered into promises and ‘understandings’ contrary to the spirit of the Peace Treaty. For example, the British unilaterally agreed with Germany that the final total reparations bill should be linked to Upper Silesia’s future – a German

Conclusion
manoeuver delaying receipt of the total reparations bill. Then, to prevent the Allies being
forced to occupy the Ruhr, the British induced the Germans to accept an interim reparation
bill in exchange for Britain supporting Germany’s retention of Upper Silesia’s industries.

Interestingly, both of these ideas originated in Berlin. Therefore by successfully
linking Germany’s future economic performance with reparations and the plebiscite’s
outcome, at a stroke, Berlin succeeded in bringing British policy directly into conflict with
the interests of her two allies, France and Poland. These differences intensified when the
plebiscite results indicated that on a strict interpretation of the Peace Treaty, the whole of
the industrial area should have been awarded to Poland. Even before these linkages and
commitments had been made, however, problems had been developing between the British
and French members of the inter-Allied Commissions operating in Germany. In *Assize of
Arms*, Morgan remarked on the gulf in attitudes separating the British and French after the
war. Noting the light-hearted manner in which London received the victory with parties,
fireworks, dancing and so forth, he compared this with the highly restrained celebrations
held on the Champs Elysees on the night of the *Fête de la Victoire*. There he saw an
equally crowded but sombre Paris, appear to look to the future with grim-foreboding.³ He
felt that this difference was reflected in the attitude of the Allied forces in the Rhineland
and those serving on the inter-Allied Commissions. For the French, whose future security
depended on how many hurdles could be erected to prevent the feared German resurgence,
disarming Germany and the plebiscites was serious business. For the British officials, their
ingrained public school ethos dictated that there should be ‘fair play’ for the Germans.

This was nowhere more apparent than Upper Silesia, where the gulf between the
Commission’s British and the French officials became legendary. Here, the British sense of
‘fair play’ does not appear to have been extended to the Poles. To most of the British
officials, the Polish Silesians were of a ‘very low class’. They did not have very much to

Conclusion
do with them. The Poles were ill dressed, spoke a strange language and were troublemakers. Like the Irish, to whom Lloyd George compared them, they were tearing apart a well-ordered society (Prussia) to seek freedom in a new country (Poland) that would probably not last five years. Of course, not all the British officials regarded the Poles thus. These were fairly typical of the views held by the seconded military officers - selected because they spoke German. Like Percival, most were unsuited to the delicate task of arbitrating between the communities there and organising a plebiscite in what became a powder keg of ethnic tensions. If Percival's selection as British Commissioner was a great mistake, then his continued service after his first nervous breakdown verged on folly. It was not Percival's fault. He had been pitched into a situation without any British military presence supporting his authority. His unsuitability for the task was acknowledged by the Foreign Office yet they ignored his repeated offers to resign.

There was no doubt amongst Upper Silesians about the partiality of the British officials. When the British troops arrived, the Poles also regarded them as being solely in favour of the Germans. Though their regimental histories beg to differ, these British troops eventually ended up treating the Polish Silesians much as the Germans had done. French officials and troops were regarded as being much softer towards the Poles. They would protect Polish interests - provided this was in accord with French interests. On the ground, this dichotomy may not have been such a bad thing. It could be argued that in attempting to resolve such ethnic conflicts, the ability of each contending party to have confidence, even trust, in one of the powers policing them, is better than all sides distrusting what might be disinterested neutrality. It had been to give the Germans the confidence to go ahead with the plebiscite, that British troops first appeared in Upper Silesia in March 1921. And it had been on that basis they returned in June to help terminate the third and final insurrection.
If this Anglo-French dichotomy had some merit within Upper Silesia, it had none when it came to deciding the territory’s fate. As soon as the plebiscite results were known Britain pinned its colours to the German mast. However, this thesis has demonstrated the fallacy of the British arguments about Germany’s numerical strength across the plebiscite area – something the Foreign Office officials had also recognised. It has not only shown how outvoting increased the German’s numerical vote by over 25%, but explained why outvoting had a minimal effect on results in the industrial communes - both numerically and when the plebiscite result is interpreted in accordance with the Peace Treaty. We also know that the British were not making a disinterested assessment of the voting. The French wanted reparations to cripple Germany, Lloyd George wanted them to keep his Coalition’s Conservatives quiet. Britain also had an unofficial commitment to Wirth’s Cabinet. After ostensibly pursuing their ‘fulfillment’ policy and having used their influence to prevent full-scale civil war in Upper Silesia, the German Cabinet now anticipated retaining the industrial districts. But France continued to support Poland’s case over Upper Silesia and an another deadlock ensued.

Recognising an opportunity to raise their organisation’s profile, League of Nations’ officials had been canvassing London and Rome for the problem to be referred to them. The outcome was a disaster for the whole of Upper Silesia. Using the plebiscite’s 6 to 4, German to Polish voting ratio, the League arrived at what later proved to be an unworkable partition of the industrial area. It was divorced from reality, and required a near-permanent League presence to arbitrate between the two parties. Economically, the Geneva Protocol had left everything much as it had been. The same people owned and ran the factories, the mines and other industries. They were protected and could not be removed. As for the local inhabitants in the industrial area, they experienced great difficulties with the practicalities of living and working in an area of such high inter-dependence yet where the streets were

Conclusion
partitioned, and ridiculous working arrangements and administrative divisions had been imposed. Even the German currency had been forcibly retained in areas that were now Polish sovereign territory. None of this accorded with the Peace Treaty. The economic arrangements had been made for Germany’s benefit, but this was never acknowledged. The outcome had also displeased the Polish voters. Correctly believing that they should have received the whole industrial area, they had more right to complain than the Germans.

The whole episode had been an exercise in Great Power expediency for which the Upper Silesians ultimately paid the price. As for the British half-promises and intimations to Germany, there is a certain logic in accepting Lloyd George’s Commons statement that referral to the League cancelled all previous commitments – that is until one recalls that prior to the referral, Hankey and Lloyd George believed that the League’s decision would favour Germany. It is arguable who was manipulating whom, but the decision resulted in Wirth’s Government falling and the Foreign Secretary, Rosen, joining the list of those sacrificed to Lloyd George’s expediency. In Warsaw, Upper Silesia was only one of a series of important differences with London. Nevertheless, whilst the Poles were relieved to learn that they would be getting some share of Upper Silesia’s wealth, they were not so pleased with the economic restrictions and the fact that over 500,000 Poles still remained on the German side of the new Upper Silesian border. Lloyd George’s ill-informed attacks on the Poles and his many rebuffs to their ambitions had witnessed British influence in Warsaw diminishing to near non-existence.

Philip Kerr’s 1920 explanation to Rumbold that the Poles had misunderstood Lloyd George’s attitude towards them, and that the British Prime Minister was ‘not in the least anti-Polish’, is difficult to accept. Both Poland and Upper Silesia were victims of Lloyd George’s disastrous tenure in overall charge of British foreign policy. On his arrival in Paris for the Peace Conference, apart from two years wartime diplomacy he had little

Conclusion
experience of foreign affairs. After eclipsing President Wilson by force of personality and assuming the *de facto* leadership of the Allied Powers, he went on to dominate decision after decision. The Versailles Peace Treaty’s much criticised compromises have Lloyd George’s name stamped all over them. Throughout the subsequent rounds of conferences and meetings his unassailable position as leader continued. His domination was such that French leaders tried cutting back the frequency of the meetings. Norman Davies points out that during this period British foreign policy was often dictated by Lloyd George’s weak position within his Coalition. Whilst this might have held true for some aspects of their policy towards Poland, this was certainly not the case regarding Polish claims to Upper Silesia.⁵ Foreign policy choices are not always obvious or easy to make. When decisions are taken many factors have to be balanced. But whether Lloyd George’s foreign policy choices are viewed retrospectively or not, it is obvious that the consistency with which he listened to the amateur and ignored informed advice, supported the wrong leader, pursued the wrong course of action, or simply dodged the problem with the short-term ‘fix’, went a long way towards undermining the Peace Treaty, establishing Appeasement and preparing the political circumstances for World War II.

Many of Britain’s differences with Poland stemmed from their differing responses to the Soviet regime. By mid-1919, British policy in East Central Europe had settled on encouraging a new ‘liberal’ Russia to emerge from the chaos of the Russian revolution.⁶ British aid to the ‘White Russians’ and then Lloyd George’s own determined pursuit of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement (signed 16 March 1921), were designed to help to bring this about. Piłsudski’s idea of a Polish-led federation of Border States clashed with British policy and it was this which so animated Lloyd George’s advisers over Poland’s presence in parts of Lithuania and East Galicia. Britain regarded both as potential members of a liberal Russian Federation. After Denikin was defeated, with Belarus, the Ukraine, and

Conclusion
areas of Lithuania falling under Bolshevik control, Piłsudski had set about attempting to reverse Bolshevik encroachment into the ex-Tsarist states and Poland’s still undefined eastern border regions. However, after defeating the Soviets outside Warsaw in August 1920, Piłsudski found himself lacking the necessary political support in Poland to sustain the ill-equipped Polish Army’s momentum back through the ex-Tsarist Border States. Despite repeated British charges of ‘Polish imperialism’, the Poles settled their frontier with the Soviets as far to the east of Warsaw as was prudent and possible. Both Curzon and Lloyd George believed Polish actions were the cause of the region’s instability, and this perception helped to influence British policy towards the Polish Silesians.

The new Soviet-Polish frontier embraced most Poles living in these materially devastated border areas. However, at different points along it, the population included large minorities of Ukrainians, Ruthenians, Lithuanians and Jews - many of the latter forced to move there by the Russians during the partitions. Whilst the Upper Silesian plebiscite saga ran its course, Britain was championing the cause of these different minorities in the League of Nations and making formal representations to the Polish Government. A similar concern about the inclusion of the ‘culturally superior’ Germans within Poland’s western frontiers, governed British policy in Upper Silesia. History shows how justified the British concerns were that the inclusion of large minorities in Poland’s border regions would be exploited by Poland’s more powerful neighbours. Perhaps it was this vindication of their inter-war criticism that induced Britain to accept a totalitarian solution to the ethnicity problems at the Potsdam Conference in 1945.

The importance of the plebiscite’s origins, the part it played in international affairs and its role in the demise of the Entente, demands that Upper Silesia be awarded far greater prominence than it currently enjoys in English-language commentaries about this period in European history. The same can be said about the plebiscite itself. The many economic and
social questions it raises, and the origins of Upper Silesia’s ethnic diversity are themselves intrinsically interesting. With so many important and historically interesting matters related to the plebiscite, it is to be regretted that in most works, these details are lost amidst the hurried confusion of events which occurred in Europe between the Peace Conference and the occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. One of the main reasons for this omission may have been the failure of British officials who had served in Upper Silesia to publish accounts of their experiences. Without these, with most official information locked away in archives for decades, the whole of Silesia becoming part of Poland, and Poland incorporated into the Soviet Bloc, the subject probably proved less and less interesting to Western historians.

Finally, what of the Upper Silesians themselves? The economic system that Upper Silesian industries operated under was laissez faire at its worst – with the state institutions and its administration geared towards supporting the German employers and managers. This system had driven most German workers in heavy industries into the arms of the Socialists, but in Upper Silesia, the workers’ awakening political consciousness had taken them into the Polish nationalists’ camp. The privations endured during the First World War convinced many that their future lay with the resurrected Polish state. However, Father Emil Szramek, a Katowice parish priest, noted that

A Silesian is like a reed, which

Depending on where the stronger wind blows from

Leans sometimes to one side, sometimes to the other.  

Fearful of losing what little they had, and promised a reformed, revitalised, socially just Germany, responding to the best efforts of the German campaign, in March 1921 over 310,000 Polish-speaking Silesians supported Germany and the status quo. On the other hand, despite the German campaign’s best efforts, despite the dire condition of Poland, and because they believed that they had little else to lose, over 55% of Upper Silesia’s resident
and immigrant voters in the industrial districts cast their vote for Poland. This amounted to over 70% of the Polish vote. No better claim for union with Poland could have been made. No better claim could have been rejected.

Britain’s role in Upper Silesia between 1919 and 1922 is not one of which it can be particularly proud. Despite the outcome of the First World War, Germany had remained continental Europe’s strongest economic power and potentially its greatest military power. It is one of the great ironies of the 20th Century that in 1939, when Britain finally drew the line that Hitler should not cross, it did so along Poland’s western frontier - an Allied nation. British post-war policy had deliberately weakened in Germany’s favour. Leaving aside the origins of the plebiscite and Lloyd George’s frantic search for a means to induce Germany to sign the Peace Treaty in 1919, Upper Silesia’s industrial districts should still have been awarded to Poland without restriction solely on the basis of the 1921 plebiscite result. This would have made Poland a far more economically viable and influential country during the inter-war period. The conduct of the British towards France regarding the matter of Upper Silesia’s inter-Allied Plebiscite Commission and the Allied military force must certainly justify the French traditional view of perfide Albion. As for the Upper Silesians, after they had restrained themselves at the Allies’ request throughout most of 1919, British demands for a plebiscite condemned them to almost three years of conflict. To this may be added the difficult inter-war years of Upper Silesia’s partition and the Nazis’ dreadful revenge when the German Army returned at the start of the Second World War. After 1919, the British had somehow or other seen their policies in East Central Europe as providing a force for stability. The truth is that just as their refusal to recognise or support the ex-Tsarist Border States had encouraged instability in eastern Poland, British support for Germany’s cause in Upper Silesia destabilised the territory and forced an unjust outcome on to the majority of the inhabitants living and working in its industrial heartland.

Conclusion
Conclusion - Notes


3. Morgan *Assize of Arms* p.5. 'I remembered London on that night at Berkeley, the brittle crackle of fireworks in the Park and the vociferous cheering of the crowds. And I remembered Paris on the night of the *Fete de la Victoire*, a pensive Paris, crowded but silent, the Champs Elysees, illuminated by four great urns resting on four great alters, each bearing the name of a martyred city, ARRAS, ST. QUENTIN, CAMBRAI, PERONNE, whence emerged a smokey flame....Beside the mournful beauty of these flaming shrines, our London fireworks now seemed to me a meretricious thing'.


7. Davies, 'Lloyd George and Poland' pp.134. This notes that it never struck the British odd that while they were condemning Poland's rule over five million White Russians and Ukrainians was as 'imperialism' and 'militarism', it was quite in order for Great Britain to rule over 450 million non-English subjects.

8. Davies, *Europe* p.1060. In 1939 the Germans expelled whole Polish populations from the 'Polish Corridor' and Upper Silesia at 24 hours notice. At Teheran in 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin redefined the Soviet Union's and Germany's post-war frontiers with Poland. At the 1945 Potsdam Conference, population exchanges aimed at creating a homogeneous Poland were agreed. the Soviet administration carried this out between 1945 and 1948. Millions of Germans were moved from what had now become Poland's former German territories (including Upper and Lower Silesia), into what became East Germany. They were replaced by millions of Poles displaced from Belarus, the Ukraine and other areas of eastern Poland annexed by the Soviet Union. A similar exodus of Germans occurred on Silesia's border with Czechoslovakia when all Sudetenland Germans were expelled.

9. Apart from D'Abernon's occasional diary entry in *An Ambassador of Peace* Vol.1, and material cited from Seton Hutchison's *Footlogger*, the only other British official's published memoirs found to date are Major Fitzroy Gardner's
Days and Ways of an Old Bohemian (London 1922) and a small chapter in More Reminiscences of a Old Bohemian (London 1929). Gardner was a member of the plebiscite police. His remarks confirm the closeness of the British and the Germans. Hutchison's Upper Silesia Revisited 1929 (London 1929) is not about the plebiscite but connects the British coal industry's problems after the General Strike in 1926 with the Polish coal exports from Upper Silesia. This is clearly the child of Germany's Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft or the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Department - see Christoph M. Kimmich The Free City: Danzig and German Foreign Policy 1919-1934 (Yale 1968) pp.78-84 for the structure of the Weimar propaganda activities against Poland.

10. Emil Szramek, who died in Dachau concentration camp in 1942, also wrote that:
   A Silesian is like a boundary stone
   He has one side turned in the direction of Poland
   And the other in the direction of Germany.

11. This figure falls to just over 51% if the outvoters are included.
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