DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

On the Function of Ground in Deleuze’s Philosophy Or An Introduction to Pathogenesis

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Or

An Introduction to Pathogenesis

John Neil McGinness

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Declaration

I, John Neil McGinness, hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and effort and that it has not been submitted anywhere for any award. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Signature: ..........................

Date: ..........................
Abstract

This thesis introduces pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as emerging and developing through functioning and grounding. This methodology is defined in an analysis of the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, whose work is used as central resource alongside the work of historical figures – Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche – and contemporary writings on Deleuze as secondary resources. The analysis proceeds by problematising the related concepts of function and ground in relation to Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy and in relation to the supplementary material indicated.
List of abbreviations

Gilles Deleuze

WG  “What is Grounding?” tr. Christian Kerslake (please see fn. 7 in the introduction).


F  Foucault, tr. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).


Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari

**AO** *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, tr. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1972).


This thesis draws the conceptual frame for the inauguration of a new disciplinary field within philosophy, one for which, it is argued, Deleuze supplies the principal material, if not a road map. The field is pathogenesis.

Pathogenesis introduces a number of new terms into philosophy that work to demarcate it as a field. Some of these terms - for example, ‘ground’ and ‘unequal’ – appear often in Deleuze’s work and their meaning in this thesis is close to their meaning there. ‘Pathogenesis’ and ‘cleave’ are new. Some of the terms, such as ‘function’, ‘dyad’ and ‘border’ are in between; they appear in Deleuze’s philosophy but they are either not fully conceptualised, or conceptualised, but with a meaning that diverges in one way or another from the meaning attributed to them in this thesis.

For the reader’s convenience, and for conceptual clarity and consistency, a glossary of the most important concepts is given at the back. It will be useful to glance at these definitions whenever one of the terms appears in the text. When we think it will be particularly useful to refer to the glossary we will indicate this by putting the relevant term in parentheses; for example, (cf. Cleave).

These definitions are preliminary. They give an idea of what the term means, but its full significance, or rather, a much fuller significance, will be arrived at only by reading the text.
Introduction

Ground, function and pathogenesis

Aims of the thesis

This thesis has two different aims, which dovetail. It aims to examine and explore the function of ground in Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy and it aims to introduce pathogenesis as methodology of a vitalist metaphysics using the materials that Deleuze provides in his work.

All three concepts – function, ground and pathogenesis – have to be understood within the context of the approach of this thesis, which is to focus on Deleuze’s critique et clinique project. This is when metaphysical categories are established with respect to real conditions of experience and activity (critical and clinical) and where this activity is understood as the clinical and critical functioning of non-organic life. Ground is linked with the first half and function to the second half. Pathogenesis is constructed by combining these two halves through an element that is common to each of them. This is ‘a life’. A life is critical and clinical; a life grounds and functions. Immanence, a central problem that Deleuze responds to throughout his work, is ‘a life’.

1 See Daniel W. Smith’s article, “‘A life of Pure Immanence’: Deleuze’s ‘Critique et Clinique’ Project”, in Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Critical tr. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997) (Hereafter cited as EC) for an excellent treatment of this project. As Smith points out here, ‘although he first announced the idea for this book during a 1988 interview, it is clear that Deleuze had conceived of the “critique et clinique” project early on in his career and pursued it in various forms throughout his published work.’ (p. ii) For the interview Smith refers to, see Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations, tr. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 142. Hereafter cited as N.
We will say of pure immanence that it is A LIFE, and nothing else. It is not immanence to life, but the immanent that is in nothing is itself a life.²

The pathogenesis of something is the life of that thing; how it functions and grounds with respect to its life. If function and ground are the fleshy components of this thesis then ‘a life’ is what animates them and gives them momentum.

In one sense, this attempt to carve out a methodology in Deleuze’s name is somewhat anomalous in Deleuze scholarship. There has never been a Deleuze school, as there has been, for example, a Lacan school. There are ‘Deleuzians’, but these Deleuzians work in disparate fields, in numerous different academic departments and on a wide array of problems, rather than a common set of problems. Deleuze’s work is spread out over various different disciplines; he is a modern polymath, demonstrating not just competency but expertise in a variety of fields. This is a paradox of his work. Despite this and despite the richness and far-reaching scope of his project(s), Deleuze saw his work as ‘philosophy, nothing but philosophy, in the traditional sense of the word.’³ This thesis aims to take Deleuze seriously when he says this. It aims to reverse the flow of much of current and past Deleuze scholarship so as to make Deleuze’s seemingly interdisciplinary project ‘disciplinary.’ It does so by attempting to establish pathogenesis as discipline and as disciplinary field within philosophy, using Deleuze’s work. Thus, we are using Deleuze’s philosophy, in this thesis, to construct pathogenesis as methodology and we are, at once, interpreting Deleuze as a pathogeneticist.

This is not to say that pathogenesis ‘exhausts’ Deleuze’s philosophy. It rather works as a lens through which Deleuze’s work can be viewed. It takes the sprawling tapestry that is Deleuze’s output and condenses it to form a lens through which we are to look again upon Deleuze’s work.

This project has the three-fold aim of: enabling a stronger grip on Deleuze’s work, offering the possibility of a new uniformity of purpose to the philosophical study of Deleuze and demarcating a new methodology. Some Deleuze scholars may balk at this project insofar as the notion of such uniformity seems resolutely anti-Deleuzian. It seems to make Deleuze the master of a school. This is a dynamic that he, especially in his work with Guattari, opposes fervently. However, this is to misunderstand the nature of Deleuze’s objections to such uniformity and it is to misunderstand what pathogenesis is and does. Pathogenesis, to repeat, is a particular way of viewing or problematising Deleuze’s philosophy. It is primarily a lens, or a problem, in the same way that, for instance, immanence is a lens – the lens that Deleuze uses frequently to position his own philosophy.\(^4\) Furthermore, Deleuze is not always reticent about establishing schools, or disciplines. Along with Guattari, he creates the concept of schizoanalysis, designating a psychoanalytic practice. This kind of school or discipline is acceptable to Deleuze because of its remit: it works towards complexification, rather than simplification, or reduction. As Guattari explains,

\[\text{Schizoanalysis, rather than moving in the direction of reductionist modelisations which simplify the complex, will work towards its complexification, its processual enrichment, towards the consistency of its virtual lines of bifurcation and differentiation, in short towards its ontological heterogeneity.}\(^5\)

Whether the uniformity instantiated by a school is acceptable to Deleuze depends on the kind of uniformity it engenders or tends towards. It can be a productive uniformity that moves towards diversity, creative modification and multiplication, or an anti-productive uniformity – Deleuze and Guattari’s example being

\(^4\) We draw connections between pathogenesis and immanence in Chapters 3 and 4.
psychoanalysis, under the auspices of the restrictive Oedipus complex - that tends towards reduction and stratification.

In Chapter 5, we argue that there is a tendency in Deleuze scholarship to introduce an anti-productive uniformity into Deleuze’s work, through interpretation. Pathogenesis is presented there, in part, as a way to address this concern. We make the claim that pathogenesis reassembles Deleuze’s philosophy in such a way that a productive uniformity emerges.

With regard to the aim of introducing pathogenesis as methodology, we think it important to make some brief remarks. Firstly, in the thesis we work to define pathogenesis in different ways. As commented upon in the below section on pathogenesis, we define it as methodology of life where life is understood in terms affectivity, feeling and so forth, and where it is also understood in relation to questions of sickness and health. Pathogenesis aims to be a full conception of life, or rather, it aims to provide tools in order to approach life in such a way that the analysis is generous in its scope. Like schizoanalysis, it aims towards complexification and processual enrichment. It does so by explaining how complexification occurs; it is an analysis of life as process of emergence and development.

The above, first aspect of pathogenesis is accompanied by a second aspect. Pathogenesis constitutes a precise analytical tool. Its precision lies in its conception of life as disease. The analysis takes the operation of disease as its model, but rather than see disease as sickness, it positions it as differential element. It works by discerning, at any moment in the system, two components that function in symbiotic, productive relationship.

“What is grounding?”

One of the most important generative elements of the concept of pathogenesis and this thesis in general was an event: the 2006 publication, on Richard Pinhas’s webdeleuze, of set of lecture notes taken by a student (Pierre Lefebvre), of a lecture
course given in 1956-57 by Deleuze, at the Lycée Louis le Grand, in Paris. The lecture series is entitled “Qu’est-ce que fonder?” (“What is grounding?”) and consists of an extended meditation by Deleuze on the notion of grounding.

Grounding is a complex and multi-faceted procedure, one that has evolved in itself and in our understanding of it from the Greek origins of Western philosophy through to recent figures, such as Heidegger. To repeat, the procedure itself and our understanding of it have both evolved and grown more complex. There is a proper evolution of grounding and of the concept of ground, akin to the evolutionary phenomena of increasing complexity, through life. Deleuze, in this lecture course, charts the emergence and development of the concept through its singular moments, which is where particular philosophers and thinkers alter its characteristics. The series constitutes a pathogenesis of the ground, an analysis of the concept’s emergence and development, which is to say, an analysis of its life. In our view, Deleuze’s conception is the ground in its most complex and evolved state. This is not simply because his is the most recent contribution to a concept that increases in complexity, but rather because he recognises this momentum and works productively with it, affirming and enriching the concept further, rather than stifling the concept by missing its momentum and working against it.

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6 Several commentators have remarked upon the differences in meaning between the terms, fondement, fond and fondation, as used by Deleuze. There is no doubt that an investigation into grounding, in Deleuze, could use these conceptual differences to draw out different aspects of the grounding operation. However, this is a line of thought not pursued here. We prefer to draw out these aspects using different methods. For the aforementioned remarks, see Paul Patton’s translator’s preface to Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, tr. Paul Patton (London: Continuum, 2004) (p. xiii) (Hereafter cited as DR), Louise Burchill’s translator’s preface to Alain Badiou’s Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, tr. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000) (pp. xvii-xix.). See especially Christian Kerslake’s discussion of these differences in his Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) pp. 13-16. Kerslake discusses these conceptual differences in the context of Deleuze’s “What is Grounding?” lecture course (see fn. 7).

7 “What is Grounding?” tr. Christian Kerslake. (Hereafter cited as WG) (Note: this is an incomplete and unpublished translation and has been cited with kind permission from Christian Kerslake). The original course is available on webdeleuze.com as, “Qu’est-ce que fonder?”

8 To be clear, Deleuze does not frame his analysis of the concept of ground in this way, at least not explicitly. This is our interpretation, and it seems to us consistent with Deleuze’s vitalist project in general.
The historical aspect of the course is accompanied by an analytic aspect. Different components of grounding are explored in a procedure akin to a dissection. Deleuze makes various cuts into the concept, distinguishing between its different characteristics and functions. The ground, for example, localises, limits and conditions - these are some of its Kantian characteristics. Along with the cuts are sutures. Socrates is woven together with Kierkegaard and Chestov, for example, insofar as all three link the ground with the question.9 With each cut and with each suture the concept increases in complexity.

The course is all the more significant since it was given by Deleuze directly after an ‘eight-year hole’ in his life, one quiet in terms of output, but extremely productive in terms of intense philosophical maturation and development. Deleuze, when speaking of this period of his life, remarked that, maybe ‘it’s in these holes that movement takes place.’10 Deleuze describes himself as being like a somnambulist in this period, moving voicelessly and unconsciously, preparing for the period where he would speak again. With this lecture course, it is as if Deleuze came out of this wilderness and laid out ingredients acquired before putting them to work.

Some of these ingredients are surprising insofar as they have no analogue in Deleuze’s published works of this period or of any other. For example, Heidegger’s conception of transcendence is discussed at length and there is substantial exegetical work on grounding in the Kantian philosophy and in that of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. There is also extensive discussion of the difference between mythological founding and philosophical grounding, with reference to Plato. These discussions coincide with schematic distinctions or cuts made with reference to grounding. Deleuze explains, for example, that grounding oscillates between method and system.11 Such distinctions are operative in Deleuze’s published texts, but they are never as obvious as here. It is as if they are deployed with a kind of transparency in

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9 See Chapter 1 for an exploration on the relationship between the ground and question in Deleuze.
10 N, p. 138.
11 See the section on method and system in this chapter.
the published texts, while they are opaque in the lecture series and are thus easier to see; as if the ingredients are more difficult to detect when they are in a mix than when they are arranged beforehand. Deleuze works in a relatively loose manner with a number of important ingredients he will use in his published works of this period. This is not necessarily to say that the notion of grounding is a great or even the great unrecognised problem of these texts, although persuasive cases for such claims could be made. It is rather that the problem of grounding is treated by Deleuze as a lens through which to work through a number of philosophical problems and issues in which he was interested at the time and that would find expression in these texts.

This lecture course has received some welcome attention since its publication. For example, one of Deleuze’s best interpreters, Christian Kerslake, has devoted an excellent article\textsuperscript{12} to the series and has used the work there extensively as a foundation to his recent book on Deleuze and immanence.\textsuperscript{13} Kerslake refers to the work as the ‘ur-text for Deleuze’s pre-1970s philosophy’, a sketch that ‘contains his main themes and problems, which are all present in intensely compacted form, before they shatter into the mosaic of his written work.’\textsuperscript{14} The course presents a strong narrative that opens up many different directions for the study of Deleuze’s work, and one that can be used as a key of sorts to help unlock much of what Deleuze says, both in this period and in his philosophy generally. It will be a central reference point for the present critical interpretation and extensive use will be made of its contents, with a focus on certain choice components. For the moment, however, the focus will be on one particular ingredient, one that does not find clear expression in Deleuze’s published works and one that works well as an introduction to the important concepts of this thesis. This is the differentiation between method and system within the context of grounding.

Method and system

For Deleuze, grounding oscillates between two poles: method and system.

The triple function of grounding ‘perpetually oscillates between two poles’: whether it is conceived ‘as a principle of things in themselves, or, on the contrary, as relating to us and our simple knowledge of things’. The former approach Deleuze christens as the ‘systematic’ understanding of grounding, and the latter as the way of ‘method’. ‘Two poles: method or system’.15

Two central terms – ground and function – enter here, but we need not be concerned with them, nor with the question as to what this ‘triple function’ is, just yet. The differentiation between method and system is what is important at this point. These are the two different approaches to grounding in philosophy. A philosopher can ground his philosophical activity in method or in system. That is, a philosopher can look to method to ground his philosophy, or he can look to system. It is a question of how, in principle, to do philosophy. Methodological philosophers ‘treat the object as already there, and its principles concern the best way to acquire knowledge from that pre-existing object.’16 In other words, philosophers of method seek to determine their method rather than their object, which is ‘already’ determined, or predetermined. Bacon and Descartes are Deleuze’s examples of philosophers of method. Such philosophers see philosophy as enquiry or investigation, with the key question being how to conduct this enquiry. Systematic philosophers work differently. For them, the task is not to determine method, but to determine the object itself. For these philosophers, (Hegel is Deleuze’s example) the object is not there predetermined, it is to be determined and this determination occurs immediately, rather than through method. It makes no sense to a philosopher of system to construct a

15 WG
16 Ibid.
method - why construct a method to examine an object of which you have immediate experience? It would be like someone with perfect vision putting glasses on to see an object in front of him or her. To carry the analogy further, it would be like someone with perfect vision putting on bifocals to examine an object; the method is not harmless, it distorts the object and cuts the wearer off from what would be otherwise readily available to them. Not only is such an approach mistaken as to the question of what it is that requires determination, it prevents the determination of the object by setting a barrier – a method - between the object and what determines it.

The examples given by Deleuze - Descartes and Bacon for method and Hegel for system - work because these philosophers explicitly connect their approach (method or system) to the ground, and in doing so, work in such a way that the opposite approach is either marginalised or excluded altogether. Often, a philosopher will demonstrate both methodological and systematic tendencies. In Deleuze’s interpretation, Kant, for example, begins with method but ends with system. The *Critique of Pure Reason* begins by asking under what conditions the world can be experienced (method) and ends with the construction of transcendental schemata capturing experience (system).

A no doubt interesting lineage of philosophers and their relationship to method and system and to the question of their connection could be developed here, adding to the one Deleuze offers in *WG*. However, we will stop short and ask the obvious question: is Deleuze a philosopher of method, of system, or both? The answer is not immediately obvious, and neither is the route to determining an answer. Deleuze scholars might point to Deleuze’s oft-quoted statement that ‘I believe in philosophy as system’\(^\text{17}\), but we should be careful here. Does this mean that Deleuze favours system at the expense of method? Not necessarily. It rules out the idea that Deleuze is methodological *rather* than systematic but not that he is systematic and

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methodological. In the present reading, Deleuze is considered to be methodological and systematic at the same time. There is an opposition or a tension between these two sides and it is an important question as to how this tension is to be understood, or how it works or functions in Deleuze’s thought. It is in answer to this question that the present interpretation diverges from Kerslake’s (see Chapter 3 for more on this), insofar as he sees this tension as occurring in Deleuze systematically - that is, under the authority of system. Kerslake charts a systematic lineage from Kant to Deleuze accordingly (through the German idealists, and on through Wronski, Warrain and Bergson). I see this reading as wrong-headed in its reading of this distinction. It is not that Kerslake sees Deleuze as resolving the opposition, but rather that Kerslake sees this opposition under the auspices of system at the expense of method. In this thesis, the opposition is maintained under no authority; there is nothing to homogenise or supervene ‘from above’ insofar as method and system are both in operation, maintaining a tension that never resolves itself. In answer to the question: is Deleuze a methodological or systematic philosopher? Kerslake answers ‘systematic’\(^{18}\), while we answer ‘both’.

There is an early indication in WG that this is the approach Deleuze takes. The differentiation between method and system that Deleuze gives, cited above, is, the reader will note, a methodological one, made within the context of the question as to how one goes about doing philosophy. Within a sentence or two, however, Deleuze will give an accompanying systematic, or categorical distinction. When the function of grounding is systematic, this means that the ground is conceived ‘as a principle of things in themselves’ and when it is methodological, it means that the ground

\(^{18}\) Despite the fact that Kerslake does come out strongly on the side of system, situating Deleuze ‘within a Kantian and post-Kantian framework’ (Christian Kerslake, *Immanence and the Vertigo of Philosophy: From Kant to Deleuze* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), p. 21, see also pp. 8-9), we are in no doubt that little justice is done to Kerslake’s careful and subtle reading by framing his reading in such broad terms. We do so in order to explain our own position clearly. See the section, ‘Third wave as final wave’ for further clarification as to how we view the relation between the present study and other critical readings of Deleuze.
'relates to us and our simple knowledge of things'. Things are switched around so that two different conceptions of the ground are evoked, rather than two different ways or manners of grounding. The distinction between method and system, then, is two-fold: methodological and systematic. What does this tell us? And why discuss this complex relationship between method and system at the outset? Firstly, it gives an impression as to some of the work that is going on in the background of this thesis, a dimension that is hopefully present in the work, but need not be a major concern to the reader. It sees in this differentiation between method and system basic meta-critical instructions for how to do philosophy. And furthermore, it sees these as Deleuze’s own recommendations for how his own philosophy should be approached and analysed: Be methodological and systematic. This thesis aims to accomplish this predominantly through its deployment of two terms – function and ground - that are distinguished and related in the same way that method and system are distinguished and related. Function and ground are related both systematically and methodologically in this thesis. From a methodological point of view, the two terms provide a differential for an analysis of Deleuze’s philosophy as object of study. Meillassoux’s approach to Deleuze’s work is a strong influence here. 

Now, as physicists are well aware, to isolate or to constitute a magnitude, it is essential to have at one’s disposal a variation, a difference in magnitude: to isolate the action of a force, we must have access to a variation of speed. So we can say the following: to isolate Deleuzian immanence, we must have available a variation of immanence, in the shape of a withdrawal, a reflux, of immanence.20

The variation of which Meillassoux speaks here is represented in the variation between function and ground. This is the ‘variation of immanence’ that we are isolating. But again, ‘a life’, rather than immanence, is our major concern. Deleuze’s

19 WG.
philosophy is treated as ‘a life’, as a philosophy that lives. ‘Everything I’ve written is vitalistic, at least I hope it is...’²¹ The life of Deleuze’s philosophy is, in this sense, the object of the investigation.

Function and ground are also systematic. They work to determine pathogenesis as system, or the systematic dimension of pathogenesis. As a system, pathogenesis is determined by its components; these components demarcate and determine pathogenesis as territory or field. Function and ground are the two most important such components. Others, such as ‘dyad’, ‘logos’ and ‘ratio’²² work alongside function and ground in this regard.

Secondly, it explains why pathogenesis is being fashioned as a new philosophical disciplinary field. It is fitting to call pathogenesis a disciplinary field within philosophy (although Cendrars’ labelling of it as a ‘special branch of general philosophy’²³ seems right too) insofar as it provides both its own method and object. Were pathogenesis the former alone, it would be introduced as a new philosophical method. Were it the latter alone, it would be introduced as a new concept, or a system. However, pathogenesis has its own method and object. The object of pathogenesis is life, or the life of an object; it is the non-organic functioning of that object. The method of pathogenesis is the manner of experiencing, where that experience is comported towards, or in relation to, an object.

Thirdly, this ‘background’ differentiation between method and system works well to prefigure some significant differentiations in this thesis, such as between function and ground, pathos and genesis, and logos and ratio. The distinction it makes most clear is the distinction between for itself (linked to method) and in itself (linked to system), and the relationship between them. This distinction, clarified in the below section on pathogenesis, would have been more difficult to introduce

²¹ N, p. 143.
²² Please refer to the glossary for preliminary definitions of these figures and of other relevant figures.
²³ See the section ‘Pathogenesis and disease’, in Chapter 2 for the full quote and clarification as to the relation between pathogenesis and disease.
otherwise. It is a distinction relating primarily to the differentiation between the ground and the function; the ground is for itself and the function in itself.

**Ground and function**

Ground is the central relational term in this thesis. To ground something is to determine that thing with respect to a basis or foundation. This value is not ‘in itself’, but is rather ‘for itself’, insofar as it relates essentially to the criteria as foundation. The demand for a ground – *on what ground are you saying this?* – is the demand for a relationship to be established or demonstrated between what is grounded and its ground. The ground is, in this sense, a claim; a claim made by a claimant. ‘Claiming is claiming to something by virtue of a right.’ In claiming that Picasso’s *Three Musicians* is a masterpiece, I make a claim. The claim might be made with reference to a set of aesthetic criteria that the painting is submitted to. ‘To claim is to pretend towards something. The act of claiming implies submission to a comparison by that which can give or confirm our right.’ Accordingly, ground is epistemological, rather than ontological, insofar as it has to do with things that are in relation to us, rather than things as they are in themselves.

This ground for itself is accompanied by the function in itself. Function is, in this reading, the primary ontological category in Deleuze’s philosophy, its essential mode of being. Rather than say, for example, that each and everything ‘is’ or that each and every thing ‘differs’ (which would be preferable), we say that each and every thing functions. Deleuze’s metaphysics is readily recognised as an anti-substance metaphysics, or perhaps better, a post-substance metaphysics. He is often styled as a process metaphysician, with ‘process’ being a post-substance ontological

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24 WG.

25 Ibid.

26 Keith Robinson is among the Deleuze scholars keen to situate Deleuze’s philosophy in processual terms. ‘…the concept of ‘process’, most closely associated with Whitehead in the twentieth century, is a constant theme throughout Deleuze and Deleuze and Guattari. In this respect there is not only an explicit repetition of Whitehead and the concept of process in Deleuze, but also an implicit encounter with the process tradition.’ Keith Robinson, “Introduction: Deleuze, Whitehead, Bergson –
category. A further refinement is offered here: Deleuze’s metaphysics, while no doubt processual, is more accurately described as a functional or functioning metaphysics. ‘Process’, gives way to ‘function’, as Deleuze’s primary ontological category.

The term ‘function’ is usually used by Deleuze to refer to the object of science, rather than philosophy; science needs functions and philosophy needs concepts.27 Deleuze looks to mathematical and biological functions in his endeavour to articulate a philosophical concept of difference.28 Difference, in and for Deleuze, is always differing and it does so in two directions. There is differentiation (articulated with reference to differential calculus) and differenciation (articulated with reference to biological specification and partitioning). ‘Difference’ is what is common to both differentiation and differenciation; they move in different directions and in doing so they differ in themselves and with respect to one another.29 However, there is something else that is common to both movements: they both function. To say this and to construct the concept of the function is a reflexive move on our part. Deleuze’s concept of difference, which he constructs using non-philosophical functions, is itself used to create a philosophical concept of the function.30

28 ‘…we tried to constitute a philosophical concept from the mathematical function of differentiation and the biological function of differenciation, in asking whether there was not a statable relation between these two concepts which could not appear at the level of their respective objects.’ DR, p. xvi.
29 The reader will notice the distinction between method and system entering again. There is difference in itself (system) and with respect to another difference (method).
30 The term, ‘function’ is used in different ways by Deleuze, several of which are commented upon at length in the chapters in this thesis. It designates the object of science: functions are operative in scientific fields, while concepts are operative in philosophical fields (see ‘Mechanisms of pathogenesis’ Chapter 3 for some brief comments on this distinction). It designates a state of powerlessness: the ‘functionary’ is one whose life is a function of something else (see Chapter 2). And lastly, it becomes a concept of sorts in Deleuze’s collaboration with Guattari. ‘We define the abstract machine as the aspect or moment at which nothing but functions and matters remain.’ (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1987) p. 141) (Hereafter cited as TP). The concept of function constructed in this thesis is something of an amalgamation of all three senses. It is a concept constructed with reference to the scientific functions Deleuze uses, a concept designating a life that is
Like the ground, the function is split, or differentiated, in two. It has two components which differ: input and output. A function, in this respect, is a threshold ‘between’ an input and an output. Or rather, the three components of a function are its input, its output and the turn between input and output. Neither the input nor the output has an assigned value; as will be explained further in later chapters, they work to assign value, rather than bear value themselves. In this respect, they are like Deleuze’s actual and virtual; they determine value and can be used to determine value - they evaluate. In fact, the concept of the function can be introduced with reference to these two concepts. In the movement from the actual to the virtual (differentiation) the actual is the input and the virtual the output, and in the movement from the virtual to the actual (differenciation) the actual is the input and the virtual the output. These two movements are viewed in this thesis primarily as operations, with the function or the concept of function being difference understood within the context of an operation. It is in his middle period work with Guattari, where a more overtly technological discourse comes into play, that Deleuze uses concepts that chime most with this notion: ‘breaks’, ‘cutting edges’, ‘thresholds’, and so on, are referred to within a machinic discourse, where a machine is ‘a system of interruptions or breaks.’ The machine here is an ontological designator insofar as ‘the breaks should in no way be considered as a separation from reality’. For Deleuze and Guattari, a machine is not separate from reality. Reality itself is machinic; reality functions. And, in the interpretation offered here, reality functions in itself. This last qualification is what makes this thesis focus on Deleuze’s earlier work; it is the function in itself, rather than the function that is in question. This play

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of the in itself and for itself – prevalent especially (with difference in itself and repetition for itself) in DR – is a feature only of Deleuze’s pre-1970’s work.

**Pathogenesis**

Pathogenesis is developed in this thesis along two interrelated lines. It is developed in relation to questions of sickness and health and in relation to notions such as affect/affection, feeling and emergence. The former is the more important of the two lines in this thesis. We will, in Chapter 2, identify pathogenesis as a conception of life as disease. We will develop upon this as a theme in subsequent chapters. The latter is the less important of the two lines, but it works well to introduce the major theme. Disease is not considered to be that which inhibits the functioning of life, and is rather considered a model for how life functions. It becomes a differential element that explains how sickness and health function together and how life functions ‘in general’. A pathogenetic relation is a relation between a host and an agent. This relationship has to be understood in terms of a dynamic of affect; the host affects and is affected by the agent at the same time that the agent affects and is affected by the host. We introduce pathogenesis via the second line here and develop the notion of disease in relation to pathogenesis later.

Pathogenesis is the cleavage of pathos and genesis, which is to say that in pathogenesis, pathos and genesis are both split apart and in relation. ‘Pathos’ is affectivity and ‘genesis’ is emergence. All genesis is pathogenesis insofar as all genesis is affective genesis. Therefore, through the cleavage of pathos and genesis, affect and emergence function together. ‘What’ is functioning in this way is ‘a life’; the pathogenesis of a thing is the life of that thing. ‘A life’ is a life of affectivity and emergence. According to pathogenesis, an entity emerges and develops by affecting other entities and their environments and by being affected by other entities and their environments. Genesis occurs ‘through’ this pathos or affectivity and affectivity is affective, or becomes affective, ‘through’ genesis. A tree’s shape finds its articulation at the borders ‘between’ its own growth and articulation and the
growth and articulation of things around it and the environment in general. It will, for example, act on another tree that is in its path of growth and that tree will act upon it. Each tree’s life – its continual emergence and development – is perpetuated along the path shaped by this dynamic. Its evolution has two vectors; it evolves, in one way, by affecting and, in another, by emerging. In affecting, it emerges and in emerging, it affects. The two movements are separate but indissociable; one does not occur without the other and indeed one cannot imagine one occurring without the other. Pathos and genesis are in a priori relation, as are emergence and affect. How can something grow or emerge without affecting other entities and their environment? And how can there be affection that does not involve emergence or growth? A life is mutual; it is double, which is to say that it is a heterogenesis, living and evolving in itself and through other lives.

For me, the system must not only be in perpetual heterogeneity, it must be a heterogenesis – something which, it seems to me, has never been attempted.33

Pathogenesis is a heterogenesis; pathos is heterogeneous to genesis, just as a tree is heterogeneous to another tree and their environment.

There is ambiguity in saying that pathos is heterogeneous to genesis. Does this mean that pathos and genesis are heterogeneous to one another but homogeneous in themselves, or heterogeneous to one another in addition to being heterogeneous in themselves? In Chapter 3, our answer, ‘both’, is articulated in detail, where a treatment of the actual and virtual is offered consistent with the above sketch of pathogenesis.

According to this dynamic, everything happens at the border or threshold ‘between’ the two trees. Each tree’s life evolves at, or from, this border. What does

this mean exactly? And what is the significance of this border image, and what is its relation to pathogenesis?

The first thing to be said is that borders (cf. Border in the glossary) are curious things insofar as they perform two seemingly opposed functions; they split things at the same time that they glue these things together. The border between Germany and Poland separates the two countries at the same time that it links them. Among Deleuze’s concepts, the fold best captures this idea. The crease of the fold is a border, and folding and unfolding always occurs ‘along’ the crease made, just as life always occurs ‘at’ the border.34 A term in English works well here as an accompaniment and clarification both of this notion in general and of the concept of the fold: ‘cleave’35 (cf. Cleave). This term carries the two opposed meanings in question: to cleave is to split asunder and it is to bring into relation. The function of a border is to cleave. Pathogenesis is a conception of life ‘at its borders’, of life as cleaving.

Two of Deleuze’s concepts, along with one distinction, work well to introduce pathogenesis with respect to this notion of cleaving: deterritorialization, becoming, and the aforementioned distinction between in itself and for itself. The distinction will be revisited before the concepts are introduced.

The distinction between in itself and for itself corresponds to the distinction between system (things are they are in themselves) and method (things are they are in relation to us). This distinction was made before, but what was missing and what pathogenesis provides, is an understanding of this distinction that ‘takes place’ at the border, one that explains the link between in itself and for itself. We said previously that Kerslake understands the distinction between method and system (or the for itself and in itself) under the authority of system (or the in itself), rather

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35 I am indebted to Graham Priest for drawing my attention to this term, ‘cleave’. During his paper, “Contradiction, Language and the World” – given during the 25 Years in Contradiction conference at the University of Glasgow (7th-9th December 2012) – Priest discussed the paradoxical nature of borders and proposed the term ‘cleave’ as a useful term to describe their curious function.
than according to both, but no answer was provided as to how the distinction could be both. A conception of the in itself and for itself as cloven is required. What does this mean exactly? What, in the first place, do ‘in itself’ and ‘for itself’ mean precisely?

Consider an object of potential study: an empty room. Imagine that you are standing outside of the room and that a door separates you from inside the room. Imagine that this room prevents all access; not only does it separate you from the room itself, it separates the room completely – there is, for example, no equipment inside that is transmitting information outside the room; it is entirely enclosed. If the room is truly an in itself, then it will, by necessity, remain inaccessible, unknowable. If you open the door and enter the room then the object of study is no longer an in itself; it ‘becomes’ for itself, insofar as it is now in relation to you, as an observer or participant.

A central question is how the in itself and for itself can be consistent with one another. It seems that the two are mutually exclusive. Or at least, it seems as though one must dominate at the expense of the other; they will be related (or distinguished) but according to the order of one of them, rather than the other. For instance, what a philosopher of system will do, and what Kerslake sees Deleuze as doing, is to keep this distinction between the in itself and for itself but unite under the umbrella of the in itself. It is as if the observer and the door are shifted inside the room, but in such a way that the room remains an in itself. Other Deleuze scholars – perhaps the majority – see Deleuze as keeping the distinction between the in itself and for itself, but coming down on the side of the for itself. Readings such as Meillassoux’s see Deleuze’s philosophy as grounded in the for itself. Despite his efforts, Meillassoux claims, Deleuze cannot access the in itself because he begins with the for itself.  

The tendency, in any case, is to pick one side at the expense of the other; method, rather than system, or the other way round; the in itself, rather than the for itself, or

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36 See Chapter 5 for a discussion of this example in relation to Meillassoux’s critique.
the other way round, and so on. A different approach is suggested here, premised upon the claim that authors have come at the problem the wrong way. These authors either begin with the inside of the room or the outside of the room, with respect to the question of how the two are linked. In doing so, they share the fate of many in trying to solve riddles, they miss the obvious. The door – the middle term – is the key to solving this problem. The question has to be re-oriented ‘beginning’ neither outside the room, nor inside the room, but ‘at’ the door. What Deleuze does – throughout his work, but most explicitly with the connection and coalescence of difference in itself and repetition for itself – is to change the terms of the problem. For Deleuze, the inside of the empty room is already a conjunction of the in itself and the for itself, and the experience of the observer or participant is itself a conjunction of the in itself and for itself. There is a separation, but this separation works in such a way, that the in itself is always accompanied by the for itself, just as the tree’s affective growth, from the example above, is always accompanied by affective growth of the tree it changes in tandem with, or the tree it is heterogeneous with. The door in the image we have given cleaves; it separates one side from the other at the same time as joining them.

This analogy has an obvious limitation – it is static. In reality, everything must be dynamic; it must grow and develop. This is where Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of deterritorialization has potent explanatory power. It functions, in a sense, by dynamising the in itself and for itself, as conjugated. It is as if the static concept of the cleave becomes an activity: cleave. Deleuze and Guattari, in constructing this concept, effectively take the in itself and for itself and make it move. Again, everything happens at the border (between a thing and another thing, or between a thing and its environment). All movement – all growth and development, all activity - happens here; things grow at the border and they do so by affecting and by being affected at the border, or by acting and being acted upon.
The two sides of the border, or what lies on each side of the border, are related in a special way. A sort of symbiotic relationship ensues, a relationship captured particularly well in Deleuze’s image of the orchid and the wasp.

The orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on that image. The wasp is nevertheless deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome.37

The distinction between deterritorialization and reterritorialization here is a corollary of the distinction between ‘to affect’ and ‘to be affected’, or the in itself and for itself. Insofar as everything happens at the border, there is interplay between a de-bordering (deterritorialization) and a re-bordering (reterritorialization). This is tension ‘at’ the border, all transformations occur ‘at’ or ‘from’ here. The first tree – let us suppose it is an oak - and second tree – let us suppose it is a linden - enter into a complex dynamic made up, in a sense, of two movements; the oak affects the linden while the linden is affected by the oak. Meanwhile, the linden affects the oak while the oak is affected by the linden. The coupling deterritorialization-reterritorialization captures this complex dynamic. There is mutual becoming on either side.

…a becoming-wasp of the orchid and a becoming-orchid of the wasp. Each of these becomings brings about the deterritorialization of one term and the reterritorialization of the other; the two becomings interlink and form relays in a circulation of intensities pushing the deterritorialization ever further.38

There is, similarly, a becoming-oak of the linden and a becoming-linden of the oak. In each case, there is a border ‘between’ each side; the life of each tree is cleaved

37 TP, p. 10.
38 Ibid.
to/from the other tree. Pathogenesis, as methodology, takes into account and explores the complexities involved in this dynamic.

The historical aspect
The three most important concepts in this thesis – ground, function and pathogenesis – have thus far been introduced and their relationship sketched. Commented upon now will be the historical bent to the thesis.

The thesis has a distinctively historical character in the sense that it involves extensive discussion of historical figures. These historical figures have been chosen because they are the ones who provide the most important material with regards to the two aims of the thesis: to examine the function of ground in Deleuze’s philosophy and to introduce pathogenesis. It was said earlier that the concepts of function and ground have evolved, their characteristics changing according to treatment by different philosophers. The idea is invoked here again; the figures referred to at length here have been the most prominent in the life of these concepts. They are also the most important for the development of pathogenesis as concept.

Given the myriad nature of Deleuze’s oeuvre, any critical reading of Deleuze will involve significant inclusions and omissions. One often has the feeling that the reasons behind these selections and omissions deserve more than the cursory remarks that are often given to them by the author. In the first four chapters, Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche are examined at length. The particular reasons for these inclusions will be given alongside each analysis. In the fifth chapter, the contemporary scene in Deleuze scholarship is discussed at length, and the reason for this change in strategy is explained there. The reason for the two most significant omissions will be discussed briefly here. These are Heidegger and Spinoza.

Heidegger worked in the tradition of treating ‘ground’ as a principle and is perhaps the last great philosopher to treat the ground in this way. This tradition – one linked to the for itself, or the methodological, rather than the in itself, or the
systematic – was, according to Heidegger,\textsuperscript{39} inaugurated by Leibniz; the high-point being Leibniz’s construction of the principle of sufficient reason. With Heidegger, this principle is heard ‘in a different key’\textsuperscript{40}: ‘Being means ground – ground means Being.’\textsuperscript{41} It is in this key that Deleuze, like other philosophers in his time, encountered this principle. Much of Deleuze’s work on ground and grounding can, as such, be construed as a response to Heidegger’s treatment. This being the case, why is Heidegger omitted from this analysis?

This question can be broached by asking where Deleuze diverges most significantly in his treatment of ground from Heidegger. The question concerns the question of the activity of beginning and in particular the relationship between ‘beginning’ and ‘originating’. In Deleuze’s view, there is an important difference between these two conceptions. A concert will begin tonight, but it will not originate tonight. It will not originate at all; it has no origin, which is to say that its beginning is anoriginal. The activity of beginning, \textit{qua} activity, has no origin. What is the difference between the two, between originating and beginning? To begin successfully is to begin in such a way that the split of which we have spoken is in operation, with nothing ‘behind’ it. As Deleuze says, ‘...difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing.’\textsuperscript{42} Difference can only be behind everything if this difference is not a difference \textit{between} two things. Difference must ‘be’ the origin itself, which is to say that there is no origin; in its place will be difference. According to Deleuze, Heidegger conflates beginning and originating. Heidegger thinks difference ‘at’ the origin, rather than thinking difference instead of the origin.

\textsuperscript{39} ‘For it was only in the seventeenth century that Leibniz recognized the long current idea, that nothing may be without ground, as a decisive principle, and presented it as the principle of ground.’ Martin Heidegger, “The Principle of Ground” tr. Keith Holler, \textit{Continental Philosophy Review}, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1974), p. 208.
\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Ibid.} p. 207.
\textsuperscript{41} \textit{Ibid.} p. 218.
\textsuperscript{42} \textit{DR}, p. 57.
This is our difference from Clausewitz, but also Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, and even still from Heraclitus... Because we think without origin, and without destination, difference becomes the highest thought, but we cannot think it between two things, between a point of departure and a point of arrival, not even between Being [l'etre] and being [l'e'tant]. Difference cannot be affirmed as such without devouring the two terms that cease to contain it, though it does not itself cease from passing through assignable terms. Difference is the true logos, but logos is the errancy that does away with fixed points; indifference is its pathos.43

Another way to put it is to say that Heidegger appreciates the necessity of bordering or folding, but positions the border or fold in the wrong place. Heidegger’s border is between Being and being; it is an ontological border, or a differentiation that takes place under the authority of one side (the ontological), but not of the other (the epistemological). Later in the thesis, with reference to Deleuze’s three syntheses, a numerical or ordinal aspect to this talk of borders and cleaving will be introduced. Both the first and second syntheses have their own borders, but they can only be articulated properly by setting thought at the level of the third synthesis, which is the border, or cleaving of the first and second syntheses. What Heidegger does is to cleave at the second, rather than the third. If the epistemological is the first and the ontological the second then their cleaving is the third. Heidegger’s ontological cleave or fold occurs at the second, rather than the third. This is why Deleuze says that Heidegger ‘went too quickly’.44 Eager to construct a philosophy of difference, Heidegger cleaved too early, at the second.

Bergson also cleaves at the second. Given Bergson’s inclusion in the present analysis, Heidegger’s exclusion must be further clarified. In fact, the reason for this omission essentially comes down to the difference between Bergson and Heidegger,

44 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Seán Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988) (Hereafter cited as F) p. 112.
with regard to the role of these cleavings or differences in their respective philosophies. Deleuze, in the above quote, has already explained the difference: Bergson thinks without origin, while Heidegger does not. What does this mean exactly? In Bergson, difference is never ‘located’ between two sides because, in Bergson, there is no such ‘between’; it is dissolved, or ‘devoured’, to use Deleuze’s image. It is this dissolution which enables Bergson to think difference according to the contours of this differentiation. This activity might occur only according to the boundary or difference of the second synthesis, without reaching the third, but nevertheless no ‘between’ remains in Bergson. This is why, as we will see, Deleuze credits Bergson with the achievement of making this difference truly active. Bergson cleaves at the second, but the cleave he enacts belongs at the second. Heidegger’s philosophy is not ‘truly active’; there is an element of reactivity. Rather than think this difference in terms of activity, or in terms of positivity, Heidegger involves the negative; the ontological difference, in Heidegger, is the ‘not’ between two sides, Being and beings.\footnote{‘The ontological difference is the “not” between beings and being,’ Martin Heidegger, “On the Essence of Ground”, in Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 97.} It is as if Heidegger realised the need to make the third cleaving, but tried to do it ‘at’ the second cleaving and in the process failed to perform either. In truth, Heidegger’s error is an error of conflation. In one sense, it is the conflation of beginning and originating and in another it is the conflation of the folds or cleavings. Were this thesis concerned primarily with the question of how to avoid this, or any conflation connected to questions concerning grounding and functioning, rather than with the question of how to actively ground and function – or to use more Deleuzian terminology, how to induce a ‘becoming-active’ of these concepts - then Heidegger would be an important reference point. However, he would not be the central reference point; this would be Spinoza.

A thorough examination of the question of ground with reference to Spinoza and Heidegger would work as a good companion piece to this thesis. For Deleuze, it
is Spinoza who provides the framework necessary in order for grounding to become active, this framework being the plane of immanence. We develop a line of thought throughout this work concerning immanence, alongside our questions concerning ground and function. We will, however, remark briefly here on the problem of immanence by returning to the question of why Spinoza is omitted from the analysis.

The first thing to say about Spinoza’s omission is that it is only an omission in a particular sense. Spinoza does play a significant role in this examination; nonetheless, it is right to say that he is omitted. There are two reasons for this. We will draw each out by referring to remarks made by Deleuze concerning the influence of Spinoza on his thought. Firstly, Deleuze says that his early philosophy worked towards the ‘great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation.’ This remark is taken seriously in this thesis. In a sense, the triad, ‘Spinoza-Nietzsche-Deleuze’ is the most important ‘formula’ in this thesis. The concepts of function and ground that are constructed using the materials Deleuze provides and the discipline of pathogenesis similarly constructed owe perhaps as much to Spinoza as they do to Nietzsche. Spinoza’s concept of affect, for example, is an important concept for pathogenesis. ‘Affect’ is closely linked to our term ‘cleave’; it too carries two opposed meanings: to affect and be affected (see Chapter 2). Affect is, like cleave, deterritorialization and fold, a ‘border concept’. These are concepts with an implied middle that function to separate and relate either side.

The problem with Spinoza’s philosophy, however, is not simply that it creates these concepts, but rather that it occupies, or better, proliferates along borders. It is as if everything happens ‘at’ the border in Spinoza, with the result that borders and limits tend not to emerge in his work. Or rather, the consequence is that borders do not function in Spinoza’s work as limits. If there is truth to what we have about Spinoza’s work then the question presents itself: how can we insinuate ourselves

46 ‘Yes, I did begin with books on the history of philosophy, but all the authors I dealt with had for me something in common. And it all tended toward the great Spinoza-Nietzsche equation.’ N, p. 135.
within such a dynamic with Spinoza’s philosophy when there are no borders to act upon?\textsuperscript{47} As Deleuze, in conversation with Parnet, remarks,

\begin{quote}
(With Spinoza,) philosophy becomes the art of a functioning, of an assemblage. Spinoza, the man of encounters and becoming, the philosopher with the tick, Spinoza the imperceptible, always in the middle, always in flight... What Lawrence says about Whitman’s life is well suited to Spinoza: the Soul and the Body, the soul is neither above nor inside, it is ‘with’, it is on the road, exposed to all contacts, encounters, in the company of those who follow the same way, ‘feel with them, seize the vibration of their soul and their body as they pass’, the opposite of a morality of salvation, teaching the soul to live its life, not to save it.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

Perhaps Spinoza’s philosophy shows us a ‘way’ of living, (is this not what Deleuze and Guattari are getting at when they call Spinoza the ‘Christ’ of philosophers?\textsuperscript{49}) a life of pure affect, a ‘continuous life’, lived ‘in the middle’. As we explain in this thesis, this is a life lived \textit{on its borders}, rather than a life lived according to limits.

\textit{Organisation of the thesis}

Pathogenesis is introduced in this thesis through an examination of the function of ground in Deleuze’s philosophy. Function and ground are developed as concepts with reference to their treatment in Deleuze’s philosophy. The two central texts in this regard are the aforementioned \textit{WG} lecture series and \textit{DR}. We said earlier that some of the elements of \textit{DR}, concerning grounding and functioning, are present in \textit{WG} as raw ingredients. One of these ingredients is the differentiation between

\textsuperscript{47} Meillassoux, in the article on Deleuze cited above, makes a similar point. When investigating immanence, he eschews an examination of the Spinoza-Deleuze nexus in Deleuze’s thought because he is unable to locate in Spinoza a differential that would allow him to ‘access’ immanence. Immanence in Spinoza is, according to Meillassoux, like a ‘diffuse light’ insofar as it is impossible to isolate. Quentin Meillassoux, “Subtraction and Contraction: Deleuze, Immanence and Matter and Memory”, in \textit{Collapse III: Unknown Deleuze} (London: Urbanomic, 2007) esp. pp. 65-67.


\textsuperscript{49} WP, p. 60.
method and system within the context of grounding. One other ingredient from WG will be particularly important in the rest of the thesis. This is Deleuze’s demarcation of the three main features or characteristics of grounding.

- A question is an appeal to a ground.
- There are three different structures of questioning: paradoxical, universal and critical.
- These three structures constitute a triple function of grounding.

The first characteristic is explored in the first chapter. Two of the three structures of questioning – paradoxical and critical – are explored in the second chapter, and a third – universal – is explored in the fifth chapter.

The second important reference point is the tripartite structure operative in Deleuze’s thought. There are various triplets for Deleuze that operate as variations of one another. The most important in the present analysis are the three syntheses of time (DR), the three syntheses - connective, disjunctive and conjunctive – (AO) and the neo-Platonic triad. These triplets are particularly important reference points for pathogenesis. They will be used to construct the three different categories of pathogenesis: acute, chronic and recurrent. These categories correlate to Deleuze’s triplets.

- Chapter 1 examines the relation between ground and function, under the rubric of the question of Plato’s influence on Deleuze. We argue that Plato is the first philosopher to cleave, or differentiate. This is identified as a central thread running through Plato’s work. We also see Plato as introducing pathogenesis into philosophy by considering the problem of life in its relation to questions of sickness and health. A reading of Plato thus enables us to construct a preliminary pathogenesis of function and ground as concepts in relation. Pathogenesis is also staked out, in this chapter, as a field using Platonic figures of a reverse Platonism.
• In Chapter 2, pathogenesis is developed within the context of Deleuze’s Nietzschean understanding of life as non-organic functioning. Through an examination of Nietzsche’s philosophy, we arrive at a conception of life as disease. Pathogenesis is developed further with reference to the concepts introduced in the previous chapter, and to two of the three structures of questioning, the paradoxical and critical questions.

• Chapter 3 introduces and explores the notion of dual functioning and explains its role in pathogenesis. This is when life is understood in two ways at once. It is understood as oscillation between actual and virtual as limits, sickness and health as limits, and so on. In each case, there is a middle linking the two limits. In Chapter 2, this middle was understood as disease. In this chapter, this insight is developed upon by examining Deleuze’s three syntheses as middles – that is, as milieus or pathways – that can be understood in terms of disease. We define these pathways as pathogenetic categories, using Deleuze’s syntheses. These are the acute, chronic and recurrent pathways. We also use material from three historical figures – Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche – to define these pathways.

• Chapter 4 introduces and explores the notion of dual grounding and explains its role in pathogenesis. It is argued that Kant provides the conceptual apparatus required to understand dual grounding. We examine Kant’s philosophy and use it to define pathogenetic understanding in relation to the problem of ground, while showing why Kant’s philosophy falls short of pathogenetic understanding. We claim this because the genesis involved in pathogenesis is internal genesis and, as Deleuze argues, Kant’s philosophy fails to discover principles of internal genesis. Following the curve of Deleuze’s line of thought, we contrast Kant and Nietzsche’s approach and use the latter’s philosophy to explain how internal genesis – a characteristic
feature of pathogenesis – occurs. We explain how internal genesis works with reference to mycorrhiza, a symbiotic and pathogenetic association.

• Chapter 5 is a ‘case-study’ of pathogenesis. The lives of a number of critical readings of Deleuze’s philosophy are examined. A hypothesis regulates the enquiry in this chapter: there have been two distinct waves of Deleuze scholarship and we are on the brink of a third. These waves correspond to the three different mechanisms or categories of pathogenesis and to the three syntheses in Deleuze; first-wave scholars cleave in the sense of splitting asunder, while second-wave scholars cleave in the sense of gluing together. It is as if the readings glimpsed the first and/or second categories or mechanisms and thought them sufficient for life, when, in fact, all three are required. We argue that a move to a third-wave is required. Pathogenesis is presented as third wave discipline.
Chapter 1

The function of ground

Beginning with Plato

Why begin an examination of grounding and functioning, in Deleuze, with Plato? And why is Plato important for our general aim of establishing pathogenesis as philosophical discipline and disciplinary field? There are three reasons.

The first relates to comments made in the introduction. We said that the concept of ground has a life, one that has evolved and increased in complexity since its emergence. If Plato’s philosophy does not signal this emergence then it at least signals the emergence of the particular point of interest in this study: the ‘cleaving’ characteristic. Prior to Plato, two different conceptions of the ground or two different manners of grounding competed in the minds of thinkers. In our interpretation, Plato cleaves (cf. Cleave in the glossary) these two sides in his philosophy. They are, at once, split apart and related within his philosophy. In this chapter, this cleaving will be explored with reference to Plato’s philosophy and to the existing material he draws on for each side.

Similarly, in our interpretation, the concept of function emerged with Plato, or it emerged in the relationship with philosophy that we see the function as being in. This is the second reason. Plato’s work opens up ‘functionality’ as measure of philosophical success. Plato’s dialectic, for example, is read in this thesis as a way of testing certain theories, elements within theories, and avenues of thought in order to determine functionality. This is how Plato goes about doing philosophy (his method)
and it is also how his philosophy works in itself (system\(^{50}\)); it functions, or at least, it attempts to function. It is a philosophy that functions, rather than one which, for example, contemplates, reflects or communicates.\(^{51}\)

The third reason relates to pathogenesis. In our interpretation, Plato is a ‘pre-pathogenetic’ philosopher insofar as he introduces into philosophy themes that characterise pathogenesis. In the Socratic side of his philosophy, or in his early philosophy, he gives a picture of life in its relation to health and sickness. This gives way in the middle and late periods of his philosophy, where it is still a question of life, but life understood primarily through the problems of grounding and functioning. Plato’s philosophy is vitalistic; it develops a vast array of problems, but always with the problem of life at its centre. In the \textit{Republic}, for example, the task is to determine, or ground, the Just State, which is the State that functions best, the \textit{healthy} State.\(^{52}\) Thus, questions of health and sickness become configured so as to provide criteria for what constitutes good functioning - a philosophy that functions well is a healthy philosophy. A healthy philosophy is a philosophy that works towards complexification and enrichment. We will show in this chapter that while Platonic analysis introduces ‘health’ as criteria for functioning in philosophy, it also introduces an element that works against such functioning: the transcendent Idea.

The first part of this chapter will analyse Plato’s philosophy with respect to the related problems of ground and function. It does so in order to open up the Platonic aspects of the problems of ground and function in Deleuze’s philosophy, and to open up these problems in general. The second part will further develop these problems within the context of a conceptual endeavour whereby pathogenesis is introduced as a philosophical conception of life. A preliminary demarcation of this

\(^{50}\) See the discussion of method and system in the introduction.

\(^{51}\) We allude here to Deleuze and Guattari’s comments with regard to the question of what philosophy is not. ‘We can at least see what philosophy is not: it is not contemplation, reflection, or communication. This is the case even though it may sometimes believe it is one or other of these, as a result of the capacity of every discipline to produce its own illusions and to hide behind its own peculiar smokescreen.’ \textit{WP}, p. 6.

\(^{52}\) Cf. \textit{Republic} IV 444a-e.
field is attempted using four Platonic figures operative in Deleuze’s philosophy: the question-problem complex, repetition, selection and ungrounding.

**Plato’s grounding**

Plato is often viewed as a philosopher of the foundation. Not only is his work a foundation of Western philosophy, but his philosophy works to establish foundations - it founds, or grounds. Already, with such a statement, the duplicity proper to grounding comes into view: the first grounding is outside of, or external to, the establishment of something ‘other’ than the philosophy in question (even if that philosophy is the first example of the tradition it inaugurates), while the second grounding is inside of, or internal to, that philosophy. In the introduction, we said that it is a mistake to begin with the external at the expense of the internal, or to begin with the internal at the expense of the external. We said that a philosophy must construct and operate along borders that function by distinguishing and linking (cleaving) these two sides. And we said that, in fact, each side is already a cleaving of both: the internal consists of a cleaving of internal and external, as does the external.

Plato’s philosophy demonstrates this point well. To say that Plato was the first to ground philosophy from an internal perspective, is to say that he is the first to ground philosophy *in* philosophy. This links to the common understanding of Plato as self-conscious with respect to the activity of philosophy he is engaged in. Plato is concerned with questions concerning philosophy’s limitations, its scope, its ambitions and so forth. In our interpretation, these concerns condense into the question as to what a philosophy’s function is, or rather, how a philosophy functions, or might best function. This awareness is not a psychological trait of Plato’s, it is an aspect of his philosophy; that is, an aspect that *features* in and *characterises* his philosophy. The question of self-consciousness fades and it becomes a different problem: the problem of how grounding can occur *within the philosophy itself*; a self-grounding. The Presocratics determine a philosophical order, but Plato brings order
into philosophy itself. This is not to say that Plato’s philosophy is hermetic, its operations sealed within itself. Neither is it to say that this is how Plato conceived of the practice of doing philosophy. Or rather, we can say both these things, as long as we make an important clarification: the world such a philosophy creates or determines is the ‘same’ world in which that creation occurs and in which that philosophy operates. Before Plato, there was a gap between philosophy, or the method of doing philosophy, and the object of philosophy, or what philosophy was about. Plato bridges this gap: his philosophy constitutes a bridging, or, to use our favoured term, a cleaving. The bridge represents simultaneous separation and unification (cleaving) of what lies on either side. This is a characteristic trait of Plato’s philosophy; he proceeds by cleaving. The best known example of such cleaving is the attempt to overcome the traditional methodological opposition\(^{53}\) between mûthos and lógos; between, ‘telling a story’ and ‘making an argument’ (Protagoras 324d), as regards the question of which is the superior ground in philosophical discourse.

This opposition reverberates through the history of Western philosophy until the present day, offering itself as a strong voice weaved in its polyvocal narrative. It is a useful opposition to keep in mind; one that can function, for example, as a methodological tool in philosophical analysis. For example, it works well to introduce the notoriously difficult-to-characterise opposition between ‘Continental’ and ‘Analytic’ philosophy. The former arguably finds its ground predominantly in mûthos and the latter in lógos. Analytic philosophy depends on logical analysis and formal abstraction, while Continental philosophy has a strong historicity and concern with rhetoric and style. The opposition is presented here in terms of a

\(^{53}\) It is contentious as to whether the relationship between mûthos and lógos should be described as an opposition. Burnyeat, for example, claims that the two are in opposition, while Vlastos claims that they are variations of one another. Cf. Myles Burnyeat, “Eikös mûthos”, Plato’s Myths, ed. Catalin Partenie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) pp. 167–186, and Gregory Vlastos, “The Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus”, Classical Quarterly, (1939) 33: pp. 71–83. To an extent, both readings are consistent with our own. We see the relationship between mûthos and lógos as constituting opposition and reversibility. See the discussion of reversibility in the ‘Functioning’ section in Chapter 2.
cleaving that occurs ‘at’ the ground. Rather than choose between the grounds, Plato chooses both.

Plato has important precursors for mûthos and lôgos. For mûthos, the precursors are mythological stories. These stories concern heroes who go on a quest, Deleuze’s favoured example being Odysseus. In performing this task, or fulfilling the quest, the hero creates a world. That is, he determines or grounds a world. The story is a continuous narrative of determination, one that is, at the same time, split between the hero on one side and the world he/she determines on the other.

In Deleuze’s characterisation, the narrative is a pathway of determination, one split between its finite and infinite components: the hero as finite and the world constituted as infinite. ‘The founder is the one who poses and proposes an infinite task.’ In this form, these myths have no philosophical import insofar as they are imaginary. ‘If mythology is imaginary that is because infinite tasks cannot be realised.’ Plato contrasts the founding in mythology (imaginary) with philosophical grounding, where the tasks are realised.

So when does the problem of founding become philosophical? At the moment that the founder proposes infinite tasks as something which must be realised in this world.

Platonism is ‘the philosophical Odyssey’ because it involves undertaking this infinite task in this world.

We have presented a conception as to what constitutes grounding: to ground is to perform of an infinite task. What does this mean exactly? What does it mean to perform an infinite task? What kind of infinity is Deleuze invoking here? This latter question might seem like the right one to ask, but in fact it goes slightly wide of the

54 WG.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Gilles Deleuze, “Plato, the Greeks”, in EC, p. 136.
mark. It is not a question of *which* infinity Deleuze is speaking of, but of *how this infinity functions*. Or rather, it is a case, in the first instance, of considering an infinite as being conjoined or cleaved with the finite. What does this mean exactly? Two kinds of examples will be of use here: firstly, a mathematical-logical example, and secondly, an ‘affective’ example.

In the first example, this cleaving means that Deleuze’s infinite task is not akin to the ‘Supertask’ of the Thompson lamp.\(^{59}\) Supertasks are thought experiments patterned after Zeno’s paradoxes and designed to demonstrate the impossibility of realising or performing infinite tasks. The Thompson lamp thought experiment, where a lamp is switched on and off an infinite number of times within a finite period of time, is one of the best known of these Supertasks. Unlike this Supertask, Deleuze’s infinite task *is* able to be performed; that is, it is able to take place in this world. Why is Deleuze’s infinite task able to be performed? It is because Deleuze introduces a new compatibility between finite and infinite. Our way of expressing this compatibility is to say that finite and infinite are *cleaved*. Each event, or each activity in this world, is a performance occurring at a border (cf. *Border*) ‘between’ finite and infinite. Thus, for Deleuze, the task of switching on the lamp *once* is an act involving the infinite. When flicking the switch, the individual floods the room with light, determining that room and determining a world.

One way of characterising the difference between Deleuze’s task and the Supertask is to say that there is a difference between a task being *completed* (infinite task of the Supertask) and a task being *performed* (Deleuze’s infinite task). To ask whether the task can be complete is like asking whether finite and infinite can ever be brought into coincidence. The answer, according to the Thompson paradox, is that they cannot. They are like two parallel lines; they will never meet. To ask whether the task can be performed is to enquire into the relationship between finite

and infinite ‘from the beginning’. It is not a question of whether they will meet, but of what relationship they are ‘already’ in.

How does determination occur here? It occurs according to the differential element represented by the finite-infinite couplet. Determination occurs ‘at’ the border ‘between’ this couplet, between the finite aspect and the infinite aspect of this one task. The switch for the lamp works well to represent this border. Each flick of the switch constitutes an act of determination that is infinite. Likewise, the switch image works with regard to our positing of the function as Deleuze’s primary ontological category; the switch is the border ‘between’ input and output, in this case the finite is the input and the output the infinite.

Our second example is one of Deleuze’s own. A declaration of love occurs ‘at’ the border between finite and infinite. ‘To say that “I love you” instead of saying “I desire you” is to propose an infinite task.’ It is infinite insofar as it ‘cannot be presented as realisable’. The task is unrealisable or inexhaustible in the same way that the Supertask is inexhaustible: neither can be completed. How does the task become realisable? Again, the answer is by being performed. I perform the infinite task of loving someone, but I do not complete the task. The task of loving someone is not one that can be completed. To think of the task in this way is to misunderstand it. It is, to repeat, realised through performance, rather than through completion. It is a task that is realised in this world insofar as it is performed in this world. I perform this task be cleaving of finite and infinite.

What is on this other side, who are Plato’s precursors with regard to lógos? The Presocratics are these precursors. These thinkers denounce myth, or story, as proper foundation for enquiry and seek to ground instead in rational and logical argument. In a sense, these thinkers reject the finite as starting point (the hero, as finite agent) and instead begin with the infinite of a world. This goes some way to explain the preoccupation these thinkers have for the natural world and with natural

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60 WG.
61 Ibid.
phenomena: the finite agent is ‘missing’ in these philosophies, or at least, missing from the ground. The object of concern is the world minus agency. There is, as with mûthos, a fissure, but a fissure between two infinites. In Parmenides, for example, there is a conjunction of two ways or paths: the way of ground (that which is) and the way of the groundless (that which is not).

Where does this overcoming of the opposition between the two sides occur in Plato? According to Deleuze,62 it happens in Plato’s method of division. This is an operation whereby a definition is arrived at through continuous and progressive division into relatively equal parts. In the Sophist, for example, the angler is defined by first asking whether he is a man having expertise or not having expertise (219a). Upon deciding that he is a man having expertise, it is asked whether this expertise is acquisitive or creative (219d). The acquisitive is then itself subdivided into two parts, and so on, until a definite understanding of the angler’s expertise and the thing itself is reached (221b).63 The method seems to work by dividing a genus into contrary species in order to subsume the thing investigated under the right species. However, this would be to interpret Platonism according to the Aristotelian model. In truth, the method works to establish ‘a dialectic of rivalry (amphisbetesis), a dialectic of rivals and suitors.’64 Each subdivision delivers two rivals or suitors, with one emerging victorious before the next subdivision.

The method continues in this way until myth enters the picture seemingly interrupting the proceedings. In the Statesman, for example, the method of division is interrupted by a ‘large part of a great story’ (268d), before the division is returned to. Rather than see these myths (mûthos) as disrupting the procedure, Deleuze sees it as an integral element. There is, to use Plato’s turn of phrase, a ‘mixing in’ (268d) of myth. For Deleuze, the method of division is designed to constitute a mix of these

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63 Note again the duplicity and cleaving: method (angler’s art) and system (thing itself).

64 LS, App. 1, p. 254.
two sides. In our interpretation, this means that the method cleaves each side: myth and the dialectic become cleaved within the method of division.

The characteristic of division is to surmount the duality of myth and the dialectic, and to reunite in itself dialectical and mythical power.\(^{65}\)

The unity of which Deleuze speaks is two-fold. Division works to surmount the duality of myth and the dialectic (this is its methodological, or ‘for itself’ aspect) and reunites in itself dialectical and mythic power (this is its systematic, or ‘in itself’ aspect). In truth, dialectical and mythical power each has to be understood in relation to one another. The power of which Deleuze speaks here ‘is’ the differential element ‘between’ myth and the dialectic.

The Platonic project comes to light only when we turn back to the method of division, for this method is not one dialectical procedure among others. It assembles the whole power of the dialectic in order to combine it with another power, and represents thus the entire system…\(^{66}\)

The differential element enables determination (‘as’ differentiation), or, we should say, it enables determination in this world. Just as finite and infinite represent the differential element in operation, so do myth and the dialectic represent this element.

Bringing these two aspects together, we can say that the method of division enables the determining of a world from within that world. Plato inaugurates the Western tradition which sees the activity of philosophy in this way: to philosophise is to determine from within a world. The practice of philosophy he inaugurates is cartographic: myth and the dialectic are used in a co-ordinating fashion to determine. To determine the true lover, for example, one must find the ‘right co-ordinates’ of

\(^{65}\) Ibid. pp. 253-255.

\(^{66}\) Ibid. p. 253.
the true lover, according to a play of myth and the dialectic. The task of determining, however, is not like solving a puzzle where the answer is there but obscured from view. It is to really determine the true lover: the true lover only becomes the true lover ‘at the moment’ of determination and according to the act of determining itself. Accordingly, this determination is a selection, the true lover is determined in the sense of being selected. Insofar as this determination takes place with respect to the two sides that are constructed by and in that philosophy - as opposed to being sides that are pre-determined - this determining constitutes grounding.

To ground is, in this context, to select and involves ‘a will to select and to choose’. This will is identified by Deleuze as the ‘motivation’ of Platonism and its theory of Ideas. What does this mean exactly? In our interpretation, the motivation of Platonism is the function of Platonism. Its motivation is what keeps it going, it is how it works. This ‘will to select and to choose’ is a will to establish, to ground. The question is how it does this, how Platonism grounds. For an answer to this we need to explore the relationship between Plato’s philosophy and the function by introducing the problem of function into the examination.

**Plato’s function**

We have spoken thus far as if Platonism re-emerges relatively unscathed in Deleuze’s philosophy, as if Deleuze’s philosophy is a new Platonism. Certainly, Deleuze’s philosophy constitutes a renewal of Platonism, but it is a renewal involving a reversal. Deleuze, following Nietzsche, engages himself in the project of reversing Platonism. What is involved in this project? To reverse is not to oppose or to negate, but to radically inflect. In order to reverse something, one must first get to the heart of that thing. The heart is not the outcome, the heart is the engine, what drives an operation, rather than what it produces. “To reverse Platonism” must

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68 We associate selection with grounding here because selection is a part of, or a dimension of the grounding procedure. When I select, I ground. See the below section on selection for an explanation of the relationship between selection and ground.
mean to bring this motivation into the light of day’.\textsuperscript{69} This involves, in our interpretation, seeing Platonism in terms of a will to operate, and to operate well.

Plato wants to determine how the good life is to be lived.\textsuperscript{70} In our interpretation, this means that he wants to determine what constitutes good and healthy functioning. Furthermore, he wants his philosophy to function thus. As we explain further below, Plato positions his philosophy as a tool to be used in the creation and maintenance of a healthy, functioning society. And he configures his philosophy with this function in mind. The problem is that the philosophy falters. It has flaws that make it difficult for it to function. It is as if Plato created the idea of reality or life as functioning within a philosophy that itself aimed to function – an ‘abstract machine’, to use Deleuze and Guattari’s concept – but arranged the components of this machine in such a way that it does not work. To reverse Platonism is to reassemble the machine so that it does function. It is to transform this dysfunctional Platonism into a functioning Platonism, and to do so by retaining much of the project’s original drive. Retained is this notion of a philosophy that functions and the demand that the philosophy function well.

Let us address the question now: why does Plato’s philosophy not work? What is it that prevents the philosophy from functioning? It is the transcendent Platonic Idea. In the history of the function, Platonism is unique insofar as it introduces the concept of the function, and of philosophy as functioning, at the same time that it introduces the first dysfunctional element: the Platonic Idea.

The poisoned gift of Platonism is to have introduced transcendence into philosophy; to have given transcendence a plausible philosophical meaning.\textsuperscript{71}

\textsuperscript{69} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{70} This is a general aim of Plato’s, which becomes a specific aim in the Philebus.
\textsuperscript{71} Gilles Deleuze, “Plato, the Greeks”, in EC, p. 137.
There is no irony here: only when the function is introduced are the conditions under which something can be dysfunctional determined, hence Deleuze’s ‘poisoned gift’ remark.

How must we understand this opposition between function and dysfunction? How is it characterised? And what is the relationship between the function and the Platonic Idea? Is the opposition, for example, the same as that between ‘organised’ and ‘disorganised’? Is to be organised to be functional and to be disorganised to be dysfunctional? This is the Aristotelian view. According to Aristotle, Plato’s philosophy does not function well insofar as there is no space for rigorous organisation. The method of division, for example, proceeding as it does through progressive subdivision, is viewed as an illegitimate syllogism. Plato’s philosophy seems unable to function insofar as it attempts to function without a mediating concept. Even if it is accepted that Plato proposes a dialectic of rivalry, how can a selection be made if there is no concept in general with which to measure the rival suitors? How can, for example, the true statesman be identified if there is nothing to measure and judge the suitors? Does Platonism not need such a mediating concept in order to function? Deleuze thinks that it does not.

Aristotle indeed saw what is irreplaceable in Platonism, even though he made it precisely the basis of a criticism of Plato: the dialectic of difference has its own method - division - but this operates without mediation, without middle term or reason; it acts in the immediate and is inspired by the Ideas rather than by the requirements of a concept in general. It is true that division is a capricious, incoherent procedure which jumps from one singularity to another, by contrast with the supposed identity of a concept. Is this not its strength from the point of view of the Idea?\footnote{DR, p. 59.}

Two different functions or two different concepts of the function are in question here: functioning as organised and functioning as non-organised. In the former case, the
formula ‘functional = organised’ holds true and in the latter it does not. The former is an Aristotelianised Platonism.

One might think of the concept of the body-politic to understand what is involved in this Aristotelian conception of functioning. The body-politic is considered here as totality of operations pertaining to the functioning of the organs. Here, functioning is understood purely in terms of the functioning of an overarching system. Functioning does not occur in itself and occurs in virtue of something else: the system. All activity is mediated insofar as it occurs in virtue of the system. A reverse Platonism functions differently.

How does a reverse Platonism function? Here, it will be useful to accompany the formal treatment of Platonism offered thus far with a narrative. Our segue between the two treatments is Deleuze’s remark that a concept is always created as the ‘function of a problem’. This is how we propose to develop the question of how Plato’s philosophy functions. It functions, in the first instance, as a response to a problem.

Platonism and its problems
What problem or set of problems is Platonism a response to? We have to look to the historical context. The Greek polis was characterised by a state of perpetual and productive conflict, a clamour of voices, vying to be heard. Each voice brings with it a claim.

The joiner lays claim to wood, but he comes up against the forester, the lumberjack, and the carpenter, who all say, ‘I am the friend of wood.’

73 WP, p. 16.
74 Ibid. p. 9.
When looked at more closely, it becomes clear that each claim is double; it is *de jure* and *de facto*. The joiner says that he should be the one that is successful in this case (*de facto*) because he is the one who is the true friend of wood (*de jure*).

Well now, we prohibited a shoemaker from simultaneously undertaking farming or weaving or building, but had him concentrate exclusively on shoemaking, to ensure quality achievements on shoemaking; and we similarly allotted every single person just one job—the one for which he was naturally suited, and which he was to work at all his life, setting aside his other pursuits, so as not to miss the opportunities which are critical for quality achievement.  

Each individual is allotted a job for which they have a natural aptitude (*de jure*) but one in which improvements must be made (*de facto*: not missing ‘the opportunities which are critical for quality achievement’). The State’s functioning is dual; it works with these elements in tandem. Or rather, it cleaves (cf. *Cleave*) both these elements.

Platonism constitutes a sorting mechanism that will determine how the State will function. As a method, it can be used to determine what functions will be performed, who will perform what function and in what measure, and so on.

The rivalry is itself an element in the functioning. It is an internal, genetic element of determination. Through it (and the sorting which accompanies it) the city will be determined progressively as milieu. The nodal points of the city-scape will form a structural network or grid. These are the contours of the body-politic in its non-organic or non-organisational functioning. We will refer to this concept of functioning being determined according to an ‘internal genetic element’ later in the thesis with reference to Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism. The Platonic framework does not allow complete understanding of this element, but it does present an understanding of life as *evolutionary*. Plato’s philosophy, in a sense,

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75 Plato, *Republic*, 347c.
76 See the section on ‘The genetic’, in Chapter 4.
responds to the problem of life as changing, as dynamic. There is a dynamic to the State that requires a philosophy sufficient to its movements. A dynamic, evolving State requires a philosophy that is itself dynamic, that is itself evolutionary. Plato realised the need for his philosophy not simply to be a philosophy that formed concepts of life, but a philosophy that itself lived, that itself functions. Plato does not present simply a conception of life, but a philosophy that itself lives, or at least, attempts to live. This philosophy serves to ground the State through an analysis that works towards complexification and enrichment.

With this understanding established, we turn to address the old question: is The Republic a precursor to modern totalitarianism? Are the lives of the individuals of the State a function of that State? Are the operations of Plato’s philosophy as a whole a function of a system, in the sense of being in the service of that system? It is clear that, in Plato, the healthy functioning of the State is everything, but this does not necessarily lead to totalitarianism. And in fact a reverse Platonism offers a different interpretation. Plato’s juridico-legislative program, as outlined in the Republic, does not involve the supervenience of the State over individual affairs. Individual activity and expression is not a function of the State. It is closer to the truth to say that it is the other way round, to consider the State as a function of individual activity and expression. Or, to be more precise, everything is organised according to optimum functioning, but a functioning that is not immanent to the State and where the State is instead immanent to functioning. In other words, the State is ‘in the service’ of life, or of functioning, rather than the reverse. In fact, one of the great innovations of Platonism is to conceive of the State as coextensive with life; its operations are vital operations. We would say that the State is like an organism, were it not for the fact that life here operates according to a non-organic order. In a reverse Platonism, the mechanisms are ordered in a different way, a way that ‘allows’ them to function without the mediation involved in organisation. Life, according to Plato, ‘is’ non-organic functioning. It is a question of determining the internal mechanisms of this functioning.
Before we turn to these internal mechanisms, let us ask: how can there be functioning without mediation, or without a middle term, in the manner of Aristotle? The answer is that there will be a functioning in the middle. What does this mean? Here, it is useful to turn to the Plato-Aristotle conflict again.

The Platonism we are used to is Platonism pushed entirely in one direction. It is a systematic or ‘standard’ Platonism, or one might say an Aristotelian Platonism. It might be expected that a reverse Platonism, such as Deleuze’s, would choose the other path - that of method - just as decisively as Aristotle chooses system, but this is not the case. In pushing Plato towards method as forcefully as Aristotle pushes his philosophy towards system, Deleuze would be repeating Aristotle’s error, rather than correcting it. In Aristotle’s view, the tension between the methodological and the systematic has to be resolved by eliminating one in favour of the other. Deleuze’s strategy is not to resolve this tension but to involve it as an element in his philosophy. There is, in Plato, a kind of coherence that Aristotle stabs out with his own philosophy. Negatively speaking, Platonism’s strength is the lack of a mediating concept. In fact, a neat and formally instructive characterisation of the functioning of a reverse Platonism is available here: (a reverse) Platonism works to construct a middle, or milieu, by eschewing the principle of excluded middle. It is not myth or the dialectic, nor method or system, nor finite or infinite: it is, in each case, both.

In truth, we should not speak of the absence (or negation) of this negation, nor of a refusal to choose, but rather of an inclusion of the positive, of a choosing of both. Rather than exclude the principle of excluded middle, Deleuze, following Plato includes the middle. Difference ‘is mediated, it is itself mediation, the middle term in person.’\textsuperscript{77} With regard to Plato’s philosophy, the question is whether the Platonic Idea will be associated with that which excludes difference, or understands it in

\textsuperscript{77} DR, p. 31.
virtue of something else, or that which includes difference in the sense of finding a concept of difference in itself.

With Plato, the issue is still in doubt: mediation has not yet found its ready-made movement. The Idea is not yet the concept of an object which submits the world to the requirements of representation, but rather a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not 'representable' in things. The Idea has therefore not yet chosen to relate difference to the identity of a concept in general: it has not given up hope of finding a pure concept of difference in itself.78

In our interpretation, this opposition between the identity of a concept in general and a concept of difference in itself corresponds to the opposition between the dysfunctional, or the absence of functioning, and the functional. If I say ‘I love you’ to a person this can mean that I have identified the concept of love and have determined that the way I feel about that person conforms to this model – the identity of a concept in general. There is no performance, no functioning, and the declaration constitutes a reflection on a syllogism. Alternatively, it can mean that I have, in this declaration, proposed an infinite task, a task that I perform by loving the person. In performing this task, I ground, I establish a world.

We have established that a reverse Platonism functions through an inclusion of the middle or through an inclusion of difference in itself, but we have not explained what sort of functioning this gives us. How does a reverse Platonism function? Again, a comparison with an Aristotelian Platonism is useful. The latter is ordered according to its organs; it is organised. What of the former? It functions without organisation and without organs. We can make a Deleuzian move here and suggest that Plato’s Republic constitutes an attempt to construct a concept of a ‘body-politic without organs’, a concept standing as an early precursor to Deleuze’s concept of the

78 Ibid., p. 59.
‘body without organs’, introduced in *LS*, and developed in the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia* project, with Guattari. We need to look to discern a non-organic order in Plato. Consistent with our interpretation of Platonism as functioning, we will say that it is a question of discerning the internal mechanisms of Plato’s philosophy. We do so because we see these mechanisms as the earliest ‘versions’ of the internal mechanisms operative in Deleuze’s philosophy.

*Plato’s mechanisms*

What are the mechanisms operative in Plato’s philosophy, standing as precursors to those operative in Deleuze’s philosophy? We must look to the ‘motor’ of Platonism, the method of division, to detect these mechanisms. From the movement of this method, three mechanisms can be identified: the claimants, that which is claimed, and that which determines the success of the claim. These mechanisms are captured by the neo-Platonic triad of the Participant, the Participated and the Unparticipated (or the Imparticipatable).

…the Neo-Platonists provide us with such a profound understanding of Platonism in setting out their sacred triad: the Imparticipable, the Participated, and the Participants. The grounding principle is imparticipable but nevertheless provides something to be participated in, which it gives to the participant, who is the possessor in second place, the claimant who has been able to pass the grounding test. One could say: the father, the daughter and the suitor.

These figures have different synonyms, including Unparticipated/father, Participated/daughter and Participant/fiancée. Different suitors, all claiming the hand of the daughter are judged by the Father. The Participant makes his claim to the Participated and the success of the claim depends on the Father, who is not

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79 Cf. *LS*, pp. 82-93.
80 *DR*, p. 62.
participated in, but rather bears the right to the Participated that the Participant seeks. If the Participant is successful, then the reason he is successful lies with the father. The father is the gate-keeper; he grounds the union in the sense of bequeathing the right for it to occur. ‘...in claiming the hand of a daughter...one takes as arbiter the Father who is the third, the foundation.’

In essence, this is how Platonism functions with respect to the question of grounding. It is the method of division broken up into its internal mechanisms. These concepts, or mechanisms, are created by Plato as the function of a problem; in this case, the problem of grounding. In a sense, they stand as alternatives to the transcendent Idea, with respect to this problem. The Idea and the Platonic triad vie to be the ground in Plato; they are themselves claimants to the title of ground.

How does this alternative Platonism function? What is the order involved if it is not organisation? It is, we claim, a pathogenetic order. This order will be marked according to its separate mechanisms in Chapter 3. At the moment, we will say that this is an order after the manner of a cleaving. Each figure of the neo-Platonic triad has a double function. For example, these concepts function in and for themselves; that is, they function in themselves and also function ‘for’ Plato. The neo-Platonic triad are the internal mechanisms of Plato’s thought, but they are also themselves created by Plato. Myth, for example, is cleaved by Plato and it is also cleaved within Plato’s thought. It performs a double function and its function is double, just as the border of a country performs a double function (it separates and links countries), at the same time as its function is double (through it, the countries are separated and linked). This is a ‘model’ for immanent functioning and for life, in its functioning. It is how Deleuze’s triplets operate: the three syntheses of time in DR, the three syntheses in AO, and other triplets operative in his thought (including the aforementioned neo-Platonic triad). They are created by Deleuze within his

81 WG.
philosophy at the same time as they function within that philosophy. As Deleuze says, in conversation with Foucault,

A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We don’t revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others. It is strange that it was Proust, an author thought to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don’t suit you, find another pair.82

Neither Plato’s philosophy, nor Deleuze’s, functions ‘for itself’. The coherence proper to it includes the use to which it is put, ‘beginning with the theoretician himself’. The neo-Platonic triad is a mechanism where the participant (as figure of the Participant) is one of the mechanisms. ‘I am a writing machine. The last screw has been added. The thing flows. Between me and the machine there is no estrangement. I am the machine...’83

Later, we will say that this participation must be understood in relation to the concept of pathos, of functioning within the milieu constructed, and we will link this neo-Platonic triad with the concept of pathogenesis and its mechanisms. However, at the moment, we will turn to an examination of other Platonic figures operative in Deleuze’s philosophy: ‘the question-problem complex’, ‘repetition’, ‘selection’ and ‘ungrounding’.84 Each is a component in Deleuze’s functioning philosophy and each will be examined with respect to the question of how it functions and how it contributes to functioning as aspect of Deleuze’s reversal of Platonism. Each

84 We are here greatly indebted to Daniel Smith’s study, “The concept of the simulacrum: Deleuze and the overturning of Platonism”, Continental Philosophy Review, Vol. 38 No. 2 (2006)”. In this work, Smith gives a detailed exposition for each of the four figures.
component will deliver, in our interpretation, a concept proper to pathogenesis. The question-problem complex will deliver the dyad, repetition will deliver \textit{ratio}, selection will deliver \textit{logos} (a new version of Plato’s \textit{lógos}) and ungrounding will deliver the unequal.

\textbf{Question-problem complex and the dyad}

The question-problem complex features prominently in \textit{WG} and \textit{DR}. It is a problematic relation between the question and the problem. Deleuze, in his book on Hume, defines a philosophical theory as a question.

\begin{quote}
...a philosophical theory is a developed question, and nothing other. By itself, in itself, it consists not in resolving a problem, but in developing to its limit the necessary implications of a formulated question.\textsuperscript{85}
\end{quote}

Philosophy is concerned with questions, rather than with answers or solutions. Why this is the case can be understood by examining the relation between a question and an answer. All the power in a question-answer relationship lies with the question. A more powerful response to a question will be a question, since to pose a question in response (rather than give an answer) is to create a world, rather than to accept the world determined by the question. If one’s answer is determined purely by the question, then all the power in the exchange will lie with the question. In giving an answer – that is, something that is nothing but an answer – one submits wholly to the question. J.A. Symonds’ characterization is apt:

\begin{quote}
For mere logic every question contains its own answer – we simply fill the hole with the dirt we dug out.\textsuperscript{86}
\end{quote}


Whether this particular structure is involved in a question, or to what extent this question tends towards this structure, depends on the form of the question. It is for this reason that Deleuze undertakes a critique of questions.

It is not certain that the question *what is this?* is a good question for discovering the essence or the Idea. It may be that questions such as *who?* *how much?* *how?* *where?* *when?* are better—as much for discovering the essence as for determining something more important about the Idea.87

The question *what is this?* is linked to what we can call the ‘question-answer complex’. No differential is involved in this complex: the answer to this question—the Platonic Idea—can be nothing other than what it is. As Smith remarks,

Empirically speaking, a mother is not only a mother, but also a daughter, a lover, perhaps a wife; but what Plato would call the Idea of a mother is a thing that would only be what it is, a mother that would be nothing but a mother (the notion of the Virgin Mary could be said to be the Christian approximation of the Idea of a pure mother).88

Smith’s characterisation is a useful one. However, it does not work as sufficient characterisation of the Platonic Idea. It is not simply that the Platonic Idea, or the question, *what is this?* has no empirical purchase. It also has no power. The *what is?* question of the early Socratic dialogues silences the interlocutor, precisely because it renders them powerless.

You’ve cast some spell over me, so now I’m completely at a loss. In fact, if you don’t mind me turning the whole business into a bit of a joke, on the inside you’re like one

87 “The Method of Dramatization”, in DI, p. 94.
of those stingrays that paralyzes everything it touches; you look a bit like one, too – broad and flat. Anyway, now you’ve done it to me; both my mind and my tongue are completely numb. I’ve got no answer to give you.  

There is a lack of power on both sides. The question cannot be used to determine any response (that the interlocutor might have). There is also powerlessness on the other side insofar as the interlocutor is rendered unable to perform the task being asked of him. Smith sees the primary purpose of the early elenchic dialogues as ‘preparative’ – their aim being ‘to silence empirical responses in order to open up the region of the Idea in general’. This is consistent with our own interpretation, which sees Plato in these dialogues demonstrating the superiority of the question-problem dyad over the question-answer dyad. As regards the problem of power, the former is superior because the latter is powerless. In what sense is it powerless? It cannot determine a world and it cannot determine that which constitutes a world. The question-problem dyad is able to perform these functions due to its dyadic structure. The question-answer dyad can be discarded here as ‘non-dyadic’ because we use the question-problem dyad to construct a new entity: the dyad. Here, we propose to consider the dyad as an entity in its own right, as an entity standing as constituent component of a world it functions to determine. The dyad is here recast as metaphysical entity. It is the basic building block of a functioning life-world.

The dyad’s great precursor with regard to its role as metaphysical entity is Leibniz’s monad. Like the monad, the dyad is a theoretical entity that is indivisible and unextended. We can understand the difference between the two concepts by focusing on what ‘indivisible’ means in each case. A monad is indivisible insofar as it is unable to be broken down or differentiated ‘further’. It constitutes what Deleuze

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89 Plato, *Meno* 80a-b.
91 It must be emphasized that, due to time constraints, we cannot attempt a full conceptualisation of the dyad in this thesis.
calls the ‘Small’: an infinitesimal, or infinitely small, difference. The monad represents the smallest difference there can be; it constitutes a ‘minimum’. It is minimum difference, rather than a concept of difference in itself.

The test of the Small and the Large seemed to us to misconstrue selection because it renounced any concept of difference itself in favour of the requirements of the identity of the concept in general. By inscribing itself within the identical concept or within analogous concepts (minimum and maximum), it only fixed the limits within which determination became difference.\footnote{DR, p. 42.}

Leibniz discovers the minimum difference, which is at once in close proximity to a concept of difference in itself and nowhere near the concept. As difference derived from an identical concept, it is nowhere near a concept of difference in itself. As closest approximation to difference in itself, it is proximate.

The dyad is different. It has nothing to do with approximation. Difference is at its centre, operating as ‘source’ of the dyad. What does this mean? Like the monad, the dyad is indivisible in the sense that nothing outside it can divide it further. However, in the case of the dyad, this is because the power to divide is enveloped within the dyad, at or as its centre. The dyad has a centre that is a border (cf. \textit{Border}). Just as the function of a border is to ground and determine, so does this border ground and determine. It is able to ground and determine in its capacity as border. We refer here to a curious aspect of the border; we see the border as an \textit{a priori} ‘element’. A border cannot not ground; its function is to ground.

We see the border as the ‘real’ grounding element in this thesis and in pathogenetic understanding. This is because the border captures function and ground in an \textit{a priori} relation; a border functions by grounding and it grounds in its functioning. We will explain how this relationship contributes to pathogenetic in Chapters 4 and 5, where the activity of life is explained to consist of a proliferation of
borders, where these borders ground and determine in their circulation. For now, we connect this understanding with the dyad, as sketched. The dyad is able to function in the way we have described – as determining agent in a world, rather than as element in a composite – ‘because of’ this a priori relation. Or rather, this a priori relation explains why the dyad is able to ground. The dyad, as concept, captures that which cannot not ground: a border. What does it mean to say that the concept ‘captures’ a border? We explain with reference to Leibniz’s window, linked to our concept of the border. Like the monad, the dyad has no windows through which anything can enter or leave, but this is because the dyad is such a window. This window is, in our usage, a border. Leibniz’s window is reconfigured here as a border that functions by cleaving inside and outside of the window. It functions as the door from the example given in the introduction does; it cleaves inside and outside of the room.93

We stress here again that our aim is not to present the dyad as fully formed concept. It is only sketched here briefly. This sketch is offered for two reasons. Firstly, it contributes to our understanding of pathogenetic functioning, an understanding developed progressively in the present work. Secondly, it works alongside concepts such as border and cleave to explain how Deleuze’s philosophy functions. We see Deleuze’s philosophy as dyadic.

In response to the question as to what is dyadic in Deleuze’s philosophy, we will resist the temptation to reply, ‘everything!’ and answer: actual and virtual. The actual and virtual are dyadic: cleaved, they constitute the actual-virtual dyad. The world of Deleuze’s early work has the actual-virtual dyad as its basic building block, its primary metaphysical entity. It is an entity representing, or rather, capturing ‘a life’ in its pathogenetic functioning. We will develop a pathogenetic understanding of the actual-virtual dyad in Chapter 3.

93 We develop this inside/outside dichotomy in Chapter 4, in relation to Kant’s differentiation between an inner ground and external determination. See the section on ‘The genetic’ in that chapter.
Repetition and ratio

The second figure of a reverse Platonism is ‘repetition’. This section will be more about reason, however, and will work to construct ratio as a figure representing reason. To be more precise, it will work to construct ratio as a figure representing reason as it is conceived in pathogenesis.

There is no obvious link between repetition and reason, either with respect to the Platonic dimension of this figure of Deleuze’s or with respect to its other aspects – the Freudian dimension, or the Nietzschean dimension, for example. So why link the two? The short answer is that repetition triangulates with three elements: a term, a repeated term, and the element that makes the movement ‘between’ terms a repetition. This is the reason proper to the repetition: what makes the repetition a repetition. What is this reason? We can look to the two types of repetition Deleuze speaks of in order to determine an answer. There is, in Deleuze, ‘naked’ repetition, which we see as corresponding to an Aristotelian Platonism, and ‘clothed’ repetition, which we see as corresponding to a reverse Platonism. A naked repetition is a bare repetition of the Idea alone. If, for example, I tell the same anecdote at different times, this will be a repetition of this anecdote. In naked repetition, the anecdote is repeated in such a way that the Idea of the anecdote grounds the repetition, making of it a repetition. In naked repetition, the transcendent Idea is the reason – it is the identical middle term that links the first term and its repetition, the repetitious difference being said in virtue of each anecdote’s relation to the Idea. A clothed repetition is different. A clothed repetition takes into account all sorts of what Deleuze calls ‘disguises and displacements’, elements that seem to disfigure the anecdote. This includes all sorts of variables, such as the intense relations in the room, my spontaneous attitude towards the anecdote and towards the people in the room, what mood I am in, what mood others are in and so forth. The anecdote will

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94 ‘What is essential is that we find in these systems no prior identity, no internal resemblance. It is all a matter of difference in the series, and of differences of difference in the communication between series. What is displaced and disguised in the series cannot and must not be identified, but exists and acts as the differenciator of difference.’ DR, pp. 299-300.
have a different torque; it will come out of my mouth with different intonations, different emphases, and so on. Deleuze asks: should we see these aspects as distortions of the original anecdote (naked repetition), or on the contrary, as aspects that ‘clothe’ the repetition, aspects that constitute the ‘internal genetic elements of repetition itself, its integral and constituent parts’.

His answer is the latter.

With clothed repetition, reason no longer stands in a relationship of transcendence to the event, and becomes instead immanent. What does this mean exactly? What is the significance of this shift, with regard to the difference between transcendence and immanence? It might seem as though Deleuze makes virtual intensities, affects and so forth, the reason proper to the repetition, rather than the transcendent Idea. In a sense, this is true, but we must be precise here. It is important not to think of the virtual as the reason ‘brought down’ from transcendence into immanence, with the virtual’s relation to the actual being a replica of the Platonic Idea’s relation to its material instantiation.

Here, we separate one aspect of this reading in order to examine it critically: the line of thought that sees the virtual as reason standing in a relationship of transcendence to the actual. We claim that Deleuze does not simply ‘bring reason down’ into an immanent realm, but rather offers a structure of reason that is itself immanent. It is not a question of reason being immanent to... or transcendent to.... It is rather a case of reasoning being immanent. We seek to construct ratio as pathogenetic figure representing reason as immanent.

What makes up this figure of ratio? Firstly, we can ask: can an idea as to what ratio will consist of be gleaned from what we know of the difference between immanence and transcendence, with regard to Plato’s philosophy and to the difference between a traditional Platonism and a reverse Platonism? We know that, in the latter, totalities are eschewed. Thus, ratio will have nothing to do with the

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95 Ibid., p. 17
96 We claim, in Chapter 5, that DeLanda tends to understand the actual/virtual relationship in this way. See the section on ‘Responses to Badiou and other first wave readings’, in that chapter.
totality. How does this aid us? And what will ratio have to do with, if not totalities? A brief turn to mereology will aid our investigation here.

Mereology, as a discipline, consists generally in the study of two relations. First, it considers a ‘part/whole’ relation, a relation that becomes ratio in pathgenetic understanding. These are the relations between parts and wholes. Second, it considers an ‘element/element’ relation, a relation that becomes logos in pathgenetic understanding. These are the relations between elements (see the section on logos, below). Usually, the whole is taken to be a totality, but we know that there are none in a reverse Platonism. Thus, a mereology of a reverse Platonism will have no totality. What is the significance of the absence of the totality? In our view, the totality is a figure of confusion in mereology. It is often mistaken for the whole, when the two are entirely different. The whole, in Deleuze’s philosophy, must be understood in terms of the notion of open-ended becoming. This is a whole without total; a process, with its own emergent thread of consistency, which is in continuous development. This is what Deleuze, following Bergson, calls a virtual and continuous multiplicity.

It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers.97

To repeat, this multiplicity is whole without being total. It cannot be understood as totality because in a relationship where there is totality, there is supervenience upon constituent elements. We can think here of a totalitarian society. Individual expression, in such a state, is absent because such expression is only tolerated if it constitutes adequate expression of the society’s values, its ethos, and so on. Expression is a function of the state as totalizing system. The system functions to determine expression. Now, to clarify, we are not railing against totalitarianism here.

97 B, p. 38.
Our purpose is actually quite different. We want to draw attention to a sort of crossover in mereology between what we have called *logos* (element-element relation) and what we have called *ratio* (part-whole relation). We have said that there is conflation of whole and totality in mereology, but we are also interested in a specific consequence of this conflation. This is that the whole-totality functions to determine elements and their relations. *Ratio* and *logos* each encroach on the other’s territory, with the result that, to use a Platonic turn of phrase, neither is able to do its job properly.

In our interpretation, Deleuze, in reversing Platonism, addresses this issue by clarifying the relationship between the part/whole relation (*ratio*) and the element/element relation (*logos*). We will claim, in the below section on *logos*, that Deleuze separates the two relations in an ungrounding of mereology as a discipline. We will be more concerned with the relation between *ratio* and *logos* in that section. Here, we are concerned primarily with *ratio*, rather than with its relationship with *logos*. The aforementioned differentiation prepares the way for us to understand why *ratio* is considered as the relationship between part and whole.

In the above, we have associated reason with a part/whole relation. We now say that reason ‘is’ the relationship between part and whole. What does this mean exactly? We have a ready-made answer to this ‘is’ question, insofar as we have stated the primary ontological category in this thesis: the function. According to pathogenesis, each and every thing including reason functions. Reason ‘is’ not; it *functions*. What does this mean? We become Kantian here. Kant wanted us to limit analysis to that which takes place under specified conditions. For him, this means binding reason, or its application, to possible experience. For us, it means binding it to the *function*. For reason to appear is for reason to operate. We are not defining reason here simply as a tool that can be used. We are rather saying that the structure of reason is in coincidence with the structure of the function. This is reason and the function in an immanent ‘relationship’. This is how *ratio*, as a figure, is defined.
What would it mean for reason and the function to be in a relationship of immanence? What does it mean for them to be in coincidence? We prepared the way for an answer to this with the above differentiation within mereology. Ratio, we said there, is a part/whole relation. Here, we draw attention to the link between this relationship and the function. Just as reason differentiates according to a part/whole relation, so does machinic analysis differentiate according to a part/whole relation. If I want to determine how a machine functions one option open to me is to attend to the machine by passing back and forward between wholes and their parts. I engage in a process where I view various independent components and determine how they interact with one another as a whole. I pass back and forth between these two perspectives, until I understand the machine not simply as a whole, but as a whole in its relation to its parts. Here, we must remember not to limit our thinking as to what constitutes a whole and what constitutes a part. For example, we might attend to a machine which performs multiple processes at once. We might think of these processes as parts in relation to a whole that is the interconnection of these processes. This whole is the machinic process ‘as a whole’.

In our interpretation, such thinking is at the root of the machinic analysis in operation throughout Deleuze’s work with Guattari. When they ask, ‘In what respect are desiring-machines really machines, in anything more than a metaphorical sense?’, we interpret this question as pertaining to the link between machines as part/whole relationship and reality. Their response is as follows.

A machine may be defined as a system of interruptions or breaks (coupures). These breaks should in no way be considered as a separation from reality; rather, they operate along lines that vary according to whatever aspect of them we are considering.

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88 AO, p. 38.
89 Ibid.
A machine is not separate from reality. Reality itself is machinic, reality functions. And when I analyse the operations of reality, I do so by invoking this part/whole structure. Or rather, when I apply reason to reality, I ‘break it up’ according to this part/whole structure. I can use this structure as a model of sorts to understand reality in its functioning. To use reason is to analyse something in its functioning, which is to say, it is to determine through co-ordination of part and whole. Or rather, it is to determine according to a cleaving of part and whole. If, for example, I want to analyse a complex process like the publication of a newspaper, I break up that One-whole process into its constituent process-parts – writing, editing, researching, and printing, and so on – and I determine the sense of each process by relating it to the One-whole process. Again, we emphasize the simple point here that this is a way of approaching reality reasonably. It is a way to ‘cut up’ reality, to order it in a reasonable way.

Selection and logos

Logos is best understood in its difference from ratio. Ratio refers to a relationship between part and whole and logos refers to the relationship between elements. Logos and Ratio are my terms for the two most general sorts of relations obtaining in Deleuze’s philosophy. We will define them over the next few paragraphs, using some examples.

Logos refers to a relation between elements; it is a logical or formal relation. It obtains locally; the logos question is always a ‘next’ question. To enquire into the logos of a large machine, for example, is to analyse it in terms of how its components are linked together – how they are next to one another and how these relations form a nexus, or nexuses – rather than how it functions as a whole, with respect to its parts. Ratio refers to this relation between part and whole. It obtains non-locally; the ratio question is always a ‘context’ question. This is to analyse the components of a machine not with respect to how they are linked but with respect to how they, as parts, function with respect to the whole. It is a questioning of determining
according to a relation between part and whole. To determine something ‘in context’ is to attribute sense to something by examining it in relation to wider processes; that is, to determine that thing as part in relation to a whole that is the whole of these wider processes.

If I want to work out how a machine functions, I can approach it by asking how its processes as parts function in relation to its process as whole. This is ratio. Alternatively, I can analyse the machine in terms of its linkages instead. I can look to the connections of the machine, to the emergent threads proper to the individual processes. These threads are not made up of parts and whole, but of elements. Multiple elements become synthesized in one continuous process. The question proper to this process always what happens next. The logos question is a ‘next’ question: it has to do with nexuses and sequences.

I passed my exam because I studied. This might be the reason I passed, but it tells us nothing of different selections that were made in the process of this studying. I chose the right books, studied the right topics and so forth. In other words, I was able to pass because I made good selections. The movement here corresponds to the movement of the Platonic dialectic, a sequential movement that proceeds according to steps, by forging links.

To take another example: in analysing the economic situation of the United Kingdom, I have to analyse its relations with countries such as Greece at both a local (logos) and non-local (ratio) level. Bilateral interactions – free trade agreements, for example, established between the two countries, as sovereign states – involve logos relations. These are local relations, or linkages. Multilateral interactions – such as those occurring between the two countries as E.U. member states (rather than as sovereign states) involve ratio relations. These are non-local relations.

For a more formal distinction between logos and ratio, we can turn to Kant’s distinction between grounding and determining. Kant defines a ground as ‘that
which determines a subject with respect of any of its predicates’. And for Kant, ‘to determine is to posit a predicate while excluding its opposite.’ We associate grounding with *ratio*, and reconfigure the relationship as occurring between a whole and its parts, rather than a subject and its predicates. And we associate determining with *logos*, and reconfigure the relationship as occurring between elements. *Ratio* and *logos* operate in conjunction with one another, but they refer to separate relations.

One final way of understanding the differentiation between *logos* and *ratio* is to see *logos* relations as ‘local’ and *ratio* relations as non-local. Deleuze, in our view, captures their relationship by referring to *Erewhon*.

The task of modern philosophy is to overcome the alternatives temporal/non-temporal, historical/eternal and particular/universal. Following Samuel Butler, we discover *Erewhon*, signifying at once the originary ‘nowhere’ and the displaced, disguised, modified and always re-created ‘here-and-now’.

The relationship between part and whole is real, but it is also ‘nowhere’. Multiple processes, such as the writing, editing, co-ordinating, researching and editing that make up the process of publishing a newspaper are themselves in relation to one another and in relation to the publication process as a whole. These relations are, to repeat, non-localisable but are real nonetheless. They are real insofar as they have the power to produce an effect – those working within these processes are aware of this structure and their actions are influenced by it. One cannot explain the workings of a newspaper office without referring to these non-local relations, but nor can one explain those workings without referring also to local relations.

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102 *DR*, p. xxi.
One cannot explain the workings of a newspaper office without referring to local relations in addition to non-local relations. These are the selections involved in each of the aforementioned processes. I make ‘local’ choices, I proceed through syntheses. I decide to follow up on a lead on corruption involving mid-level politicians. I make selections and through these selections I synthesize; a narrative emerges.

It is through these analyses on ratio and logos that we arrive at an important question: how does one, in an analysis, completely determine functioning? We need to somehow combine ratio with logos. How are they combined? An analysis makes use of each ‘at once’, just as Erewhon signifies at once the nowhere and the here-and-now. With this ‘at once’ we have something like a third element in play, one that couples or cleaves logos and ratio. The sense of this cleaving will be understood by turning to the last Platonic figure: ungrounding.

**Ungrounding and the unequal**

‘Ungrounding’ (cf. **Ungrounding**) is perhaps the least well understood of the four figures of a reverse Platonism. How do we understand ungrounding? And what is the relation of ungrounding to the unequal? We can introduce the unequal by referring to a fundamental distinction Deleuze makes in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze associates the equal with the sciences, rather than with philosophy. Working on what Deleuze and Guattari call a ‘plane of reference’ and dominated by what Deleuze calls ‘the symbol of equality’, science charts activity, but elides talk of power or grounding/determination. Science asks the what? question – *what happens in this process or operation?* – and remains neutral with regards to questions of determination. Philosophy, by contrast, asks questions such as who? how much? how? where? when? insofar as it is interested in the determining that occurs in these operations, determining that does not occur in science insofar as it is dominated by the equal. We are interested here primarily in what is involved in this determining,

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103 See WP, especially Chapter 5.
104 DR, p. 2.
and we are interested in the philosophical plane that accompanies science’s plane of reference, the plane of immanence. More precisely, we are trying to understand how this plane moves and what it does. We see this plane as infinite proliferation of borders, the function of which is to determine and ground. The unequal, or the Unequal in itself, is the engine of this proliferation.

Consider again the border and imagine a movement that is nothing but perpetual construction of borders, an iterative process that takes place along borders under construction. It is as if there is not ‘enough time’ for a ground or territory to become established because the movement itself is a transformation of borders. The movement – ungrounding – simultaneously defines territory, or grounds (reterritorialization) at the same time as dissolving this territory (deterritorialization). Perpetual border construction is a proper evolution, a movement that is approximated by saying that it is a dynamic where de-bordering and re-bordering, or deterritorialization and reterritorialization, occur simultaneously.

Deterritorialization must be thought of as a perfectly positive power that has degrees and thresholds (epistrata), is always relative, and has reterritorialization as its flipside or complement. An organism that is deterritorialized in relation to the exterior necessarily reterritorializes on its interior milieus. A given presumed fragment of embryo is deterritorialized when it changes thresholds or gradients, but is assigned a new role by the new surroundings.105

We have explained ungrounding as if it consitutes a dialectic, where de-bordering and re-bordering, or deterritorialization and reterritorialization, occur simultaneously, but in truth this is a secondary understanding of ungrounding. Understood this way, bordering is a revolving. Deleuze tells us that ‘the door of the

105 TP, p. 5.
world is a revolving door.’ A primary understanding sees it as cutting ‘between’ each as that which enables each. This is the evolution of the border, an evolution that should be understood as a straight line, rather than a circle.\textsuperscript{107} In relation to these two movements (reterritorialization and deterritorialization), it is a circle, but understood in itself, it is a straight line. In understanding the Unequal in itself we understand it in itself, rather than in relation to such movements. These two movements might be unequal to one another, but to say this is not to capture the Unequal in itself essential of the movement of ungrounding. Ungrounding involves the Unequal in itself (cf. Unequal, in the glossary).

The Unequal in itself is an important figure in DR, albeit one that is overshadowed by the related figures of difference and repetition. It is the ‘reason of the sensible, the condition of that which appears’;\textsuperscript{108} it is ‘disparateness as it is determined and comprised in difference of intensity, in intensity as difference.’\textsuperscript{109} Formally speaking, determination occurs through a play of the unequal. The Unequal in itself does not ‘keep to itself’; it does not operate in the same way as the traditional thing in itself of which Nietzsche has forbidden us to speak. It proliferates to infinity.

When we say that the eternal return is not the return of the Same, or of the Similar or the Equal, we mean that it does not presuppose any identity. On the contrary, it is said of a world without identity, without resemblance or equality. It is said of a world

\textsuperscript{106} Deleuze’s lecture on Kant: ‘Cours Vincennes : Synthesis and Time - 14/03/1978’, tr. Melissa McMahon; on Richard Pinhas’ Webdeleuze.com. See Chapter 4 for a discussion of this revolution in relation to Kant and the problem of dual grounding.

\textsuperscript{107} Cf. Deleuze’s discussion of the entrance into the third synthesis in DR: ‘…we enter into the third synthesis. It is as though time had abandoned all possible mnemic content, and in so doing had broken the circle into which it was lead by Eros. It is as though it had unrolled, straightened itself and assumed the ultimate shape of the labyrinth, the straight-line labyrinth which is, as Borges says, ‘invisible, incessant’. (p. 111).

\textsuperscript{108} DR, p. 222.

\textsuperscript{109} Ibid., pp. 222-223.
the very ground of which is difference, in which everything rests upon disparities, upon differences of differences which reverberate to infinity (the world of intensity).\textsuperscript{110}

This is the ‘world of intensity’ understood in a formal way. This world is the world of experience, but we can see clearly that there is a formalisation at the root of this world. A purely formal definition of this (intensive) world is available. It is \textquote{\textquote{E-E' where E refers to e-e' and e to ε-ε'…}}\textsuperscript{111} The movement Deleuze refers to with this formula is a proliferation of borders and a reverberation of intensity. E is bordered with \textquote{E'}, but their bordering is an intensity that implies a proliferation through e-e', and so on. There is perpetual differentiation. In our interpretation, this is to say that there is perpetual bordering.

This is one of the senses to be attributed to the Unequal in itself, but there is an accompanying, less positive sense. This is that the Unequal in itself is ‘in itself’ insofar as it is not understood in virtue of something else, namely the equal. When one speaks of the unequal, the question will be asked: ‘by unequal, do you mean, \textit{not equal}?’ It is important to realise that the unequal is different from the not equal. What is the difference?

Firstly, what is the equal (cf. \textbf{Equal})? We must ask this because, unlike the unequal, the not equal implies negation of the equal. Following Deleuze, we see the equal not as a ground for opportunity – a ground that encourages and enables social mobility, for example, through a levelling, where each individual is treated the same – but as a concept representing inhibition. An example can explain how we see the equal. For example, consider two individuals, A and B, who are different heights; A is taller than B. Even though A is taller than B, are A and B not determined by a principle ordering them, a metric principle, for example? Are they not \textit{equal} in this determination in the sense of being in the same relation to this principle? A response might be that they are not equal insofar as one is taller than the other. To this, we

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 241.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 117.
reply that they can only be determined as *not* equal, if there is an original determination of them as equal. They can only be not equal if they are, in a sense, ‘already’ equal. They must first be determined as equal (by a measuring principle) and then determined as not equal to one another by separation according to this principle each is subject to.

What is unacceptable about this ‘not equal’? Insofar as each thing is determined by its relation to a concept, or a principle of ordering, each thing becomes a functionary of that concept, or principle. In other words, there is, everywhere, repressive equality. The point is that under the rubric of the not equal, there is no determination. If I prosper in the department I work in at a university, I may get a promotion from Junior Lecturer to Senior Lecturer. I may earn this promotion and some will perhaps say that I have engaged in self-determination, but this promotion is to a position that is pre-determined. Again, this is not to say that the classification is there in advance. It is to say that the determination is made according to a system in operation, in this case, the hierarchical ranking system of the university. Wherever I am, my position is determined by the university. Or rather, my position is pre-determined. This is not to say that everything is determined temporally, in advance. It is rather to say that there can be no determining that constitutes *grounding*. Even if I outperform my peers and the university sees fit to invent a position for me, this is not to say that I have grounded in the sense of creating a ‘new space’ for myself. This space is that which is determined by the university as system.

What is the alternative to this picture, what of the unequal? The Unequal in itself has to be understood not in virtue of what determines it, but as that which has the ability or power to determine. Consider again the figure of *ratio*, defined in the above section devoted to it. We said that *ratio* is a figure representing the relation between part and whole, where this relation can be used as a tool in analysis. I can approach processes by splitting them into parts and wholes. For example, I can analyse the process of production of a newspaper by splitting it into processes as parts (researching, writing, editing, co-ordination) and by relating these processes to
one another as parts in relation to a whole which they constitute. But it is a condition of this analysis that the parts and their wholes are unequal to one another. A ratio ‘is’ always unequal in the sense that the two sides of any ratio are unequal (to one another). Indeed, by definition, the two sides of a ratio are unequal. Or rather, we should say that the two sides of ratio are split by the unequal. There is a border splitting the two sides, represented by ‘:’. This border, as unequal, is at the heart of a ratio and at the heart of our figure, ratio. We have already said that we see the border as a priori ‘element’. Now we can see this in relation to a method of analysis more clearly by saying that it is a condition of reasonable analysis (ratio, in pathogenetic understanding) that part and whole be ‘split’ by the unequal.

To the answer to the question as to how the unequal can split the two sides without becoming a common ground, our answer is that the unequal – as Unequal in itself, in this relation – works like a border does. It functions to split apart (and relate together) but it does not, in itself, constitute territory in the sense of ‘counting as’ territory.

Let us reorient the discussion slightly and focus on this question of the relationship between ratio, the equal and the unequal. A fascinating question that takes us to the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference is this: is the judgement ‘two sides proper to (a) ratio are unequal’ an analytic one? We are pulled in two directions. The judgment seems to be true by definition and thus does seem to be analytic. However, at the same time, it involves the unequal essentially and thus does not seem to be analytic, insofar as such judgments usually have as their components two things that are equal. Again, someone may ask to clarify the judgment: ‘by unequal, do you mean, not equal?’ If this is the case, if our judgment and this correction have the same sense, then our judgment is reducible to an analytic judgment. However, as we have sought to clarify, this changes the sense of the judgment: ‘unequal’ does not have the same sense as ‘not equal to one another’. The latter judgment involves mediation; it presupposes a principle that renders the two components equal. Thus, it presupposes an outside. The judgment, ‘two sides
of a ratio are unequal’ does not presuppose an outside. As a judgment, it is unmediated.

As Bergsonians, we can say that the corrected judgment contains less reality than our judgment. Any reduction must involve the reduction of the corrected (analytic) judgment, rather than our judgment, insofar that the former involves mediation and ours does not. Does this not stand as a good demonstration of what Deleuze means when he says, ‘difference is behind everything, but behind difference is nothing’? That is, does it not demonstrate that an ‘unequal judgment’ lies behind any analytic judgment? We must answer, ‘yes’, but with a qualification: there is no demonstration in this judgment. Here we have to differentiate our own clarification from a famous clarification made by Kant. As Deleuze remarks,

Kant comes along and says: if I say that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles - elementary geometrical proposition - what is that? Is it an a priori analytic judgment or an a posteriori synthetic judgment? Stunned silence!

Kant’s synthetic a priori judgment differs from an analytic a priori judgment insofar as it involves demonstration. The truth of that judgment is not derived from observational experience, but it nonetheless requires demonstration. This demonstration ‘provides’ the synthetic aspect. Or rather, the conditions under which the demonstration takes place provides the synthetic aspect. We will argue in subsequent chapters that this conditioning – Kant’s transcendental conditioning – is not a ‘real’ conditioning insofar as it occurs as function of a pre-determined regime. Here, we make a simpler point that accompanies this. A truth that is demonstrated is a truth that is pre-determined. If I demonstrate something then the truth of that thing has already been decided, its ground already laid or determined.

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112 DR, p. 57.
114 See ‘Kant’s Copernican Revolution’ in Chapter 2 and ‘The genetic’ in Chapter 4.
We oppose our judgment to Kant’s synthetic *a priori* judgment. Our judgment involves no demonstration, or, rather, it involves it only secondarily; it does not capture the nature of the judgment. What captures the nature of our judgment? What is involved, rather than demonstration? *Participation* is involved. It is a participatory judgment, the truth of which depends on participation, rather than demonstration.

What is the relationship between participation and ungrounding? One might think of it in the following way. As soon as participation is assumed to be an element ‘bound up’ with Truth everything changes. It is as if ‘participation’ represents here a chaotic element whose function is to upset any order, or rather, prevent any order from establishing itself. This is why we associate participation and ungrounding. We might think of the Platonic figure of the Participant as wandering figure that functions to determine any system it encounters. If I walk into a room then my participation becomes a determining element in the Truth of that room. For example, and to link to comments we made in the introduction and will return to in Chapter 4 and the conclusion, by walking through the door of the room from outside to inside, I render that room inside, when it was previously outside. Understood in this way, Truth actually disappears. If participation becomes a determining feature then there can ‘be’ no Truth. To put it another way, participation is fundamentally *falsifying*.

...narration ceases to be truthful, that is, to claim to be true, and becomes fundamentally falsifying. This is not at all a case of ‘each has its own truth’, a variability of content. It is a power of the false which replaces and supersedes the form of the true...\(^{115}\)

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This notion of ‘narration’ works here to express the point. We spoke above of the Participant as ‘wandering figure’; his wandering is a narrative of determination. Like Odysseus, he determines a world in his wanderings.

How does the unequal work as figure of pathogenesis? It works to explain how we should understand the milieu of affect. We associated pathogenesis, in the introduction, with the concept of affect and said that pathogenesis retains its links with notions of feeling, affectivity, and so forth. We see this duplicitous concept of affect – affect = to affect and be affected – not as static, but as dynamic. In Chapter 4 we will show, with reference to examples, that this dynamic is cyclical. Here, we have tried to explain how the Unequal in itself, as concept, captures this dynamic. The concept is here at once abstract and concrete: it is abstract as it refuses any examples; it must be understood in itself. And it is concrete insofar as it is that which enables determination. It is, to repeat Deleuze’s characterisation, the reason of the sensible.

Here, we can leave our project of offering a preliminary demarcation of pathogenesis as concept or disciplinary field. We finish by turning to an important Platonic concept in Deleuze’s philosophy: the simulacrum. We turn to this concept because it helps us to understand the milieu with which pathogenesis is concerned. We said in the introduction that this milieu is a milieu of affect. The concept of the simulacrum helps us to understand the sense of this milieu.

The simulacrum

The simulacrum, as Plato would have us believe, is an infinitely diluted copy, the most imperfect copy possible of a Form. It is a thought without ground; a thought of no fixed identity, a nomadic thought, neither for nor against anything. Rather than bring order to the Greek city state, the simulacrum would seem to do the opposite; it would bring unproductive chaos, through decentering, rather than centering. However, as Deleuze notes, Plato himself gleaned an alternative understanding of the simulacrum, which will become the ‘heart’ of a reverse Platonism.
...the *Sophist* contains the most extraordinary adventure of Platonism: as a consequence of searching in the direction of the simulacrum and of leaning over its abyss, Plato discovers, in the flash of an instant, that the simulacrum is not simply a false copy, but that it places in question the very notations of copy and model. The final definition of the Sophist leads us to the point where we can no longer distinguish him from Socrates himself – the ironist working in private by means of brief arguments. Was it not necessary to push irony to that extreme? Was it not Plato himself who pointed out the direction for the reversal of Platonism?\(^{116}\)

What significance is to be attributed to the discovery of the simulacrum? It places the notation of copy and model into question in the same way that our judgment, ‘the two sides of a ratio are unequal’, places the notation of the analytic judgment in question. It is the discovery that there is an unequal that is unequal in its own right, rather than in virtue of an equal. With or in the simulacrum, everything is understood from the perspective of the participant inside the milieu. The simulacrum involves the participant essentially, or rather, it involves participation essentially.

The simulacrum includes the differential point of view; and the observer becomes a part of the simulacrum itself, which is transformed and deformed by his point of view.\(^{117}\)

This is a world that includes the point of view of the participant. Or it is a world of participation, where – as we said previously – the Participant is one of the mechanisms in the functioning of the world. The mechanism does not function for itself; it involves participation. With this reorientation everything is transformed, everything becomes simulacrum. We can track down what this means by referring

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to one specific change, a change involving one of our Platonic figures referred to above. This is the transformation of *logos* to *pathos*.

With pathos, the delirium that Plato understands as founding a claim returns; a successful claim (in a world of simulacrum) demands the inducement of delirium, of pathos. The world determined is a world of semblance, without resemblance. What would a world be in which there is only semblance? Nabokov, in *Pale Fire*,\(^{118}\) gives a strong portrayal of such a world and of its implications. The title of the novel is taken from Shakespeare’s *Timon of Athens*.

> The sun’s a thief, and with his great attraction / Robs the vast sea: the moon’s an arrant thief, / And her pale fire she snatches from the sun.\(^ {119}\)

The standard Platonic reading of this is as follows: the sun participates in fire immediately – it is the foundation, or the father. The moon takes after the sun; its possession is second-hand. Nabokov, in a reversal, emancipates Shakespeare’s moon so that it is no longer a thief, obtaining its sustenance from elsewhere. It rises up on its own, emancipated, and lights itself. Resemblance is cast aside for semblance.

This reversal, welcoming semblance, is represented in the novel’s characterisation. The protagonist - the deposed King of Zembla (semblance) - has gone over to madness. The novel both recounts and enacts this madness by playing on perspective and refusing to clarify any main character’s identity. In doing so, the book removes any fixed point of reference that would enable such identification, including the Self. There is a ‘becoming unlimited’.

In short, there is in the simulacrum a becoming-mad, or a becoming unlimited, as in the *Philebus* where ‘more and less are always going a point further,’ a becoming always

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other, a becoming subversive of the depths, able to evade the equal, the limit, the Same or the Similar; always more and less at once, but never equal.\textsuperscript{120}

The equal is ‘evaded’ due to participation. To repeat our above comments, there is, with participation, a narrative of falsification; the unequal (falsity) replaces the equal (truth).

What happens when the equal is absent? There is full immersion as participation in the milieu. Without the equal, or any other mediator in operation, one finds oneself in a state of pathos. ‘Pathos’ here refers to the fact that everything in the milieu can be understood in terms of affect, in the Spinozian sense. We see here Spinoza’s affect, or an affective realm, as an immanent realm of participation. To participate immanently is to affect. It is also to be affected; my participation is two-pronged, I am affected when I participate. When an oak exerts pressure on a linden, that oak participates in a realm of affect. That realm might be defined by the oak, the linden and their environment. There is a dynamic of participation, where each tree affects and is affected by the other at the same time that they affect and are affected by their environment. This is pathogenetic functioning, understood with emphasis on the problem of participation.

\textit{Conclusion: Pathogenesis as field}

In this chapter, we have worked to introduce pathogenesis as methodology by defining several of its key concepts: dyad, \textit{ratio}, \textit{logos} and the unequal.

The dyad is the basic building block of the world, according to pathogenetic understanding. Rather than element in a composite, it functions to determine composites. It has the power to determine a world as composite, or rather, a world as multiplicity.

\textit{Ratio}, as a figure, represents how reason works in pathogenetic understanding. Pathogenesis, influenced by Kant and Deleuze, sees reason as immanent. It asks the

\textsuperscript{120} \textit{LS}, App. 1, p.259.
question as to what reason ‘is’ and answers that it is, like each and every other thing, something that functions. It gives a definition of reason that fits this answer. Reason is fashioned ‘in the image’ of the function; it ‘consists’ of a part/whole relation. And this relation functions by grounding; reason can be used as a tool to determine. One can determine according to this part/whole configuration.

*Logos* is also ascribed machinic understanding in pathogenesis. Logic, when put through our function-ground lens becomes *logos* and refers to elements in their relation within functional processes.

The Unequal in itself is an elusive figure that we have tried to explain primarily through the concept of the border. This figure represents the basic conceptual motor of life; life proliferates along borders and it is able to do so ‘because of’ the unequal, or the Unequal in itself.

We have also explored with reference to Plato characteristic themes of pathogenesis: its understanding of life in relation to sickness and health and its method of understanding life according to a coupling of function and ground. And we have characterised pathogenesis as a project continuous with the Nietzsche-Deleuze project of reversing Platonism.

An examination of Plato’s philosophy has allowed us to make these moves, but this analysis has its limitations. We need to go beyond Plato and the conceptual framework he offers in order to develop pathogenesis further. We do so in the next chapter by turning to the figure responsible for inaugurating the modern project of reversing Platonism with which we see our project as continuous: Nietzsche. We will continue both our development of function and ground as dynamic concepts in pathogenetic relation, and our development of pathogenesis as concept. And we continue in our development of pathogenesis as concept. The central development, in this regard, will be the introduction of disease as feature of pathogenetic understanding. Following Nietzsche, we will develop pathogenesis as conception of life as disease, rather than as conception of life in its relation to health and sickness.
Chapter 2

The function of ground

Nietzsche is engaged in a critique of all conceptions of affirmation which see it as a simple function, a function of being or of what is… For, insofar as affirmation is presented as a function of being, man himself appears as the functionary of affirmation: being is affirmed in man at the same time as man affirms being.\textsuperscript{121}

\textit{A modern reversal of Platonism}

In the previous chapter, Deleuze’s philosophy was presented as a philosophy of life, one with the related problems of function and ground at its centre. This philosophy was read critically as a reverse Platonism and was explored using this characterisation as a lens of sorts. Following Nietzsche’s declaration that the task of a philosophy of the future is to reverse Platonism, and Deleuze’s affirmation of this, we read Deleuze’s philosophy ‘as’ such a philosophy. The examination restricted itself to the Platonic framework, a framework that a reverse Platonism goes beyond. This chapter continues in the vein of the last, but progresses insofar as it turns to problems articulated and developed in Nietzsche’s philosophy in order to further determine the problem of life in Deleuze’s philosophy.

This chapter develops the modern problem of subjectivity in relation to Deleuze’s philosophy. Our analysis will not attempt to develop this problem as a question in its own right, however, and will instead offer a discussion of it as preliminary to problems constitutive of Nietzsche’s philosophy.

We introduce this question of subjectivity by raising a possible concern with regards to Deleuze’s philosophy, and one that might in particular be raised in response to the reading developed in the previous chapter, where Deleuze’s philosophy was presented as a renewal of Platonism. This is that Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy, insofar as it works with a Platonic structure, is better understood as conservative, rather than experimental. Consider Artaud’s scorching remarks,

God does not exist, he withdraws, gets the fuck on out and leaves the cops to keep an eye on things. He separates from himself 3 cops divided into 3. Okay, but why not 4 or 2 or 1 or zero or nothing at all? And from where did these 3 incorrigibly filthy accomplices of the father, son, the holy ghost (the father, mother and son), come to equal 1 and not 3?\textsuperscript{122}

Artaud’s challenge is significant because, although it happens to be directed at monotheism (and Judaism in particular), it is difficult to tell why it does not work as a criticism of Deleuze. Circulating throughout Deleuze’s philosophy of life are triplets corresponding to the neo-Platonic triad: the three syntheses of time, the three syntheses of AO, the “three Ethics” of Spinoza\textsuperscript{123}, and so on. Why do the triplets in Deleuze’s thought come to equal One – that is, the One proper to the indefinite article of ‘a life’, or to a univocal ontology – and not three? Why does, and how can, Deleuze ‘keep’ this triadic structure, a structure that emerged in Platonism? How can ‘a life’ be divided into three? Is this not a structure that makes a mockery of the philosophical problem of life? Rather than getting to life as real problem, is Deleuze not rather playing with a conceptual framework? Deleuze notes Artaud’s ire with regard to a similar topic, in LS.


Artaud considers Lewis Carroll a pervert, a little pervert, who holds onto the establishment of a surface language, and who has not felt the real problem of a language in depth – namely the schizophrenic problem of suffering, of death and of life. To Artaud, Carroll’s games seem too puerile, his food too worldly and even his fecality hypocritical and too well-bred.\textsuperscript{124}

While it is true that Artaud’s indignation is directed against a surface language – one also operative in Deleuze’s philosophy (and most evidently in use in \textit{LS}) - rather than a conceptual, triadic framework, the objection stands. Is this triad not simply a play of concepts \textit{representing} life?

The previous chapter delivered a promising answer: these figures are not the same figures of Platonism, they are the \textit{simulacra} of these figures. And as simulacra, these figures do not represent. Artaud’s stinging criticisms have no efficacy here as they are inspired by and directed against the rigid, fixed figures of Platonism, rather than the ‘versions’ of these figures operative in Deleuze’s philosophy. These ‘versions’ are simulacra. However, there is nothing in the analysis thus far that enables the differentiation of these figures from their transcendent counterparts. \textit{How do we know} that these figures in Deleuze’s work constitute simulacra? Objectively speaking, the two sets of triplets are the same. A concept could be formed for the Platonic triad that would be the same concept for any of the Deleuzian triads. It is as if we are standing at a vantage point from where the two triads are identical; they seem to be in the same relation with one another and they seem to perform the same function. The problem can be expressed by saying that we have unearthed nothing in Deleuze so far that will enable us to say that his philosophy is not Ideal, or reducible to an Idea. From a \textit{subjective} point of view, the triads can perhaps be differentiated. This point of view is represented by questions such as \textit{how do we know?} and \textit{by what right?} In his analysis of the concept of ground in the history of

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{LS}, p. 84.
philosophy, Deleuze remarks that it is Hume who imputes to the concept the
characteristic of subjectivity.

Hume falls upon an extraordinary problem. He poses the problem as follows: to know
is to go beyond. But where does that come from?

It is to ask what grounds knowledge. And according to Hume, it cannot be anything
else than a subjective principle. It is not the object, rather the subject that permits one to
discover the ground. It is this going beyond that incites the problem of grounding.\textsuperscript{125}

Grounding, until Hume, Kant and the modern era, was objective. In Deleuze’s
philosophy, grounding is subjective, or rather, it has a subjective dimension. Grounding and functioning, as the two sides of life, are subjective in Deleuze’s
philosophy. As we will show, subjective and objective are cleaved in Deleuze. In
order to show this, we turn to the philosopher whose work signaled, even more than
Hume, the splitting apart of subjectivity and objectivity: Kant.

\textit{Kant’s Copernican Revolution}

Kant’s Copernican revolution involved a realisation that philosophy had so far been
object-oriented. Previously, knowledge conformed to objects, and philosophical
problems, such as life, also conformed to objects. Kant identified this mode of
philosophising as dogmatic.

We deal with a concept dogmatically (even if it is supposed to be empirically
conditioned) if we consider it as contained under another concept of the object, which
constitutes a principle of reason, and determine it in accordance with the latter. But we
deal with it merely critically if we consider it only in relation to our cognitive faculties,
hence in relation to the subjective conditions for thinking it, without undertaking to
decide anything about its object.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{125} WG.

\textsuperscript{126}
With Kant’s Copernican revolution, philosophy re-oriented itself to become subject-oriented. Kant is like the empiric who, upon viewing bacteria under a microscope, suddenly realises that the lens he is using to view the bacterium itself determines how the bacterium appears. The lens in Kant’s case is the cognitive faculties and our subjective constitution; a constitution that is constitutive insofar as it constitutes a world and what is constitutive of that world. This is Kant’s transcendental idealism.

According to Kant’s thesis of transcendental idealism, the spatiotemporal world does not exist objectively - or in itself - and is instead structured by the subject experiencing the world. Space and time are the subjective forms of experience - everything that appears is necessarily spatio-temporal insofar as it appears ‘to’ a subject; the pure forms of space and time are the conditions under which something appears.¹²⁷ Everything that appears in the Kantian schema does so under the auspices of the transcendental schemata, representing the structure of subjectivity. Determination is subjective, which is to say, with regard to our thesis, that grounding is subjective, as are the related problems of function and life. Grounding becomes a subjective operation: the determination of a world and that which constitutes a world becomes a subjective operation; a world exists for itself (subjectively), rather than in itself (objectively), or rather, a world has objective reality or validity, but is determined subjectively. This is a shift that, while modern, can be understood in Platonic terms. As Bergson remarks,

Briefly, the whole Critique of Pure Reason ends in establishing that Platonism, illegitimate if ideas are things, becomes legitimate if Ideas are relations, and that the ready-made idea, once brought down in this way, from heaven to earth, is in fact, as Plato held, the common basis alike of thought and of nature.¹²⁸

¹²⁶ Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, § 74
Grounding, in Kant, ceases to be understood as revolving around the object and instead revolves around the subject: the object-oriented metaphysics of Plato and other pre-Kantian philosophers is replaced by the subject-oriented metaphysics of Kant.

How should we understand this shift? Several options seem open. We might take after Thomas Kuhn’s analysis of scientific progress\textsuperscript{129} and conclude that Kant’s philosophy heralds a paradigm shift in philosophy. Just as, in physics, the Newtonian paradigm might be understood as being succeeded by the Einsteinian paradigm, so might object-oriented metaphysics be understood as being succeeded by subject-oriented metaphysics. Or we can take a different tack and see Kant’s revolution as one that has parallels with the emergence of culturally significant movements, such as punk-rock music. Just as punk-rock emerges from a milieu of rock music partly as response to the dominance of rock, so does Kant’s philosophy emerge as response to a philosophical culture dominated by object-oriented philosophy. In our interpretation, neither reading hits the mark precisely, but each informs the Nietzschean critique we favour. Kant’s move is a revolutionary response to a dominant trend, one that seeks to undo that dominance by reclaiming a ground. In this way, Kant works like a pioneer of any culturally significant movement. He rejects the old ways and styles and creates new ones. However, in our view, Kantianism does represent something like a paradigm shift, which is to say that it presents a wholly new paradigm for philosophy to operate according to \textit{and for life to submit to}. The revolutionary move of orienting knowledge and life around the subject rather than the object is a move whereby life becomes a function of subjectivity, rather than objectivity. We will not say, with Nietzsche, that Kant is like

\textsuperscript{129} See Kuhn’s landmark text, \textit{The Structure of Scientific Revolutions} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
the fox who goes ‘back into his cage’,\textsuperscript{130} after it has broken free, but will say rather that Kant is like the fox who, after breaking free, goes into a different cage: a cage of subjectivity, rather than objectivity. Kant liberates life from the trappings of objectivity, only to make life a functionary of subjectivity. Kantianism still preaches a submission to laws as a way of life.

The Nietzschean revolution heralds a reversal. Such laws, or such orders, revolve instead around life. A new conception of philosophy emerges with Nietzsche, with new criteria. Philosophy becomes concerned, in the first instance, not with questions such as what we know, or how we know it, but with the problem of life itself. Or rather, it becomes concerned with the problem as to how to improve the tenor of existence and how to intensify life. It becomes less concerned with notions such as ‘true’ and ‘false’ and becomes more interested in questions to do with augmentation and diminution: what augments life and what degrades it? Nietzsche poses this question according to the same broad framework as Plato before him. It is for Nietzsche, as it was for Plato, a question of health.

\textit{Nietzsche and philosophy}

Nietzsche’s great strength, for Deleuze, is his conception of philosophy as ‘a symptomatology and a semiology’.\textsuperscript{131} The philosopher, for Nietzsche, is a ‘cultural physician’.\textsuperscript{132} Nietzsche proceeds by identifying sicknesses in culture – beliefs that do harm to man, or rather, beliefs that define man, since ‘man’, for Nietzsche, designates the state of being afflicted by these sicknesses. ‘Man’ is, in this sense, something to be cured, to be overcome.\textsuperscript{133} Here, we return to Nietzsche’s project of reorienting philosophy so as to function in (to use Spinoza’s concept) a realm of


\textsuperscript{131} NP, p. 2.


affect. In this realm, a central question is one of power, or capacity. With this in mind, we ask ourselves, with regards to the question of health: what is it that serves to render incapacitate, to decrease power? A provisional answer (one that will be amended later in the chapter) is ‘disease’. ‘Disease can be defined as any condition that limits life in either its power, enjoyment or duration.’134 What might examples of such diseases be? Nietzsche lists several in a letter, shortly after discovering a kinship with Spinoza.

I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted. I have a precursor, and what a precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by "instinct." Not only is his over-all tendency like mine — making knowledge the most powerful affect — but in five main points of his doctrine I recognize myself; this most unusual and loneliest thinker is closest to me precisely in these matters: he denies the freedom of the will, teleology, the moral world order, the unegoistic, and evil. Even though the divergencies are admittedly tremendous, they are due more to the difference in time, culture, and science. In summa: my lonesomeness, which, as on very high mountains, often made it hard for me to breathe and made my blood rush out, is now at least a twosomeness. Strange.135

These diseases vary, but they have a common root and that root is ‘disease’ itself. All the diseases uncovered by Nietzsche are harmful to life; they devalue life by opposing life. In the first instance, or in the abstract, they are the opposite of life; they impede life. Nietzsche is thus closer to Socrates than he is Plato here (or at least to the Plato of the early, Socratic dialogues) insofar as the question for Nietzsche is always one of health.

In every age the wisest have passed the identical judgment on life: it is worthless… Everywhere and always their mouths have uttered the same sound – a sound full of doubt, full of melancholy, full of weariness with life, full of opposition to life. Even Socrates said as he died: ‘To live – that means to be a long time sick: I owe a cock to the saviour Asclepius’.\(^{136}\)

Here we encounter an important aspect of Nietzsche and Deleuze’s reverse Platonism. The ‘reversal’ is a reversal in relation to sickness and health. The diseases Nietzsche lists above are sicknesses, or diseases, ‘full of opposition to life,’ preventing life from flourishing and increasing in complexity; preventing the borders of life from proliferating further.

These are the diseases Nietzsche diagnoses. What diseases does Deleuze diagnose? We might identify concepts from DR, such as identity, resemblance, opposition, the identical, the similar, the equal and the opposed, as diseases. In Anti-Oedipus, the Oedipus complex is a disease, and Deleuze and Guattari’s work here functions as a diagnosis of this disease, as Nietzsche’s The Antichrist does for Christ, or Christianity. This gives us examples of diseases, but it does not tell us what a disease is, or how it functions. What is a disease and how does it function?

Let us suppose that to have a disease is to be sick. Can we explain what it means to be sick? A preliminary answer is the following: to be sick is to function as a functionary. What does this mean? The term ‘functionary’ has political overtones, ones that speak to the sense that we want to attribute to the term: a functionary is a representative of the State, one who performs official State functions. Deleuze, especially in the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, recommends strongly against such functioning. But what is this functioning precisely? Is it a question of totalitarianism, either in a political sense, or in a de-politicised sense, where paradigms, totalities, dominant trends, or hegemonies supervene upon activity,

leaving no space for independent functioning? If A supervenes upon B then when A differs B will differ in correspondence. The idea is that the totality supervenes upon any functioning, suppressing the independence of that functioning and decreasing its vitality. The totality is, in this respect, a disease that causes sickness.

Let us track this sickness further by identifying its mechanisms. We have said that the totality supervenes and that, in doing so, it causes sickness. The question seems to be how to ensure against the return of equilibrium that would instantiating totalities. These totalities represent a threat to life. The enemy seems to be, in the terminology of *TP*, the ‘molar’ regime; a plane of stability that threatens to interrupt or block the ‘molecular’ functioning of free-flowing thought and being. Such an appraisal does not quite hit the mark, however. As John Mullarkey has pointed out, Deleuze recognizes micro-fascists as readily as he does macro-fascists. A ‘micro-fascism’ is a fascism rooted, not in an overarching system, but instead within methodological procedures. For example, a large corporation will instill habits in its employees’ behaviour regarding various small procedures: keeping stationary on your desk at right angles; saying, ‘how can I be of service to you today?’, rather than ‘can I help you?’ These methodological procedures will be consistent with systematic procedures at the opposite end: imbibe the company ethos, embody the company slogan, and so on. They are limiting in themselves, rather than limiting in a way where the impediment stems from the system in which they operate. Thus, the more sophisticated realisation is that the molecular presents as much of a threat to immanence as the molar. There is little or no improvement in shifting the orientation of activity and life so that it becomes a function of method, rather than a function of system. And indeed, the swing from Plato to Nietzsche is not a swing from the molar to the molecular. In truth, the swing is from that which

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137 Cf. *TP*, pp. 1-5.
impedes to that which enables and affirms. Life, in Nietzsche, is affirmation; affirmation that is, by definition, unencumbered by diseases that would oppose it.

What is the key to a life that functions in this way? What ‘is’ this kind of functioning, a functioning diametrically opposed to the functioning of a functionary? Is there a concept that captures this functioning? We propose the function in itself as this concept. It is a case of life functioning in itself, rather than functioning as function of something else. What does this mean? How does a life function in itself? It is a question of life functioning in such a way that it is free to affirm in the absence of subjugation. Here, we turn to a second, related reorientation of philosophy in Nietzsche. In addition to problematizing life in relation to notions of sickness and health, Nietzsche problematises it in relation to power. We said that, for Nietzsche, life fluctuates between health and sickness. We now propose to understand this fluctuation in terms of power: health represents increase of power and sickness represents diminution of power. In turning to the question of power, we are turning to Nietzsche’s ontology.

**Nietzsche’s ontology**

Nietzsche’s ontology is an ontology of force. A world is this immanent world consisting of a constellation of forces. In this ontology, force is (already) the relation of force with another force. There is reactivity (as opposed to activity, or affirmation) not when ‘bad forces’ enter the milieu, but rather when this relation ‘between’ forces is disrupted. Nietzsche’s concern is thus not that ‘good forces’ are being overpowered by ‘bad forces’, but that forces are being separated from other forces. As Deleuze tells us, it is nonsensical to say that a good force can encounter a bad force, given that all forces are always already in relation with all other forces.¹³⁹ When force is separated from another force – or, in Deleuzian terminology, when difference is separated from its object (another difference) – thought and being are

¹³⁹ Cf. *NP*, pp. 6-10.
taken ‘out of this world’.\textsuperscript{140} If we consider this world, with Spinoza, as one of \textit{affect}, then the result of this separation is a diminution in the ability to act, which is to say to affect and be affected.

How does separation occur? What is worldly (or healthy) and what is non-worldly (or unhealthy)? What is ‘worldly’ for Nietzsche is always, formally speaking, ‘unequal’ and what is ‘non-worldly’ is always, again formally speaking, ‘equal.’\textsuperscript{141} Nietzsche’s theory of force, as Deleuze understands it, is characterized by its eschewal of the equal, or rather the irreducibility of force to equality. It is worth quoting Deleuze at length with regard to this point.

Every time that Nietzsche criticises the concept of quantity we must take it to mean that quantity as an abstract concept always and essentially tends towards an identification, an equalization of the unity that forms it and an annulment of difference in this unity. Nietzsche’s reproach to every purely quantitative determination of forces is that it annuls, equalises or compensates for differences in quantity. On the other hand, each time he criticises quality we should take it to mean that qualities are nothing but the corresponding difference in quantity between two forces whose relationship is presupposed. In short, Nietzsche is never interested in the irreducibility of quantity to quality; or rather he is only interested in it secondarily and as a symptom. What interests him primarily, from the standpoint of quantity itself, is the fact that differences in quantity cannot be reduced to equality.\textsuperscript{142}

Nietzsche works to criticise the concepts of quantity and quality, but only as abstractions. Quantity and quality are rejected as grounding modes of explanation because they themselves, as abstractions, require determination and must be

\textsuperscript{140} We take this expression from Peter Hallward’s, \textit{Out of this world: Deleuze and the philosophy of creation} (London: Verso, 2006). See Chapter 5’s section, ‘Life as function of a universal’, for a critique of Hallward’s reading of Deleuze.

\textsuperscript{141} For a useful discussion of Nietzschean force and its relation to the equal, see Dorothea Olkowski’s \textit{Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) esp. pp. 44-47.

\textsuperscript{142} \textit{NP}, p. 90.
explained. Nietzsche explains these concepts through his concrete theory of force; that is, he explains how quantity and quality become determined. Qualitative and quantitative determinations are enveloped in his theory in germinal form as unequals. Because they are enveloped as unequals they are not explanatory themselves and are instead explained by this theory of force. It is as if the ‘pre-qualitative’ and ‘pre-quantitative’, each working to explain the qualitative and quantitative respectively, are in tension with one another. With respect to Nietzsche’s theory, this characterisation is misleading. The two elements struggle with one another and the result of this struggle is not the quantitative and the qualitative. Thus, emerging from this struggle is not, for example, a leaf with a certain shape (quantitative determination) and a certain colour (qualitative determination). Or rather, there is this emergence, but from another perspective: this emergence constitutes a reconfiguration, a new arrangement of force.

It is a question of a struggle between two elements of unequal power: a new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them. The second condition is something fundamentally different from the first (not its effect): the essential thing is that the factions in struggle emerge with different quanta of power.143

Activity is understood in terms of a struggle between unequals. The important thing for us to note at this point is that this struggle is ‘oriented around’ the unequal. In orienting thought in this way, Nietzsche heralds a revolution in philosophical thinking. Life becomes neither subject-oriented, nor object-oriented. Everything instead ‘revolves’ around the unequal as centre, which is to say that it revolves without a centre at all because the centre has to be thought of as eternal return. Nietzsche undoes the circle and replaces it with a new one.

For if eternal return is a circle, then Difference is at the centre and the Same is only on the periphery: it is a constantly decentred, continually tortuous circle which revolves only around the unequal.\textsuperscript{144}

A question we must ask at this point is: what happens to the subject and the object? It is imperative to understand that neither Nietzsche nor Deleuze banish them. They are rather rejected as pre-determined grounds. Life as grounding is not a function of objectivity, nor is it a function of subjectivity. Or rather, grounding is not a function of objectivity at the expense of subjectivity, or of subjectivity at the expense of objectivity. Were either to be the case the functioning in question would be that of a functionary. The trick is to operate in such a way that objectivity and subjectivity are operative at the same time, with neither achieving hegemony; that is, with neither contributing to the diminution of the other. An objection might be raised here: is this not consistent with a conception of a political state where micro-fascism works in tandem with a macro-fascism? And in fact, will an absolute fascism not ‘fill the spectrum’ from micro to macro, totalising control over life? This is to misunderstand the sense of subjectivity and objectivity referred to here. Objectivity and subjectivity, and related couplets like method and system (Introduction), finite and infinite (Chapter 1), and Deleuze’s actual and virtual (future chapters), function together in such a way that neither blocks the other. They are configured so as to each function in such a way that there is functioning in itself rather than, for example, in virtue of a totality representing the configuration. We will have to do some work in the next section to explain what this means. Our primary aim is to construct a concept of the function in itself, using materials from Nietzsche’s and Deleuze’s work.

\textit{The function in itself}

As Deleuze observes, with reference to Nietzsche’s work:

\textsuperscript{144} DR, p. 55.
This is the crucial point; high and low, noble and base are not values but represent the differential element from which the value of values themselves derives.\textsuperscript{145}

These two poles represent the differential element through which life functions. Life, for Deleuze, consists of operations of differentiation; or rather, it proceeds according to twin processes of differentiation and differenciation. This is the determination of the virtual-Idea structure and the determination of concrete spatio-temporal actualities.\textsuperscript{146} In each case, it is a determination that constitutes an operation, or a function. Deleuze’s differentiation involves the real determination of value, as opposed to a determination in which a value is merely uncovered. It is always a matter of finding the underlying forces behind a function. These forces function to determine in processes of differentiation. Differentiation is a function of life, a critical and clinical functioning.

The problem of critique is that of the value of values, of the evaluation from which their value arises, thus the problem of their creation. Evaluation is defined as the differential element of corresponding values, an element which is both critical and creative.\textsuperscript{147}

There is a determination that ‘follows the contours’ of life, or rather, that determines these contours itself. Again, we must follow the forces in operation. This determination is a problem of critique, the critical question being one of the three ‘structures of questioning’ that constitute a ‘triple function of grounding’.\textsuperscript{148} Value is not determined in advance and is instead determined within and according to the

\textsuperscript{145} NP, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{146} Deleuze’s most concise delineation of these two processes (or this two-fold process) is in “The Method of Dramatization”, in DI, pp. 94-116.
\textsuperscript{147} NP, p. 1.
\textsuperscript{148} The remaining structures are explored in future chapters. See ‘Pathogenetic analysis’, in Chapter 3 for a discussion of the existential question, and ‘The universal’ in Chapter 5 for a discussion of the universal question.
operation. There is, as such, functioning that determines an order (functioning in itself), rather than functioning that works according to an existing order.

Let us take as an example our two trees. The two trees – an oak and a linden – are, like the couplets we have been working with, heterogeneous to one another. The entangled trees grow and develop not according to the life of one tree at the expense of the other, but according to a cleaving of the trees. Neither tree dominates the other in the sense of subjecting it to its own order, its own life. Rather, the life of the trees evolves in accord with the cleaving that occurs; it evolves according to a dynamic whereby the trees are simultaneously split apart and related.

We can add here two more heterogeneities that explain the movement of the trees. The life of the trees continually emerges and develops through conflict and cooperation. Conflict is a reinforcement of the independence of each tree, while cooperation is the accompanying linkage of each tree. There is conflict in the struggle of each tree against the other to avoid the shade and capture sunlight, and cooperation when the trees are understood as relational unit, for example when their roots intertwine, creating stability. Conflict and cooperation together represent the differential determining growth and development of the trees. That is, the trees’ growth and development occurs as the result of a differential relationship ‘between’ their conflict and cooperation. This differential determines the course of life: it is the ‘hidden’ element determining what is given.

This explains the determination by the differential, but what of the relationship between the two ‘sides’ of the function representing this differential element: high and low, noble and base, conflict and co-operation? Consider Spengler’s characterisation of the function:

…the Western soul in the persons of Descartes and his generation (Pascal, Fermat, Desargues) discovered a notion of number that was the child of a passionate Faustian tendency towards the infinite. Number as pure magnitude inherent in the material
presentness of things is paralleled by numbers as pure relation...The symbol of the West is an idea of which no other Culture gives even a hint, the idea of Function.  

Spengler understands the function in terms of two ‘pure’ sides: pure magnitude and pure relation. We are not concerned with the character of these two sides as such, but with the notion of their being ‘parallel’ and of each being ‘pure’. They represent the problematic conditions through which value is determined and through which the given becomes given. We see these two parallels as two poles, or heterogeneous orders, standing in the same relation as the couplets and orders we have been working with. The function in itself, in our interpretation, represents a cleaving of these orders. These same moments find expression in different ways throughout Deleuze’s work. For example, Deleuze, following Simondon, speaks of a movement from a ‘prior metastable state’, to an actualizing of a potential and the ‘establishing of communication between disparates’ and an ‘integrating of these elements into a state of coupling which ensures internal resonance’. These are the moments of cleaving. The heterogeneous orders to be cleaved remain in a pre-cleaving, or ‘prior metastable’ state, such as when two trees grow and encounter one another, or rather ‘at the moment’ when their growth takes them to the point of interacting with one another, where the encounter is understood in the mode of mutual affection. Communication is introduced between disparates at the ‘moment’ they touch and a coupling – in our interpretation, a cleaving - occurs, ensuring ‘internal resonance’. A thread forms between the trees so that they become a relational unit; there is a becoming-oak of the linden and a becoming-linden of the oak. Each act, whether it is an act of resistance (one exerting pressure on the other so as to find the best place in the sun) or an act of co-operation (their roots entangling to ensure stability), resonates through the multiple lines of becoming.

150 DR, p. 246.
**Functioning**

The above explains how functioning in itself is able to occur, but it does not explain how it *does* occur. How does functioning occur? As Deleuze says, the function of grounding ‘perpetually oscillates’ between method and system, as poles. These poles are ideal limits that are never reached in reality. They are never reached in reality because they represent a tension that is unable to be exhausted because of the co-presence of the limits, as poles. Again, Nietzsche can be identified as significant influence on Deleuze’s philosophy here. As Lecercle observes,

> Nietzsche’s method is not history, the establishment of causal chains and the discovery of origins, but genealogy, the circular tension between constitutive rules and that which constitutes the rules.

Lecercle notes astutely that the return is engendered by a tension between constitutive rules (method) and that which constitutes the rules (system). In the introduction we showed that this dynamic is central to the operations in Deleuze’s philosophy, and we can now recognise this as another important link between Nietzsche and Deleuze.

What is elided from Lecercle’s observation, or perhaps just not clarified, is the role of grounding. The function of the circularity is to enable and engender grounding. In a sense, the circulation is ‘in the service’ of grounding. As we said in the previous chapter, the border that grounds life evolves and revolves, but its evolution is primary. Attention is brought to this because of a danger in interpretation. The danger is to focus on circulation, rather than grounding. One of

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151 WG. See the discussion of method and system in the ‘Method and system’ section in the introduction.

152 In truth, this notion of always tending towards these ideal limits – of reality consisting of indissolubly of mixtures that are always partially subjective and partially objective – demonstrates Deleuze’s Bergsonian, rather than Nietzschean heritage.


154 See the section on Ungrounding and the unequal.
the effects of this approach is to see grounding as an act of endless deferring, an operation akin to Derrida’s *différance*; a movement of perpetual transcendence, of endless circulating. It is as if there is an avoidance of subjugation through transcendence: orders or laws can never dominate insofar as they are always transcended. In Deleuze, ‘new’ grounds are always being established, but not through transcendence. Neither of the heterogeneous orders regulating the circulation is transcended. Life will, for example, never transcend conflict, nor will it transcend cooperation: life will always operate according to a regulation by heterogeneous orders. What these heterogeneous orders are, or how we conceive of these orders, will change depending on what problems are being considered or what problems are orienting life.

We referred to a change in orientation in the above section on Kant: the reorientation in philosophy around the problem of subjectivity, where subjectivity and objectivity become heterogeneous orders. There is no problem in saying, for example, that Deleuze’s philosophy is a philosophy of subjectivity, as long as it is acknowledged that it is also a philosophy of objectivity, or of the concept. Similarly, there is no problem in saying that life is cooperation, as long as conflict is acknowledged as being cleaved with cooperation. From a conceptual point of view, the danger lies in retroactively attributing to the differential element the characteristics of one of the two poles; that is, when the differential element is understood according to a limit towards which it tends, rather than in its tendency ‘towards’ this limit. This is when the path shaped by our two trees is read as one of conflict at the expense of cooperation, or cooperation at the expense of conflict. Or rather, it is when determination is viewed as a function of one at the expense of the other. Inverted commas are apt here insofar as there is really no ‘toward’ in question. Insofar as there are two limits in operation simultaneously, it follows that neither orients the activity. Or rather, *both* orient activity, but their co-presence
prevents the grounding being a function of either side at the expense of the other.\textsuperscript{155} Were there only one limit, grounding would be a function of the structure proper to this limit.

Let us pose another question: how can functional differentiation occur? That is, how can there be real grounding? In Nietzschean terms, the question is: how can there be real determination of value? Is there not a value to each of the ideal limits in operation? Does each not represent an order brought to the operation, preventing that operation from being a real grounding? Is there not fixity to, for example, subjectivity and objectivity? Let us pose a related question: ‘when’ are these two orders themselves determined? And how are they determined? We have said that there can be a true grounding because of the tension between two heterogeneities such as subjectivity and objectivity, but if they are ‘already’ determined, does this not mean that the operation occurs according to pre-determined grounds? One possible answer is to allow there to be indeterminate value on either side. However, we find this to be unacceptable insofar as we think this indeterminacy can itself be attributed a value \textit{qua} indeterminacy; two things can be equally indeterminate, or equal in their indeterminacy. For example, two unidentified aircraft on a radar screen (travelling at comparable speed and at a comparable bearing relative to the aircraft potentially under attack) will be treated as an equal threat in a combat situation until their identity becomes determined. In any case, Deleuze does not proceed in this way. How does he proceed? He proceeds in such a way that there is determination without fixity. His strategy is to configure the orders so that any rule or principle that can be applied to one order is able to be applied to the other order.

\textsuperscript{155} This is a preliminary understanding of how these two orders function in relation to one another. At the moment, we are focusing on how the orders are able to function in such a way that neither impinges upon the other. In later chapters, we become more positive and ask how the orders function in relation to the other. In Chapter 3, we move from considering this operation in terms of two orders, to enquire into dual functioning. In Chapter 4, we understand this operation in terms of dual grounding. And in Chapter 5, with emphasis on the link between pathogenesis and disease (as drawn out in this chapter), we explain this functioning using a ‘host-virus’ analogy.
The two sides are well determined, but are also reversible. Consider the following important footnote to Deleuze’s book on Bergson, quoted at length.

“We apply the term subjective to what seems to be completely and adequately known, and the term objective to that which is known in such a way that a constantly increasing number of new impressions could be substituted for the idea which we actually have of it”: *TF* 83 (57, 62).\(^{156}\) Taken literally, these definitions are strange. By virtue of their context, one might even wish to reverse them. For is it not the objective (matter) that, being without virtuality, has a being similar to its “appearing” and finds itself therefore adequately known? And is it not the subjective that can always be divided into two parts of another nature, which it only contained virtually? We might almost be inclined to think it a printing error. But the terms Bergson uses are justified from another point of view.\(^{157}\)

Deleuze says that one might wish to reverse them, but the point is that these definitions are reversible for Deleuze: ‘the most subjective will be the most objective.’\(^{158}\) All the heterogeneities referred to in this thesis are reversible – method/system, subjective/objective, actual/virtual, and so on – insofar as any rule or principle that can be applied to one side is ‘equally’ applicable to the other. Each side is a variation of the other; the sides are opposed, but can also be reversed. A rule for one side can ‘equally’ be said for the other. ‘Equally’ is in inverted commas because it is a reversibility or exchangeability absent of the equal. Despite the fact that each side is well determined, the two sides are able to change places. This sounds complicated, but we can grasp what Deleuze is talking about quite easily. As he says, it is a question of perspective. An oak affects a linden and that linden is affected by the oak. And from a different perspective, the linden affects the oak at


\(^{157}\) B, p. 123, fn. 12.

\(^{158}\) WP, p. 11.
the same time that the oak is affected by the linden. This is the reversibility of which Deleuze speaks.

We can think of this in two ways that are connected. First, ‘life’ involves this reversibility; these two perspectives operate naturally. That is, the two orders, as reversible, are involved in the determining of life-processes. And a philosophy must involve both perspectives if it is to evade working with an order that subjugates its operations. To bring these together, we can say that a philosophy of life must involve both orders in this way if it hopes to avoid subjugating life. A system where there is an ability to change places is healthy insofar as it means that there is no subjugation to a supervening order. To refer to our provisional definition of disease as that which renders life incapacitate, we can say that this ability is something like a stalwart against disease. When there is reversibility there is an ability to function in such a way that the operation is not inhibited by this disease.

Pathogenesis and disease
We have come to an understanding of life here that stands as a development of Plato’s: life understood in relation to sickness (dysfunction) and health (function). At this point, we attend to the Nietzschean reversal of this picture. Let us suppose, rather than a dysfunction/function understanding, we have instead two different sorts of functioning: functioning that tends towards dysfunction (sickness) and functioning that tends towards functioning (health). The dysfunctional is ‘brought into the world’, or made immanent, in an act that sums up Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism. While Plato, as we said in the previous chapter, introduces transcendence into immanence, Nietzsche renders transcendence immanent. Again, function can be thought as correlating to health or ‘nobility’ in Nietzsche, while dysfunction correlates to sickness or ‘baseness’. That which would inhibit functioning – the dysfunctional, the diseased - is made to function. The sickness of transcendence, or ‘poison’, as Deleuze puts it, is considered as precisely this: something that diminishes health and should, as such, be avoided. Insofar as this
element is involved in experience, this avoidance does not constitute a negation. ‘Let looking away be my only negation!’\textsuperscript{159}

It also implies a different kind of relation between health and sickness, where they do not represent transcendent values, but where they in fact represent the function of grounding. Life functions with health and sickness as its ideal limits. As such, it oscillates between these limits. And it functions with a differential element. What is this differential element? It is disease. Our provisional definition of disease as ‘that which renders life incapacitate’ (a definition that remained provisional insofar as it related to pre-reversal understanding) is cast aside in favour of a definition of disease as ‘differential element of life’. This is a conception of life as pathogenesis. It is, as Cendrars points out, a conception of life that has never been explored in philosophy.

As a special branch of general philosophy, pathogenesis has never been explored... All those who have written on the subject are full of prejudice. Before searching out and examining the mechanisms of causes of disease, they treat of ‘disease as such’, condemn it as an exceptional and harmful condition, and start out by detailing the thousand and one ways of combating it, disturbing it, destroying it; they define health, for this purpose, as a ‘normal’ condition that is absolute or immutable.

Diseases are. We do not make or unmake them at will. We are not their masters. They make us, they form us. They may even have created us. They belong to this state of activity which we call life. They may be its main activity. They are many of the many manifestations of universal matter. They may be the principal manifestation of that matter... Diseases are a transitory, intermediary, future state of health. It may be that they are health itself.\textsuperscript{160}


How is pathogenesis to be understood? Two things can be said, relating to the line of thought developed in this chapter so far.

Firstly, pathogenesis is not the study of the emergence and development, according to certain mechanisms, of disease as such. Following Cendrars and Nietzsche, we do not think that health and sickness can or should be differentiated in such a categorical way. The health of a tumour is also the sickness of a person, its host. And the sickness of a tumour is also the health of its host. Disease is the differential element uniting, or cleaving, sickness and health. It is through disease that we are able to understand how health and sickness function together.

What constitutes health is, from another perspective, sickness. Disease, to repeat, is at the centre of things, at the border separating sickness and health. In Richard Matheson’s *I am Legend*, the protagonist, Robert Neville, is the only individual unaffected by a disease that has mutated the rest of the members in his society. We follow the narrative with the idea in mind that Neville is healthy and the rest of the population sick. In the book’s last pages, however, a reversal occurs. The reader realises that Neville has ceased to be the healthy specimen functioning despite the spread of disease, and now represents a disease to a different norm, a different order of health previously recognised as disease. He is a ‘legend’ not in the sense of being the hero of an order that fights to survive, but in the sense of being a remnant of a past age. Neville’s state, his way of functioning, is a sickness from the perspective of the mutants, while the mutant plague is a sickness from Neville’s perspective.

This example illustrates how two orders can be opposed and reversible: health is opposed to sickness insofar as the former encourages life, while the latter suppresses it. Nevertheless, the two are reversible. Whether the mutant gene, for example, is a sign of health or sickness depends on the perspective adopted.

161 ‘Health and sickness are not essentially different, as the ancient physicians and some practitioners even today suppose. One must not make of them distinct principles or entities that fight over the living organism and turn it into their arena. That is silly nonsense and idle chatter that is no longer any good.’ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1967) Book 1 (47) p. 29.

Secondly, as a concept, pathogenesis has to be understood in its inequality. This seemingly simple proposition – to understand pathogenesis in its inequality - masks a labyrinthine task. This task can be begun by analysing pathogenesis in terms of its separate and constituent features: pathos and genesis. These features are, like other couplets in this thesis and in Deleuze’s philosophy, cleaved; that is, split from one another, while in relation. They will be analysed accordingly, in their separation and in their union.

Pathos
How can pathos be understood? We propose to define it using Deleuze’s work on Kant. ‘Pathos as such’ or ‘pathos in itself’ is in close proximity to ‘difference in itself’: pathos is always a pathos of difference, a pathos proper to difference, the principle of which Deleuze extracts from Kant’s philosophy. It is a principle that Deleuze describes as a long and inexhaustible story: ‘I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense.’

This is Rimbaud’s project of arriving at the unknown by a disorienting all the senses. In principle, this disorientation occurs when the I is displaced from the self through the opening of a caesura.

...time out of joint means demented time or time outside the curve which gave it a god, liberated from its overly simple circular figure, freed from the events which made up its content, its relation to movement overturned; in short, time presenting itself as an empty and pure form.... We may define the order of time as this purely formal distribution of the unequal in the function of a caesura.

The caesura functions as a border. It constitutes a break that works to separate whatever lies on its sides at the same time as establishing relational resonance. The pairs of tendencies are, as such, differentiated: objective and subjective, function and

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163 DR, p. 86.
164 Ibid., p. 89
dysfunction, health and sickness, self and I, and so forth. These sides, as we have said, represent heterogeneous orders, or grounds. Here, we arrive at a working definition of pathos: there is pathos when two (unequal) grounds are in operation simultaneously. We can think here of cognitive dissonance in order to understand pathos, as long as we appreciate that pathos is not limited to that with cognitive apparatus. It is the dissonance ‘experienced’ by the oak and the linden in the following dynamic: the oak affects the linden, which is affected by the oak, and, at the same time, the linden affects the oak, which is affected by the linden. There is a synthesis of opposing perspectives here, with the result being the ‘attainment’ of pathological perspective. Pathos, as pathological perspective, is when we see from two different points of view at once.

It is insufficient to adopt a single perspective, just as it is insufficient to operate according to one order. Two perspectives must be in play at once, or rather, a differential point of view must be adopted. I cannot understand my life from my own perspective alone insofar as this one perspective is coupled with perspectives that are other. For example, I affect my environment and it is affected by me. However, to acknowledge this is to acknowledge implicitly that my environment affects me and I am affected by it. One perspective implies the other: my internality implies an externality. This ‘outside’ needs to be interiorised by me. As Deleuze remarks:

...the double is never a projection of the interior; on the contrary, it is an interiorization of the outside. It is not a doubling of the One, but a redoubling of the Other. It is not a reproduction of the Same, but a repetition of the Different. It is not the emanation of an I, but something that places in immanence an always other or a Non-self.\(^{165}\)

How are these two perspectives – inside and outside – cleaved? A border (cf. \textbf{Border}) is established that functions by cleaving the two orders. This border functions to

\(^{165}\) \textbf{F, p. 98.}
split asunder and glue together the two orders. We said in the introduction and in Chapter 1 that this is how the border functions, but we here draw out a new aspect of the border. This is that the border is able to function in this way insofar as it is neutral with respect to the territories it separates. It is a third ‘between’ these countries, with a value separate from these countries. The border between Germany and Poland is neither German nor Polish. It defines their respective territories by constituting and being constitutive of their respective limits. And, as we said in Chapter 1, the border shifts all the time in movements of ungrounding; through language, economy, historicity, and so on. This is how the border functions, but how it is able to do so is a different question. To discover this ability is to discover ‘that which differentiates’: it is to discover difference in itself. According to Deleuze, this is Kant’s discovery.

In differentiating two grounds, \(^{166}\) and ‘adding a third logical value’ \(^{167}\) that functions to differentiate these grounds, Kant establishes the question of the differential in its own right. We see this differential element, this middle term, as a border. Kant, through the introduction of this ‘third logical value’ enables us to understand differentiation as the function of a border.

There is, however, difference only ‘in principle’, or ‘as such’, in Kant. It is a purely formal notion of difference: an \textit{a priori} relation between two heterogeneous sides (I/self, internal/external, transcendental/empirical and so forth). Kant refuses to differentiate or unify the sides by utilising resources from either side of the caesura insofar as such a move would undercut the legitimacy of the split. If one side or the other is invoked then the split would be conditioned by that side, rendering that differentiation illegitimate or inauthentic. Kant realises that the problem is how to avoid retroactive determination of the differential according to one of the ideal limits representing it. His solution is remarkable, but flawed. Rather than find the principle for differentiation on one side, Kant finds the principle of differentiation

\(^{166}\) See Chapter 4, especially ‘Kant and ground’, for an examination of these grounds.

\(^{167}\) \textit{DR}, p. 86.
between’ the two. Concerned that the border will become Polish or German and will cease, as such, to perform its function of determining territory, Kant declares this border a separate entity, or he accords to it a distinct value. It becomes a single principle of differentiation, ‘located’ at the interstice between the two sides. This is the ‘third logical value’: difference as mediator, the border as sovereign within itself.

The Kantian philosophy, in our view, encounters difficulty in seeing this border in itself for two related reasons. Firstly, Kant fails to fulfill what we have argued are the conditions for critique: operate with two unequal grounds at one and the same time, or rather, operate unequally. The border has to itself be double rather than single. We will say that there has to be dual functioning (see Chapter 3) and dual grounding (see Chapter 4), but here it is sufficient to understand this duality in terms of cleaving. The function of a border is double: it splits apart and relates together. Secondly, the border cannot be in itself insofar as the in itself constitutes one of the two heterogeneous orders cleaved. Consider again our ‘room’ example, from the introduction. The door, in this example, borders the in itself and for itself. Insofar as the door borders the in itself and for itself, it cannot constitute an in itself.

What this amounts to, in the case of Kant, is an inability to perform the cleaving operation of which we have spoken, when two perspectives corresponding to the two orders are attained at once. Thus, despite making advances in considering the pathos of difference, Kant ultimately fails to enact pathos, that is, to engender pathos within thought.

The notion of ‘engendering’ pathos within thought brings us to what is cleaved with pathos in pathogenesis: genesis.

**Genesis**

The notion of genesis is best understood through the difference between the Kantian legislator and the Nietzschean genealogist. The operation of critique in Kant is performed by the legislator. The Kantian legislator subjects thought to critique and acts according to his findings. The ideal philosopher is ‘a lawgiver of human
reason.”168 The legislator determines the world, but he does so from a position external to that world.

Kant lacked a method which permitted reason to be judged from the inside without giving it the task of being its own judge. And, in fact Kant does not realize his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis.169

In the case of genesis, this means that external conditions have to become internal, genetic conditions. How does this transformation take place?

The insufficiency of Kant’s critique can be understood from another perspective. It takes only one of the two necessary steps in a true critique: differentiate (the step taken by Kant) and authenticate the differentiation. The differentiation needs not only to be made, but to be verified. And it cannot verify itself; it has to be verified by something outside it. If the first step is internal then the second step stands heterogeneous to it, as external. What Deleuze is saying is that Kant was unable to link the two steps together in a legitimate way. According to Deleuze, this flawed legislation is corrected by Nietzsche through the introduction of a new principle.

Only the will to power as genetic and genealogical principle, as legislative principle, is capable of realizing internal critique. Only the will to power makes a transmutation possible.170

The Nietzschean genealogist replaces the Kantian-legislator. Both figures are philosophers of the future: indeed, both are legislators, but the genealogist is the authentic, or ‘perfect’ legislator. The genealogist is the only figure who can both

169 NP, p.85.
170 Ibid.
create and authenticate the different. The genealogist stands as the figure who replaces the Kantian legislator because he is the one who authenticates the differentiation conceived but not enacted by the legislator.

Critical philosophy has two inseparable moments: the referring back of all things and any kind of origin to values, but also the referring back of these values to something which is, as it were, their origin and determines their value... Nietzsche creates the new concept of genealogy. The philosopher is a genealogist rather than a Kantian tribunal judge or a utilitarian mechanic... Nietzsche substitutes the pathos of difference or distance (the differential element) for both the Kantian principle of universality and the principle of resemblance dear to the utilitarians. “It was from the height of this pathos of distance that they first seized the right to create values and to coin names for them; what did utility matter?” Genealogy means both the value of origin and the origin of values.\textsuperscript{171}

To repeat, the method of genealogy is two-pronged: it involves the creation of the different and the authentication of the different. What we have not noted is the pathos here involved. It is \textit{pathological} to create and authenticate at the same time insofar as it involves the dissonance of which we have spoken. It is pathological to invoke both the value of origin and the origin of value.

This ‘pathos of distance’ of which Nietzsche speaks\textsuperscript{172} has a correlate in the concept of action-at-a-distance, in physics, where there is interaction between two objects separated in space. There are significant differences, however: in the case of the latter, the distance is between two spatiotemporal objects. In the case of the former, the distance is ‘between’ differences. We place ‘between’ in inverted commas precisely because there is no ‘between’. Our oak affects the linden and the linden is affected by the oak, but there is no ‘between’ in this indivisible activity.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 2.
The oak affects the linden at the same time that the linden is affected by the oak. An order of cause and effect is not here being invoked by Nietzsche, but an order of affecting and affected.

It will be countered that in order for the oak to affect the linden, the oak has to be physically contiguous to the linden. While this is true, we think that a lot depends on what perspective is being adopted. We can see the oak and linden as physically contiguous, but we can also see them in terms of a relation of tension. And, as we have said previously, we think that it is always a question of discerning the underlying forces behind a function. Adopting this perspective, there is only what Nietzsche calls ‘quanta of power’.

If we eliminate these additions, no things remain but only dynamic quanta, in a relation of tension to all other dynamic quanta: their essence lies in their relation to all other quanta, in their “effect” upon the same. The will to power not a being, not a becoming, but a pathos – the most elemental fact from which a becoming and effecting first emerge...173

There is a field of force, or variations, but this field does not mediate; the variations vary ‘with’ one another without mediator. ‘For in fact there is no “medium”, no field of forces or battle.’174 Each variation is unequal ‘to’ each other variation immediately. There is instantaneous exchange: a ‘lightning flash’,175 where communication occurs between disparates.

**Pathogenesis and immanence**

We have considered pathos and genesis separately and we now consider them together. There is a profound moment of groundlessness with pathogenesis, one

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174 NP, p. 39.
175 Cf. DR, p. 118.
precipitated by the realisation that *pathos and genesis each contains the other*. This is the meaning of Deleuze’s oft-quoted, but rarely understood, statement that ‘immanence is the very vertigo of philosophy’. To engender pathos within thought is, to repeat, to operate with two (unequal) grounds at the same time. This is the experience of vertigo in Deleuze. It is the dissonance of which we have spoken, when two heterogeneous orders are in operation at once within the one system.

The grounds, or heterogeneous orders, can be any number of things, as we have said: in pathogenesis, one is pathos and the other is genesis. Pathos, in this way, ‘contains’ genesis in the sense that these grounds represent the differential element through which determination through generation occurs. In what way does genesis contain pathos? Genesis involves the authentication of the different, but genesis is *itself* differential insofar as it is concerned with two disparates; ‘the origin of value and the value of origin’. Pathos contains genesis and genesis contains pathos. Each contains the other, which is to say that each is immanent to the other. This is what Deleuze means when he insists that immanence is ‘only immanent to itself.’ \(^{177}\) Immanence is mutual. As Deleuze tells, ‘Spinoza was the philosopher who knew full well’ \(^{178}\) that this is the case. It was Spinoza who developed the realisation made in Christian and Jewish neo-Platonism that ‘because the two concepts are not opposed to one another, they imply a principle of synthesis: *complicatio*.‘ \(^{179}\) This leads to an understanding of immanence as mutual; where there is an ‘interplay of (two) notions, each contained in the other.’ \(^{180}\)

What does the immanence of pathogenesis tell us? It tells us that pathogenesis as method is differential. It is a methodology, but at the same time, it is not a methodology with its own ‘agenda’. It has been carefully constructed so that it will


\(^{177}\) *WP*, p. 48.

\(^{178}\) *Ibid*.

\(^{179}\) *EP*, p. 16.

\(^{180}\) *Ibid*. 
interact productively with that object. It is able to act productively with that object insofar as, in itself as method, it works productively. Its two aspects, pathos and genesis, work in such a way that neither inhibits the functioning of the other.

Pathogenetic understanding involves, as we have shown in this chapter, considering life as disease. We developed this understanding of life using Deleuze and Nietzsche as primary resources. Each philosophy constitutes a reversal of Platonism, where life is understood in terms of sickness and health. Disease, in this configuration, is not that which inhibits life, as sickness. Disease actually becomes, in our method, a stalwart against such functioning insofar as it allows sickness into the consideration in order to productively consider it effects. Disease becomes the differential element that explains how sickness and health function together. Pathogenesis, as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, analyses functioning according to questions of sickness and health, with disease as differential element. In the next chapter, we develop this methodology by defining what we will call the different ‘pathways’ of disease. We do so by examining the internal mechanisms of Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy.
Mechanisms of pathogenesis

We have been working thus far to establish pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics by examining the related problems of function and ground in Deleuze’s philosophy. The pathogenesis of a thing, we have said, is the life of that thing. A life fluctuates between sickness and health, which is to say that it fluctuates between varying degrees of activity, where activity is understood as capacity to affect and be affected. As we showed in the previous chapter, disease is the differential element that explains how sickness and health function together. This is why pathogenesis, as methodology, sees life as disease. In this chapter, we progress to define the internal mechanisms of life as disease and we will continue to use the material from Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy to define these mechanisms, focusing in particular on his three syntheses. In our reading, these syntheses are planes that life operates on. Functioning as such, they allow us to give a pathogenetic understanding of life’s mechanisms.

What are the mechanisms of life as disease? One way to develop this question is to look at pathogenesis in medical science. Pathogenesis, in pathology, may be defined as ‘the mechanism by which a disease is caused’[^181], or as ‘a disease’s development’.[^182] Situated within this scientific context, pathogenesis is, in Deleuze’s terminology, a functive, rather than a concept. We will take these definitions and the

three categories of pathogenesis, examined momentarily, to aid the construction of pathogenesis as methodology. In doing so, we follow a strategy employed frequently by Deleuze - in his use of mathematical functions and biological functions, for example – of using functives and the components of functives to help determine concepts.

...when an object – a geometrical space, for example – is scientifically constructed by functions, its philosophical concept, which is by no means given in the function, must still be discovered. Furthermore, a concept may take as its components the functives of any possible function without thereby having the least scientific value, but with the aim of marking the differences in kind between concepts and functions.\footnote{WP, p.117.}

The concept of pathogenesis takes its components from the biomedical functive of pathogenesis (Cf. \textit{Pathogenesis}). These components are the categories of acute, chronic and recurrent. (Cf. \textit{Acute, Chronic} and \textit{Recurrent}) These are the three different \textit{pathways} a disease can take. An acute disease (or pain, or condition) is characterised by rapid onset, or short course. A chronic disease endures over a prolonged period of time. A recurrent disease is one that comes back again and again. The individual characteristics of a disease might differ significantly but they can be categorised according to the pathway upon which it operates as problem.

It is common practice, even in introductory biomedical texts,\footnote{Cf. J.M. Morgan, J.A. de Fockert and C. van der Meer, \textit{An Introduction to Pathology: Clinical Investigation and Methods for Health Care Students}, (Edinburgh: Campion Press, 1993) esp. p. 15.} to work with these categories without explaining the difference between them. These texts spend their time differentiating between specific conditions rather than these general categories insofar as the latter are assumed to be known. ‘Everyone knows’ what chronic means but not what it means, for example, with respect to chronic pancreatitis. We want to accord more significance to these categories, using them to define metaphysical categories capturing life in its functioning. We will later say
that in philosophical pathogenesis the pathways give reality, or give life, to the particular disease operating in these pathways. This is in contrast to biomedical pathogenesis, where the pathways as classificatory have nothing like a ‘reality giving’ power.

Our definition of these pathways demonstrates Bergsonian and Nietzschean influences: they are mechanisms of disease (Nietzsche) characterised by duration (Bergson). The pathways are defined primarily using Deleuze’s philosophy, however, which is itself influenced by Bergson and Nietzsche. These three pathways will be correlated to the triplets circulating in Deleuze’s thought: acute to the first synthesis, chronic to the second synthesis, and recurrent to the third synthesis. Each synthesis, in our interpretation, represents a pathogenetic pathway in Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy.

It might be expected at this point that we would turn directly to Deleuze’s three synthesises. However, our strategy is different. We want to conduct an enquiry into Deleuze’s philosophy that ensures that nothing interferes with the investigation. In scientific inquiry, this means operating in such a way that no variables encroach upon the study, compromising it. In philosophy, it is a case of ensuring against any return of transcendence: a method is required that satisfies the demands of immanence. What would such a method be? We have linked the concept of immanence thus far with life and with the newly constructed concept of cleaving. Life proliferates along borders that cleave what is on either side. This cleaving aspect, having been in background operation until now, will in this chapter be brought to light in its role within our methodology. It is introduced into a critical and clinical analysis by cleaving the ‘approach’ with the ‘object’ of study, in this case, Deleuze’s philosophy. In proceeding in this way we are influenced by Deleuze’s own approach to the history of philosophy.

I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous. It was really important for it to be his own child, because
the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed.\textsuperscript{185}

We see this copulation as a \textit{cleaving}. And in fact by describing this copulation as a cleaving we are engaging in the act Deleuze describes. We think that Deleuze cleaves, although the concept of cleaving is ours, not his. The main ‘child’ of this thesis, however, is not the notion of cleaving but the concept of pathogenesis, the genetic material of which, or the pre-genetic material for which, is found throughout Deleuze’s philosophy.

Pathogenesis has been described thus far as disciplinary field and as philosophical discipline. As a philosophical discipline, pathogenesis demands that one cleave one’s approach with the object of study. One does this by ensuring that there is no clear distinction between one’s approach and the object of study, but in such a way that the object of study is precisely this: an object of study, something marked by its independence and self-consistency. The object has to be well determined. In order to achieve this determination of the object, limits have to be set so as to exclude dysfunctional or transcendent elements that would compromise the procedure. To determine the object in this way is to cleave in the external sense, where to cleave is to split asunder. It is to determine an in itself. This is the first half of the procedure. The second half is to enter into an \textit{internal} relationship with the object. This is to cleave in the sense of establishing relations with what has been determined. First I exclude anything that would prevent the object being given to me, and then I enter into relations with that object.

Our aim is thus to create an object capturing Deleuze’s philosophy (first sense of ‘cleave’) and ‘displace oneself insidiously within it’\textsuperscript{186} (second sense of ‘cleave’). In a sense, we are treating Deleuze’s philosophy as a machine we are able to plug into.

\textsuperscript{185} N, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{186} This is Foucault’s turn of phrase, referring to how one must reverse Platonism, with Deleuze. See his, “Theatrum Philosophicum”, tr. Donald F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon, \textit{Critique} 282(1970), p. 886.
Deleuze’s philosophy is like a highly functional machine that we are able to tinker with – add new components, try to improve upon some of its specifications, and so on – in order for that machine to perform operations it did not perform previously. The resulting operations ‘belong’ to the computer, but they could not be made without the connections and reconfigurations made.  

What will be the object of our study be, the object that will capture Deleuze’s philosophy? We propose to use the dyad. We said in Chapter 1 that a life is dyadic, and that the fundamental entity in Deleuze’s philosophy is the dyad. This makes the dyad a good object of study for one hoping to explore Deleuze’s philosophy. However, we need a particular dyad, rather than the the Idea of the dyad, for our study. Many dyads operate in Deleuze’s philosophy, including the question-problem dyad and the deterritorialization-reterritorialization dyad. We will work with the actual/virtual dyad. Few will dispute that this dyad is more prolific and more important in Deleuze’s philosophy than any other. In Badiou’s words, ‘the nominal pair virtual/actual exhausts the deployment of univocal Being’, in Deleuze’s philosophy. Our task is to determine the mechanisms operative in and constitutive of this dyad. These will be posited as the pathways of pathogenesis. First, however, this dyad has to itself be determined as object of study.

A sketch of the actual/virtual dyad

There is no consensus as to how the actual/virtual relationship in Deleuze’s thought should be understood. Questions such as, is there more than one virtual? and how do the virtual and actual interact, if they interact at all? have been developed extensively in

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187 A second characteristic feature of the method will be examined in the next chapter, in relation to Nietzsche’s method of diagnosis and genealogy. This is that the method and object of the study each determine the other.


189 Alberto Toscano is among those who recognise the presence of more than one virtual in Deleuze. Cf. Alberto Toscano, The Theatre of Production: Philosophy and Individuation: between Kant and Deleuze
the literature. There is now acceptance that there are two different virtuals in Deleuze, or two different conceptions of the virtual, but what this means remains obscure and the consistency proper to the actual/virtual dyad has not been understood sufficiently. In our view, this is because of a tendency on the part of Deleuze’s interlocutors to fail to understand the actual/virtual dyad as dyadic. It will be countered that there is widespread understanding of the actual/virtual dyad as dyadic, just as there is widespread understanding that there are two different virtuals in operation in Deleuze. However, we think clarification is necessary here because there are three different conceptions of the dyad. That is, there are three different conceptions of the structural integrity of the dyad.

This is not to say that there are three ‘competing’ conceptions of the dyad. It is to say that there is a consistency proper to the dyad where all three different conceptions are in play. These three conceptions are implicated within the dyad. Crucially, all three different conceptions are operative in Deleuze’s philosophy. Expressed within Deleuze’s dyad are these three different understandings of the dyad. The actual/virtual dyad is, thus, multi-layered and multi-perspectival. All three points of view and all three different conceptions are complicated (complicatio) within the dyad.

There is, we claim, a tendency in Deleuze scholarship to conflate the components of this dyad, rather than complicate these components. This situation has an important historical precedent. In the aftermath of Hegel’s work scholars such as Benedetto Croce constructed a critique of Hegel’s system, where they argued that Hegel’s dialectic conflated, or at least failed to distinguish between, three different kinds of opposition: contradiction, contrariness and difference. Some of the post-Hegelians worked to delineate these oppositions and explore the dynamic interplay

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between them. From a metaphilosophical perspective, the situation is similar in Deleuze. A complex triad operates in Deleuze’s thought, as it does in Hegel’s. Furthermore, each triad is understood in terms of its function; Croce, in distinguishing these differences, effectively makes the claim that Hegel’s system does not function.\footnote{Deleuze’s critique of Hegel works along similar lines to Croce’s. To my knowledge, only one commentator, Elena Ficara, has noted the resemblance between Deleuze’s and Croce’s critique of Hegel. See her article, “Hegel’s Dialectic: Croce and Deleuze” \textit{Idealistic Studies}, Vol. 39 (2009) pp. 87-97.} Although Hegel’s work has been subjected to this searching criticism by post-Hegelians, it is not clear that Deleuze’s thought has been subjected to the same question with the kind of rigour and focus afforded to Hegel by Croce and other Hegelian scholars. Thus, the reverse situation to the Hegelian one now obtains in Deleuze scholarship. Here, it is the scholars who have conflated these different differences and it is our task, as Deleuzian scholars, to remedy the situation by identifying these different differences as internal mechanisms. This links to the current task of determining pathogenetic categories, insofar as these different internal mechanisms operating in Deleuze’s philosophy are these pathogenetic categories.

How is the actual/virtual dyad to be understood? We said in the previous chapter that life operates according to two ideal limits; that is, it oscillates between these limits and is driven by a tension that is never exhausted because of the co-presence of these limits. And we said that the actual and virtual function as the two main limits in Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy. When Deleuze develops two different understandings of how the actual and virtual relate to one another he is setting out two ideal limits operative within his philosophy. Life tends towards actuality (or the external) and towards virtuality (or the internal). Or, life has an actual tendency and a virtual tendency, or an actual and virtual side, a double existence.
A life contains only virtuals. It is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it its particular reality.\textsuperscript{193}

Life is virtual and actual. It moves from the actual to the virtual and from the virtual to the actual. How must we understand these two movements? We must be careful here. The sense of the movements depends on which perspective is being adopted and correspondingly on what ‘plane’ it is that ‘gives it its particular reality’. These planes are, in our interpretation, pathways.

There are, as we have said, three different perspectives in play here corresponding to the three different planes giving each movement its reality: an acute pathway, a chronic pathway and a recurrent pathway. On each pathway, there is dual functioning; actual and virtual determine problems on the pathway by functioning mutually as limits. But, as we show below, they function according to different relations in each case.

When speaking of the actual and virtual, it is imperative to acknowledge that the sense to be attributed to them depends on the pathway on which they are operative. Thus, it is both insufficient and misleading to say, as Boundas does for example, that difference ‘means’ the movement from the virtual to the actual, complemented by the movement from the actual to the virtual.\textsuperscript{194} Such a view does not take into account the fact that the sense of the movement depends on the plane on which it takes place. We can look to cultural differences to understand what this means. To leave food on your plate might constitute an insult to a host in Scotland, but to do so in China is well-mannered. The reality of this ‘same’ movement depends on the plane on which it occurs.


In Deleuze, there are three fundamental planes in operation. What Boundas refers to is the movement as it occurs on the first plane; the ‘acute’ plane of the first synthesis. Deleuze explains this first movement as follows:

The actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst the actualization relates it back to the plane as if to that which turns the object back into subject.\(^\text{195}\)

On this plane, actual and virtual are *external* to one another, and so determination on this plane is external. To say that the actual ‘falls from the plane like a fruit’ is to say that it is externalized ‘by’ the virtual. That is, it is produced by, or differentiated ‘from’, the virtual. This plane is characterised by externality; it is life considered as external. We said previously that life might be understood as operating with conflict and cooperation as its limits. This captures the ‘conflict’ side. It is a condition of their conflict that a tumour and its host be external to one another. They are distinct unto themselves (homogenous in themselves) and distinct from one another (heterogeneous to one another).

Deleuze describes the movement on the second plane as follows:

...the inverse movement also occurs; in which, as the circles contract, the virtual draws closer to the actual, both become less and less distinct. You get to an inner circuit which links only the actual object and its virtual image: an actual particle has its virtual double, which barely diverges from it at all; an actual perception has its own memory as a sort of immediate, consecutive or even simultaneous double.\(^\text{196}\)

Here, the actual and virtual become indiscernible insofar as they are operating on a plane – the chronic plane of the second synthesis – where they are internally, or virtually differentiated. The actual and virtual cannot be differentiated in an


\(^{196}\) *Ibid.*
objective sense insofar as the difference between them is subjective, rather than objective (as in the first plane). A tumour and its host are distinguishable on the first plane, but not on the second plane. On this second plane, they coexist in, for example, their shared struggle for survival, even if in this struggle they conflict with one another (first plane). The actual and virtual are here distinct (heterogeneous to one another) but also indiscernible, insofar as they are each heterogeneous in themselves.

We have explained how the dyad works. Let us ask the question, though: which dyad? We have said that there are three dyads included in the dyad, or that the dyad is understood from three perspectives, each of which is dyadic. Which dyad have we arrived at a general understanding of? The answer is all three; it is a general understanding, applicable to each dyad. In each dyad, there is a pull in both directions at once, in the direction of the actual and in the direction of the virtual.

Each dyad has its own pathway and each pathway is structured according to its own actual/virtual relationship. The acute pathway operates with actual and virtual as limits, where actual and virtual are external to one another, as in the first actual/virtual relationship Deleuze describes. This makes sense when we think of the acute, for example, as something that has a rapid onset or short course: insofar as a principle of externality operates on this plane, there is no time for anything to endure; the problems on this pathway are constitutive and urgent. With acute inflammation, for example, there is a rapid response of the body to pathogens invading it. Acute inflammation can be described as ‘a reaction of the vascular and supporting elements of the tissue to injury; it results in the formation of a protein-rich exudate, providing the injury has not been so severe as to destroy the area.’ 197 This inflammation is acute insofar as it is characterised by an immediate response to the injury caused by the invading pathogens. The injury is reacted to immediately and invasion and response are essentially external to one another. There is little or no

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overlap between the injury and response: it is, as such, a ‘reaction’ rather than a ‘process’.

There is a different structure in chronic inflammation. In this case, there is not simply injury and immediate response.

It sometimes happens that the cause of the damage (e.g. bacterial infection) is not removed. In this event there is a prolonged tissue response in which acute inflammation is combined with demolition and attempts at healing. This process is termed chronic inflammation.198

This prolonged response constitutes, for us, an endurance of a sort on the part of the problem. The problems on the chronic pathway endure.

We have defined the first two pathways according to their limits but will delay addressing the third pathway until later in the chapter.

We have defined each pathway according to its limits. We turn now to the question as to how the reality of each pathway can be established. We do so by using Deleuze’s three syntheses. In our view, Deleuze’s syntheses are planes operative in his vitalist philosophy. Their reality is established by Deleuze in his work. By analysing their establishment we are developing the question as to how the reality of these pathways of life can be established.

Pathogenetic analysis

Each plane in the actual/virtual dyad is connected to a particular philosopher in Deleuze’s work. Acute/connective synthesis is linked to Hume, chronic/disjunctive synthesis is linked to Bergson, and recurrent/conjunctive synthesis linked to Nietzsche. Each of these figures is attached to one particular plane in Deleuze’s thought insofar as they are responsible for the liberation of that plane. One way of understanding this is to say that each philosopher ‘unblocks the flow’ of each

198 Ibid.
pathway by ridding it of its dysfunctional or sick elements, elements that would stem the flow, preventing realisation of the plane. For example, we will argue that Bergson is a second synthesis/pathway, chronic philosopher, insofar as he realises chronic functioning by ridding it of its dysfunctional components. Bergson opens up this pathway, or determines this plane, primarily by removing the counter-productive tendency to think this pathway in terms of immobile sections external to one another, rather in terms of the internality proper to the pathway. In the language of pathogenesis, what Bergson does is realise that chronic problems have hitherto been understood as acute. In viewing chronic problems in this way, the reality of the process under consideration becomes distorted, the life of that process misunderstood.

How is this establishment of the reality of the pathways to be understood? To determine a pathway or plane is to ground. Each grounding is an operation that takes place according to a procedure, or set of procedures. Each philosopher’s work can be seen in terms of this grounding procedure. There are various features of this procedure, and one way of exploring them is to use the figures of ground from a reverse Platonism, as drawn out in Chapter 1: question-problem complex (or dyad), repetition (or ratio), selection (or logos) and ungrounding (unequal). Each grounding procedure has a narrative with nodal points corresponding to these figures. Just as each plane has its own actual/virtual relationship, so does its own set of figures. We will construct, in this chapter, some but not all of the narrative for each pathway. To construct a complete narrative would be too time-consuming insofar as it would involve drawing out all four aspects for all three philosophers. We will instead construct a short narrative of the grounding procedure for each plane, with reference to these figures at relevant points.

Before we turn to this task, one more aspect of this grounding procedure must be addressed. We have said, following Deleuze, that to pose a question is to posit a
ground: ‘A question’, as Deleuze says, ‘is an appeal to a ground’.\textsuperscript{199} We also noted that, for Deleuze, there are three different structures of questioning operating as a ‘triple function of grounding’.\textsuperscript{200} The first structure, associated with Kantian critique, was developed in the previous chapter.\textsuperscript{201} The second – the ‘universal question’ – is developed in Chapter 5.\textsuperscript{202} In this chapter, the second structure is developed. This is ‘an existential questioning of the kind exemplified by Kierkegaard in his \textit{Philosophical Fragments}, a questioning which “refuses all responses”, and for which the operation of grounding consists in “paradox”.’\textsuperscript{203} What does this mean?

To pose a question that refuses all responses is to pose a question that is in no relation with an answer. It is to pose a question that does not ground an answer. Such a question has the structure of what we, in Chapter 1, called the question-problem dyad. Such a question carries with it no implication of a limit. This is essential for the construction of the pathways insofar as they can only be constructed and work as pathways if there is nothing blocking or limiting them, nothing retarding their flow. Each pathway is its own smooth, uninterrupted plane. To pose a paradoxical question is, as such, \textit{productive} insofar as it contributes to the grounding of a plane.

Paradox plays an important, productive role in Deleuze’s work, particularly in \textit{LS}.\textsuperscript{204} Not only is its role productive, but it, to repeat, is \textit{itself} productive. There could not be functioning without paradox.\textsuperscript{205} It enables the construction of the plane as it ensures resonance on that plane;\textsuperscript{206} that is, it enables realisation of planar consistency. How does one understand the paradoxical as productive? As Deleuze remarks,
Good sense affirms that in all things there is a determinable sense or direction (*sens*); but paradox is the affirmation of both senses or directions at the same time.\(^{207}\)

The connection Deleuze draws here between paradox and affirmation is important. Paradox is *pathological* in Deleuze; it is pathological to affirm two senses or directions at the same time. Each of the aforementioned philosophers – Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche - enacts a pathos within thought insofar as they each, in their respective philosophies, move in two different directions at the same time.

We have said that each philosopher is, in a sense, a philosopher of pathos. It is important to understand that this notion of pathos retains its links with the commonly understood notion of pathos as ‘suffering’. Each philosopher operates *affectively* in the milieu he constructs; affectivity is implied in the construction of each plane. Why? For one thing, there are no limits that would separate the act of constructing that plane from the plane itself. The grounding of the plane is an act (among other acts) that takes place *within* the plane itself. One cannot construct such a plane in transcendent detachment; the construction must be an affirmation. There is *investment* and *participation* in the plane constructed. The construction of the plane is an affective movement, one that follows the contours of the affect/affection dynamic outlined in previous chapters. To say that there is pathos in this construction is to say that the construction takes place through suffering, where to suffer is to be affected. This suffering is not necessarily negative and, in fact, as we have said previously, an increase in this ability, along with an increase in the ability to affect, is always preferable. Thus, an aim is to become fully immersed in the milieu so that this ability is not hampered by limitations.

In the same way that the relation between the actual and virtual depends on the plane on which it occurs, the character of each pathos depends on the plane on which the movement occurs. In posing a paradoxical question, each philosopher sets out a plane. With regard to Deleuze’s philosophy and to the actual/virtual dyad,

this means not simply that Deleuze’s thought is pathological, but that it involves three different paradoxical perspectives and corresponding planes. We must draw each pathos or paradoxical perspective out. First, we must draw out the sense of pathos ‘as such’ and for this task a return to Kant is required.

Even though, as we showed in the previous chapter, Kant fails to engender a pathos within his thought, he does discover the principle of pathos; the principle of moving in two different directions at the same time. It is a principle, or concept of difference in itself, or pure difference. We associated this difference with the concept of the border. The function of the border is to ground, and in grounding it cleaves. Cleaved with respect to the problem of how to constitute a plane are two different senses or directions.

When I say “Alice becomes larger,” I mean that she becomes larger than she was. By the same token, however, she becomes smaller than she is now. Certainly, she is not bigger and smaller at the same time. She is larger now; she was smaller before. But it is at the same moment that one becomes larger than one was and smaller than one becomes...This is the simultaneity of becoming...It pertains to the essence of becoming to pull and to move in both directions at once.208

There are, potentially speaking, three paradoxical perspectives to be drawn out here: the cleaving from the perspective of the first plane, cleaving from the perspective of the second plane, and a cleaving whereby the two previous cleavings are themselves cleaved. To be clear, there is a cleaving of the actual and virtual in each case and on each plane, but insofar as the relation between actual and virtual is different on each plane, the two directions or senses cleaved will be different in each case. Each can be understood formally:

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208 Ibid., p. 1.
**First Plane:** Cleaving of two sides where the sides are heterogeneous to one another and homogeneous in themselves. This difference is associated, following Deleuze, with Hume. This is acute or actual pathos, constituting an actual or acute plane. There is cleaving, where ‘to cleave’ means to ‘split asunder’, or externalize.

**Second Plane:** Cleaving of two sides where the sides are heterogeneous to one another *in addition* to being heterogeneous in themselves. This difference is associated, following Deleuze, with Bergson. This is virtual or chronic pathos, constituting a virtual or chronic plane. This is cleaving, where ‘to cleave’ means ‘to relate together’, or internalize.

**Third Plane:** Cleaving of the differences of the first and second planes. This difference is associated, following Deleuze, with Nietzsche. This is recurrent pathos. Rather than there being a planar consistency like the first and second planes, there is the consistency proper to a bordering in perpetual and infinite proliferation (which might be identical to planar consistency). The border cleaves. This is a cleaving which carries the double sense of the term, ‘cleave’. To cleave is here ‘to split asunder’ and ‘to relate together’, to externalize and internalize at once.

Let us now turn to the three planes individually.

**Hume and the first plane**

One of Hume’s greatest contributions to philosophy, according to Deleuze, is his creation of ‘the first great logic of relations’.\(^{209}\) It is through this construction that Deleuze, following Hume, is able to think relations in their own right, rather than as occurring between constituted terms. In Hume, the operative distinction in this construction is between impressions and ideas as terms and impressions and ideas

\(^{209}\) *ES*, p. ix.
as relations. Using terminology we have developed thus far, this means that relations cease to be understood as a function of terms. When understood as ‘that which obtains between constituted terms’, relations function as functionaries (of terms), rather than functioning in themselves. In separating terms and relations, Hume ensures that relations function in themselves rather than as functionaries. In other words, Hume *cleaves* terms and relations in the sense of splitting them apart. He does so within one consistent theory, or on one plane of consistency.

What happens once terms and relations are cleaved in this way? They function as limits for Hume, in a way analogous to the way that noble and base do for Nietzsche, and virtual and actual do for Deleuze. They determine the upper and lower limits of a scale. Impressions and ideas are, in Hume, determined *within* this scale and according to these limits. Here, we refer to Hume’s famous distinction between impressions and ideas in terms of their differing degrees of vivacity or liveliness. In our interpretation of Hume, impressions are determined on this scale as *more acute* than the *less acute* ideas; impressions are more vivid and sharper to the mind, while ideas are less vivid, less sharp to the mind. The plane Hume constructs functions, in our interpretation, as a scale of ‘acuteness’, a gradated scale where the limits of that scale – terms and relations - are externally related.

Insofar as everything operates according to these limits, everything tends towards both limits at the same time. Thus, they ‘are’ both limits at the same time. Here, we arrive at the pathos of Hume’s thought and of the acute plane. Hume speaks of a hypothesis of ‘double existence’ which ‘pleases our reason’ and of the idea of a system that would be the ‘monstrous offspring of two principles... which are at once both embrac’d by the mind, and which are unable to mutually destroy

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This ‘embracing by the mind’ is the affirmation of paradox of which we have spoken. With this embrace, or affirmation, there is grounding not in reason or logic, but in affectivity. It is as if there is, accompanying this embrace, an entrance into a realm of affectivity. This is how we should understand Hume’s famous declaration that ‘reason is the slave of the passions’. This is Hume’s pathos.

What makes up this pathway? It is constituted by things external to one another; however, this is not to say that it is made up of parts. Consider the following extract from Deleuze’s book on Hume.

Of course, families are social units; but the characteristic of these units is that they are not added to one another. Rather, they exclude one another; they are partial (partials) rather than made up of parts (partielles). The parents of one family are always the strangers of other families. Consequently, a contradiction explodes inside nature. The problem of society, in this sense, is not a problem of limitation, but rather a problem of integration. To integrate sympathies is to make sympathy transcend its contradiction and natural partiality. Such an integration implies a positive moral world, and is brought about by the positive invention of such a world.

Hume realises that people act in a certain way because they are partial; this is the reason for their actions. The problem is how to integrate this partiality on a social level. Hume develops the question as to how the differentiation of partiality can be complemented by integration. By being partial to ourselves, our relations and acquaintances we differentiate, while being indifferent to strangers. This indifference is overcome through an integration that does not annul, but rather complements, the original differentiation. In our interpretation, this constitutes a

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213 Ibid.
215 ES, p. 40.
cleaving, in Hume, of this differentiation and integration. Through this cleaving a plane emerges, there is ‘positive invention’ of a world.

In Deleuze’s philosophy, this is the plane of the first synthesis of time, or the connective synthesis. Connected are things that are heterogeneous to one another and homogeneous in themselves. In fact only things that are in this relation can be said to be connected: this is the relation proper to the connective synthesis. The resultant plane is a plane made of ‘partial objects.’

We said in the introduction that life operates along borders that cleaves two sides, but left undeveloped the question as to whether the two sides are heterogeneous to one another but homogeneous in themselves, or heterogeneous to one another in addition to being heterogeneous in themselves. Here, a cleaving along the lines of the first is made. In our interpretation, this is the pathway of the acute. Life ‘is’ external on this plane; everything is external on this plane, or everything operates according to relations of contiguity. The plane is ‘acute’ insofar as there is no duration, the problems on this plane, as we said, are constitutive and urgent. Insofar as there are only relations of externality, there is no time for anything to endure in. It is not in the nature of these urgent problems to endure. What ‘makes up’ this plane has no duration insofar as it is homogeneous in itself. It is as if, in the original composition of this plane, Hume creates a plane of instants standing external to, or in a relationship of contiguity with, one another.

Given that they use Melanie Klein extensively in the first synthesis and credit her with the ‘marvellous discovery’ of partial objects, it seems that Deleuze and Guattari see Klein as working in something of a Humean mould. Cf. *AO*, esp. pp. 44-46.

We cut short in this analysis of Hume’s work in relation to the first plane, when much more could be said about Hume’s demarcation of this plane and of the influence of Hume’s project on Deleuze. We will say one thing, briefly. Everything is external to one another on this plane, but, according to Hume, there are three different ways in which they can be external; they can be contiguous, successive or in conjunction. These linkages derive from Hume’s famous and remarkable treatment of causality, and his analysis of two billiard balls striking one another in what seems to be a causal relationship. The event is broken down by Hume into a triad of (non-empirical) circumstances that accompany causality necessarily: contiguity in space and time, succession in time and constant conjunction between cause and effect (Cf. David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (London : Oxford University Press, 1960) Book I Part III Section VI pp. 87-94). Hume rejects causality as the principle for the construction of a philosophical plane and constructs a different plane.
A ‘second’ grounding of the plane

Consider again how this acute pathway is ordered. The objects constituting it are heterogeneous to one another, but homogeneous in themselves. The plane Hume has constructed consists of partial objects, or ‘actual differences’. The question presented is: what is the relation between these actual differences/partials within the plane constructed? Hume constructs a plane of externality, but we must remember that there is internal consistency to this plane. In other words, there is an inside to the plane. We know how the partials relate to one another in order to constitute the plane, but how do they relate to one another within the plane constituted? On, or in, this plane the partials are heterogeneous to one another and heterogeneous in themselves.

This question regarding the internality of the plane can be framed as a criticism of Hume. There is, in Hume, a matrix of partialities, but nothing that ties this matrix together, making of it a whole. There is nothing ‘holding them together’; they are external to one another, but nothing determines the way they relate to one another within the plane. It is as if Hume has constructed a line of beads without the thread that holds them together. Does this mean that Hume’s project is illegitimate insofar – the plane that will become, in Deleuze, the connective plane – setting out these linkages as the logos of this plane. Rather than causal links, Hume sees connection, succession and constant conjunction. It is not that Hume discovers three different logics, it is that he determines three different linkages that, taken together, are sufficient to determine a milieu, or instantiate a plane (cf. Deleuze’s analysis, in ES, p. 103). This demarcation is taken up by Deleuze in his determination of the three syntheses, with an important divergence: in Deleuze, the syntheses are not three ways in which things can be external, but three ways in which they can be unequal. Something can be ‘externally unequal’ (corresponding to Hume’s ‘contiguous’) ‘internally unequal’ (Hume’s ‘successive’) or externally and internally unequal (corresponding to Hume’s ‘constant conjunction’). This is the first synthesis, second synthesis and third synthesis, respectively. There is correspondence between Hume’s set of contiguity, succession, constant conjunction and the three syntheses in their various forms, as they operate in Deleuze’s philosophy. With Deleuze and Guattari’s three syntheses, operative in AO – connection, disjunction and conjunction – the correspondence becomes striking. Like the correspondence between the syntheses and the categories of pathogenesis, it is so curious that it has not been commented upon. It is perhaps due to the fact that commentators on Deleuze rarely dwell at length on the influence of Hume on his thought - there are very few book-length studies on Deleuze and Hume. Jeffrey Bell’s Deleuze’s Hume: Philosophy, Culture and the Scottish Enlightenment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009) is a notable and valuable exception.
as he presupposes this whole, this thread, rather than including it, or an account of it, in his philosophy? In a way it does. We claim is that in not fulfilling a condition of his own thought, Hume reintroduces the negative, or dysfunction. It is true that this condition is ‘attached’ to real activity, but insofar as the condition remains unrealized, the condition signifies reactivity. However, an important clarification must be made here. This condition is a real, genetic condition in the sense that it is generated (as an unactualised possibility) from within Hume’s own thought. It is not a condition that comes from outside, as pre-determined. It is generated, rather than ‘discovered.’ It is as if the beads can only be threaded once they have been connected together. Our example breaks down, in a sense, because we have to understand the connecting of the beads in terms of a generation of the thread that links them.

Deleuze calls the first plane (where the beads are connected) the ‘foundation’, and the ground it generates and which grounds it (the thread), the ‘ground’. This latter is the second plane, the ground of the foundation.

The first synthesis, that of habit, is truly the foundation of time; but we must distinguish the foundation from the ground. The foundation concerns the soil: it shows how something is established upon this soil, how it occupies and possesses it; whereas the ground comes rather from the sky, it goes from the summit to the foundations, and measures the possessor and the soil against one another according to a title of ownership.219

This synthesis is, as Deleuze remarks, the ‘foundation’ insofar as it establishes a milieu, or plane. It nevertheless needs a ground. In temporal terms, this means that the time proper to the first synthesis needs a time in which to pass; the acute pathway needs a chronic pathway, the beads need their thread. As Deleuze remarks:

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219 DR, p. 79.
Although it is originary, the first synthesis of time is no less intratemporal. It constitutes time as a present, but a present which passes. Time does not escape the present, but the present does not stop moving by leaps and bounds which encroach upon one another. This is the paradox of the present: to constitute time while passing in the time constituted. We cannot avoid the necessary conclusion - that there must be another time in which the first synthesis of time can occur. This refers us to a second synthesis.\(^2\)

This is a ‘necessary conclusion’ in the sense that it is forced by the order of thought. In constructing the plane, Hume also generates conditions for that construction that have to themselves be met. It turns out that the beads can be constructed without the construction of a thread, but that the construction of the beads demands the construction of the thread. It is a question of going all the way; to stop is to introduce inconsistency, illegitimate limitation. The move to the second synthesis is an impulsion, one that can either be resisted - thereby introducing reactivity or the negative - or encouraged and affirmed. We claim that in not fulfilling a condition of his own thought, Hume stops short and reintroduces the negative, or dysfunction into his philosophy. If we think of Deleuze as imbibing this line of thought from Hume, we can see Deleuze’s move to Bergson as a way of developing the line of thought he finds cuts short in Hume.

**Bergson and the second plane**

In the first synthesis there is contiguity and, as such, a balance of sorts but in the second there is imbalance, disjointedness. On this plane, everything differs in kind; everything is flattened in a milieu of coexistence, as in a Möbius strip. All the elements are in a (second synthesis) relationship of internality, rather than a (first synthesis) relationship of externality. All difference is heterogeneous; differences are heterogeneous in themselves and heterogeneous to one another. Everything is not yet ‘out of joint’ (as it becomes in the third synthesis), but disjointed. The plane is

\(^2\) Ibid.
ordered according to a non-hierarchical structure of coexistence, an order of logical and temporal priority. On this plane, the disjunction synthesis, rather than the connective synthesis, rules.

How does the disjunctive synthesis work? As is well known, the Deleuzian disjunction is unusual insofar as it is inclusive rather than exclusive.

A disjunction that remains disjunctive, and that still affirms the disjoined terms, that affirms them throughout their entire distance, *without restricting one by the other or excluding the other from the one*, is perhaps the greatest paradox. "Either ... or . . . or," instead of "either/or."221

Rarely commented upon is the significance of the fact that the two disjunctions share the same order. Just as there is an order of priority implied in the exclusive disjunction, so is there such an order implied in Deleuze’s inclusive disjunction. The ‘x’ in the disjunction, ‘either x...or y’ has *priority* over the ‘y’. Thought is directed to the ‘x’, in each case, before the ‘y’; or rather, the ‘x’ comes before the ‘y’ within the order of thought. This priority is instrumental for both Bergson and Deleuze in giving time a *direction*; everything coexists in time, time is virtual coexistence. This coexistence refers to a *distribution according to an order of logical and temporal priority*. The thread we referred to previously will be stretched out and I will not be able to differentiate it in as clear a way as I can the beads, but I do know that (imagining the thread represents a time-line) one strip is *prior* to another strip. This is the case not insofar as one strip is at one end (representing a time in the future) and one at another end (representing a time in the past) but insofar as *in relation to one another*, one is prior to the other.

How does the question of pathos fit here? What are the two senses or directions affirmed in this plane? In order to answer this, we must note that the synthesis is not a synthesis of the ‘either’ and the ‘or’ (or of their objects). Rather, the synthesis is

221 *AO*, p. 76.
a synthesis of differences. These differences are, as we have said, heterogeneous to one another in addition to being heterogeneous in themselves. In terms of the disjunction, this means a synthesis of, ‘either...x or...y’ and a difference heterogeneous to this in addition to being heterogeneous in itself. This can only be the inverse of ‘either...x or...y’; this is: ‘either...y or...x’. So, to clarify, what is synthesized is ‘either...x or...y’ and its inverse, according to an order of priority, ‘either...y or...x’. What this means is that ‘either...x or...y’ and ‘either...y or...x’ operate as ideal limits for the scale of the second, chronic plane. Why do we say this?

The relationship between them corresponds to the actual/virtual relationship. Each, as Deleuze tells us, becomes the ‘mirror image’ of the other. ‘It is not’, as Deleuze remarks, ‘so much that one cannot assign the terms ‘actual’ and ‘virtual’ to distinct objects, but rather that the two are indistinguishable.’ By considering the two limits proper to the disjunction, we can make sense of Deleuze’s confusing definition. Of course they cannot be distinguished. How can there be distinction when in each case it is ‘either...or’? Our earlier differentiation between sickness and health will help us understand what is going on here.

A host will be sick due to the tumor attacking it. And the tumor’s health will increase in proportion to the decrease in health of the host. The limits for this interaction are health and sickness: there is fluctuation between them as limits. Sickness and health can be differentiated as limits (we know when something is sick and when it is healthy) but insofar as the reciprocal relationship between the tumor and host exists, it follows that sickness and health are indistinguishable – when the host’s health increases, it does not do so objectively, but in relation to the decrease in health of the tumour.

Here, we arrive at another aspect of this second plane: reciprocity. When there is an increase in health of the cancerous cells there is an accompanying decrease in the

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223 Ibid., p. 151
health of the host. To take another example, there is a neuromuscular phenomenon whereby a stimulation of a group of muscles is complemented by an inhibition of another. In each case, there is reciprocal determination: the health of the cancerous cells is determined as an increase in relation to the decrease in health of the host.

There is, on the second plane, a reciprocal relation between the two disjunctions, and between the actual and virtual as limits proper to the plane. Insofar as the actual and virtual relate to one another as limits proper to that plane and insofar as determination occurs according to these limits, we can say that there is reciprocal determination on this plane, or according to this scale. What does it mean to say that the actual and virtual are related reciprocally? This is when the actual is accompanied by the virtual as its mirror image, or when, to refer to our example above, an increase has a decrease as its mirror image. We can see why this is so and why the virtual is said by Deleuze to be the actual’s ‘simultaneous double’ on this plane. An increase and reciprocal decrease are the mirror image of one another. Furthermore, they cannot be distinguished if they are considered in relation to one another. If in the neuromuscular movement, excitation is accompanied by a reciprocal inhibition (and if no other features are considered, such as the particular muscles in play) the two determinations are indistinguishable. Their separation is assured, as is the separation of an object and its mirror image, but there is no way to determine which is which.

Let us turn now more squarely to the connection between Bergson and this second plane. What is the ratio (cf. **Ratio**) proper to this synthesis? What ratio is there operative in reciprocity and in the inclusive disjunction? Given the claim made with regard to the ratio operative in Hume’s thought, our strategy for drawing out this second ratio will perhaps be anticipated. Just as Hume injected the differential into the first side in the ‘part/whole’ structure to deliver his theory of partiality, so will Bergson do the same for the other side, the whole. Reason, in Bergson, is grounded in the whole; truth, in Bergson, is the truth of the whole. What does this mean exactly?
One of Bergson’s most important concepts captures this whole ratio: \textit{durée}. \textit{Durée} refers to the open whole. One’s experience is durational, enduring among other durations operative in an open whole itself constituted by durations. This is the whole of different rhythms and lives. These different rhythms are not so much ‘understood’ as \textit{endured}; one participates by enduring. One’s own duration is an element in the totality of durations and one can only understand duration ‘in general’ by enduring and by participating.

If I want to mix a glass of sugar and water, I must, willy-nilly, wait until the sugar melts. This little fact is big with meaning. For here the time I have to wait is not that mathematical time which would apply equally well to the entire history of the material world, even if that history were spread out instantaneously in space. It coincides with my impatience, that is to say, with a certain portion of my own duration, which I cannot protract or contract as I like. It is no longer something thought, it is something lived. It is no longer a relation, it is an absolute.\textsuperscript{224}

To say that ‘duration is no longer something thought, it is something lived’, is to record the entrance into the milieu constituted – the second, chronic milieu – through the adoption of a pathological perspective. That is, it is to leave \textit{logos} behind in favour of \textit{pathos}, or rather, to make pathos primary.

The second, acute pathway is constituted by relations in unmediated relation with other relations. This is time as plane. Time is described by Bergson as ‘absolute’ both because there is nothing limiting the plane and because there are no limitations on the plane. The plane is a smooth surface, with no interruptions within the plane and no horizon signalling the limit of the plane. It is a plane of rhythms and flows; a plane of heterogeneity, where everything is heterogeneous in itself and in its relation to other heterogeneities. There is, as such, only an inside on this plane. Insofar as everything that emerges on this plane coexists, there is nothing outside the plane.

Turning to the corresponding plane in Deleuze’s philosophy, we say that the actual and the virtual proper to this plane also operate as limits, but these limits are in an internal relationship rather than an external relationship. To repeat, there is still a tendency towards the actual and virtual as limits (as there is in the first synthesis) but insofar as things are now operative on the second, chronic plane, the relationship between these limits is virtual or internal, rather than actual or external.

What enables determination on this plane? Deleuze broaches this question in his work on Bergson in a number of ways, two of which are particularly interesting. He quotes Bergson’s famous sugar example and then, after noting that Bergson says we must wait until the sugar dissolves, he says: ‘This is slightly strange, since Bergson seems to have forgotten that stirring with a spoon can help it to dissolve.’ What is the meaning of this odd comment? To stir with a spoon is to make a difference; to make a difference within the totality of durations. It seems impossible in Bergson’s account to make a difference insofar as any difference is ‘anticipated’ by the durational whole. No matter how much we twist and strive to create on the endless Möbius strip, we find that none of our moves make a difference. Consequently, there is nostalgia of sorts for the plane of the acute, for externality. The ruptures of this first plane seem to present conditions for differences to be really made. When I come to the edge of one bead there is opportunity for creation, opportunity that is lacking on the second plane.

If, as we have claimed, there is no opportunity for creation, where does the power required for determination ‘come from’ on this plane? We know in what way there is determination in the sense that we know the order in which things are determined – an order of coexistence and priority – but do we know how this determination can come about? It might be countered, perhaps, that this question betrays a misunderstanding of Bergson’s philosophy; that he uses this differentiation in order to provide positive or functioning interpretations of phenomena. This is a

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reply that speaks to our own project insofar as it basically says that what Bergson is doing is drawing a functional distinction, a distinction – to use our own terminology grounded in the function. Our reply to this is to alter our question slightly: how is Bergson able to differentiate between these two directions or two ways ‘in the first place’? Where do the resources come from to differentiate, for example, ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’? To be clear, we are asking how ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ are differentiated ‘in the first place’, rather than ‘an increase’ and ‘a decrease’; that is, an increase and a reciprocal decrease.

Our point is that, even if we can say that an increase is an increase in relation to a decrease, there is nothing that enables the anoriginal differentiation between ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’. It is as if we need to put ‘space’ between the two terms in order to determine them but cannot do so on this plane of coexistence. This space is not the space of the first plane, the space where homogeneous elements are external to one another. We are not saying that Bergson needs to demonstrate how two coexistents are able to be separate in order to be called coexistent. A different sort of space is in question. It is the space of intensive quantity. It is ‘space as an intensive quantity: the pure spatium.’ For us, this is the space of the border (Cf. Border), one represented well in Deleuze’s characterisation of intensity as ‘E-E’ where E refers to e-e’ and e to ε ε’ …

Deleuze works to demonstrate that this border, the intensive, is operative in Bergson’s thought. He refers to Bergson’s critique of intensity, but claims that this critique is directed against only one kind of intensity, that the intensive really is involved in Bergson’s thought, despite this critique. Deleuze does this not in order to be gracious, nor to abide by a principle of affirmation (to avoid criticism and focus instead on elements of a philosophy he enjoys and finds useful), but because he thinks this difference or power is itself an element (as condition) operative in

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226 DR, p. 230.
227 Ibid., p. 117.
228 B, pp. 91-92.
Bergson’s thought. Bergson, in constructing this milieu, does determine; there is determination in this milieu. We interpret Deleuze as saying here that, for example, the increase that Bergson’s method makes available to us – an increase that constitutes an increase insofar as it is in relation to a decrease – is a movement that involves determination; to increase is to determine.

Bergson’s philosophy remains a strong point of reference in this thesis with regards to question of function and mobility. Bergson, as we do, understands freedom and life (functioning) in terms of mobility. ‘Life in general is mobility itself.’ Life must function as mobile and cannot function as functionary. In this thesis, this mobility has been understood primarily in terms of the concept of border, and of bordering. A border circulates and keeps doing so because it is in the nature of a border to ground determine. In this regard, our conception of mobility differs from Bergson. There may be a border in Bergson’s work, (between ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’, for example) but it does not function in the same way. We claim that it performs only one of the two tasks we see a border as performing: bringing into relation. Bergson enables us to understand, for example, the relation between the excitation of a group of muscles and the reciprocal inhibition of another set. But he does not involve, in his thought, the fissure that functions to split apart. Thus, unlike Deleuze’s border, Bergson’s border does not have a double function.

Bergson makes important remarks with regard to the question of whether dual functioning occurs. Speaking of the theory whereby ‘there is a strict parallelism between the cerebral and the mental’, he says,

...it is not likely that nature has indulged in the luxury of repeating in the language of consciousness what the cerebral cortex expresses in atomic or molecular movements. For every superfluous organ atrophies, every useless function disappears. A
Bergson is here critical of the notion of the duplicitous, but he does so with regard to a specific understanding of the duplicitous; this is when two different things perform the same operation. It is the *duplicate*, rather than the *duplicitous* or the dual that Bergson is critical of. Bergson’s critique is, in fact, directed towards the notion of two different things performing the same function (duplicate), rather than one thing performing a double function. His concern lies with the perceived redundancy of any function in which two components perform the same function simultaneously. In fact, in our view, the reality of Bergson’s plane (which Deleuze uses to form the second plane and which we use to define the chronic pathway) depends on dual functioning.

The problems on the plane of coexistence Bergson constructs function in two ways: a first way and its reciprocal. It allows us, for example, to understand the dynamic between excitation of a muscle group and reciprocal inhibition of a different set of muscles. To repeat, this is why Deleuze uses Bergson’s philosophy to construct his second plane and it is why we use Bergson and Deleuze’s philosophy to define what we have called the chronic pathway.

*Nietzsche and the third plane*

Deleuze depends on Nietzsche’s philosophy for the establishment of the third plane. As is the previous planes, this plane is realised through syntheses. And as is the case with the previous syntheses, the construction of the plane is a synthesis of time. What is this time, the time of the third synthesis? In one important sense, it is what

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231 It might seem as though we contradict ourselves in saying this insofar as we said previously that Bergson’s border does not have a dual function, but this is not the case. There is dual functioning in Bergson’s philosophy, and on Deleuze’s second plane, insofar as actual and virtual function mutually on that plane as limits in internal relation. However, the *border* between actual and virtual on this plane does not have a double function. In accord with the relation between actual and virtual on this plane, it *only* brings into relation.
Nietzsche refers to as the *untimely*. What does this mean? Rather than refer to an absence of time, it refers to an absence of *subjugation* to time. This is the same subjugation of which we spoke in the previous chapter, but there it was subjective and objective orders that subjugated, here it is time that functions in this way.

Life, according to Nietzsche, has for too long functioned as a functionary of time. Man must rise and extricate his life from this functioning. As Nietzsche states (indicating a distance from Bergson), man ceases to regard ‘himself as belonging wholly to the history of becoming.’ When regarded in this way, man is a functionary, a ‘bearer of the flow of time’. We use this Nietzschean understanding to define the recurrent pathway. We do so because we see this pathway and its problems in terms of this absence of subjection. To be more precise, we see the problems on this pathway in terms of an overcoming of sorts. A recurrent disease is one that *overcomes*. We know that a recurrent disease, in biomedical science, is defined as a disease that comes back again and again. This is how we define the recurrent pathway in pathogenesis. On this pathway problems come back again and again. Or, to be more accurate, problems on this pathway are characterised by their ability to re-emerge. Thus, rather than define this pathway negatively (in terms of an absence of subjugation), we define it positively: problems on this pathway are able to re-emerge, they are able to re-claim a ground. When a cancer patient goes into complete remission, the disease is no longer manifest, but there remains potential for manifestation in the future, the disease can come back. The cancer may still be in the body during this period of remission but no signs or symptoms can be detected. The cancer remains ‘hidden’ and retains an ability to determine; it is able to re-emerge at any moment.

This ability to determine is what we are most interested in here. Insofar as this problem remains hidden as undetected and insofar as it retains its ability to determine, we think there is reason to associate this problem with the eternal return.

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In the eternal return, all activity becomes ‘oriented towards’ the future in the sense that all activity now determines. What it determines is the future. It is a future, or a future world, that will be determined and is in the process of being determined. ‘You still want to create the world before which you can kneel: that is your ultimate hope and intoxication.’ This is the grounding activity of which we spoke in Chapter 1, the creation of the world from within that world. The hope of which Nietzsche speaks is a hope ‘for’ the future, one that must be understood in terms of a capacity for change; that is, one understood in terms of an ability to determine. It is a question of ‘awakening’ this ability to determine.

On the other hand, how right it is for those who do not feel themselves to be citizens of this time to harbour great hopes; for if they were citizens of this time they too would be helping to kill their time and so perish with it - while their desire is rather to awaken their time to life and so live on themselves in this awakened life.

Time has to be awakened to life. Previously, life and its problems followed the order of time. With Nietzsche, they function in such a way that no order is accepted as arena for them to subsist in, including the order of time. These problems set out to determine orders for themselves.

Let us return more squarely to Deleuze’s use of Nietzsche, in the third synthesis. How is this synthesis to be thought? This synthesis is not a connection, nor is it a disjunction. It is neither insofar as the linkage in question cannot be the same as the one operative in and constitutive of each of the previous milieus. There is a new linkage proper to this milieu: neither a connection, nor a disjunction, but a conjunction. With this conjunction there is difference both externally and internally,

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both actually and virtually, at the same time. In our interpretation, this conjunction is a cleaving. In a sense, it is a cleaving of the resources of the previous two syntheses. The continuous, disjunctive flow of the second plane is mixed (cleaved) with the connectivity and externality of the first plane. As Deleuze and Guattari remark,

In the third synthesis, the conjunctive synthesis of consumption, we have seen how the body without organs was in fact an egg, crisscrossed with axes, banded with zones, localized with areas and fields, measured off by gradients, traversed by potentials, marked by thresholds.  

The body without organs is more or less identical with the plane of the second synthesis. It is a ‘smooth, slippery, opaque, taut surface’, a whole without a partitioning into organs. What Deleuze and Guattari are saying here is that the third synthesis brings with it the realization that there is partitioning on the body without organs, but a partitioning that is not of the order of the organic. It is, in a sense, the partitioning of the first plane. In the third synthesis, or on the third plane, this partiality conjoins (hence, conjunctive synthesis) with the wholeness of the second plane, delivering a plane that is both ‘whole’ and ‘part’. And it delivers a plane with borders (‘marked by thresholds’) that function to demarcate the zones, localize the areas and fields, etc. For us, according to the pathogenetic understanding established using these syntheses, this bordering characterizes the third synthesis.

Does this mean that there was no bordering previously, on the previous planes? No. As we showed above, each of the pathways has its own two senses and directions, and each is constructed by cleaving these senses and directions. Each plane is characterised by dual functioning. Even though the reality of the border qua border is only established at the end, with the third, there was still bordering going

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235 AO, p. 84.
236 Ibid., p. 8.
on previously. In other words, although we had to pass through the first two planes to get to a ‘true’ bordering, or a ‘true’ cleaving, it was there from the beginning.

But is it third because it comes third in order? Certainly not. It is also the first. But it is third because it acts from within the shadows, in the unconscious. It is first. Whatever is there at the beginning, that is the third.\(^{237}\)

This connects with what we have said about Hume and Bergson’s philosophy with regard to the activity proper to their philosophy. Each of these philosophies is ‘already’ active, but neither of these philosophers goes as far as Nietzsche – as far as the third – to determine the conditions of the activity they are engaged in. Or rather, neither philosopher involves the conditions of activity as a real, active element in their philosophy.

Let us turn now to the role of pathos in Deleuze’s third plane. We see the eternal return as the pathos of this plane. And we see this pathos as cleaving of the previous pathea. It is pathos constituted by pathos on one side (Humean, actual pathos) and pathos on the other side (Bergsonian, virtual pathos). With pathos on both sides there is absolute delirium or intoxication; one experiences what Deleuze refers to as the ‘vertigo of immanence.’\(^{238}\) One might imagine oneself as a border proliferating infinitely; there is never anything to cling on to, ‘as soon as’ a limit is established it is undone. There is perpetual overcoming of limits. Without these limits, there are no available markers for orientation. This is a feeling or pathos of groundlessness: one cannot get any bearing at all insofar as there is groundlessness and paradox on both sides.

At the third synthesis there is the final exclusion of any transcendent element, any pre-determined aspect that would orient thought. Here we arrive at the realisation that life and thought grounds and orients itself through this movement.

\(^{237}\) WG.
We leave the question of how this grounding occurs for the next chapter, however, where the focus will turn from the problem of function to the problem of ground.

Deleuze says that the first two syntheses are left ‘in the wake of’ the third. What does he mean by this? He means that the two syntheses come together to form a problem; their conjunction is the constitution of a problem. The first two syntheses only have real significance, or are only remarkable, in the time of the third synthesis because only here are they problematic. This problem will be understood as a problem of grounding in the next chapter. Here it is understood as a problem of functioning. The third synthesis explains how the first and second syntheses, and their problems, function together. Here, we invoke the pathogenetic conception of life as disease, where disease is the differential element explaining how heterogeneous orders function together. They function together by being in problematic relation. Together, they constitute a problem and they function in doing so. In functioning in this way, they constitute a problem, the function of which is to ground. Again, we delay explaining what this involves until the next chapter, in relation to the problem of grounding.

What of the ratio proper to the third synthesis? This ratio finds expression in Nietzsche primarily in his notion of the will to power. The will to power is, as Deleuze tells us, the ‘differential element of force’.

The will to power interprets (it is a question of interpretation when an organ is constructed): it defines limits, determines degrees, variations of power.

It is a reasoning that is pathological insofar as it is a wholly involved in the milieu; it is ‘manifested as the capacity for being affected, as the determinate capacity for force

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239 DR, p. 94.
240 NP, p. 7.
for being affected.’242 If partiality is the reason operative in Hume and the first synthesis, duration the reason operative in Bergson and in the second synthesis, then the will to power is the reason operative in Nietzsche and the third synthesis. ‘Life’, according to Nietzsche, ‘is will to power.’243 The will to power is the rationale proper to life; it constitutes its ‘truth’. This ‘truth’ works as a criterion or reason for life and active functioning.

"Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered-but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end - introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum, an active determining, not a becoming conscious of something that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the "will to power."244

Insofar as it is the reason proper to active functioning or living, it is not given; it is a truth or reason that is, rather, created or determined. How does determination occur in this third synthesis? It occurs through affirmation, or more precisely, through double affirmation. Each affirmation has thus far been double (two directions at once), so we must ask: in what way is this affirmation double? It is an affirmation constituted by the previous two affirmations (proper to the constitution of the planes). It is ‘the double affirmation of becoming and of the being of becoming’.245 It is the affirmation of the first synthesis (becoming-foundation) and second syntheses (being-ground) at once.

242 NP, p. 63.
244 Ibid. p. 552 (all formatting in original).
245 NP, p. 24.
...the eternal return must be thought of as a synthesis; a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation.246

It might be thought that this double affirmation refers to an affirmation of one followed by the affirmation of the other, but this would be to suppose that there are two affirmations, rather than one double affirmation. It is not that there are two, but rather that there is one and it is double. It is double in the same way our border is double. Two operations are affirmed at once, there is dual functioning. This affirmation can be understood in the context of the proliferation of borders. We arrive again at the twin movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization spoken of previously. The proliferation is a positive movement. It remakes itself continuously, the ground is reclaimed repeatedly. And this positive reclaiming ‘makes’ the accompanying de-borderings and re-borderings themselves positive. Again, we can think of this proliferation of borders as a perpetual ungrounding. This is perhaps the most mysterious aspect of the third synthesis. The eternal return is never given to thought, rather it is always beneath the given of thought, being ‘neither qualitative, nor extensive, but intensive, purely intensive.’247 The eternal return, in our interpretation, is a border, or rather a bordering, in perpetual proliferation. Insofar as it never becomes anything other than a border, it remains mysterious. We always feel the effects of this bordering, just as we always feel the effects of borders without seeing them.

A response here might be to say that physical borders are often in plain sight, but these physical borders are only representative, or perhaps symbolic, of a power that is not localised or limited to that border. Furthermore, it is in the nature of borders - political, social, economic, and so forth - to constantly shift and transform. Borders are inherently mobile; they are unlimited, in the sense that they limit rather

246 Ibid., p. 48.
247 DR, p. 303.
represent limitation. This mobility is not only an ability to move, it is an ability to determine through this movement, through this proliferation. It is of the nature of the border not only to be mobile, but to determine in its mobility. These borders, in a sense, ‘replace’ the grounding performed by the figures of transcendence. Borders perform the same function as pre-determined, transcendent figures, but they do so immanently. That is, there is limitation but this limitation is ‘drawn down’ from transcendence and ‘positioned at’ the border. Rather than transcendent such as God, Self and World operating to determine, we have borders in proliferation. These borders function to ground and this grounding occurs without illegitimate limitation. It occurs on a plane of life, Deleuze’s ‘plane of immanence’.

Questions unanswered
We have answered a set of questions in this chapter and we have left some questions that emerged in the development of our narrative unanswered. The questions we have developed pertain to functioning; we chose in this chapter to focus on the problem of function and delay developing the question of ground until the next chapter. And, within the problem of function, we focused on the problem of dual or mutual functioning, delaying developing the question of dual or mutual grounding until the next chapter. It worked to explain the significance of dual functioning in pathogenetic understanding. We defined three pathways of life using Deleuze’s syntheses and we showed how each of the three syntheses or planes in Deleuze’s philosophy function doubly; on each pathway, there is tendency toward the actual and virtual. This contributed to our explanation for why Deleuze’s three planes can be understood as pathogenetic pathways. Insofar as pathogenesis is life understood as mutualistic and evolutionary, these planes can be understood as pathogenetic: functioning on these planes is mutual – actual and virtual operate mutually as limits on each plane.

What of the questions that emerged but were not developed or answered? These questions relate to the ground and to genesis. We focused, in this chapter, on each of
these problems’ other halves: function and pathos. In doing so, we touched, inevitably, on questions of ground and genesis, without developing them. We spoke of the determining of planes in Deleuze’s work, but we did not explain how this determining or grounding takes place. And we spoke of these planes as emerging through genesis, but we did not explain what was involved in this genesis. In the next chapter we will explain how genesis happens and how grounding, as dual grounding, functions in pathogenesis.
Chapter 4
Pathogenesis

Deleuze and grounding
In the previous chapter, we sought to determine how Deleuze’s philosophy functioned as a vitalist philosophy of life. The philosophy’s internal mechanisms were defined and explored. Deleuze’s philosophy functions according to a play of the actual and virtual on three different vital planes corresponding to Deleuze’s three syntheses. We defined the concept of pathogenesis through a study of these syntheses. This allowed us to define three pathogenetic pathways corresponding to the three syntheses. The pathways are acute, chronic and recurrent. On the acute pathway, we claim that actual and virtual are external to each other. This pathway is acute insofar as its problems are constitutive and urgent. On the chronic pathway, we claim that actual and virtual are internally related. This pathway is chronic insofar as its problems endure and are continuous. On the recurrent pathway, we claim the actual and virtual are cleaved, as externally and internally related. The pathway is recurrent insofar as its problems are characterised by an ability to re-emerge.

The central concept of cleaving in this thesis explains these relations of virtual and actual, which create borders in many different ways which require a pathogenetic understanding. According to pathogenesis, life functions along and according to an infinite proliferation of borders. One of the functions of a border is to ground. We have not yet investigated this function of grounding. In this chapter, the focus turns from the question of functioning to the question of grounding. While in the previous chapter, ‘life’ as the life in Deleuze’s philosophy was examined with
respect to its functioning, in this chapter, it is examined in relation to grounding. We develop the question as to how this grounding occurs and what sense is to be attributed to this grounding. This question is developed in relation to the problem of genesis. Grounding is shown, in this chapter, to be a generative process, where the ground does not stand as external condition, but rather operates as internal genetic element. Again, we follow the argument of Deleuze’s philosophy as a way of showing this to be the case. And we use Deleuze’s work to further define pathogenesis, by explaining what it means to say that, in pathogenetic understanding, grounding is genetic.

We begin with the question: how does grounding occur? A curiosity becomes apparent when this question is asked of Deleuze’s philosophy. We seem unable to ask the same question of the ground as we did the function. The sense of the question, how does Deleuze’s philosophy function? is clear and straightforward, while the question, how does Deleuze’s philosophy ground? is not. Clarification is necessary. Is it the ground that Deleuze’s philosophy requires? Or is it the ground operating within Deleuze’s philosophy as such? In other words, is the ground external to the philosophy, or is it internal?

Here, we return to, and aim to develop, the definition of grounding activity constructed in Chapter 1. To ground is to determine a world internally and externally. Following Deleuze, we see grounding as double. In what way is grounding double? We spoke in the previous chapter of the necessity of operating with two senses and in two different directions at once. Each of Deleuze’s syntheses is a synthesis of two senses or two different directions. Anything operating in these directions or pathways is actual (in its first sense or direction) and virtual (in its second sense or direction) insofar as actual and virtual constitute the limits according to which the functioning of life on these pathways occurs. The same cleaving is true for grounding. Just as there is, in Deleuze, dual functioning so is there dual grounding.

What is involved in dual grounding? And what difficulties are involved in
understanding dual grounding? Let us use an example from pathogenesis in biomedical science to orient our investigation. We refer here to mycorrhiza, a pathogenetic relation between a fungus and the roots of a land plant.

Most land plants are dual organisms. Attached to their roots is a fungus whose hyphae are thinner and more richly branched than the root itself; they invade more soil than is directly accessible to the roots. The host plant supplies the fungus with the carbon needed to make its hyphae. The fungus does much of the job that schoolchildren used to be taught was done by the root hairs. It supplies the plant with nitrogen, phosphorous and other nutrients, and sometimes water too; it can even defend its host against competition from non-mycorrhizal neighbours. Neither functions well without the other; seedlings use their seed reserves to make contact with the fungus, and die if they fail to find a partner.248

A becoming ensues between the host plant and fungus corresponding to Deleuze’s wasp-orchid becoming, referred to in the introduction. In each case, dual functioning and dual grounding occurs. We reached an understanding of this dual functioning previously by relating it to questions of sickness and health. Here, we accompany this with an understanding of the dynamic in relation to the question of dual grounding.

How are these two sides – the host plant and the fungus – related to one another in relation to the problem of dual grounding? Several questions emerge. How can there be more than one ground – is there not a necessity to determine one ground, one Truth? What are these grounds? How do the grounds relate to one another? Are they related ‘immediately’ or through an intermediary? If they relate through an intermediary, does this intermediary not constitute a third ground? If they are related to one another without intermediary how are they able to come into contact? We develop these questions using resources from Deleuze’s philosophy, but we turn

first to the philosopher who we think provides the conceptual framework for dual grounding, Kant.

Kant and ground

One of the most important conceptual distinctions in Kant, with regard to the problem of ground, is between grounding and determining. On one side is grounding; Kant defines a ground as ‘that which determines a subject with respect of any of its predicates’\(^\text{249}\). On the other side is determining: ‘To determine is to posit a predicate while excluding its opposite.’\(^\text{250}\) These definitions are complex and highly significant, both for our study\(^\text{251}\) and for the problem of ground in general.

These operations of grounding and determining are inseparable in Kant. Each involves the other and we can discern how they do so by breaking the operation into steps. To ground is to determine; what is determined is a subject with respect to its predicates; these predicates are posited in an act of determination. These steps are complicated and involve a unique kind of circularity that we will explore later in the chapter. For now, we will note that each operation refers only to the other operation, in a sort of reverse symmetry. To ground is to determine and to determine is to ground. Each operation is defined with reference to the other in such a way that an


\(^{250}\) Ibid.

\(^{251}\) We note here the correspondence between these two operations and between two of the key figures in pathogenesis as methodology: what we have called ratio (cf. Ratio in the glossary) and logos (cf. Logos). Ratio refers to a part/whole relationship and logos to the linkages that obtain between elements. Kant’s ‘grounding’ corresponds to ratio and his ‘determining’ corresponds to logos. Or, to be precise, the differentiation Kant makes corresponds to the differentiation we make between ratio and logos. The grounding operation, in Kant, involves the determining of the subject in respect to its predicates; that is, it refers to a part/whole relationship. This is the relationship in ratio. The determining operation – the positing of a predicate, while excluding its opposite – refers to the linkages made, or the relations that obtain, at the ‘level’ of the elements; an element is determined in its difference from other elements, rather than as a part in relation to a whole (or predicate in relation to a subject). See relevant sections on each figure in Chapter 1.
outside is eschewed. Their relationship is one of mutual association, where the association is sufficient unto itself.

The significance of this conception of grounding and determining, which captures much of the Kantian enterprise, cannot be over-stated. In the first instance, it signals a removal of pre-determined grounds from philosophical thinking. Insofar as each operation is related internally to the other within the association, there is no mediation. As such, neither side is subject to an overarching totality; that is, neither side is a function of a supervening order.\footnote{In our view, this demonstrates a tendency in Kant to what we referred to, in Chapter 1, as an ungrounding of mereology (cf. the section on ‘Ungrounding and the unequal’). This involves a separation of ratio and logos (see previous fn.). As consequence of this ungrounding no totality supervenes upon constituent operations in an operation considered as a whole.} Totality is, in a sense, bypassed; nothing mediates each operation. As such, pre-determined grounds are eschewed. These grounds include the Subject and the Self; there is no centre of action. Each operation acts upon and responds to the other without intermediary and is able to do so insofar as there is no intermediary. Each operation actively – that is, positively – responds to the other. To use our oak and linden example, the trees do not interact with one another through an intermediary; their affection is mutual and immediate. The Kantian framework allows us to see this one movement as mutual and immediate, with respect to the question of ground. How does it do so?

Let us use our mycorrhiza example to draw out the significance of Kant’s differentiation between grounding and determining. Kant’s differentiation enables us to differentiate the host plant and its fungus in such a way that one functions as ground and the other as determination. If the plant is the ground, then the fungus is the determination. So, to say that the host plant ‘supplies the fungus with carbon needed to make its hyphae’ is to say that the host plant grounds the fungus as determination. And in supplying the plant with nitrogen, phosphorus and other nutrients, the fungus determines the plant as its ground.

Perhaps what is most crucial to take away from this is the separation of the two sides: grounding and determining. There is not simply one Theory in play here that
captures the plant-fungus dynamic. If there were, there would be simply a ground in play, representing the totalizing function of this Theory. Instead, there are two grounds, or co-terminal grounds, or dual grounding: grounding and determining.

How are we to understand this dual grounding? We can begin by attending to the difference ‘between’ them. We have attended to the (an)original differentiation before, but not in the context of how grounding occurs without transcendent outside and without totality. In this context, this differential is transcendental difference.

**The transcendental**

How is transcendental difference understood? We have referred to couplets thus far that represent the transcendental differential element – virtual-actual, method-system, noble-base, and so on - but we have been content with determining the element as differential, rather than seeing the element as transcendental difference. One pairing is particularly useful for demonstrating what transcendental means in this context: the antecedent-consequent pairing. We invoke here Kant’s distinction between two grounds: the antecedent ground and the consequent ground.

Kant delineates these two different grounds in a rejoinder to Wolff’s rationalist philosophy, which Kant argued was founded upon the ambiguities of the term ‘ground’ and a conflation of two senses of the ground or two operations of grounding.253 This is the same ambiguity referred to above; it is a conflation of the ground *within* and the ground *of*. The former is, for Kant, the ontological ground; the ‘ground why, or the ground of being or becoming’.254 It is, for Kant, the antecedent ground. The latter complements this ground; it is the epistemological ground, the ‘ground that, or the ground of knowing’.255 It is, for Kant, the

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consequent ground. Kant gives his own examples illustrating the difference between these two grounds, but we refer to Howard Caygill’s more straightforward example.

Gravity is the antecedently determining ground/reason for the orbits of the planets – it explains why they are thus, but the ground/reason that they are thus is determined consequently by the combined mass of the sun and planets.

How is this pair understood? What sense is to be attributed to this pairing? Much could be made of the definitions in themselves, but we are more interested here in their relation to one another. What is the antecedent antecedent to and what is the consequent (or subsequent) subsequent to? The antecedent is antecedent to the consequent and the consequent (or subsequent) is subsequent to the antecedent. Or, to be more precise, the antecedent is antecedent to its consequent and the consequent (or subsequent) is subsequent to its antecedent. All mediation has been subverted or bypassed, as it was with the differentiation between grounding and determining. This demonstrates a commitment to immanence on Kant’s part, or at least a substantial degree of commitment. With this grounding, there is a demarcation so that nothing can be ‘outside’ insofar as the grounds are in internal relation.

Let us turn to our pathogenetic relation to explain how this immanent grounding works. We do so in such a way that we integrate the antecedent/consequent relation with the ground/determination relation. If we consider the land plant the ground (antecedent) then the fungus will be what is grounded as determination (consequent), and if we consider the fungus the ground (antecedent), then the land plant will be grounded as determination (consequent). The point here is that the fungus-plant dynamic is understood without introducing a frame of reference that their relationship would be a function of. The fungus-plant becoming does not take

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place in a separate arena, as Absolute. And in fact the designations, ‘antecedent ground’ and ‘consequent ground’ give us the basis for a non-Absolute framework insofar as there is activity – differentiation, through grounding and determining – that takes place without reference to, and without the presupposition of any Absolutes, any arena for the pathogenetic activity to take place. What the antecedent/consequent pairing demonstrates more clearly than the determining/grounding pairing is the transcendental nature of grounding. With the transcendental, there is removal of any Centre and any-predetermined grounds orienting life. What do we mean by this? What is the significance of Kant’s move here? Let us explain using an analogy.

To say that the antecedent is antecedent to its consequent and that the subsequent (or consequent) is subsequent to its antecedent is like saying that North is not North absolutely but north in its relation to South. And conversely, it is like saying that South is not South absolutely, but south in its relation to North. In fact, we must get rid of capitalisations here, since there are no absolutes in play.

It is as if, prior to Kant, philosophers were like explorers who would create maps, but always ultimately in accord with absolutes: North, South, East, West as cardinal points, where North is north of a Centre, and where South is south of a centre, and so on. This centre represents a frame of reference that is absolute, the arena in which the drama of life takes place. Kant’s Copernican revolution upsets things by snatching away this centre.

The formula suits is so well: "the time is out of joint". It's beautiful! It's a very beautiful formula if we understand it. What is the joint? The joint is, literally, the hinge [pivot]. The hinge is what the door pivots around. But the door? We have to imagine a revolving door, and the revolving door is the universal door. The door of the world is a revolving door. The door of the world swings and passes through privileged moments which are well known: they're what we call cardinal points. North, South, East, West. The joint is what makes the door swing in such a way that it passes and re-passes
through the privileged co-ordinates named cardinal points. Cardinal comes from *cardo*; *cardo* is precisely the hinge, the hinge around which the sphere of celestial bodies turns, and which makes them pass time and again through the so-called cardinal points, and we note their return: ‘ah, there’s the star again, it’s time to move my sheep!’

We can explain what Deleuze is saying here in the language of pathogenesis. Before Kant, there was a hinge around which a door turned. This door swung in an arc, or rather, it swung repeatedly through the arc, through the same ‘privileged co-ordinates named cardinal points’. This arc constitutes a fixed *border* (Cf. *Border*) for philosophy, or a complex set of borders, demarcating limits. This is how pathogenesis, using Kant’s analysis, frames pre-Kantian philosophy. All life and activity was determined in relation to these borders. I would act, but I would always be aware that these actions had their limits and that my acts would ultimately be determined by these limits. My life would be determined by these limits, not only insofar as the order helped regulate my actions – I know when to move my sheep – but in the sense that the meaning to be attributed to my activity and the activity of my life, would be determined by this order.

In unhinging the door – setting things ‘out of joint’ – Kant does not bring disorder, as we might expect. Such disorder would be the absence of determination, the absence of borders. Borders remain in Kant - and in fact, as we have said in previous chapters and as we say again momentarily, these illegitimate borders are essentially moved elsewhere by Kant - but he will set in motion the idea whereby the borders are considered mobile, rather than fixed, and where the function of these mobile borders is to determine and ground.

As long as time remains on its hinges it is subordinate to movement: it is the measure of movement, interval or number. This was the view of ancient philosophy. But time out

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of joint signifies the reversal of the movement-time relationship. It is now movement which is subordinate to time. Everything changes including movement… Time is no longer related to the movement which it measures, but movement is related to the time which conditions it.259

Thus, the removal of fixed borders is accompanied by an ‘installation’ of mobile borders. Movement becomes determined in relation to time, which functions as mobile border. We encountered this border previously where it was understood in relation to the problem of ungrounding.260 We explained there that the border evolves and revolves. This is how we must understand the mobility of the border, it evolves and revolves.

We have not yet arrived at an adequate understanding of this border in relation to the problem of ground. We know that the border grounds, but what does it ground? What is on either side of the border? The border has now to be understood as that which differentiates south and north, or antecedent and consequent. The border, as always, stands as difference ‘between’ its two sides. In this case, it is the difference between south and north, or between the plant and its fungus (if the north-south relationship is considered identical in this relation with the plant-fungus relationship). This is, to repeat, an altogether different difference, a transcendental difference.

It amounts to the discovery of Difference - no longer in the form of an empirical difference between two determinations, but in the form of a transcendental Difference between the Determination as such and what it determines; no longer in the form of an external difference which separates, but in the form of an internal Difference which establishes an a priori relation between thought and being.261

260 See the section on ‘Ungrounding and the unequal’ in Chapter 1.
261 DR, p. 86.
If the plant as ground is the ‘determination as such’, then the fungus as determination is ‘what it determines.’ The transcendental difference is in the ‘between’ the two. There is an *a priori* relation between what lies on either side. There is an *a priori* relation between the plant and its fungus, just as there is an *a priori* relation between pathos and genesis. We know that any activity of the plant will impact on the fungus because they are in relation. Or, to be more precise, we know that any activity of the plant also signals activity of the fungus; the two are, like pathos and genesis, in relationship of mutuality.²⁶² When the plant affects, the fungus is affected. This, to repeat, is an *a priori* relation, not to be confused with a cause and effect relation. We might think of the plant in this relation as affecting as antecedent and its fungus as affected as consequent, where antecedent and consequent are in transcendental relation.

**The genetic**

We arrive here at the break between Deleuze and Kant on the question of the transcendental. Deleuze claims that Kant’s transcendental principles are insufficient because they constitute principles of conditioning, rather than internal genesis. This will be important for us because we see the grounding conditions of pathogenesis as internal. We will follow Deleuze’s critique of Kant in order to draw out an understanding of internal genesis. Consider Deleuze’s remarks.

Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions which still remain external to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis.²⁶³

We explained that Kant constructs a framework for immanent grounding and determining, where the two operations are internally related. Deleuze is saying that

²⁶² See the discussion of immanence in relation to the notion of mutuality in Chapter 2’s section, ‘Pathogenesis and Immanence’.

²⁶³ *NP*, p. 85.
Kant does not demonstrate enough commitment to immanence and consequently falls back into externality. We can examine another important line of thought developed by Kant in order to discern the point of divergence between his work and Deleuze’s here. And we can use the analysis to arrive progressively at a sense of this ‘genetic’ of which Deleuze speaks. The line of thought referred to is Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts.

In this argument, Kant demonstrates the existence (or insistence) of an inner ground by showing that one cannot rely exclusively on external determinations to differentiate between two objects that cannot be equal. As Kant argues:

…the shape of the one body may be perfectly similar to the shape of the other, and the magnitudes of their extensions may be exactly equal, and yet there may remain an inner difference between the two, this difference consisting in the fact, namely, that the surface which encloses the one cannot possibly enclose the other. Since the surface which limits the physical space of the one body cannot serve as a boundary to limit the other, no matter how that surface be twisted and turned, it follows that the difference must be one which rests upon an inner ground.\textsuperscript{264}

At the time of writing, Kant’s claim was that this demonstrates the existence of Absolute Space as ‘fundamental concept’.\textsuperscript{265} Later, (in his Critique period) he recants the conclusion that this inner ground is to be associated with Absolute Space, but will maintain the existence of the inner ground and link it to the transcendental. Does Deleuze read this inner ground in the same way as Kant? No. We must be absolutely clear here. The transcendental (or internal) difference – what Deleuze calls a ‘third value’\textsuperscript{266} is the difference ‘between’ this inner ground and external determination. The inner ground is the ‘determination as such’ in the above quote.


\textsuperscript{265} Ibid. p. 371.

\textsuperscript{266} DR, p. 86.
and the external determination is ‘what it determines’. If the plant is inner ground
or determination as such, then the fungus is external determination, or what is
determined by the plant. If the inner ground (plant) is the first and the external
determination (fungus) is the second then this internal difference is the third.

Deleuze finds fault with how Kant configures the relationship between externality and internality. Kant’s differentiation is between the internal (ground) and the external (determination) but he understands these two sides in their external relation to one another. How can this be the case? Is one of the consequences of the introduction of the transcendental not banishment of externality? How can there be anything ‘outside’ in a world governed by the antecedent/consequent couplet? Does this pairing not ensure that nothing escapes it? It does, but it does not exclude the possibility of externality within this order, which we identify, as we did in previous chapters, as a subjective rather than objective order. According to Deleuze, Kant’s philosophy is not transcendental enough insofar as it reintroduces externality in this way.

Kant understands the third value not in its own right but as a function of the order according to which these two sides – inner ground and external determination – are related. Insofar as these two sides are in an external relationship within this order, this means, to repeat what we have said previously, that this difference – transcendental difference – is a function of subjectivity. Kant takes away the capitalizations from North and South – he takes away cardinality – only to reinstate it in a different way. It is as if north becomes North once again by becoming absolutely north of south in the sense that the subjective order in which it operates (and which it constitutes) becomes itself absolute.

In honing in on the transcendental difference between inner ground and external determination, Deleuze is drawing out a different difference that will subvert this kind of encroaching order. Everything turns on the question of ability/power/capacity. Kant discovers the transcendental, where north is north of south, rather than north of a centre. Deleuze uses Kant’s insight but develops upon
Deleuze focuses on ability, ability to, for example, differentiate north from south. Such ability is not accounted for in Kant’s philosophy, but the ground for developing this account is prepared.

North is north of south and the antecedent is antecedent to its subsequent, is not understood here as a Truth, but as a rule of sorts that is able to be used in a grounding movement. This is the difference between transcendental principles that are principles of conditioning, and genetic principles involved in internal genesis.

The difference here is essentially between a condition and a genetic condition. What is the difference between a condition and a genetic condition? A condition is a pre-determined condition; it is a condition of possible, rather than real experience. A genetic condition, in contrast, is a real condition of experience. What is the difference? The difference is that a genetic condition really conditions insofar as it has the ability or power to condition, while a transcendental principle does not. A transcendental principle does not really condition and does not have the power to condition insofar as it operates in a subjective order, an order in which there is no grounding insofar as everything is ‘already’ determined according to this order. Internal genesis is genesis that occurs without a transcendent outside and without any order (such as objectivity or subjectivity) supervening upon it as an operation. This is the genesis that occurs in pathogenesis.

The fungus and plant determine, in their relation, a genetic pathway. To say this pathway is determined through internal genesis is to say that the fungus and plant are internally related. We know how this internal genesis does not occur – according to a pre-determined order, as in transcendental conditioning, or in virtue of a totality – but we have not yet determined how the internal genesis does occur. How does Deleuze reconfigure Kant’s dual grounding so as to accommodate internal genesis? Here, there is a need to understand dual grounding according to a new configuration, where the configuration is wholly immanent. We propose to use here the figure of the problem to understand how dual grounding occurs immanently.
**Internal genesis and the problem**

Internal genesis has to be understood in relation to Deleuze’s transcendental project of determining conditions of real experience, as opposed to possible experience (as in Kant). It is insofar as these conditions function as conditions of internal genesis that the conditions are of real, rather than possible experience.

When enquiring into the sense of internal genesis, one of the obvious questions to ask: what is generated and conditioned? We do not think this is a good question with which to approach internal genesis. In our view, a much better question is: how does the condition in internal genesis function *qua* condition? How can the condition ‘remain’ a condition in a process it is involved in? Is the condition ‘part of’, or continuous with the genesis, or is it discontinuous with it? It seems as though it must be both. This presents a difficulty insofar as the two seem irreconcilable. They are, however, in Deleuze’s view and in ours reconcilable. The task is to establish a configuration where the condition can function *qua* condition in a genetic process.

We see the question here as being how the condition can ‘remain’ a condition in the procedure, rather than being swallowed up as continuous with the process or with the result of the process. And so we must frame this element in a context in which it functions in this capacity. In fact, we must frame this element *as capacity* and *in its capacity* as generative element. What is it that is capacity *and nothing but a capacity*, that, in its functioning, or ‘in its deployment’ generates? It is the problem. We think that an analysis of the problem will help us to explain how genetic grounding can occur internally. The idea is that the problem will come to our rescue here by offering, or contributing towards, a different configuration where the condition can function in the way that has been described. Using Deleuze’s philosophy again as our primary resource in developing pathogenetic understanding, we turn to Deleuze’s conception of the problem.

In turning to Deleuze’s conception of how the problem functions, we turn once again to Kant. Deleuze looks to Kant for inspiration with regard to the question of
how to understand the problem. Just as Kant discovers the transcendental, so does he discover the problematic, or rather, it is Kant who first conceives the real as intrinsically problematic. The ‘real’ enters here as question because we are looking for real conditions of experience and functioning.

Consider de Beistegui’s observation,

Indeed, Ideas for Kant designate first and foremost problems, and human reason, as the site where these Ideas originate, designates the faculty of generating problems. Yet the significant difference with Kant’s conception of the Idea is that, for Deleuze, it is not reason as a human faculty that is the site of Ideas, but the real itself: the problematic, or the Ideal, is a dimension of being itself...267

The problem, in a sense, functions as alternative to an absolute frame of reference. Rather than look at the world as absolute, we can look at it as problematic. The problem is the arena of a world. When I want to understand something I do so by problematising. For example, when I want to understand how a newspaper runs (to use our example from Chapter 1) I problematisé. I might distinguish between different processes (editing, research, printing and so forth) as parts in relation to a whole they constitute. In approaching the situation in this way I problematisé, and in doing so, I create a world. The problem, in this way, takes on new significance with Kant.

Deleuze takes up the thread from Kant on this point. There is an important difference, however, between how the problem functions in Deleuze and how it functions in Kant. What is the difference? In our interpretation, the problem discovered by Kant is not truly problematic. Kant strives towards a determination of the real; that is, towards a determination of an order of the real that we have identified as subjective. In the Kantian scheme the encounter between an oak and

linden will constitute a problem, but it will be a problem within a subjective order. Insofar as this is the case, the encounter will not be truly problematic, as we claim it is in Deleuze. There is a Truth to this order that works to undermine the problematicity of the encounter.  

The difference turns on how the problem operates in each case. How does it function in each case? We will explain by referring to the difference between transcendental difference in Kant and transcendental difference in Deleuze.

Deleuze has said that the problem with transcendental difference (in Kant) is that it is in relation with the conditioned. Insofar as this is the case, difference does not function qua difference – it does not function ‘in its difference’. It functions, instead, ‘in its relation.’ We think that the same distinction can be said of the problem. The problem in Deleuze (but not in Kant) functions qua problem. What does this mean? It means, for one thing, that the problem is not understood in its relation to a solution. We claim that the subjective order functions as ‘solution’ in Kant insofar as it represents a Truth. Thus, the problem in Kant, to repeat, is not truly problematic.

It is true that Deleuze says that a problem ‘does not exist, apart from its solutions’, however, this is not to say that the problem is in relation to the solution. Rather, the problem ‘insists and persists in these solutions.’ This is to say that the problem is, by its nature, implicative; ‘difference is essentially implicated…its being

\[\text{In our view, de Beistgui’s reading of Deleuze tends towards the Kantian understanding of the problem. The virtual and actual, in de Beistegui’s reading, seem to be in a relationship corresponding to the relationship Kant draws between the inner ground and external determination. The problem, according to de Beistegui is ‘the virtual side of the real, or the pre-individual, proto-actual within the individual or the actual’. (Ibid.) The virtual and actual are here differentiated externally within being. It as if there is the realisation that differentiation must be internal, coupled with the belief that it is sufficient for this internality to be involved by setting difference within being. In our view, de Beistegui makes the same error that Deleuze (as we saw in the Introduction) accuses Heidegger of; that of folding, or cleaving in the wrong place, or at the wrong time. The fold must be ‘between’ external and internal. It is with this in mind that we would approach de Beistegui’s concept of ontogenesis in order to further define pathogenesis. Unfortunately, we do not have time here to explore de Beistegui’s concept of ontogenesis, nor do we have time to explore the related concept of morphogenesis, or morphogenetic processes. If the methodology of pathogenesis is to be developed further then de Beistegui’s work will prove an important reference point. For de Beistegui’s treatment of ontogenesis, see Ibid., esp. Chapter 8.} \]

\[\text{DR, p. 163.} \]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
is implication.' Rather than exhort us to think the problem in its relation to the solution, Deleuze really exhorts us here to understand the problem \textit{qua} problem.

How can the problem be considered \textit{qua} problem? In the first instance, it must be understood in such a way that it is in no relation to a solution. There are a number of ways in which one can proceed in order to ensure that this is the case, several of which have been referred to in this thesis. For example, there is the strategy whereby the problem is understood as double of the question (in the question-problem complex), rather than in relation to an answer. The problem and question are here actually in a transcendental relationship, the same relationship as between the antecedent and consequent ground, and between north and south. In what way does this structure ensure that there is no relation to a solution? We have said that it is because there is only internality. With internal genesis, a relationship of \textit{internality} insists between condition and conditioned, or between ground and determination.

What does this mean exactly? It means, in the first instance, that the conditioned is not external to the condition. This links up to what we said about understanding the problem \textit{qua} problem, rather than in relation to a solution. For the conditioned to be external to the condition would be for the conditioned to act as solution or answer to the condition.

A common mistake is to see the relationship between condition and conditioned as isomorphic to the relationship between problem and solution. Such isomorphism does not obtain in pathogenesis. The host plant, insofar as it supplies the fungus with carbon needed to make its hyphae, acts as condition to the conditioned that is the fungus and its hyphae. But the formation of the fungus' hyphae is not a \textit{solution} to a problem presented by the host plant. A ‘problem-solution’ relation does not fit here insofar as the fungus also grounds by supplying the plant with nitrogen, phosphorous, and so forth. There is a dyadic relation (cf. \textbf{Dyad}) between the fungus and plant. Fungus and plant together constitute a problem without solution; they

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.} p. 228.}
represent here what Deleuze calls the question-problem complex (see Chapter 1).

This being said, the question-problem complex does not help us when it comes to determining how to understand the condition-conditioned couplet as problematic. The crucial difference here is between ‘form’ and ‘formed’: the condition, in this relationship is form and the conditioned, formed. The question-problem complex does us no good because, in this relation, ‘question’ and ‘problem’ are both forms. The question-problem complex presents us with the form of the problematic, but not with the problematic as formed. We can see the plant-fungus relationship as a question-problem relationship in the sense that their encounter forms a question (or a problem), but we must also understand that this encounter generates, not a solution, but a conditioned: the fungus forms its hyphae as a ‘result’ of this encounter, while the plant receives nitrogen, phosphorous and other nutrients. In order to understand this relationship as problematic, we need a determination that is problematic.

What would a determination be that is problematic? Before we give a direct answer, we must here refer to a number of notions drawn out throughout this thesis closely connected to this notion: pathos, reversibility, duplicity and the paradoxical. We refer to them because each of them, in their own way, has an important relationship with the problematic. To be precise, however, none of them captures this problematic determination. Only one determination does this: the circle.

The circle does not enter here from nowhere; it is implicated within transcendental difference. To say that the antecedent is antecedent to its subsequent and to say that the subsequent is subsequent to its antecedent is to introduce circularity into the proceedings. The condition conditions the conditioned, but this conditioned also conditions the condition. The host plant conditions the fungus, and the fungus also conditions the host plant. Clearly, there is circularity, but the question is how this circularity functions. Do we understand the relationship between the fungus and host plant in terms of an endless, interminable and productive struggle, where there is a cycle that goes from the plant, to the fungus,
and back again, *ad infinitum*? No. To do this would be to understand the circularity as a return of the identical or the same.\(^{272}\) It would be to understand the circle as a circulation through cardinal points, with the host plant and fungus operating as the two obvious cardinal points, and with the operation ‘passing through them’ in a cycle.

The circle enters rather as determination that is problematic. In Deleuze’s philosophy, this form is in internal relationship with the condition. What is the condition? What would a condition be that is essentially problematic? It is that through which the conditioned is given, it is *difference*. In this relation, difference is the ground as condition. The fungus and plant operate in this pathogenetic relation on condition of difference, the same transcendental difference of which we have spoken in this chapter already.

Or rather, to be precise it is *not* the same difference as we have spoken of already insofar as it is being considered in a different relation, as the condition in the condition/conditioned couplet, where this couplet is problematic. How is this difference considered here? If the circle is form of the problematic, then difference is being of the problematic. As Deleuze remarks:

> More profoundly still, Being (what Plato calls the Idea) 'corresponds' to the essence of the problem or the question as such. It is as though there were an 'opening', a 'gap', an ontological 'fold' which relates being and the question to one another. In this relation, being is difference itself.\(^{273}\)

We have the problematic as form on one side and the problem in its being on the other, related by an "opening", a "gap", an ontological "fold" which in our vocabulary, is the border cleaving them (Cf. *Cleave*) as its two sides. This is a

\(^{272}\) Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s eternal return is operating firmly in the background here. ‘Every time we understand the eternal return as the return of a particular arrangement of things after all the other arrangements have been realised, every time we interpret the eternal return as the return of the identical or the same, we replace Nietzsche’s thought with childish hypotheses.’ *NP*, p.xvii.

\(^{273}\) *DR*, p. 64.
cleaving of difference or transcendental difference and circularity. The fungus and plant are internally related and they ground and determine one another in a circular dynamic. All the requirements for functioning are ‘contained’ within this configuration, a configuration that meets Deleuze’s requirements that it must have the ‘aptitude to function a priori from within.’ Functioning is able to occur in this way insofar as there is no reference to a transcendent outside and insofar as the internal mechanisms – in this case, difference and the circle – constitute a problem that engenders perpetual regeneration.

In sum, difference and the circle have been configured in a problematic relationship with one another, a relationship that explains how internal genesis can operate with conditions that function within processes as conditions.

**The circle and the transcendental**

We have arrived here at a juncture where there are two possible conceptions as to how the circle operates in Deleuze’s philosophy. There is the productive circle where genesis is understood as circular, and where the circle is in an internal relationship with difference, as being. This is conditioning where there is internal genesis. There is, however, a second circle. This is when the circle operates in an external relationship with difference as being. This second circle is the circle that corresponds to transcendental conditioning, rather than internal genesis.

In the above section, we said that the circle must be in an internal relationship with difference insofar as an external relationship would make circularity a return of the identical or the same. Here, we provide an accompanying argument by saying that the circle cannot be in a relationship of externality with difference because this would mean that the circle would become counter-productive; it becomes a negative, vicious circle. This is the case because the circle would be – insofar as it is in external relation – in relation to a totality, or supervening order. Its activity would constitute

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274 *LS*, p. 17.
a reaction to this order and this reactivity would be ‘imbibed’ by the circle, making it a vicious, reactive circle. This, we claim, is the root of Deleuze’s opposition to this vicious circle, not the circle itself. Consider the following extract, where Deleuze speaks of the vicious circle in relation to the transcendental.

The error of all efforts to determine the transcendental as consciousness is that they think of the transcendental in the image of, and in the resemblance to, that which it is supposed to ground. In this case, either we give ourselves ready-made, in the "originary" sense presumed to belong to the constitutive consciousness, whatever we were trying to generate through a transcendental method, or, in agreement with Kant, we give up genesis and constitution and we limit ourselves to a simple transcendental conditioning. But we do not, for all this, escape the vicious circle which makes the condition refer to the conditioned as it reproduces its image.²⁷⁵

Deleuze is saying that we can either give up on genesis and constitution (which he does not) or accept transcendental conditioning and the vicious circle that arrives as consequence.

We draw attention to this now to differentiate the transcendental condition/conditioned relationship Deleuze alludes to from the (patho)genetic condition/conditioned relationship we have outlined. In internal genesis, the condition does not refer to the conditioned as it reproduces its image. The plant is the condition and the fungus the conditioned, but crucially, the plant and fungus - despite being in a circular relationship – do not refer to one another in this way. The condition does not reproduce the image of the conditioned. If the condition is the ground, then what it conditions is not its ground, but a determination. The fungus as ground grounds the plant as determination, not as ground. We depend on Kant’s distinction between grounding and determining here, discussed in the above ‘Kant and ground’ section. This distinction enables us to say that there is never a

grounding of a ground, there is instead a grounding of a determination. This is the kind of grounding operative in dual grounding. Crucially, there ‘is’ no operation whereby the fungus as ground grounds the plant as ground of the fungus. And there ‘is’ no operation whereby the plant grounds the fungus as ground of the plant. These two operations are viciously circular, but they do not ‘take place’ in pathogenesis.

Of course, this is not to say that there is no circularity. It is to say that there is no circularity of this kind. Again, we emphasize the fact that the circle is introduced as determination capturing the problem, in relation to the ground capturing the problem (difference). Bryant speaks of the necessity of halting the ‘chain of significations,’ in order to root out vicious circularity but this is to approach the issue too late. The negativity must be rooted out at the beginning, precisely by involving the circle ‘from the beginning’. It is involved from the beginning as constitutive feature of the problem. This is, to repeat, what happens with internal genesis.

For all this, let us ask the question: have we explained how the two sides – difference and the circle, the determination of the ground and the grounding of the determination, the plant and its fungus, the oak and the linden – relate to one another? Not yet, we turn to this question now.

The third

Life engenders a coupling of the oak and the linden, or the plant and its fungus, but how does it do so? What relates each side to the other? We know that the plant grounds the fungus as determination at the same time that the fungus determines the plant as ground. And we know that the fungus grounds the plant as determination at the same time that the plant determines the fungus as ground. The question, however, is how this happens. There has to be what Deleuze calls a

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‘coupling’ of the plant and its fungus as heterogeneities. To explain how this coupling occurs is, according to Deleuze, ‘the most important difficulty’.

Does the difference between differences relate difference to itself without any other intermediary? When we speak of communication between heterogeneous systems, of coupling and resonance, does this not imply a minimum of resemblance between the series, and an identity in the agent which brings about the communication?277

Deleuze is asking here where there must not be some resemblance between, for example the fungus and the plant. We can pose a related problem and say that it is all well to distinguish one, for example, as antecedent and the other as consequent, but in order to do this, does there not have to be a minimum of resemblance between antecedent and consequent? Is it not a condition of me saying that antecedent is antecedent to its consequent that the two or of the same sort, or same kind? Do they not have common ground? Similarly, do the fungus and plant not interact with one another insofar as there are similarities between them? In fact, do they not interact with one another insofar as they are organisms? And do they, together, not constitute a dual organism? What is the answer to this problem? We require something that does not ground or determine, but rather enables grounding and determining to take place, something that does not itself differentiate, but which enables other things to differentiate (ground or determine).

...instead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something which distinguishes itself - and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does not distinguish itself from it. Lightning, for example, distinguishes itself from the black sky but must also trail it behind, as though it were distinguishing itself from that which does not distinguish itself from it.278

277 DR, p. 119.
278 Ibid., p. 28.
This is pure difference, or difference in itself. It is transcendental difference, considered from the perspective of the question of indifference. Pure difference works, in the first instance, by being indifferent to both sides in question. Pure difference does not ground or determine; it rather enables grounding and determining to take place by being that from which they differ. In pathogenesis, this pure difference is linked closely with the image of the border (cf. *Border*).

The function of the border is to ground and it does so by allowing its two sides to differentiate themselves from it. It is indifferent; it is distinguished from, but it does not differentiate itself, from that which lies on its two sides. This indifference allows there to be differentiation without resemblance. Germany and Poland are differentiated not from one another, but from the border that separates them. The countries distinguish themselves from it, but the border is neutral and indifferent. The border is indifferent; it does not distinguish itself from the countries. It does not, itself, constitute territory.

We have attended to this element already, in the context of transcendental difference. Why do we draw attention to it now? We do so because there is the question as to what this element becomes once it is involved in the aforementioned operations of grounding and determining. We have said that life operates along and according to borders that proliferate infinitely, but now – with these operations of grounding and determining – these borders become transformed insofar as they are understood in a different relation. They must be understood as singularly determined. They must be understood as *singularities*.

**Pathogenesis and the singularity**

The singularity is a fascinating element in Deleuze’s philosophy, one he routinely refers to with reference to Nietzsche. The singularity is often understood in terms of absence: in the absence of transcendent points of reference, such as God, the Self
and the World, there are singularities. However, this is far from an adequate characterisation of the singularity. As Deleuze remarks,

Nietzsche is not at all the inventor of the famous phrase “God is dead.” On the contrary he is the first to believe this phrase to have no importance whatsoever as long as the human occupies the place of God. Nietzsche was trying to uncover something that was neither God nor Human, trying to give voice to these impersonal individuations and these pre-individual singularities...²⁷⁹

We must understand the singularity in terms of its positivity; this demands understanding the singularity in terms of ground and in terms of determination. The host plant and its fungus ground and determine each other. They do so insofar as this grounding and determining are themselves operations made up of singularities. But what are these singularities?

Singularities are turning points and points of inflection; bottlenecks, knocks, foyers and centers; points of fusion, condensation and boiling, points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, “sensitive” points.²⁸⁰

Singularities are the pre-individual and impersonal points or moments in the plant-fungus dynamic that constitute the dynamic. They are moments that do not belong to the plant at the expense of the fungus or to the fungus at the expense of the plant. They belong to both, they link the two. Any ‘moment’ in the processes whereby the host plant supplies the fungus with the carbon needed to make its hyphae constitutes a singularity, as does any ‘moment’ where the fungus supplies the plant with nitrogen, phosphorous and other nutrients. These singularities link the two in terms of functioning; the plant and fungus are engaged in a process of dual functioning, where this functioning operates with sickness and health as limits (see

²⁸⁰ LS, p. 52.
Chapter 3). But it is only able to function in this way if the singularity is determined. Singularities are determined by the grounding and determining procedures traced in this chapter, where plant and fungus ground and determine one another. In this dynamic of grounding and determining, the singularities that make up this dynamic become determined and grounded as singularities.

We come to an understanding of the singularity as an anomaly. It is an anomaly because it does not belong to a norm. But these anomalies swarm together in processes of dual functioning. These processes are made up of these anomalies. And, to repeat, we see these anomalies as borders. We have made much of this concept of the border as new concept in pathogenesis, but in fact, Deleuze uses the image himself at points in the same way as we do. In the following quote, he uses the image to explain what the anomalous is.

If the anomalous is neither an individual nor a species, then what is it? It is a phenomenon, but a phenomenon of bordering. This is our hypothesis: a multiplicity is defined not by the elements that compose it in extension, nor by the characteristics that compose it in comprehension, but by the lines and dimensions it encompasses in ‘intension.’ Thus there is a borderline for each multiplicity; it is in no way a center but rather the enveloping line or farthest dimension, as a function of which it is possible to count the others, all those lines or dimensions constitute the pack at a given moment (beyond the borderline, the multiplicity changes nature).\(^\text{281}\)

The function of a border is to ground and determine. Among the things it grounds and determines are other borders – ‘as a function of which it is possible to count the others...’ Thus, borders do not only determine territory, they also determine each other as that which determines territory. The processes whereby the plant supplies the fungus with carbon and where the fungus supplies the plant with various nutrients determine the plant/fungus dynamic. These processes are multiplicities

\(^{281}\) TP, p. 270 (my italics).
understood as plant-fungus becomings. But at the same time these processes are constituted by singular moments that ground the dynamic and work to determine other singular moments within the dynamic.

**Diagnosis, genealogy and pathogenesis**

We have framed the grounding of the determination and the determination of the ground as pathogenetic operations: a land plant will ground its fungus as determination, while that fungus determines the land plant as ground. We have said several times in this thesis that pathogenesis can be understood as philosophical method that determines as life determines. We close this chapter by making some remarks on pathogenesis as philosophical method by referring to its two precursors: Nietzsche’s methods of diagnosis and genealogy.

We see pathogenesis in terms of a sort of assimilation of these two methodological procedures. Pathogenetic analysis tends towards both diagnosis and genealogy; they are the two limits of pathogenesis. Diagnosis and genealogy function as limits in pathogenesis just as actual and virtual function as limits in Deleuze’s philosophy (see Chapter 3). To put it another way, pathogenesis has diagnosis and genealogy as its two halves.

It is right to draw attention to this configuration now insofar as we see these two halves as ‘dynamic versions’ of Kant’s two different grounds, the ground and determination. Or, to be more precise, we see these two halves as dynamic versions of these two halves in their pathogenetic relation. Diagnosis is the grounding of determination and genealogy is the determination of a ground.

A philosophical diagnosis is more akin to a diagnosis where a condition or disease is identified for the first time. It is a *grounding* of the disease as determination. It involves specifying a disease as a determination by collating information to make a diagnostic impression. Insofar as this is a procedure involving differentiation, we can say also that philosophical diagnosis is close to a medical differential diagnosis, a procedure that perhaps has Plato’s method of
division (see Chapter 1) as its earliest precursor. The procedure follows steps of division until multiple alternatives are whittled down to one, the impression made. This one impression might be the ‘true lover’, as in Plato, or lupus erythematosus, as in pathology.

Crucially, the procedure itself is what grounds the determination, or rather, it is in this procedure that the disease is grounded as determination. Now, this might be understood as the case in medical diagnosis insofar as the determination – for example, lupus erythematosus – is a medical determination; that is, one that makes sense within an established discipline and discourse. However, there is ‘more’ determination in philosophical diagnosis insofar as the method affects the object under examination and is affected by the object. This is the case insofar as the method and object are internally related. In grounding the fungus as determination, the land plant affects the fungus, as it is affected by the fungus insofar as the fungus determines it as its ground. In diagnosis, method grounds the determination by affecting it, at the same time that it is affected by the determination, insofar as the determination determines the method.

We do not dwell on diagnosis here as we see the previous chapter as an example of diagnosis: the functioning of Deleuze’s philosophy as disease – where life is understood as disease – was determined. We sought to determine the internal mechanisms of Deleuze’s philosophy and in doing so we sought to diagnose Deleuze’s philosophy. In articulating ‘pathogenesis’ we grounded a determination, we classified Deleuze’s philosophy as a philosophy of pathogenesis. And we did so in such a way that the object of the study – Deleuze’s philosophy – affected our approach. We turn here to genealogy.

A genealogical investigation, like a diagnostic procedure, does not lie outside the milieu it investigates; it is in contact with it, influencing it, affecting it and being affected by it. To put it in another way, and to refer to the line of thought from the above section, genealogy as method is in an internal relationship with its object. Genealogy is the study of the ground in relation to the thing it determines, where
that ground is, in Nietzsche’s words, the ‘origin of the emergence of a thing’.

…the origin of the emergence of a thing and its ultimate usefulness, its practical application and incorporation into a system of ends, are toto coelo separate; that anything in existence, having somehow come about, is continually interpreted anew, requisitioned anew, transformed and redirected to a new purpose by a power superior to it; that everything that occurs in the organic world consists of overpowering, dominating, and in their turn, overpowering and dominating consist of re-interpretation, adjustment, in the process of which their former ‘meaning’ [Sinn] and ‘purpose’ must necessarily be obscured or completely obliterated.  

To consider a thing’s ‘usefulness’ and its ‘practical application and incorporation into a system of ends’, is to consider that thing according to its extrinsic determinations. Nietzsche, in excluding these determinations from his examination, shows himself as successor to Kant. It is not surprising that Deleuze, in his book on Nietzsche, reads Nietzsche as belonging ‘to the history of Kantianism.’ Nietzsche effectively gets rid of the externality from each of these Kantian procedures and injects internality into them, in order to arrive at what Deleuze calls ‘true critique’, which is critique that operates without transcendence. There is no recourse, in Nietzsche’s method, to a transcendent outside. Everything is understood inside and in its internal variation. There is a milieu of internality, consisting of variations. As such, the method and its object are themselves variations; they do not come in contact with one another through the intermediary of the milieu, but rather come into contact insofar as they are each variations (of one another). This is, to repeat, the Nietzsche’s notion of ‘pathos of distance’, linked with action-at-a-distance in physics. Variations vary ‘with’ one another within a milieu without intermediary.


283 NP, p. 52.
Everything is understood in its power to affect (from a distance within the milieu) and be affected. Each thing is understood in these terms; that is in its variation, which is to say in its internal variation and in its variation ‘with’ other variations. We might think here of the ‘automatic’ decrease in bond prices when interest rates go up. The two associate with one another in the same economic milieu. One cannot increase or decrease without the other immediately increasing or decreasing.

The object of genealogical enquiry is itself understood in its internal variation. That is, it is understood in its power. It is being understood in its power in itself, but also in its power to determine. One of the things it determines is the method used to examine it. This is what enables the genealogist to proceed without recourse to any transcendent points of reference that would function to determine his method. He is able to ‘rely’ on the object under examination to determine his method as ground; the method grounds the object as determination while the object determines the method as ground. This is an important point; in grounding a determination, one does not ‘discover’ that thing’s ground; rather, one really grounds that thing.

The above explains one aspect of pathogenesis as methodology, but it does well to explain how it can be used practically. For this, we must return to its conception of life as disease, and of systems as operating according to mutualistic grounding relations. We might use it to analyse economic relations: America borrows billions from China, absorbing and spending excess Chinese capital, but the upshot is that China’s voice on the international stage becomes stronger given America’s inability to attack China diplomatically given its reliance on cheap credit. The American foreign policy is interacting productively with the Chinese, as the Chinese fiscal policy interacts positively with the Americans. It is a dynamic system that changes according to mutualistic associations.

Pathogenesis explains the dynamic without recourse to pre-conceived ideas or forms. It is, for example, resolutely non-ideological, even as it explains how different ideologies themselves interact with one another and develop through this interaction. In this, we are also Deleuzian: ‘There is no ideology and never has
been.\textsuperscript{284}

Let us finish here with a final question: what advantage does pathogenesis have over diagnosis and genealogy? We have said that pathogenesis assimilates diagnosis and genealogy in the sense that it operates with them as its two limits. It is tempting to say that pathogenesis is superior to these methods insofar as it cleaves them, enabling them to be used at the same time: pathogenesis introduces a coupling of diagnosis and genealogy. However, this seems somewhat vague and empty. And in any case, Nietzsche used both methods at the same time without using pathogenesis. Our answer must be something else.

We have posited pathogenesis as a lens through which to situate Deleuze’s thought and so the question is, in one sense, how Deleuze’s philosophy advances upon Nietzsche’s with regards to the problem of life. One answer is to say that Nietzsche does not have the three pathogenetic categories – corresponding to Deleuze’s three syntheses – at his disposal. Pathogenesis is more comprehensive than genealogy and diagnosis insofar as it sees the functioning of life as tripartite. Life as disease can be acute, chronic or recurrent, or rather, life is all three. How precisely this is more comprehensive is a question we will not develop here. Instead, we turn the question around here and ask whether this complexity signals a possible disadvantage of pathogenesis.

Insofar as pathogenesis separates life into three different pathways, is there not a danger that these three pathways will be conflated? We spoke of the danger of such conflation in the previous chapter, but here, with a more complete picture of pathogenesis as it relates to Deleuze’s philosophy, we can ask this question of Deleuze’s philosophy itself. If Deleuze’s philosophy operates with these three pathways, is there not a danger that one will be privileged at the expense of the others? Insofar as Deleuze operates with three diseases (where disease is life), is there any danger of diagnosing Deleuze’s philosophy so that one is thought to encapsulate that functioning at the expense of the others? In our view, this is

\textsuperscript{284}TP, p. 4.
precisely the situation we find ourselves currently in Deleuze scholarship. Deleuze’s philosophy has been subject to systematic misdiagnosis, turning on a tendency to universalise one of the pathways operative in his philosophy at the expense of the others. We turn to these diagnoses now, and aim to demonstrate errors in these readings of Deleuze’s philosophy by contrasting the picture of functioning that is sketched with our picture of Deleuze’s philosophy as pathogenetic.
Chapter 5

Pathogenesis and Deleuze scholarship

Three waves

In this chapter, we continue with our strategy of using pathogenesis to understand how Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy functions. According to pathogenesis, life functions as disease. However, disease is not considered as that which inhibits the functioning of life, but as a differential element of life. Life, in its functioning, oscillates between sickness and health, where disease is the differential element that determines the different ways that sickness and health function together. We have described three general sorts of disease: acute, chronic and recurrent. We also defined these sorts as pathways of life, using Deleuze’s three syntheses. The syntheses function by creating planes that we see as pathogenetic pathways.

On the acute pathway, actual and virtual are external to one another. The pathway is acute insofar as its problems are constitutive and urgent. On the chronic pathway, actual and virtual are internally related. The pathway is chronic insofar as its problems endure. The problems on the recurrent pathway are characterized by an ability to re-emerge. The problems on this pathway ‘reclaim’ a ground.

We turn now, with this understanding of Deleuze’s philosophy as pathogenetic, to critical readings in Deleuze scholarship. We have a claim with regard to these critical readings that will be developed in this chapter. There have been two distinct waves in Deleuze scholarship and we are now on the cusp of a third wave. Scholars in the first wave present an isolated acute configuration of Deleuze’s philosophy and scholars in the second wave present an isolated chronic configuration. Deleuze scholars in the first wave see the pathogenesis or disease of Deleuze’s philosophy as
acute. That is, they present a picture of Deleuze’s philosophy as it works only along the acute pathway. We claim that they do so at the expense of the chronic pathway and the recurrent pathway. Second wave scholars present a chronic configuration of Deleuze’s philosophy. We claim that they do so at the expense of the recurrent pathway.

These readings reconstruct Deleuze’s philosophy to explain how it works, and in some cases, to explain why it breaks down. We claim that these readings do not give the whole picture as to how Deleuze’s philosophy functions. Despite advancements made in each of these waves, there is ultimately misdiagnosis of Deleuze’s philosophy. Before turning squarely to these waves, we will make comment on a consequence to the misdiagnosis that we see occurring in each wave. We will argue in this chapter that these philosophies reassemble Deleuze’s philosophy in such a way that it has difficulty functioning.

Deleuze’s philosophy is like a computer that these readings operate creatively and productively on. The problem is that the computer has two different operating systems that function at once. These are its acute and chronic pathways. Each operating system works in itself and also works in relation to the other system. However, the system only functions when it is configured such that the two operating systems work productively with one another, according to a particular configuration. This is the recurrent configuration. We claim that readings examined in this chapter track the functioning of the operating systems, but that they track one at the expense of the other.

First wave readings track the acute pathway and encounter problems because they see only the acute operating system. They recognise the complexity of Deleuze’s philosophy, but only from the perspective of the acute pathway. According to our reading, the acute pathway is not sufficient for operation, and so the machine encounters difficulties and ultimately breaks down. Second wave readings track the chronic pathway and the acute pathway. However, they miss the recurrent pathway. They read the functioning in terms of chronic and acute but do
not account for the relation between the two. That is, they do not ‘reach’ the recurrent configuration. And therefore the machine still encounters difficulties and ultimately breaks down.

The root of these difficulties is different in each wave. First wave readings reconfigure Deleuze’s philosophy in such a way that it does not have the ability to function, while second wave readings reconfigure Deleuze’s philosophy in such a way that it does not have the ability to break down. We develop this claim in a dialectical procedure where it is argued that readings in each wave encounter difficulties because they lack the resources of the other wave. We progress by responding to challenges to the position developed made in the name of authors whose work is critiqued. Our third wave pathogenetic reading aims to present a configuration of Deleuze’s philosophy where it has the ability to function and break down.

**Function and dysfunction**

We have said that philosophers in the first and second waves reconstruct Deleuze’s philosophy in such a way that it tends to break down. We clarify this point here by stating that this is dysfunction that ‘belongs’ to Deleuze’s philosophy. What do we mean by this? To say that an operating system functions is also to say that there is a danger of that system breaking down. To say that Deleuze’s philosophy functions according to two different operating systems is to say that there are, in general, two ways in which it can break down. As we said in Chapter 1, function is cleaved to dysfunction. Whenever something is able to function, that thing is also able to break down.

We see these waves in terms of these ‘breaking downs.’ The dysfunction that occurs – and that is discerned by some of the philosophers discussed – is a dysfunction proper to one of the operating systems. The problems, as such, seem to emerge in Deleuze’s philosophy itself. It is as if these philosophers boot up one of Deleuze’s operating systems and encounter error messages from the operating system itself, pertaining to its own operations.
For us, this is a natural effect of the relationship between function and dysfunction. To repeat, function and dysfunction are in an *a priori* relation. Wherever there is an ability to function, there is also an ability to break down. And to repeat what we have said in previous chapters, this function-dysfunction couplet offers clarification as to how the relationship between immanence and transcendence should be viewed. Just as dysfunction stalks functioning at each moment, so does transcendence stalk immanence at each moment.

This is transcendence rendered infinitely applicable; a danger with the potential to emerge at each and every moment. Deleuze derives this understanding of transcendence from Kant.

For the concept of error, (Kant) substituted that of illusion: internal illusions, interior to reason, instead of errors from without which were merely the effects of bodily causes.285

Our concern here is not with illusion as such. Illusion can be something positive; in fact, it plays an important, positive role in Deleuze’s philosophy, but only when considered in a particular way. There are transcendent illusions, (discovered by Kant) which are to be avoided, and immanent illusions, such as optical illusions (associated with the simulacrum) that can play a positive role. In the former, the illusion is a cause and in the latter, it is an effect.286 We see the difficulties characterising each wave as transcendental illusions. We do not see the readings analysed as making ‘errors’. We think that they present careful, informed readings of Deleuze’s philosophy, by tracking its operations. Difficulties emerge not from outside, but from the operations themselves. Deleuze’s philosophy, as we have said, has the ability to break down and *these readings actualize this potential*. In the first

285 *DR*, p. 136.
286 The difference between them comes down to a question of power. The transcendent illusion, as cause, does not have the power to produce anything; it is to be avoided because it is inactive. In the case of immanent illusion, an effect *is* produced. ‘That the Same and the Similar may be simulated does not mean that they are appearances or illusions. Simulation designates the power of producing an *effect.*’ *LS*, App. 1, p. 263 (italics in original).
wave, the ability to break down, understood from the perspective of the acute system, is actualized. In the second wave, the ability to break down, understood from the perspective of the chronic system, is actualized.

A clarification has to be made before we continue. We have said that for something to function that thing must be able to break down. This might seem strange, but it is, in fact, perfectly logical. Something has gone wrong in a reconfiguration if a machine is unable to break down. If Deleuze’s philosophy is reconfigured so that it does not have the ability to break down, then we must suppose that there is a structural flaw somewhere. Rather than this flaw leading to the break down of Deleuze’s philosophy, it prevents it from functioning ‘in the first place.’

The universal

Before we turn to these waves, let us ask a question: why are there difficulties with functioning in each of these waves? We have said that first wave scholars discern the acute operating system in isolation and encounter functional difficulties as a consequence. And we have said that second wave scholars discern the chronic operating system and encounter functional difficulties as a consequence. But why does dysfunction enter the picture? There must be a reason why the operating system’s functioning is impeded in each case. It might be thought that it is because one operating system is being used without the accompanying system. However, it is not clear that this is the case. After all, each operating system functions in itself and in its relation to the other system. It seems to follow that I should be able to use one system without activating the other – perhaps there is a configuration where I use one operating system with the other one operating in the background. Whether the system can work this way or not, the point stands that we have not accounted for the dysfunction that we claim results in these waves.

We claim that it is because each of the philosophers reconfigures Deleuze’s philosophy so that its operations become a function of an operating system. In the
first wave, the operations of Deleuze’s philosophy are a function of the acute system. In the second wave, the operations are a function of the chronic system. Rather than see Deleuze’s philosophy in terms of a problematic, pathogenetic relation between the two systems (we will explain later what this means), readings in this wave identify one system alone as operative. As consequence, the operations of Deleuze’s philosophy are rendered as a function of this system. Any operation in Deleuze’s philosophy will be a function of a ‘Deleuze operating system.’ Insofar as these operations are operations of life, it follows that life, in such a configuration, is a function of this operating system.

The operating system, in the above analogy, represents universality. As such, a concern we have with the readings examined is that each renders life as function of a universal.

With this turn to the question of the universal’s role in Deleuze’s philosophy we turn again to Deleuze’s claim that grounding occurs according to different structures of questioning. Deleuze delineates the ‘universal question’ as one of three different structures of questioning.

There are three different ‘structures’ to questioning as such. First, there is an existential questioning of the kind exemplified by Kierkegaard in his *Philosophical Fragments*, a questioning which ‘refuses all responses’, and for which the operation of grounding consists in ‘paradox’. Then there is the type of question ‘which claims to lead to the science of all the solutions to possible problems, according to a universal principle’. Here, Leibniz is the model. Third, there is the ‘critical question’ which ‘reclaims a critique of the conditions’ that govern the act of grounding. Deleuze indicates that he sees these three different structures of questioning also as a ‘triple function of grounding.’

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We explored the critical and existential questions in previous chapters and we introduce the universal into the examination now.

As is clear from the above quote, Deleuze considers the universal as function of grounding. Our present claim is that philosophers in the waves reassemble Deleuze’s philosophy so that grounding is a function of the universal, rather than the universal being a function of grounding. We will explore these readings with this claim in mind. At the moment, we will clarify what it means for the universal to be a function of ground, in relation to pathogenetic understanding.

We said that in Deleuze, functioning is acute, chronic and recurrent and that each pathway is defined by its relationship between actual and virtual. We can say now that on the recurrent pathway there is a reorientation of sorts. The pathway is still defined by its relation between actual and virtual, but actual and virtual are considered as the acute pathway and chronic pathway respectively. Thus, on the recurrent pathway, the acute and chronic pathways constitute a problem. To be more precise, these pathways constitute a problem that can be understood as pathogenetic. We must explain what this means.

On the recurrent pathway, acute and chronic pathways function in pathogenetic relation to one another. This means that the operations in Deleuze are not a function of an operating system or pathway as such, but are a function of grounding. The acute and chronic pathways constitute systems in pathogenetic relation with one another. Does this mean that Deleuze’s philosophy is not a function of an operating system because it is rather a function of two operating systems in tension with one another? In a sense it does, but we can say more than this here. Firstly, it must be understood that the pathogenetic model presented is not one in which two operating systems simply support one another. They do not band together in order to constitute one robust, dynamic system, protected from viruses. To put it in another way, the model is not that of a system that works to become immanent by protecting against the entrance of transcendence (the virus). The more accurate model is that is that of the virus itself. Or rather, the more accurate model is a pathogenetic, productive
relationship between an operating system and a virus. We stretch the operating system/virus analogy here because viruses, in this context, are usually understood as harmful. The mycorrhiza example in the previous chapter works better because it explains how a pathogenetic association can be mutually productive. Nonetheless, we continue with our operating system example because it is has the advantage of portraying Deleuze’s philosophy as a machine.

Neither the acute, nor the chronic system operative in Deleuze’s philosophy is here identified as the virus, or as operating system. One can identify either pathway as the operating system, but when one does this then the other system is the virus. It is the operating system-virus dynamic that is important.

How does the universal function in this relationship? Here, we progress from understanding Deleuze’s philosophy as a function of two operating systems or two universals in co-presence, to a more complex understanding of the role of the universal. The operations in Deleuze, which are operations of life, must not be understood as a function of an operating system. A more accurate analogy, as we have said, would be to see Deleuze’s philosophy as a function of an operating system in relation with a virus. We have to twist this picture however. The virus is not attacking the operating system, but is rather working productively with it. Our mycorrhiza example in the previous chapter provides the model for this functioning. Neither the host plant (correlating to the operating system in the present analogy) nor its fungus (correlating to the virus) achieves hegemony, and in fact, each grounds and determines the other in a cyclical, productive relationship. We still have the universal, in fact, we have two universals: the host operating system and the virus represent universals insofar as they each constitute their own perspective, their own world. Each constitutes, as such, their own system. Each system functions, but its operations are a function not of their own systems, but of the grounding and determining that occurs in the mutualistic association.

Let us now turn squarely to readings in the aforementioned waves.
**First wave: Badiou**

What names do we associate with the first wave of Deleuze scholarship? DeLanda, Protevi, Mullarkey, Badiou, Hallward and Toscano are prominent operators in this wave. Despite numerous differences in methodologies, strategies and objectives in these readings, we see sufficient signs in each of these authors work to say that each reads Deleuze’s philosophy as operating according to an acute configuration.

The defining attitude of this wave is to see externality as universal in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze’s actual and virtual are cleaved (cf. **Cleave** in the glossary) in the sense of being split asunder (rendered external), as opposed to being split asunder and linked together. We said that ‘cleave’ is a useful term insofar as it carries both these meanings. According to our reading, first wave philosophers see actual and virtual as cleaved in the former sense alone.

There is a split within this field that corresponds to this cleaving. The cleaving at once differentiates and unifies these critical readings. It unifies them insofar as each author accepts the external split in question and it differentiates them insofar as some choose one half of the split (virtual) and some the other half (actual). It is as if the acute operating system functions with two halves: actual and virtual. Some readers prefer the virtual half (Badiou and Hallward) and others prefer the actual half (DeLanda, Protevi, Mullarkey and Toscano).

Of these critical readings, Badiou’s stands out. In a sense, Badiou’s reading signals the beginning and end of the first wave. Badiou begins the trend of seeing actual and virtual as cleaved in the sense of being split asunder. Or rather, Badiou takes this reading to its limit by establishing this relationship as the ground in Deleuze and drawing out the implications of considering the actual/virtual relationship in this way. Badiou thus determines, or at least renders visible, the conditions under which the wave operates. The wave ends with Badiou insofar as he – successfully, we think – demonstrates the dysfunction of Deleuze’s philosophy if the acute system is read as the only system operative.
Badiou’s reading aims to demonstrate that Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of transcendence. For us, this translates to mean that Deleuze’s philosophy has dysfunction at its core. Through a careful drawing out of the constituent features of Deleuze’s philosophy, Badiou shows that it works with, or tries to work despite, inherent contradictions being in force. Or rather, he shows that it contains a fundamental contradiction that is at the core of Deleuze’s philosophy. Everything is traced to this one fundamental contradiction as ground.

His method for drawing out this contradiction involves showing that two aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy that should be in coincidence – the doctrine of the univocity of being and the actual-virtual dyad – are, in fact, incongruous.

Even when successively thought of as distinct from the possible, absolutely real, completely determined and as a strict part of the actual object, the virtual cannot, qua ground, accord with the univocity of the Being-One.288

We can render Badiou’s critique here in our own terms. He sees the actual and virtual as distinct in the sense of being cleaved asunder. And he sees this relationship functioning in this way universally in Deleuze’s philosophy. Our reconfiguration of the difficulty he presents is as follows: if the sole function of the operating system is to cleave in the sense of splitting asunder then this will not accord with the Oneness of the operating system. Such a cleaving renders a Two that will not accord with the One of univocity. The conclusion is that Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of transcendence. It is the function of a cleaving as splitting apart.

Our reply to this has been prepared. Badiou’s reading does not take into account the fact that there is another operating system in Deleuze’s thought. There is a coupling of acute and chronic systems. Badiou sees the virtual as the ground of

288 Alain Badiou, Deleuze: The Clamor of Being, tr. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis, 2000) p. 52.
the actual, and in this regard he is correct, but it is only the ground of the actual on the acute pathway. On the chronic pathway, or in the second operating system, the virtual is not the ground of the actual. On this plane, actual and virtual are internally, rather externally related. Thus, Badiou’s mistake is to see actual and virtual as externally related, when in fact they are related externally and internally.

Badiou’s reply here might perhaps be to reaffirm his position. He might say that all we have done is shift the pieces of Deleuze’s philosophy around only to come up again with a different Two – actual and virtual in external and internal relationship – rather than a One. Our reply is to point out that this Two we refer to is not the same as the one Badiou has in mind. It is the Two proper to cleaving (cf. Cleave). Actual and virtual are cleaved in the sense of being split asunder and brought together. The univocity of the Being-One has to be understood according to the sense of this ‘and’.

The ‘and’ does not signal the fact that an addition is being made, it signifies something entirely different. The ‘and’ refers to a border (cf. Border) that cleaves. We can think of this border as a One. It is a One that is consistent with a Two. A border performs a dual function (cf. Chapter 3) and enables dual grounding (cf. Chapter 4). The function of a border is to ground. It performs this function by, at once, splitting apart at the same time as bringing into relation. In our view, the real ground in Deleuze is the border. Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of this grounding, rather than the grounding discerned by Badiou. Badiou points out, quite rightly, that the virtual is the ground of the actual. He realises that this means that the virtual determines the actual. But he infers, wrongly, from this that Deleuze’s philosophy is itself a function of this determination. He forgets about the ‘hidden’ element that is the border. It is through bordering that virtual and actual are cleaved apart ‘in the first place’. The virtual is able to function as ground of the actual insofar as virtual and actual are differentiated (cleaved apart) by a border.

To put it another way, what Badiou is claiming is that Deleuze’s philosophy is the function of an outside (actual and virtual as external to, or outside one another). But there can only be an outside if there is also an inside: outside is outside in relation
to an inside. Furthermore, an outside must be *determined* as an outside. It is determined by a border – a door, perhaps – cleaving inside and outside. Thus, to say that Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of the actual/virtual externality is, in this context, to mistake effect for cause. Deleuze’s philosophy is not a function of an outside, but a function of that which determines an outside in relation to an inside.

*Life as function of a universal*

Before turning to first wave rejoinders to Badiou’s critique, it is worthwhile drawing out further the claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of a universal. This line of thought emerges with Badiou, but is developed further by Hallward. Hallward follows Badiou in three ways. Firstly, his reading is an acute reading, secondly, it focuses on the virtual at the expense of the actual, and thirdly, it sees the operations of Deleuze’s philosophy as function of a universal.

Emphasizing the virtual half of Deleuze’s philosophy leads Hallward to make such statements as: ‘Every individual is thus more or less expressive of the whole.’

Life, in Deleuze’s philosophy, is considered by Hallward to be a function of the whole. This perspective is combined in Hallward’s reading with the tendency to see Deleuze’s philosophy as a function of the universal. According to Hallward, the activity of Deleuze’s philosophy is a function of a whole that is universal. Any operation constitutes affirmation and expression of that universal. We arrive here at Hallward’s claim that Deleuze is a modern theosophist. According to Hallward, activity in Deleuze is a function of divine expression.

...the logic in Deleuze’s work tends to proceed broadly in line with a theophanic conception of things, whereby every individual process or thing is conceived as a manifestation of expression of God (pure creative potential, force, energy, life...).

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290 *Ibid.*, p. 4
According to Hallward, the problem for Deleuze is how to maximize the outpouring or ‘return’ of divine essence encased within bodies. Hallward’s criticism is essentially the same as the one erstwhile levied against Nietzsche.²⁹¹ It is that Deleuzian affirmation is an (individual) expression of a divine universal. Creativity is interpreted in these authors’ work as nothing other than divine grace. Concepts such as the ‘will to power’ (Nietzsche) and ‘deterritorialization’ (Deleuze) represent, it is claimed, affirmation of the divine and resistance to any order that would function to limit its expression. Deleuze stands as the latest in a line of thinkers who identify a vitalist impulse as what drives activity. These thinkers praise this impulse and say we must live up to it. Translated into our terms, Hallward is saying that Deleuze identifies functioning as occurring according to an operating system he calls ‘life’. All activity is seen as manifestation of this operating system, and the best activity is seen as that which increases the productivity of this system.

Hallward’s reading is interesting for us because it develops a line of thought that is a central concern of this thesis. He wants to steer individual processes away from a place where they become a function of something else. He claims that they become a function of ‘life’ in Deleuze’s philosophy. ‘Life’ becomes a universal that all activity becomes inhibited by. We think that this is a misrepresentation of Deleuze’s vitalism. Life proliferates endlessly in Deleuze’s vitalistic philosophy, but this does not make it a universal. Individual expression, in Deleuze, is not a function of an operating system. We repeat the quote from NP.

Nietzsche is engaged in a critique of all conceptions of affirmation which see it as a simple function, a function of being or of what is... For, insofar as affirmation is

²⁹¹ Cf. R.J. Hollingdale’s introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Hollingdale brings attention to the Lutheran roots of Nietzsche’s main notions: the most pertinent one here is will to power, which is ‘divine grace.’ “The clue to the connexion is the concept of ‘self-overcoming’, which is one of Nietzsche’s terms for sublimation and the hinge upon which the theory of the will to power turns from being a nihilist to a positive and joyful conception. The corresponding Christian conception is that of unregenerate nature redeemed by the force of God’s grace.” Introduction to Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tr. R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 1961), pp. 28-29.
presented as a function of being, man himself appears as the functionary of affirmation: being is affirmed in man at the same time as man affirms being. Insofar as affirmation is defined by an acceptance, that is to say an acceptance of responsibility, it establishes a supposedly fundamentally relation between man and being, an athletic and dialectical relation.292

Hallward claims that man, in Deleuze, appears as the functionary of affirmation. Life affirms and in affirming life, man is a functionary of life.

The crux of our disagreement with Hallward is that he sees ‘life’ in Deleuze as fixed limit. According to Hallward, life is that which constantly overcomes. It constitutes a fixed limit in this regard. In our view, life in Deleuze is better understood as mobile border, rather than as fixed limit. As we showed in the previous chapter, Deleuze’s philosophy is ‘unhinged’ or ‘out of joint.’ It does not have a centre that swings repeatedly in an arc that constitutes a fixed limit. There is proliferation of borders, and the function of these borders is to determine. This bordering is the essential activity of life. But this determining does not occur according to a fixed limit. There is instead a real determining and grounding that occurs without fixed limits. The function of these borders is not to limit, but to ground.

Hallward’s reply will perhaps be that life as function of grounding is effectively no different to life as function as universal. There is still proliferation of borders in life that we have to ‘live up to.’ Life grounds constantly and we must not only take this grounding as criteria for our own activity, but we are also forced to contribute to grounding.

We could reply here by pointing to the neutrality of the border. The border between Germany and Poland is neutral. Understood as dynamic, a border is, to use a turn of phrase Deleuze takes from Freud, ‘neutral displaceable energy.’293 It is not territory itself and instead determines and grounds territory through perpetual

292 NP, p. 183.
293 DR, p. 111.
displacement (proliferation of borders). This is a valid point but it does not get us to the real crux of the matter. Hallward might counter by saying that we are simply according neutrality to something that is not neutral. The real point to be made here is precisely the one Deleuze makes in the above quote. The one who sees life as something to ‘live up to’ and who works to maximize the outpouring of life has made himself a functionary. To see life’s own affirmation (proliferation of borders) in this way is to become a functionary of affirmation. It is to make a limit out of a border, rather than to use that border productively to ground and determine.

**Responses to Badiou and other first wave readings**

Before turning to other first wave readings, we will first draw attention to an aspect of Badiou’s critique mentioned, but not drawn out fully. This is that Badiou focuses on the virtual half of Deleuze’s philosophy. A standard response to Badiou’s critique is to see it as an insufficient reading of Deleuze insofar as it ignores the other half of Deleuze’s philosophy. In the first wave, Badiou is reproached for understanding Deleuze from the side of the virtual, with a reorientation to the side of the actual offered as correction. These readings accept Badiou’s premise, but reject his conclusion. That is, these readings also see Deleuze’s philosophy according to the acute operating system alone – that is, they view actual and virtual in external relation as operating as sufficient reason in Deleuze - but say that it can function like this. The idea is that the machine can be kick-started by activating the actual half neglected by Badiou. There is, in addition to this activation, tweaking of Deleuze’s philosophy. Authors in this first wave generally perform three operations in response to Badiou’s critique. They de-emphasize the role of the virtual, emphasize the role of the actual, and try to demonstrate that activity – including virtual activity

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- is a function of actuality. The virtual is effectively amputated; cleaved asunder and discarded.

How they go about the above procedure separates the readings in this wave. We will sketch several briefly and explain why we think that the proposals are flawed on their own terms. That is, we will give our reasons for drawing the conclusion that the system, as reconfigured, cannot function. We will then explain why we do not think they work as responses to Badiou’s critique.

John Protevi claims\textsuperscript{295} that the intensive really ‘belongs with’ the actual, rather than the virtual. The tendency to see Deleuze’s philosophy as a function of transcendence is, Protevi claims, due to the tendency to see the processes operative in Deleuze’s philosophy as being ‘located’ in the virtual. Protevi demonstrates the acceptance of the split of which we have spoken (actual and virtual) and also proceeds in such a way that captures the first wave response: choose the actual and amputate the virtual.

It will be replied that the virtual is still in operation in Protevi’s reading (and in other first wave, actualist readings). However, it is there as function of the actual. It is a ‘virtual space’;\textsuperscript{296} a ‘field of material self-ordering potentials guiding the production of material systems.’\textsuperscript{297}

John Mullarkey follows a different tactic. Developing a Bergsonian understanding of the actual-virtual relationship, Mullarkey urges us to ‘forget the virtual.’\textsuperscript{298} This chimes with our claim that writers in this wave see actual and virtual as split asunder. To ‘forget the virtual’ is to amputate it, to cleave it asunder and discard it.

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\item \textsuperscript{295} Cf. John Protevi’s “Review of Peter Hallward’s Out of this World: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Creation”, \textit{Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews} (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{297} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 198.
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To be more precise, Mullarkey urges us to forget the virtual in its function as ground. The virtual becomes, in Mullarkey’s transformation of the problematic, an effect. This is the virtual as ‘an optical and psychological concept derived from actual processes.’ The virtual becomes a function of the actual, or rather, of the differential operations occurring ‘in’ the actual.

In Manuel DeLanda’s work, we see another actualist, first wave reading. DeLanda, as Protevi and Mullarkey do, works to show that operations in Deleuze are a function of actuality, where actuality is associated with materiality.

One constant in the history of Western philosophy seems to be a certain conception of matter as an inert receptacle for forms that come from the outside. In other words, the genesis of form and structure invariably seems to involve resources that go beyond the capabilities of the material substratum of particular forms and structures... Yet, as Gilles Deleuze showed in his work on Spinoza, not every Western philosopher has taken that stance. In Spinoza Deleuze discovered another possibility: that the resources involved in the genesis of form are immanent to matter itself.

Unlike in these other actualist readings, DeLanda’s reading is overtly Platonic, in the sense that it constitutes a response to Platonism. The resources of form are not transcendent Ideas, but are rather immanent.

We will begin our critique of these first wave readings by examining DeLanda’s reading.

In our view, DeLanda misunderstands Deleuze’s project of constructing an immanent ontology by reversing Platonism. DeLanda understands this as involving a shifting of everything ‘down’ to a material, immanent realm. The actual and virtual are still external to one another, but are now so supposedly ‘within’ immanence.

We claim that Platonism is not here reversed, it is replicated. To reverse Platonism, as we said in Chapter 1, is to identify its motivation. The motivation is to ground. But, in our view, DeLanda’s reading encounter difficulty when it comes to the problem of grounding, as do the other readings. We think that grounding cannot be a function of actuality. Why this is the case can be understood by examining DeLanda’s reading closely.

Let us ask, where does DeLanda see the source of genesis? DeLanda claims that Deleuze develops a ‘realist’ ontology by grounding the distinctions he makes from actual, material processes.\(^{301}\) Formal distinctions – that is, those relating to actual, material forms – ground Deleuze’s philosophy at the same time that that philosophy follows a trajectory of the creation of form. There is formal differentiation (ground) and formal unification (determination of form). Thus, ground and grounded are the same. They are both actual.

We see two difficulties with maintaining such a position. Firstly, if differentiation and unification are both formal and the only distinction available is a formal one, how are the two processes (differentiation and unification) able to be differentiated? Upon what ground does such differentiation occur? Does Kant’s argument from incongruent counterparts, as discussed in the previous chapter, not have force here? Kant’s argument demonstrates that external determination can only occur if it is accompanied by an inner ground. In claiming that Deleuze’s philosophy can be reconfigured so that it is a function of actuality, these readings are saying that it can function with external determination alone. We see some of the moves in this wave, discussed momentarily, as constituting an attempt to configure things so that external determinations take up the role of this inner ground.

Secondly, is there not circularity in this actualist approach? To say that ground and grounded are of one image seems to ensure that one falls into the same vicious circle discussed in the previous chapter. If Deleuze relies on material processes in

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order to differentiate, then how can this differentiation ‘explain’ these material processes? We said that pathogenesis, following Deleuze’s philosophy (and in particular, the post-Kantian dimension of his philosophy), does not encounter this difficulty because of its ground/determination (as opposed to ground/grounded) dynamic. Grounding produces a determination, rather than a ground. Translated into virtual/actual terminology, this means that the virtual grounds the actual as determination. In this actualist reading, we are forced to say that the actual grounds the actual as ground. Without the virtual, we claim, these readings cannot make this differentiation and avoid vicious circularity.

What role does the universal play in these actualist readings? Mullarkey’s reading develops the problem of the universal further than the other readings and in the process offers a response to the problem of circularity we have just commented upon. Mullarkey asks whether there is the need for the virtual to accompany the actual. He configures the question, contra pathogenetic understanding, as one of ‘support’, whether we need the virtual in order to avoid difficulties such as the two indicated.

But what if the whole question of ‘support’ is wrong? What if the ‘support’ for time was always itself, was simply a set of other times nested within each other? The regress would not be a logical paradox or aporia whose solution requires us to stand outside time in a virtual eternity: we could embrace the regress and naturalise it in universal, enduring matter… The regress is not only benign, but a real cosmological system of non-quantifiable scales. If durée is fundamental change (as Bergson argues throughout his work), then it needs no other support, be it physical (in substance), ontological (in the virtual), or even logical (the virtual as the sufficient reason for change, the why of this passing). Actuality is a creativity neither ex nihilo nor ex potentia: it is its own ground, auto-sufficient. The passage of time (or movement) comes from itself at every level.302

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We have several concerns with Mullarkey’s strategy. Firstly, this notion of naturalising the regress in ‘universal, enduring matter’ is, in our view, unpalatable, as is accepting fundamental change as given. Our above arguments with regard to the universal are here repeated. We think that such a configuration makes us functionaries of this universal. And we think that Hallward’s concerns with vitalism re-emerge here, his criticisms this time finding a suitable target.

Secondly, where do the resources come from to differentiate between different times nested within each other? We repeat the question asked of DeLanda’s work: is there not vicious circularity? Mullarkey anticipates this objection and claims that this circularity is ‘naturalised’ in a universal. But here we run into the same problem with the universal, along with a second difficulty. Let us ask: if actuality really is its own ground - if there is auto-sufficiency - why is there a need for the universal? In fact, how can there be self-sufficiency of the ground at the same time that everything is understood as a function of the universal? Is this auto-sufficiency in fact not undercut by the universal? Is the ground, in fact, not subject to the universal?

Mullarkey could reply that it is the universal as ‘enduring change’ that is universal and self-sufficient. He might say that durée is a universal that works at the level of experience, rather at a level where it supervenes upon this experience. Our reply is that durée (as it is conceived here) is still a universal and that we, as such, are still functionaries of it.

We arrive now at what we view as a limit of sorts to this first wave. We have spoken of tendencies within this wave, grouping them together under the banner of one particular dysfunction. It is only at the limit that this dysfunction becomes really apparent. There are points in each reading discussed where this limit is approached, but we think that Toscano’s reading draws out this limit in the most effective manner. As Toscano remarks,

Let us force the alternative: Should we understand the virtual/actual distinction primarily via Deleuze’s uptake of Bergson’s paradoxes of time, or rather in terms of
‘differentiation’, the generation of divergent and heterogeneous individuations with their correlative rhythms or space-times?  

In our interpretation, Toscano is asking: should we understand the virtual/actual distinction via the chronic operating system, where virtual and actual coexist, or rather in terms of the acute operating system, where actual and virtual are external to one another? Several times Toscano asks us to choose: either the paradoxes of time or heterogeneous individuation; either the virtual of coexistence or the virtual of production. How do we understand this alternative?

Let us ask first, are there really two virtuals in Deleuze? In a sense, there are two virtuals. On each, separate pathogenetic pathway there is a tendency towards actual and virtual as limits. There is, as such, the virtual on the acute pathway, where actual and virtual are external to one another. And there is the virtual on the second pathway, where actual and virtual are internally related.

Toscano’s reading is interesting because it makes explicit the strategy employed by those in the first wave who try to rescue Deleuze’s system after Badiou’s powerful critique. The reply in the first wave is to accept this claim but to attempt to isolate this dysfunction to the virtual half and perform an amputation of this half. In our view, the actualists in the first wave treat the dysfunction Badiou identifies as an infection. It is an infection that Badiou claims is spread throughout Deleuze’s philosophy, rendering it inoperative.

The reply from the first wave actualists is to accept Badiou’s diagnosis but reject his prognosis. They think that Deleuze’s philosophy can survive if its virtual half is amputated. Left with the actual, these philosophers attempt to demonstrate how functioning can occur as a function of the actual alone. The problem, however, is that the dysfunction identified by Badiou is not confined to one half of the system. It is a problem at its core. Thus, we think that if it is accepted that Deleuze’s

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304 Ibid., p. 188.
philosophy is a function of cleaving as splitting apart, then the conclusion that that philosophy cannot function is inescapable.

In this way, Badiou’s reading is, for us, the most effective of the first wave critiques insofar as it demonstrates the need to go beyond the limit of this first wave and into a second. That is, it demonstrates the need to explore more thoroughly the chronic system. This is what we claim happens in the second wave.

**Second wave**

There are three philosophers who we find to be particularly prominent exponents of this second wave: James Williams, Levi Bryant and Quentin Meillassoux.

According to Williams, Deleuze’s philosophy consists of multiple, overlapping, dynamic processes, operating according to an order of priority, on a plane of coexistence. Drawing Deleuze close to Whitehead, Williams pushes for the recognition of ‘process’ as ontological category in Deleuze’s thought. The operations in Deleuze’s thought are understood according to internal principles and movements proper to these processes.

Bryant, in contrast, emphasizes the post-Kantian, transcendental aspect of Deleuze’s philosophy. Bryant draws out the transcendental features of Deleuze’s work – the role of the faculties, the syntheses and the relationship between subject and object, and so forth. In drawing out this aspect, Bryant draws out an understanding of Deleuze’s philosophy as web of syntheses in continual construction. There is no reference to anything outside this construction, a world is constructed through operations of syntheses and it ‘remains within’ these syntheses.

Meillassoux reads Deleuze primarily as a post-Kantian philosopher whose work he characterises as being grounding upon finitude and by the consequent limitations of such a grounding; Deleuze’s philosophy is ‘trapped within’ finitude. Meillassoux, in the interpretation presented here, occupies the same strategic in the second wave

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as Badiou does in the wave. He draws out consequences of reading Deleuze in a certain way and in the process – although it is not his intention – he demonstrates the need to move to a third wave, at the same time as providing the resources to make powerful criticisms of other second wave readings.

We group these disparate readings together because we think there is a common thread that unites them. Each philosopher sees internality at the core of operations in Deleuze’s philosophy. It is not enough, however, to say that the operations discerned are fluid and continuous. We must pose the question in terms of ground. In the first wave, the ground is the acute pathway, where actual and virtual are in external relation. In the second wave, the ground is the chronic pathway, where actual and virtual are in internal relation. Actual and virtual are cleaved in the sense of being in relation in this wave, where they are cleaved in the sense of being split asunder in the first wave.

To repeat, actual and virtual, on the chronic pathway, function as limits in internal relation. Insofar as these limits function to determine operations on this pathway, it follows that these operations will ‘remain’ internal. In Williams’ account, construction is processual and what is constructed stays ‘within’ these processes. In Bryant’s account, construction is synthetic, where what is constructed stays within the syntheses. In Meillassoux’s account, construction is finite and what is constructed remains within finitude.

We repeat our earlier characterisation of readings in this wave. We claim that each reconfiguration runs into the same problem: Deleuze’s philosophy, as reconfigured, does not work. And we claim that it does not work for the same reason in each case: the recurrent pathway, in this wave, is elided and Deleuze’s philosophy operates only on the chronic pathway. There are two important effects of reading Deleuze’s philosophy in this way. Firstly, insofar as Deleuze’s philosophy operates on only one pathway its operations becomes a function of a universal. Its operations are a function of what we call a chronic operating system. Secondly, the operations in Deleuze’s philosophy are stripped of their capacity to re-
emerge. We refer here to a particular way of viewing these operations, according to a model where operations break down, only to re-emerge.

It is a question of a model that is perpetually in construction or collapsing, and of a process that is perpetually prolonging itself, breaking off and starting up again.\textsuperscript{306}

For us, the readings in this wave reconfigure Deleuze’s philosophy so that it cannot function in this way. In these thinkers’ assemblages, Deleuze’s philosophy is in perpetual construction, as process perpetually prolonging itself. But we think that their readings encounter difficulties when it comes to explaining how collapse occurs and how there can be breaking off and starting up again. This is the problem of re-emergence. This refers to a system’s ability to find energy from its own breakdown in order to emerge renewed. The system collapses, as when a person succumbs to a sobbing fit. But there is renewal insofar as the person finds the break down cathartic. There is revitalization and renewal through re-emergence. This is the problem that characterizes the recurrent pathway we claim is elided in this wave; problems on this pathway re-emerge.

Let us now turn our attention to these critical readings individually.

\textit{Williams}

Williams’ work signals the inauguration of what we, in our critical reading, have called the second wave. This wave can be construed as a response to the first wave. In the first wave, the concern is with the perceived inability of Deleuze’s philosophy to function due to the fact that actual and virtual, at the heart of Deleuze’s operations, are split asunder. Williams draws attention to the fact that actual and virtual are in a different relation, and in the process he draws attention to a different ground operative at the heart of Deleuze’s operations.

\textsuperscript{306} TP, p. 20.
It is important to note that these claims on immanence and the distinction between actual and virtual are a key place for criticisms of Deleuze, notably by Alain Badiou. His critical claim rests on the idea that the virtual itself is a transcendent realm. But this is to miss the necessary inter-relation of virtual and actual through a reciprocal determination. Neither is independent of the other and cannot therefore be said to enter into a relation of transcendence.\(^{307}\)

Williams’ claim is that Badiou’s critique falls short because it fails to appreciate that the actual and virtual are in a relationship of internality with one another.

A question that might be raised at this point is: how is this rebuke of Badiou’s critique framed? Is it that Badiou’s reading is ineffective? Are the problems Badiou raises subject to dissolution? Are they false problems? What we are getting at here is the following. In our interpretation, Badiou’s critique of Deleuze aims to demonstrate dysfunction in Deleuze’s operations. It is dysfunction that ‘takes place’ on what we have called Deleuze’s acute operating system. We have said that there are two operating systems in Deleuze: acute and chronic. Is Williams responding to Badiou’s concerns regarding the functioning of one operating system (acute) by skipping over to the other operating system (chronic)? And if this is the case, are the resources of the acute operating system available to Williams?

This question is usually posed in this wave in the following form: does Deleuze have the resources to account for a determinacy of the order of production; that is, is Deleuze is able to provide a determinacy proper to actual determinations, separate from their virtual ground? This is essentially the same concern as the one developed frequently with reference to Bergson’s philosophy: how, if everything resonates back and forth in a sort of polyvocal rhythm, can anything be produced that has separate, individual determinacy? If reciprocal determination is in operation everywhere, how can there be individual determinacy? With regard to our example of a host

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plant and its fungus in pathogenetic relation, the question is whether the fact that these entities are involved in reciprocal processes of determination disqualifies us from saying that either entity is determined individually.

In response to this question, we arrive at a subtle and important point. Philosophers in this wave do have access to the external and internal. That is, philosophers in this wave are able to consider actual and virtual as external and as internal. To use the designations Toscano offers, this means that they have access to the virtual of production and the virtual of coexistence. They do not have to choose one at the expense of the other, as Toscano and other readers in the first wave claim. Instead, authors in the second wave are able to operate both.

We need to clarify what this ‘both’ means. It means that there is a disjunctive affirmation of both. It is a disjunctive affirmation of a plane where actual and virtual are external to one another and a plane where actual and virtual are internally related. Each plane can be understood as a ground and their disjunction the coexistence of these grounds. The coexistence of these grounds ‘forms’ a new ground.308

We might think of readings in this wave, including Williams’ reading, in terms of a background-foreground dynamic. In the background are processes in perpetual construction and in the foreground is the individual determinacy of which we have spoken – moments of concretion, ruptures of a sort. The operations in this picture, in fact, are able to be inverted. The moments of partitioning and specification are able to be understood as working in the background with the fluid, whole processes working in the foreground.309 And the moments of partitioning and specification are able to be understood as working in the foreground, with whole processes working in the background. It is a question of perspective.

308 This is the movement from first to second synthesis. See the discussion of the ‘progression’ from first to second syntheses in Chapter 3’s section ‘A “second” grounding of the plane’.
309 This is the structure of Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis, as explored in Chapter 3’s section, ‘Bergson and the second plane’. The structure is as follows: if x, then y, and its inverse, if y, then x. In the present treatment, x represents fluid, whole processes and y represents individual determinacy.
But here we ask the question: how is the foreground-background structure to be understood? Williams speaks of the reverberation of multiple processes, where all things move in multiple directions at once. Our question, in the first instance, is the following: is there not a danger that ‘process’ will become a universal? Does not everything occur in an order of coexistence, with activity being subject to this order?

Williams has anticipated these questions and the general tenor of our concern. He sees, rightly in our view, that the question is essentially one concerning open, independent activity. In what we see as a response to such concerns, Williams emphasizes the notion of ‘openness’ frequently in his writings on Deleuze.

Deleuze’s work is an attempt to construct a system that unfolds productively and openly, yet free from, or at least relatively resistant to, the return to any belief in eternal transcendent forms…fixed scientific forms…restricting philosophical methodological forms…and closed ontological forms…

The idea is that the openness manifest in Deleuze’s philosophy works to circumvent hegemonization. Life does not, in Deleuze’s philosophy, function as functionary in a regime.

We have concerns with the way Williams understand this openness. Firstly, we find it significant that Williams speak of the openness in terms of its ‘relative indeterminacy.’ We see this absence as a return of the negative. Williams can respond by pointing to the pivotal role indeterminacy plays in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze refers to the eternal return, for instance, as having ‘problematic and indeterminate value.’ It is true that indeterminacy does play a crucial role in Deleuze’s philosophy, but in our view, it is not the role that Williams ascribes to it. The determining agent in Deleuze – the differenciator that is indeterminate insofar

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311 DR, p. 90.
as it is always ‘missing from its place’\textsuperscript{312} – is at the centre of Deleuze’s thought, rather than at the limit. Or rather, since there is eternal return (rather than a centre) in Deleuze, this agent is a ‘great Mobile element,’\textsuperscript{313} that is ‘always circulating, always displaced in relation to itself,’\textsuperscript{314} as an ‘originary Third,’\textsuperscript{315} which drives the whole structure. In pathogenetic understanding, this agent is the border. And this movement is a bordering, an infinite proliferation of bordering, where the border is middle element, a Third.

This agent is, like the border, ‘eminently symbolic’, where Deleuze says ‘“eminently” because it belongs to no series in particular.’\textsuperscript{316} Just as a border belongs to no territory in particular, so does this agent belong to no series in particular. Like this agent, a border is a ‘wholly paradoxical object or element’,\textsuperscript{317} insofar as it functions to perform two mutually exclusive operations: split asunder and relate together, cleave (cf. Cleave). We claim that Williams, in a second wave reading, mistakenly identifies the border as a limit. To be more precise, Williams, in our view, imputes a limiting function to the border, while attempting to annul the negativity that arises as consequence by making it function as an ‘open border,’ as something that enables free movement, with limited or no restrictions.

The openness of which Deleuze speaks is an openness ‘indexed’ to the border; it is an ability to change that is involved, rather than an ‘endless’, universal changing. It seems to us that Williams has reversed things so that power and independent activity are understood in virtue of this openness rather than this openness being understood in terms of this activity. We think that there is openness ‘because of’ the grounding engendered by the border, rather than there being ability to ground ‘because of’ this openness.

\textsuperscript{312} Ibid., p. 102.
\textsuperscript{313} Gilles Deleuze, “How Do We Recognize Structuralism?”, in DI, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., p. 186.
\textsuperscript{315} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{316} Ibid., p. 184.
\textsuperscript{317} Ibid.
Another consequence of indexing this openness to the limit can be drawn out. We ask, is Deleuze’s philosophy able to break down, in Williams’ account? With such ‘open borders’ in operation, can there be a break down? In our view, there can be no break down and thus no renewal and no revitalization. If everything is processual how can there be a breaking down? There is a sort of stubbornness about processes, by their nature they do no cease, any apparent cessation is always defined in relation to ongoing processes. To be more precise, there is, we claim, a disjunctive relation operating as ground. This is because there is, in Williams’ reading (and other second wave readings) the disjunctive synthesis – the second synthesis – operating as ground. This means, as we said above, that cessation or individual determinacy operates in disjunction with fluidity and continuity. One will operate in the foreground and the other in the background, where the perspective taken determining which is which in each case. I think of a machinic process as whole constituted by parts and when I think of the parts of this process, I think of them in the foreground in relation to the whole as background. And when I think of the process as a whole, I think of it in relation to its parts as background. It follows that the stubbornness of which we have spoken flows from the ground, not from the processes as such. Technically, it is not the process or processes that fail to accommodate an ability to break down, but this disjointed structure.

To use our example of a body finding energy by being overwhelmed by emotion and breaking down, we see this structure as working against such release. It is as if this structure makes the system so robust and consistent that it actually works against it. These qualities prevent opportunities for growth through renewal. Consequently, the system breaks down insofar as it does not have such opportunity. Because it has been reconfigured in such a way that it does not have the ability to break down, Deleuze’s philosophy finds it difficult to function.

_Bryant_
Bryant’s reading of Deleuze can also be viewed as a response to limitations of the first wave. Where first wave readings are set on understanding Deleuze’s philosophy in terms of an intractable fissure running through it, Bryant explains that Deleuze’s philosophy must not be understood as conditioned by a split between two terms.

Insofar as differentials function as the productive rules for the qualitative givens of being, Deleuze’s position is best thought of as a hyper-rationalism rather than an empiricism. In this way Deleuze undermines the opposition between the universal and the particular, concepts and intuitions, the sensible and the intelligible, or noesis and aisthesis by discovering intelligibility in the givens of experience itself. The opposition between the sensible and the intelligible is not even operative in Deleuze’s ontology. As such, there can be no question or problem of the schematism for Deleuze insofar as there are not two terms requiring the mediation of a third term.\(^{318}\)

Bryant presents Deleuze’s philosophy here in terms of the evasion of a difficulty of working with two terms insofar as to do so would be to involve a third term, operating as intermediary.

...rather than passing through the intermediary of the categories, Deleuze proceeds directly to the synthesis of difference through repetition as a way of accounting for the genesis or structure of experience.\(^{319}\)

Bryant is referring here to Deleuze’s project of account for conditions of real, rather than possible experience. The latter route goes by way of the mediation of the categories, while the former is immediate. A world is synthetic construction, where this construction takes place without intermediary.


Our first concern with Bryant’s reconfiguration is the following: is there not a
danger that these syntheses might *themselves* function in a restrictive way? Is there
not the danger, in Bryant’s reconfiguration, that life will become a function of these
syntheses? If these syntheses are operating universally will this not have the
consequence that any activity will be subject to this multiplying? Is activity here not
a function of an operating system, of a machine that synthesizes? Does this sort of
functioning not become universal, with the operations being a function of a
universal? It seems to us to preside over any proposed differentiation, despite the
fact that it, itself, involves the differential. Life, in our view, begins to function as
functionary in a regime. Rather than increase in complexity, life becomes
diminished.

Bryant might respond here that we are being nostalgic for individual creativity.
He might suggest that we are engaging, unknowingly, in a non-Deleuzian, uncritical
affirmation of free will. And he will perhaps claim that we are missing a central
feature of his analysis, his account of the shift in Deleuze from syntheses occurring
according to pre-determined forms (as in Kant) to their occurring according to
problematic encounters. Problems in Deleuze are, as we explained with reference to
Kant in the previous chapter, implicative, as is being. In any case, he excludes
individual creativity from Deleuze’s ontological register. ‘In Deleuze it is being that
is creative, that creates, not the individual.’ Bryant reads this as a complexification
on Deleuze’s part; it is a positive, sophisticated position and indeed, Bryant presents
a picture of Deleuze’s philosophy as operation of complexification. As he explains at
one point, ‘we no longer treat each individual color as an essence, but rather as a
variation on the style, theme, or multiplicity.’ Bryant sees this move from the the
individual to the multiple as an overcoming of sorts, an overcoming of old views
that privilege the Self. However, we think that his example works to show why this
supposed overcoming encounters difficulty. It is a variation on the style, theme or

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multiplicity. The style, theme or multiplicity *endures*. Our concern does not, we think, derive from nostalgia for free will, or even for individual creativity. It is a demand for creativity itself, where creativity involves overcoming through revitalization and renewal.

Here, we arrive at our second criticism of second wave readings that we articulate with reference to Bryant’s reading. Can there be such a thing as breaking down or collapse in Bryant’s configuration? And can there be re-emergence? If everything is variation on style and multiplicity, does this not mean that anything new coexists with what came before? Bryant might respond that syntheses are always in operation, so that variation is continuous. But it is this ‘continuous’ that we have a concern with. Is there not, with Bryant’s reading, a sort of Midas effect, where synthesis operates universally and where there is functioning wherever we look? Bryant will perhaps respond that this constitutes a misreading of his work, that there is *not* functioning wherever we look insofar as functioning has to be kick-started through a problematic encounter.

Let us pose our question another way. We have insisted upon an *a priori* relation between function and dysfunction; for something to have the ability to function that thing must also have the ability to break down. Is this criterion met in Bryant’s account? In our view it is not, and we will explain why. In Bryant’s hyper-rationalist reading of Deleuze, everything is differential. It is not simply that there are differentials ‘everywhere,’ these differentials are rather ‘the very medium of experience.’ They ‘are not representations of sensations, but are the genetic conditions of sensations.’ We agree with Bryant’s description of the differentials as functioning as genetic conditions of sensations but we have concerns with the idea that they constitute ‘the very medium of experience.’ In our view, Bryant defines a plane on which these differentials function, and where operations are a function of this plane, rather than seeing this plane as constructed by these differentials.

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The crux of our disagreement with Bryant can be traced back to his first move. He gets rid of a third term intermediary. However, we claim that this third term is necessary. In our view, this third term is the differential, the element that enables activity. The differential is a third term. Difference ‘is mediated, it is itself mediation, the middle term in person but a third term that does not mediate.’\footnote{DR, p. 31.} We claim that there is, in a sense, only this third term, this middle, in Deleuze, insofar as Deleuze’s philosophy always functions ‘in the middle.’

The response from Bryant might perhaps be that he is the one who draws out the reality of this middle in Deleuze, a plane of coexistence. The disagreement is about the definition of what this middle is and how it functions. For Bryant, the middle is a ‘medium’, the medium of the plane. The middle ground, in Bryant, does not function in the same way when it’s looked at in terms of grounding and pathogenesis. In our view, to repeat, when it functions as ‘middle’ it works to inhibit, to prevent functioning and complexification, rather than engender it.

The middle we refer to is not the milieu as such; it is the middle proper to the grounding activity, which functions to ground the milieu. It is the border as middle, where the border determines the milieu in its circulation. We can add to the characterisations of the border we have offered thus far by saying that a border is characterised by its ability to produce an effect. We relate this to our stated concerns with Bryant’s reading by pointing out that Deleuze understands variation in terms of power; that is, in terms of the ability to produce an effect.

In general, a system evolves inasmuch as certain pieces change their position, in such a way that they cover a larger space than before, even while they more tightly control this space...in the case of systems that are particularly saturated or tight-knit, an evolution is necessary for particular reasons to change their positions and thus produce a new effect.\footnote{Gilles Deleuze, “Gueroult's General Method for Spinoza”, in DI, p. 148.}
These ‘internal surges’, as Deleuze (using Gueroult’s terminology) refers to them, are only able to occur if the reasons are able to change their positions. This cannot mean changing their positions relative to a flux of which they are part. This would not be a real change, real variation. There would be continuity, rather than an internal surge. There would be endurance without the potential for re-emergence. We think that Bryant re-introduces a stable form with this medium, even if this stable form is a flux and even if it is a plane that emerges through problematic encounters. Or rather, we think that the plane does not emerge through problematic encounters insofar as the plane itself ‘interposes itself’ as mediator.

Here we arrive, through a very different route, to the same criticism made of Williams’ reading. What is proposed as something that engenders openness, we think instead functions as a limit. This is the medium of experience of which Bryant speaks. And we think that Bryant makes the same move as Williams does. He attempts to strip this limit of its inhibiting function by imputing to it openness.

...Deleuze argues for the openness, the endlessness of experience in such a way that we can no longer define the limits of experience a priori.\textsuperscript{326}

We think this is to regard Deleuze’s philosophy in terms of an absence of limits, where his philosophy should instead be seen in terms of grounding. We can further refine our interpretation here. Deleuze does not define the limits of experience \textit{a priori} insofar as he shifts the \textit{a priori} to the ground, with dissolution of limits occurring as consequence. Rather than being to function without limits, Deleuze’s primary aim if for his philosophy to ‘function \textit{a priori} from within.’\textsuperscript{327} We have difficulty seeing how Bryant can reconcile such a statement, along with others in


\textsuperscript{327} LS, p. 17.
Deleuze, such as, ‘For in fact there is no “medium”, no field of forces or battle’, with his own claim that a medium of experience functions in Deleuze.

We claim, to repeat, that the medium prevents grounding from taking place. And it does so because it prevents such a priori functioning from occurring. Not only does this medium fall foul of the a priori criterion, (a medium cannot be a priori) its own mode of functioning is also incongruous with the notion of such a priori functioning. There ‘is’ always this medium, it functions continuously and so the a priori relation between function and dysfunction that we see as operating ‘at’ the ground, (in order for something to function it has to be able to function and it has to be able to break down) is not operative in Bryant’s account. Thus, when looked at in terms of pathogenesis, as informed by this notion of functioning a priori within, and in terms of the problem of grounding, Bryant’s reassemblage of Deleuze’s work encounters what we think are some difficult questions with regards to the problem of functioning.

**Meillassoux**

We said that Williams and Bryant encounter some difficult questions as consequence of the way they read Deleuze’s work. We have attempted to pose several ourselves and we turn now to a different set, posed by Meillassoux.

Meillassoux’s critique of Deleuze has to be understood against the background of the emerging Speculative Realism movement in philosophy, of which he is a founding member. This movement is, in large part, a response to post-Kantian philosophies, such as Deleuze’s, characterised by perceived restrictions placed upon thought. The starting point for these philosophies is finitude. Speculative realists claim that despite all moves to break out of finitude and gain access to things in themselves, these philosophers are always imprisoned by this finitude. In order to

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328 NP, p. 39.
access this ‘beyond’, philosophers such as Deleuze have to invoke transcendence, breaking the ‘rule’ of philosophical immanence.

An interpretive principle of this movement is the principle of correlation, constructed by Meillassoux in order to capture the workings of these post-Kantian philosophies. This principle is as follows:

By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other.330

Thus, the thing in itself cannot be thought because it is non-correlational; it is not correlated to anything. Correlationalist thinkers, such as Deleuze, are, according to Meillassoux, restricted to working within the correlation, within the syntheses. They have no access to anything outside these syntheses.

But if perception is synthetic, then we are truly condemned never to discover the nature of the matter so synthesized, since we are trapped within the limits of such a synthesis.331

One of Meillassoux’s questions is the following: if we are confined to working within these syntheses, how are we to attribute sense to something beyond, or anterior to these syntheses?

How are we to grasp the meaning of scientific statements bearing explicitly upon a manifestation of the world that is posited as anterior to the emergence of thought and even of life -posited, that is, as anterior to every form of human relation to the world?332

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We have a number of sharp responses to Meillassoux’s critique, which we will make plainly and then develop in accord with the argumentative thread developed in this thesis.

Firstly, Meillassoux claims that Deleuze (as correlationalist) begins with, or grounds upon, the for-itself and that this strategy prevents access to the in-itself. Meillassoux’s own response to the problem is to reconfigure the correlation ‘itself’ as the in itself. In this way, the in itself is ‘added’ through a methodological procedure.

We think that Meillassoux’s reading of Deleuze must be challenged right from the beginning. Perhaps the correlationalist thesis captures how other thinkers operate and perhaps it works as interpretive principle for post-Kantian thought (we leave the question open) but we claim that it does not capture the way Deleuze’s philosophy works. We re-invoke here the cleaving model (cf. Cleave) we have constructed to explain how Deleuze’s philosophy functions and oppose it here to Meillassoux’s correlationalist model.

Consider again our room example from the introduction. The room is considered an object of study, and there are two ways to observe the room. One can remain outside the room – in an adjacent hallway, for example – or one can enter the room and observe the room from inside. When the observer is outside (in the hallway) the room is in itself. When the observer is inside the room, the room is for itself. Meillassoux is saying that post-Kantian philosophers like Deleuze are observers inside the room. That is, their understanding of the room is internal insofar as the room is structured by the finite understanding of the observer. We cannot go outside of the room and take a look to see what it is like from outside. We cannot do so, as the whole world-view operates like this; experience is grounded in the for-itself. We are ‘condemned’ to remain within the limits of the reality as synthesized.

333 Cf. Ibid. p. 52.
We claim that Meillassoux’s couching of the for-itself as ground in Deleuze’s philosophy is flawed. In our view, the real ground in the example is not the for itself, nor is it the in itself. The ground is neither inside of the room, nor outside. The ground is the door separating and linking inside and outside of the room. This door is a border (cf. Border) separating and linking together inside and outside of the room. That is, the border cleaves (cf. Cleave) inside and outside of the room.

Why do we say that the door is the ground? The door determines the inside of the room as inside, and determines the outside of the room as outside. Thus, inside and outside of the room is a function of the border or of bordering.

We restate, briefly here in response to Meillassoux, points made with regard to the a priori nature of the border in the above section on Bryant’s work. We see the border as a priori starting point of experience, rather than see the correlation between thought and being as this starting point. The border, as we have shown, represents an a priori relation between function and ground: a border functions by grounding and it grounds in its functioning. We claim that the border as concept captures the relation between thought and being in Deleuze much more effectively than Meillassoux’s own reading – Deleuze speaks of a difference as establishing an ‘a priori relation between thought and being’, rather than a correlation between thought and being. Meillasoux might respond here that our argument does not hit the mark because this relation, insofar as it is established through a process of differentiation, operates under the auspices of the correlationalist. We need to do more work to respond to Meillassoux’s challenge effectively.

We can supplement this argument by turning more squarely to Meillassoux’s claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is a philosophy of finitude. We think this, at best, is misleading, and at worst constitutes a misrepresentation of Deleuze’s work. As we showed, with reference to Plato’s work in Chapter 1, grounding in Deleuze ‘takes place’ at the border between finite and infinite, rather than in the territory of the

334 DR, p. 86.
finite. Does this mean that activity is always ‘in between’ finite and infinite? In a sense, it does, but we must qualify this by saying that the border here represented by the finite-infinite couplet, but equally represented by actual-virtual, sickness-health, and so on, operates within finitude. Rather than mean that finitude becomes restrictive, it means that finitude becomes constitutive, but where this constitution is not understood as finite essentially.

What we call existence has finitude for its essence, which is identical to the true constitutive power. Philosophy strangely reorients itself: it is because man lives in time, because he is not God, is finite, that he constitutes the world.\textsuperscript{335}

The finite/infinite duality operating within the finite ‘gives’ it the power of constitution. Or rather, the border cleaving finite and infinite enables constitution. Finite is constitutive in Deleuze, but this constitution must be understood primarily in terms of power, rather than in terms of the syntheses involved in construction. Our claim is that Meillassoux understands constitutive finitude in the latter way, when it must be understood in the former way. Meillassoux focuses on the constitution itself, rather than on the power proper to this constitution.

Let us return to Meillassoux’s critique. What is its main concern? It seems to lie with the question of ‘access’ to the thing in itself. How is this access to be understood? We can think of the thing in itself here as that which stands ‘outside’ of the correlation or we can think of it as something that should be ‘inside,’ but is not. It might seem as though Meillassoux is saying that Deleuze’s philosophy falters on the first point, but in truth he is saying that Deleuze falters on the second point. By closing off this outside in favour of operating synthetically on a plane of coexistence, Deleuze, as a correlationalist thinker, has supposedly restricted thought to an inside. Insofar as Deleuze is restricted to an inside, he does not, Meillassoux claims, have the capacity to refer to anything outside.

\textsuperscript{335} WG.
This is why Meillassoux’s critique is of particular interest with respect to our task of developing pathogenetic understanding. It is, in Meillassoux’s reading, a question of power or capacity, which we regard as a problem of function. The particular difficulty Meillassoux draws attention to is also of particular interest. Meillassoux discerns, in Deleuze, an inability to refer to an outside. We interpret this as referring to an inability to break down. The principle of correlation renders it impossible for the operations it conditions to collapse. As consequence, the operations are unable to re-emerge having drawn energy from their own folding.

Rather than see Meillassoux’s critique as devastating for Deleuze, however, we see it as functioning to present difficulties for second wave readings of Deleuze. We mobilise Meillassoux’s critique so that it performs the same role in the second wave as Badiou has done in the first wave; that is; he demonstrates the insufficiency of a prevalent way of reading Deleuze. In Meillassoux’s case, it is the insufficiency of reading what we have called the chronic operating system as sole ground in operation, where actual and virtual are internally related, cleaved in the sense of being in relation, but not in the additional sense of being split asunder. When seen from the point of view of pathogenesis and the problem of grounding, Meillassoux’s critique functions in the same way as Badiou’s. They differ only in terms of the territory they occupy. Badiou occupies the territory of the acute operating system, where the ground operates with actual and virtual in external relation and Meillassoux occupies the territory of the chronic operating system, where the ground operates with actual and virtual in internal relation.

The similarity of Meillassoux’s and Badiou’s reading of Deleuze is not immediately obvious. When they are compared, however, an interesting development comes to pass. When taken together, each reading demonstrates the insufficiency of the other’s reading and their own. Each author begins by attempting to draw out the activity in Deleuze’s thought and we think each does so successfully, in their own fashion, insofar as each follows carefully the operations of a particular plane in Deleuze. Badiou draws out the acute pathway in Deleuze at the expense of
chronic pathway. Meillassoux draws out chronic functioning at the expense of the recurrent pathway. Each, as such works against the other. Each identifies a different ground as sundering the operations of Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole. To be more precise, each reading performs two operations. It demonstrates the existence of a particular pathway absent from the other reading. And each demonstrates that Deleuze’s philosophy fulfills criteria claimed to be absent in the other reading. Badiou demonstrates that Deleuze’s philosophy has the ability to break down and Meillassoux demonstrates it has the ability to function. The conclusion drawn in each case – Deleuze’s philosophy has difficulty functioning – is an effect of the elision of the operating system absent in each case, but drawn out in the complementary reading. In other words, Deleuze’s philosophy, in Badiou’s reconfiguration, lacks the resources of its configuration in Meillassoux’s philosophy and vice versa. The lack in each case makes it difficult for the machine to function.

Third wave as final wave
We have developed a critique of selected critical readings of Deleuze and have contrasted them with our own interpretation at points, but we must now state our own position clearly. With regards to the twin questions of grounding and functioning, and seen from a pathogenetic point of view, critical readings in each of the two waves examined are insufficient. Only in the third wave will there be the sufficiency that comes with a ‘productive’ configuration of Deleuze’s philosophy, that we see pathogenetic understanding as offering. This leaves us with two questions to develop in order to define this pathogenetic understanding. Firstly, what does ‘productive’ mean here? Secondly, what does ‘sufficiency’ mean in this context?

A productive configuration is not, we claim, a configuration that helps protect against break down in the form of viruses. The task is not to reassemble Deleuze’s philosophy so that it functions as robust mechanism, immune or at least highly resistant, to viruses or disease that would render it inoperative. Examples of such
viruses or disease are transcendent forms, fixed scientific form and closed ontological forms, to refer to restrictions Williams brings attention to. Instead, to repeat what we said above, we claim that Deleuze’s philosophy is better understood as virus. A productive diagnosis of Deleuze’s philosophy will not see it as a host system that is threatened by attacks from viruses, but as virus. Or rather, it will see Deleuze’s philosophy as pathogenetic – that is, mutualistic and productive – relationship between a host system and its virus. A becoming ensues between host and virus, as it does in the mycorrhiza example examined in the previous chapter. A productive, mutualistic association ensues where each entity grounds and determines the other. In our view, this is a productive model to understand how Deleuze’s philosophy functions. What we have called its acute and chronic pathways feed from one another in productive and infinite cyclical movement.

As explained in previous chapters, pathogenesis sees life in relations to questions of health sickness. And it posits disease (or virus) as element that explains how health and sickness function together. We can link this model to the dialectic set out in this chapter. We showed that first wave readings are characterized by the question as to whether Deleuze’s philosophy has the ability to function and we showed that second wave readings are characterized by the question as to whether Deleuze’s philosophy has the ability to break down. And we said that for something to function, both conditions must be satisfied. We claim that our pathogenetic model satisfies both conditions: function, or health, is paired with dysfunction, or sickness.

On reflection, it seems to us that this sickness/health dialectic model works to explain the workings in each wave. Badiou diagnoses Deleuze’s philosophy and claims that it is sick. Others, Hallward for example, review his diagnosis and affirm it and accept his prognosis. Others accept the diagnosis but reject the prognosis, claiming that health can return to Deleuze’s philosophy. We think that these readings fail because Deleuze’s philosophy, as configured in this wave, is sickness void of health.
The second wave responds to the difficulty of the first, by latching onto the health of Deleuze’s philosophy. That is, these readings draw out how Deleuze’s work works through syntheses (Bryant, Meillassoux) and processes (Williams), what we see as something like the living, growing tissue of Deleuze’s philosophy. When challenged by first wave claims that amputation is necessary, they draw attention to what sustains Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy. But, as we have shown, this wave encounters difficulty because it reconfigures Deleuze’s philosophy as health in the absence of sickness: there is no ability to break down in this wave. Pathogenetic understanding restores a structure of health and sickness at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophy.

Here, we find an end of sorts to the grounding question. By referring to this third wave of Deleuze scholarship as a ‘final’ wave, we refer to this ending. Just as the third synthesis signals the ‘final end of time’336, so does this third wave signal a ‘final end’ in Deleuze scholarship. It is not that Deleuze scholarship simply ‘stops’ with this wave. On the contrary, it is rather that, with this wave, there is acute realisation that Deleuze’s philosophy functions by grounding. The point to make here is that this has, in a sense being going on all along, whether we realised it or not. As Deleuze remarks,

There is always a third and one must seek it out since it is the foundation which presents itself as a third. But is it third because it comes third in order? Certainly not. It is also the first. But it is third because it acts from within the shadows, in the unconscious. It is first. Whatever is there at the beginning, that is the third.337

What is there at the beginning? In our interpretation, the border is there and was there the whole time. To repeat what we said in relation to Hallward’s reading, this does not mean that there is a limit in play the whole time. It means rather than the

336 DR, p. 94.
337 WG.
border is operative the whole time. We can link this idea to the critical readings. We have spoken of moving into a third wave but this wave is, in a sense, already operative and it is operative within the readings examined in this chapter. In our view, each of the critical readings examined have themselves determined and grounded. They have set out their own projects using Deleuze’s philosophy as resource. It is true that we have presented a largely negative characterization of these readings, but this was to suit our own purpose of explaining and developing pathogenetic understanding. An accompanying task would be to analyse how the readings examined develop Deleuze’s philosophy in different directions.

With this above observation in mind we can turn to the question of sufficiency. We have said that with this third wave there is something like sufficient ‘understanding’ of Deleuze’s philosophy. This understanding is, however, not really an understanding at all, insofar as it involves the realisation that the task is not to ‘understand’ Deleuze’s philosophy but to function with that philosophy. It is a question of putting that philosophy to use.

Here, we must note that this demonstrates that there is an essential insufficiency in play. By ‘insufficient’, we do not refer to lack, but to potential for growth. This is how we define the elusive recurrent pathway, the pathway we have shown (in our negative characterization) to be absent in readings examined in this chapter and the pathway we have associated with pathogenetic understanding. The recurrent pathway must be understood in terms of insufficiency insofar as it is characterised by an ability to re-emerge, to reclaim a ground. Everything is open to new linkages, to growths, to evolution. There is desire for growth, for these new linkages to be made. This desire is an element in the machine itself. There are, in the language of AO, ‘desiring-machines’338, each in flux and each plugged into other machines. These machines all function, but the reason proper to their functioning is not found in their linkages, but in a central and essential drive that is involved (as an element)

in the functioning itself. This is the border in its infinite proliferation. It is the productive pathogenetic relationship between a host plant and its fungus or between an operating system and a virus.

At this point, the question of the universal re-emerges. Without this essential drive, we claim, functioning would become a universal and activity would become a reaction to this functioning. Does this mean that there is no universal? It does not. It means that we should think of the universal as insufficient. We can understand this from two sides. On one side, and as we have argued in this chapter, with respect to the move of reading one operating system as sufficient for operations in Deleuze, it is insufficient to operate according to a universal. On the other side, it means that the insufficient is itself the universal. There is infinite proliferation of insufficiency, or rather, there is proliferation because of insufficiency. This latter insufficiency must be understood in relation to re-emergence. Insufficiency operates everywhere because it is in its nature of things to grow and develop, that is, to re-emerge.

Klossowski’s comments on the will to power help us to define further this re-emergence.

The equilibrium will be upset every time power increases, and power cannot not increase. The richness that constitutes power is not first of all the result of a will; it lies in the very nature of that which wants more than it has. This richness is thus always insufficient insofar as one wills its multiplication, its overcoming.339

For us, this describes how the bordering of which we have spoken works. We have shown that the border operates as a priori element. It circulates, enabling functioning to occur. It functions to determine and ground because its function is to determine and ground. This captures the revolutionary character of the border, with respect to

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the *a priori*, but not the evolutionary character. Klossowski, in the above quote, captures this character with respect to the *a priori*: ‘power cannot not increase’, just as a border cannot not determine. A border cannot not posit, it cannot not ground territory. And it cannot *cease* determining, it keeps determining.

It might be pointed out that some borders, such as the border between Germany and Poland, are not continually evolving. Our reply is not to say that to say that this border has to be understood as symbolic, as ‘eminently symbolic’, to use Deleuze’s definition of the differenciator, and as symbolizing relations constantly in flux; social, political and economic relations, for example. Or rather, we do bring this attention, but we do not rely on this point. Instead, we concede that a border can cease to determine, but we say that this cessation is not characteristic feature of *our* border. Our border as an *a priori* is not dependent upon empirical relations – social, economic and so on – for its function as ground. Our border cannot not ground. It cannot simply determine ‘once’; insofar as its function is to ground, it ‘keeps’ grounding. It must be understood as dynamic; as multiplier, as differenciator, as circulating agent. It cannot not overcome; its re-emergence is ‘assured.’

As well as signaling the presence of the *a priori*, Klossowski explains us why functioning through re-emergence must be understood as positive. As *insufficient*, the operation is not, and cannot be, a reaction to or a function of a universal or of anything else. There is no way to capture or represent such insufficiency. This is the final critical reversal, which is also the reversal we began with. It is a question of understanding operations not according to operating systems in which they take place, but rather according to grounding that functions to determine such systems. We have understood such grounding as pathogenetic. That is, we have understood it as occurring according as productive, mutualistic association. This is the pathogenetic understanding developed in this chapter, it is how we view the operations of Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy.
Conclusion

Methodology and Metaphysics

*Function and ground*

This thesis has developed a critical reading of Deleuze’s philosophy by problematizing the related concepts of function and ground. We constructed a pathogenesis of function and ground in their relation, where pathogenesis is life understood as productive interaction between two entities. Function and ground are the two entities in this thesis. They are coupled in a relationship where each concept feeds off the other, and where pathogenetic analyses their life in this coupling. Function and ground have, in relation to the other, evolved and increased in complexity in the history of philosophy. New characteristics emerge through their mutualistic and productive association. We sought to construct a historical analysis of the characteristics of the function-ground couplet, and we did this by identifying and tracing the emergence of key characteristics in the history of the coupling. This was accomplished by analyzing the work of a number of philosophers, including Plato, Hume, Kant, Bergson and Nietzsche. With the contribution of the analysis from each philosopher, the characteristics of the concepts changed. Deleuze’s philosophy represents the latest coupling of these concepts; it represents the life of these concepts at their most complex and developed evolutionary stage.

In Chapter 1, Plato’s philosophy was read as a sort of beginning to this narrative. The concepts of ground and function emerge in Plato in pathogenetic relation. We analyzed their relation, with an emphasis on ground. Some of the central themes of pathogenesis emerged in the analysis, in particular the problematisation of life in relation to questions of sickness and health. In Plato, life, in its functioning, oscillates
between sickness and health. We defined pathogenesis as an understanding of life, where life functions through determining and grounding. The problems of functioning and grounding connect and coalesce throughout Plato’s philosophy, forming a strong unifying thread. We traced this thread to begin our development of pathogenesis as methodology for life, where life is understood in relation to questions of sickness and health and as emerging and developing through functioning and grounding.

In Chapter 2, the focus turned from grounding to functioning. The concepts were problematised primarily in relation to Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nietzsche’s project of reversing Platonism involves a changing world-picture, where life is understood in terms of power and productive struggle. Influenced by Nietzsche’s philosophy, we defined pathogenesis as conception of life as disease. We argued, following Cendrars, and Nietzsche that disease is misunderstood as that which inhibits life; it is not the cause of sickness. It is rather that which enables us to understand how sickness and health function together. Disease becomes the differential element linking sickness and health.

In Chapter 3, the three categories of pathogenesis were defined via a study of Deleuze’s three syntheses, with each category conceived as a pathogenetic ‘pathway’, corresponding to a synthesis. These pathways, reflecting their use in biomedical science, were termed acute, chronic and recurrent. The pathways were defined with reference to these as counterparts. These categories are the pathways of life as disease, with actual and virtual designating the limits determining vital operations on each plane. On the acute pathway, actual and virtual are external to one another; problems on this pathway are ‘acute’ because they are constitutive and urgent. On the chronic pathway, actual and virtual are internally related; problems on this pathway are ‘chronic’ because they endure. On the recurrent pathway, actual and virtual are externally and internally related; problems on this pathway are ‘recurrent’ because they have the ability to re-emerge.
Chapter 3 therefore constituted a progression from Chapter 2: whereas the latter analysed functioning, the former analysed dual functioning. All functioning is dual, but we chose to understand functioning before drawing out the sense of dual functioning. There is dual functioning not when two things perform the same function, but rather when one thing functions in two different ways. Each pathway is characterised by dual functioning insofar as anything operating on the plane tends towards actual and virtual as limits. There is a different sort of dual functioning for each plane, however, precisely insofar as the relation between actual and virtual is different on each plane. Actual and virtual therefore function on each pathway to determine distinctive problems that are constitutive of that pathway.

We argued that Deleuze constructed these planes using resources from three philosophers who enable different sorts of dual functioning: Hume, Bergson and Nietzsche. The dual functioning enacted by Hume allows Deleuze to construct the first plane. The dual functioning enacted by Bergson allows Deleuze to construct the second plane. The dual functioning enacted by Nietzsche allows Deleuze to construct the third plane. These are the acute, chronic and recurrent pathways, respectively.

In Chapter 4, dual grounding was developed as problem in relation to pathogenesis. This chapter constituted a progression from Chapter 1, insofar as the latter analysed grounding, while the former analysed dual grounding. In a productive pathogenetic relation – for example, between a host plant and its fungus – each entity interacts with the other in such a way that each grounds the other. Kant provides conceptual apparatus enabling us to understanding such dual grounding. We developed a critical reading of Kant in relation to the concept of pathogenesis, and said that Kant failed to arrive at pathogenetic understanding insofar as the transcendental conditioning of his philosophy falls short of internal genesis, a characteristic feature of pathogenesis. We used Deleuze’s critique of Kant to define the operation of internal genesis in order to explain how the genesis in pathogenesis is able to be understood as internal.
In Chapter 5, pathogenesis was used as lens to situate the contemporary scene in Deleuze scholarship. Pathogenesis demanded the division of Deleuze scholars into two groups. There are ‘first wave’ scholars and ‘second wave’ scholars. First wave scholars, according to pathogenetic understanding, discern acute functioning of Deleuze’s philosophy, which is to say that they discern the plane operative where actual and virtual are external to one another. Their readings constitute a misdiagnosis of Deleuze’s vitalist philosophy as acute, when we see it is as acute, chronic and recurrent. Second wave scholars discern chronic functioning – a functioning characterized by internality – at the expense of what we, in a pathogenetic understanding, termed recurrent functioning. We argued that these scholars repeat the error of first wave scholars, only this time reading chronic functioning as representative of the functioning of Deleuze’s philosophy as a whole. This means they encounter difficulties not only in accommodating acute functioning, but, more gravely, in discerning recurrent functioning. Problems on what we termed the recurrent pathway are characterized neither by their urgency, (acute) nor by their duration (chronic), but by their ability to re-emerge. Pathogenesis was positioned as third wave discipline that is able to explain how re-emergence occurs.

Pathogenetic understanding

By developing the function-ground problematic we established pathogenesis as methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as emerging and developing through dual functioning and dual grounding. A register of concepts as terminology for this methodology emerged from productive dialogue with Deleuze’s philosophy. Several appear in Deleuze’s work, although their meaning in the present work is not entirely the same. Several are variations of certain of Deleuze’s concepts, and several are entirely new. Some must be understood in their relation to others and all must be understood in relation to pathogenesis. For these reasons, we have provided a glossary of key concepts at the back of the present work.
Of the concepts introduced, two are worth here re-emphasizing: border (cf. \textit{Border} in the glossary) and cleave (cf. \textit{Cleave}). These concepts are the most necessary and most concrete constructed in this thesis. They functions for us as stalwarts against abstraction.

The border presents an image of the ground eschewing a vertical, ‘ground up’ understanding and presents instead a planar understanding of grounding. This is when grounding occurs on a plane of immanence according to borders operating on the plane. On this plane, the border distinguishes in an act of grounding where something new is produced. In hammering down fence posts I determine my territory ‘anew’ by differentiating it from my neighbour’s territory. This distinction might be understood as introducing transcendence insofar as the splitting apart seems to render the two territories in transcendent relation. But the key feature/power of this concept is, in splitting apart, it performs the complementary operation of bringing into relation, and therefore forestalls any introduction of transcendence between the two territories. The line of the fence posts links together my land with my neighbour’s land at the same time that it differentiates the two territories. The border determines the territories in their relation to one another. Thus, with this concept of the border, understood within the framework of pathogenesis, we have offered clarification as to how grounding can occur immanently and without transcendence. The border must be understood as performing two complementary operations: engendering dual functioning and dual grounding. In order to give sense to the duality in dual functioning and dual grounding, we introduced and developed the concept of cleaving (cf. \textit{Cleave}). A border’s function is double insofar as it differentiates at the same time that it links together (dual grounding). This is to say that the border \textit{cleaves}. To cleave is to perform a paradoxical operation whereby two things are split asunder at the same time that they are brought into relation. This notion of cleaving explains how grounding occurs immanently. It explains how what is grounded can be in a relation of immanence with its ground. What is grounded appears as separate from
its ground (first sense of cleave) at the same time as remaining in relation with its ground (second sense of cleave).

According to pathogenesis, life is constituted by positive proliferation of borders. The function of these borders is to ground and this grounding is performed by cleaving. In this cleaving, the borders constitute all life, whether it is the life of an oak tree in its relation with a linden, the life of stone in a quarry, the life of an opera singer, the life of a land plant in relation to its fungus, the life of a fungus in relation to its host plant, or the life of a particle of dust. These lives grow and develop according to borders constituting and operating through them. Pathogenetic understanding is required in order to understand the dynamics involved in these operations.

We have worked in this thesis to develop this understanding. This thesis constitutes an introduction to pathogenesis as conception of how life works. It also offers clarification as to how Deleuze’s philosophy works. Pathogenesis works as a lens through which Deleuze’s sprawling philosophy can be understood. It does so by developing Deleuze’s philosophy according to one single problem: life. It reassembles Deleuze’s philosophy as a response to this problem and, in the process, creatively interprets that philosophy.

We think that pathogenesis as methodology has wider application beyond Deleuze’s philosophy, however. As well as functioning as methodology for a metaphysics of life, we think it has potential to be used as method in the analysis of living systems, where ‘living’ refers to non-organic functioning. We used an economic system as example in Chapter 4, but such examples can be multiplied. It is a question of approaching that system asking where there are aspects in productive struggle with one another, of viewing systems in terms of mutualistic, grounding relations. It is always a matter of finding the underlying forces behind functioning, by constructing a method that takes all elements into the analysis and

340 See the section on ‘Diagnosis, genealogy and pathogenesis’. 
interprets them not in terms of subjugation, but in terms of what effects they produce. Never view a system as being under attack from outside, but bring what attacks it into the analysis itself, see it as a virus in productive relationship with what it supposedly attacks. Render immanent that which would otherwise operate (or fail to operate) as transcendent. Go beyond seeing such systems in terms of coexistence and see them instead in terms of productive struggle.

Pathogenesis enjoins us to always see the flipside to any action, see the sickness that always accompanies health and vice versa. As interest rates increase so do bond prices decrease, and vice versa. There will always be this flipside. But again, this is to see systems in terms of health and sickness, when the real insight presented by pathogenesis is to see the system in terms of the element that explains how health and sickness function together: disease. Disease is at the heart of things. Bond prices decrease as interest rates increase not only because of a mutualistic association, but because of the differential element working to determine value in each case. Pathogenesis posits disease as this differential element and claims to advance upon methods that work to explain this dynamic according to a framework. This is not to say that pathogenesis delivers the model for how things work – far from it. Rather, pathogenesis, in insisting upon seeing systems in terms of essential growth and complexification, seeks to avoid an analysis whose model would function to hegemonize the operations under examination. It does not, as such, offer itself as a model, but rather as a way of thinking productively without models. As methodology, it is a-signifying. In seeing life as disease it does not apply a model to functioning, but cuts into the heart of the system to discern the differentiation that drives that system’s functioning. Its strategy of viewing disease as this heart enables it to discern this drive and this is precisely the strength of pathogenesis as methodology.

Future research
This thesis has developed pathogenesis as methodology for a new vitalist metaphysics and it has allowed us to develop terminology for considering life as pathogenetic. We will now bring the work to a close by considering the potential for developing pathogenetic understanding, as presented in this work.

This work allows for future connections to be made to morphogenesis, as the genesis and development of living form, and ontogenesis, as the genesis and development of living being. Pathogenesis might be able to be further shaped by drawing connections, for example, to Simondon and Ruyer on morphogenesis, and to Deleuze’s work on each philosopher. Connections might also be made with de Beistegui’s recent work on differential ontology. It might also be fruitful to investigate possible connections with biomedical science. And given our findings in our interpretation of Deleuze’s, there will also be potential for development with other projects involving Deleuze’s work.

We have developed pathogenesis as a methodology for a metaphysics and have made moves – particularly with respect to the concepts of ground and function – with regards to this metaphysics. Our strategy has been to view this metaphysics through the lens of methodology, rather than construct this metaphysics in itself (although we have at times, no doubt, switched perspectives, either without realising it, or in response to impulses to explain the methodology from the perspective of the metaphysics). Further development of pathogenesis will demand that the switch be made more decidedly, that the metaphysics that accompanies pathogenesis as methodology be constructed.

This move is consonant with Deleuze’s project of continuing in the Bergsonian tradition of developing a metaphysics for modern science. We think pathogenesis has the potential to contribute to the construction of such a metaphysics. And we

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341 For Deleuze’s work on Ruyer, see DR, p. 216-218 and LB, Ch. 8, esp. pp. 100-104. For Deleuze’s work on Simondon, see DR, pp. 246-254, “On Gilbert Simondon”, in DI and TP, pp. 408-410.
think that the two concepts emphasized in this conclusion – border and cleaving – are the most promising concepts in this regard. These are the two concepts that engender communication between the two sides of this thesis, between methodology and metaphysics; they are the two concepts that function on both sides. If this project of developing pathogenesis within the context of developing a metaphysics of modern science is to continue, then it must draw on aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy relevant to this wider project, that have not been developed extensively in this work, his rich and complex philosophy of time, for example.
Glossary

**Acute, Chronic and Recurrent** - Life, in this thesis, is very close to disease, to the extent that a ‘life-disease’ identity is arrived at. Acute, Chronic and Recurrent, as the three general categories of pathogenesis (cf. *Pathogenesis*) in medical science, designate the three different pathways a disease can follow: acute (rapid onset and/or short course), chronic (endures over a long period) or recurrent (re-emerges). A correspondence is established between these categories and the three syntheses in Deleuze’s philosophy. Deleuze’s syntheses operate immanently, which for Deleuze means that they operate in and constitute ‘a life.’ These syntheses operate in and constitute three different pathways of life, and they are used, in our reading, to define the three general categories of philosophical pathogenesis.

The first synthesis corresponds to the acute insofar as each is characterised by a ‘durationlessness’, where ‘the present alone exists.’ The first synthesis establishes and rules the acute pathway, the second synthesis the chronic pathway, and the third the recurrent pathway.

In the thesis, pathogenesis is developed as a philosophical concept and method at the same time that a critical reading of Deleuze as a pathogeneticist is articulated. Both moves must be understood within the context of Deleuze’s critical and clinical project. This is when metaphysical categories are established with respect to real conditions of experience and activity (critical and clinical) and where this activity is understood as the critical and clinical functioning of non-organic life. While Spinoza, Bergson and Nietzsche are the central philosophical precursors here, Deleuze finds material for this project from a variety of sources, including the biological sciences.

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*343DR, p. 76*
Border – Border is the most necessary and most concrete concept introduced in this thesis. It is presented in this thesis as a priori genetic condition. The function of a border is to ground; it is a priori insofar as it cannot not ground. Relatedly, the border can be understood as a sort of manifestation of an a priori relation between function (cf. Function) and ground (cf. Ground). A border functions by grounding and it grounds in its functioning. The concept works in the thesis to explain how grounding and functioning occurs according to pathogenetic understanding (cf. Pathogenesis). While the border is our concept, rather than Deleuze’s, it is defined as a Deleuzian concept and it is constructed using resources from Deleuze’s work. It is, for example, defined with reference to Deleuze’s notion o the ‘differenciator’; the border differentiates.

It is presented in relation to another new concept: cleave (cf. Cleave). The border between Germany and Poland functions to grounds and determine each territory in their separation from one another and in their relation. Thus, the border cleaves. It performs a paradoxical operation whereby it, at once, differentiates and brings into relation.

As concept, the border explains how grounding can occur immanently. It answers the question as to how something new (grounded) can be in relation to what generates or produces it. In establishing a border I determine new territory, but that which is determined as new and separate is also determined in its relation: both sides of the divide are determined in their separation, but also in their relation. It also helps to explain why ‘immanence’ must not be defined as an inside with no outside. There can only be an inside if there is an outside. Inside is able to be determined as inside only in relation to its outside. The border is what separates, or rather cleaves, inside and outside. The border determines the inside in relation to an outside and determines the outside in relation to an inside.
The border is defined, with reference to Kant, Nietzsche and Deleuze, as dynamic: borders evolve and revolve. According to pathogenesis, the activity of life is an activity of bordering. Life proliferates infinitely along borders of its own creation. The door of the world is a ‘revolving door’ that functions to determine and ground.

**Related terms:** Cleave, Function, Ground, Pathogenesis

**Chronic** – See Acute, Chronic, Recurrent

**Cleave** – While the term ‘cleave’ is not one of the concepts Deleuze registers, it is introduced in this thesis as a Deleuzian concept. It is best understood in relation to the concept of pathogenesis, or life, and in relation to the concepts of function and ground and the idea of a border. Life proliferates along borders (cf. **Border**) of its own construction. These borders cleave. That is, the border at once links things together (one sense of cleave) and distinguishes them (other sense of cleave). The term ‘cleave’, in English, carries these two opposed senses which are kept by our concept. In this configuration, the term works to explain how a border functions. For example, Germany and Poland are, at once, split apart and linked by their border.

In a related sense, the term ‘cleave’ stands at a convergence of ‘function’ and ‘ground’ in the sense that the function of a border is to establish limits and determine territory; that is, to ground. Grounding by a border is planar; it occurs on what Deleuze calls a plane of immanence, and the concept of cleaving helps us to understand how immanent grounding – that is, grounding on ‘one level alone’ - can occur.

**Related terms:** Function, Ground, Pathogenesis
**Dyad** – Although Deleuze uses the term ‘dyad’ infrequently, he uses the term ‘complex’ often and this is close to the meaning of ‘dyad’ in this thesis. Deleuze’s question-problem complex is dyadic, as are the categories of the actual and virtual; together, the actual and virtual form the actual-virtual dyad. The dyad plays a more significant role in this thesis than either term does in Deleuze’s philosophy. It is sketched as a metaphysical entity, as a non-substantial entity that works as the most basic constituent component of a functioning life-world.

Its great precursor is Leibniz’s monad, but it differs from the monad insofar as the monad is Oneness and the dyad is Twoness. The dyad is neither smaller nor larger than the dyad. Consider the dyad in terms of the windows of Leibniz’s monad. Leibniz says that the monad has no windows through which anything can enter or leave. The dyad ‘has’ no windows because it *is* a window, or rather, the window is the middle term of the dyad. The window is a border (cf. **Border**) that cleaves (cf. **Cleave**) its two sides. This is the ‘locus’ of the power of the dyad, the power to determine and ground a world through bordering.

**Related terms:** Border, Cleave, Function, Ground, Pathogenesis

**Equal** – The equal is one of a group of notions – others being the identical, the general, the similar, the opposed, the analogous - that Deleuze associates with powerlessness and transcendence. Equality, long seen in theory generally as positive and empowering, is, for Deleuze, negative. Rather than a springboard for creative activity – the establishment of an egalitarian society, for instance, where each individual is afforded the same opportunities (social and economic self-determination) – the equal is seen, by Deleuze, as inherently inhibitive. To be equal, in Deleuze’s view, is to be something like ‘equally subject’. Three individuals of different heights are nevertheless equal insofar as they are in the same relation – they are equal *in this relation* – to the principles of measurement determining their height. To say that the heights are *not equal* is to begin with the equal (they are equally
determined by this principle) insofar as what is examined is determined, or pre-determined by a principle that separates them within a hierarchy determined by the principle. Thus, two individuals of equal height are equal (first sense) in the sense that they are in the same relation to the principles of measurement determining their height, and equal (second sense) on the scale determined by these principles. The first sense of equal is the one worked with in this thesis.

The concept can be understood on a political level: it is as if the activity and achievements of the citizens have been mapped on a ‘State’ chart and are continually being determined by this chart. No matter what achievement is made that achievement is determined – co-ordinated - not by the activity of, or at the level of, the individual, but by a ‘State’ apparatus (pre-determined axes).

**Related terms:** Unequal

**Function** - Function is a central concept in this thesis. Deleuze tends to associate the term with science rather than philosophy (philosophers work with concepts, scientists work with functives), although he comes close to formulating it as a concept in his work with Guattari. ‘Function’ works as an ontological category in this thesis; it is the ontological category that best captures Deleuze’s metaphysics. Rather than the activity of life in Deleuze being considered primarily as substantial or processual, it is considered functional – each and every thing functions.

It is important to realise that the function is *in itself*. Pathogenesis understands life as functioning in itself rather than in virtue of something else. To function in the former way is to be open to intensification, complexification and enrichment. To function in the latter way – as a functionary - is to be closed to such transformations. The former functioning is identified as health and the latter as sick (cf. Pathogenesis).

The ‘for itself’ counterpart to the function in itself is the ground (cf. **Ground**).

**Related terms:** Acute, Chronic, Recurrent, Cleave, Dyad, Ground, Pathogenesis
Ground – Unlike the related concept of the ‘function’, ‘ground’ receives extensive thematisation in Deleuze’s philosophy, especially in his early work. If ‘function’ is ontological, then ‘ground’ is its epistemological counterpart; it relates to us and our view of things, rather than to things as they are in themselves. This is the case insofar as grounding involves determining. To ground is not simply to determine, it is to determine in a creative way, without relying on pre-determined components, (or rather, involving these components, but in such a way that they are engaged with creatively). A grounding operation is inherently problematic, it functions through problematisation. For example, if I am lost and decide to orient my activity by taking out a map I have bought, then I do not ground. To ground, in this situation, might mean orienting myself by actively engaging and interacting with the environment, perhaps constructing my own map as a product of these endeavours.

Grounding is an immanent as well as creative activity; there is no transcendence of the ground to what is grounded. This is why the concept of the border is referred to frequently in this thesis. A border grounds and it does so on, and operates on, the same plane or ‘level’ as what is grounded - a plane of immanence.

Related Terms: Border, Function, Pathogenesis

Logos – Logos and Ratio are my terms for the two most general sorts of relations obtaining in Deleuze’s philosophy. Logos refers to a relation between elements; it is a logical or formal relation. It obtains locally; the logos question is always a ‘next’ question. To enquire into the logos of a large machine, for example, is to analyse it in terms of how its components are linked together – how they are next to one another and how these relations form a nexus, or nexuses - rather than how it functions as a whole, with respect to its parts. Ratio refers to this relation between part and whole. It obtains non-locally; the ratio question is always a ‘context’ question. This is to analyse the components of a machine not with respect to how they are linked but
with respect to how they, as parts, function with respect to the whole. Their differentiation has Kant’s differentiation between ‘grounding’ (ratio) and determining (logos) as precursor: Kant defines a ground as ‘that which determines a subject with respect of any of its predicates’. And for Kant, ‘to determine is to posit a predicate while excluding its opposite.’

Deleuze’s philosophy and his concepts are more dynamic than these concepts: grounding and determining are dynamic operations in Deleuze. In a sense, Deleuze, throughout his work, gives a novel, rigorous and highly complex analysis of how grounding and determining occurs within numerous spheres, including economic theory, thermodynamics, ecology, film theory, cartography and embryology. The concepts of ratio and logos work to slow down or ‘freeze’ this dynamic purely to get a clearer idea of what is involved in the operations.

**Related terms:** Pathogenesis, Function, Ground

**Pathogenesis** – Pathogenesis is a methodology for a vitalist metaphysics, where life is understood as mutualistic and evolutionary. The pathogenesis of something is the life of that thing. It is a cleaving of pathos and genesis, where pathos introduces an aspect of affectivity to any genesis, and where genesis is taken from Deleuze’s debt to the biological sciences, as found in figures such as Simondon and Cuvier. Any genesis is pathogenesis, occurring, as it does, at the border between any given entity and its environment. Any growth is, as such, affective growth; an entity grows by affecting local entities and their environment and by being affected by local entities and their environment. Evolutionary growth is, in this way, mutualistic.

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Pathos is this ‘double affectivity’, not only the duplicity whereby any activity involves affecting and being affected at the same time, but other duplicities, such as the duplicity whereby two sorts of affection occur in each case: local (cf. *logos*) and non-local (cf. *ratio*), and the duplicity whereby two different perspectives are adopted at the same time: the perspective of A - that which affects (B) and is affected (by B) - is coupled with the perspective of B - that which affects (A) and is affected (by A). Deleuze’s favourite example capturing this ‘double affectivity’ is the mutually beneficial relationship that has emerged between the orchid and the wasp. The orchid and wasp form what Deleuze calls a ‘becoming’, a complex relationship involving these multiple duplicities. Our favoured example is mycorrhiza, a symbiotic and pathogenetic association between a host plant and its fungus. The fungus is a disease to the host plant, but a disease that contributes to the healthy functioning of its host and which feeds off it itself. We prefer this example because it works to explain another aspect of pathogenesis: pathogenesis sees life as *disease*. Disease is transformed in pathogenesis from that which represents sickness to the differential element that explains how sickness and health function together in life.

**Related terms:** Acute, Chronic, Recurrent, Differential point of view, Dyad, Ground, Function, Ground, Unequal

**Ratio** – See *Logos*

**Recurrent** – See *Acute, Chronic, Recurrent*

**Unequal** – ‘Unequal’ is the most fundamental formal term in my thesis. The unequal and the Unequal in itself are important concepts for Deleuze (especially in *DR*, Chapter 5), although they tend to be overshadowed by the related concepts of difference and repetition.
The unequal is not ‘not equal’. To see two things as ‘not equal’ is to first see the things as equal (they are in the same relation to a principle that determines them (cf. Equal) and as distinct within an order determined by that principle. Thus, a Professor with a chair in Philosophy is equal to a Junior Lecturer within the same department in the sense that their positions are determined by the University, but not equal to the lecturer insofar as the former is higher in the University hierarchy than the latter.

The Unequal in itself is unequal not insofar as it is determined in relation to the equal, but in itself: unequal, rather than not equal. The unequal does not ‘need’ the equal, as the ‘not equal’ does. In fact, the Unequal in itself has to be understood not in virtue of what determines it, but as that which has the ability or power to determine. A border between two countries, for example, is able to determine: it determines the territory of the countries on either side. It renders those countries unequal and it does so of its own power, remaining ‘in itself’, rather than being determined by either country.

**Related terms:** Equal
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