Campaigning against apartheid: The rise, fall and legacies of the South Africa United Front 1960-1962

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Abstract

The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral causes. Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the country. In March 1961, the international campaign against apartheid achieved its first major success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd chose to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of State Summit held in London. As a consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure would effectively serve as a catalyst for achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South Africa. The global campaign, centred on South Africa remaining in the Commonwealth, was the first of its kind launched by South Africa’s national liberation movements, and signalled the beginning of thirty years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a role in launching and co-ordinating this particular transnational campaign, the South Africa United Front (SAUF), an alliance of liberation groups, have been largely forgotten. Leading members of the SAUF claimed the organisation had a key part in South Africa’s subsequent exit from the Commonwealth, and the purpose of this article is to explore the validity of such assertions, as well as the role and impact it had in generating a groundswell of opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. Although the SAUF’s demands for South Africa to leave the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, the documentary evidence suggests that its campaigning activities and impact were not a decisive factor; however the long-term significance of the SAUF, and the position it had in the rise of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) has not been fully recognised. As such, the events around the campaign for South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth act as a microcosm of developments that would define the international struggle against apartheid.

Keywords:

Commonwealth; apartheid; anti-apartheid; South Africa; South Africa United Front (SAUF); African National Congress (ANC); Pan Africanist Congress (PAC); Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM)
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‘Largely through our efforts South Africa had to withdraw from the Commonwealth’

Yusuf Dadoo, South Africa United Front (SAUF)

The international struggle against apartheid that emerged during the second half of the twentieth century made the system of legalised racial oppression in South Africa one of the world’s great moral causes. Looking back at the anti-apartheid struggle, a defining characteristic was the scope of the worldwide efforts to condemn, co-ordinate, and isolate the ruling white-minority National Party (NP) government. In March 1961, the international campaign against apartheid achieved its first major success when Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd chose to withdraw South Africa from the Commonwealth following vocal protests at the Heads of State Summit held in London. As a consequence, it appeared albeit briefly, that external pressure would effectively serve as a catalyst for achieving far-reaching and immediate political change in South Africa. However, such aspirations were short-lived, dashed by a combination of intransigence and repression by the NP government, and appeasement by major western powers. The outcome was the continuation of white minority rule and the emergence of a protracted struggle against apartheid by domestic and transnational movements.

In the long and multi-layered history of the struggle against white minority rule, the internationalisation of opposition to apartheid became one of the core strategies utilised by South Africa’s liberation movements in the fight for freedom. There was a belief that concerted international action, such as boycotts and protests, would accelerate the overthrow of apartheid. International solidarity and protest against apartheid-rule had developed throughout the 1950s in Britain, facilitated by organisations such as the Africa Bureau, the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), and Christian Action, which were aided by a network of South African exiles including Tennyson Makiwane and Vella Pillay. By the late 1950s, these groups had initiated publicity campaigns to raise public awareness of apartheid including mass rallies and boycotts. However, the first major campaign (1960-61) launched by the exiled liberation movements, in conjunction with British anti-apartheid groups, focused on South Africa’s application to remain in the Commonwealth, which initiated thirty years of continued protest and lobbying. The contributions from one organisation that had a role in coordinating this transnational campaign, the South Africa United Front (SAUF) have largely been forgotten in the wider narratives; yet if Dr Yusuf Dadoo, a leading representative of the SAUF is to be believed, the organisation played a pivotal role in securing South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth. The SAUF is briefly discussed in an array of academic works, but has not attracted the full attention of studies addressing this period. Established in June 1960, the SAUF was an alliance of Southern African national liberation movements, comprising the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Indian Congress (SAIC), and the South West Africa National Union (SWANU), with the stated purpose of: overthrowing white domination and the creation of a democratic state based on universal adult suffrage. Working in tandem with the nascent British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM), the most high profile campaign that the SAUF waged was to have South Africa’s excluded from the Commonwealth.
This article will explore Dadoo’s claim by assessing the role and impact that the SAUF had in generating a groundswell of international opposition to apartheid in the early 1960s. The SAUF’s demands for South Africa to be excluded from the Commonwealth were ultimately fulfilled, but the evidence indicates that Dadoo’s assertions are overstated as its campaign activities and influence were negligible; in reality the apartheid state exited of its own volition. However, in the early 1960s, the SAUF was an important cog within the evolution of the AAM, providing the organisation with legitimacy and support for its activities that sought to increase British public awareness of apartheid. Moreover, the rise and fall of the SAUF provided a mechanism for the ANC to secure its position as South Africa’s preeminent liberation movement within British anti-apartheid circles, to the detriment of the PAC. The SAUF therefore provides a microcosm of the developments that would come to later characterise the international struggle against apartheid.

**Establishing the SAUF**

In March 1960, the brutality of the apartheid state vividly caught the attention of the international community following the police massacre of 69 protesters at Sharpeville. Even the United Nations Security Council, not usually known for its condemnation of South Africa, moved quickly to censure the government, calling for an immediate end to apartheid. Around the world, the Sharpeville Massacre drew public and political denunciation and increasingly put South Africa’s racial discrimination under the spotlight. Domestically, the dynamics of black political opposition were irrevocably altered by the massacre. In the immediate aftermath, protest marches and violent clashes erupted across South Africa, which briefly challenged the hegemony of the apartheid order. However, it was short-lived. The NP responded ruthlessly by declaring a state of emergency on 30 March, arresting thousands of people including many prominent political leaders, and swiftly banned all African opposition movements including the ANC and PAC. The impact on both liberation movements was far-reaching. Facing harassment from South Africa’s security forces and with political leaders either in prison or in hiding, the NP had drastically inhibited the ability to organise, co-ordinate and escalate political protests against white minority rule. Ultimately, Sharpeville was a defining moment for the liberation movements, sparking an enforced re-evaluation of their tactics and strategies. Furthermore, the inability to operate legally in South Africa pushed the movements into indefinite exile, scattering their supporters across the world.

Before the events at Sharpeville, both the ANC and PAC had planned to create external missions, so that domestic activity could be augmented by international solidarity and action. In December 1959, the ANC had discussed creating an international mission, which would ‘carry abroad the message of its vision and solicit support for the movement’. The role of establishing an External Mission fell to the ANC’s Deputy President Oliver Tambo, who had been nominated by the leadership to co-ordinate the movement’s international efforts. However, out of necessity, these plans were rapidly accelerated in the aftermath of Sharpeville. Tambo secretly left the country in April 1960, first making his way to the British Protectorate of Bechuanaland (now Botswana), and then on to Tanganyika (now Tanzania). Likewise, the PAC had also recognised the importance of garnering international support for their cause, and had nominated Peter Molotsi and Nana Mahomo to represent the movement abroad. On the eve of the Sharpeville Massacre, they had both left South Africa for Tanganyika, which in the early 1960s, served as a secure base for many exiled African liberation movements. Yusuf Dadoo, another
key activist in the SAUF, representing both the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the SAIC, had exited South Africa in a similar fashion; his remit decided upon by ‘the SACP in consultation with the SAIC... [was] that Dadoo should go abroad to give the Party an external presence and to help in organising all-round international support for the internal struggle’. As a result, all of the main South African liberation movements had some representation abroad by April 1960. Although the liberation movements had envisaged a relatively short period in exile, little did they realise that this small band of exiles would establish the foundations of their respective struggles against the apartheid state.

An important question to consider is why the different liberation movements sought to create an alliance in exile against apartheid? For the ANC and SAIC, an alliance was a ‘natural’ decision. The two movements were already part of what was known as the Congress Alliance within South Africa, an anti-apartheid coalition that had emerged during the 1950s, and whose members had played important roles in the writing of the Freedom Charter in 1955. Once in exile, maintaining this alliance was an obvious decision. Moreover, in the light of Pretoria’s on-going occupation of Namibia, SWANU, and later the South West Africa People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in January 1961, were included into the United Front. In fact, mirroring events at Sharpeville, only three months previously in December 1959, South African policemen had shot dead eleven protestors at the Old Location in Windhoek. The incident demonstrated the parallels between the repression of African political opposition and state brutality in the two countries, and the need for urgent political action to combat it.

However, the inclusion of the PAC was far less obvious. It must be remembered that before the Sharpeville Massacre the ANC and PAC were fierce political rivals; indeed the PAC was formed as a splinter group in 1959 by disaffected members of the ANC, who believed that ‘Africanist’ ideals had been subsumed by communist sympathies. Furthermore, the protest at Sharpeville on the 21 March 1960, was organised by the PAC, designed in part to usurp the ANC’s own planned demonstration later in the month. Political tension and mutual suspicion between the two movements was apparent from the outset.

Nevertheless, there are several explanations as to why the PAC would want to be part of the United Front, and why its rivals might entertain the possibility of a partnership. First and foremost, all the exiled liberation movements were facing a parlous state of affairs, particularly financially. After Sharpeville, a pressing concern for each of the movements was to secure allies that could offer safe refugee and political solidarity. Although the organisations had begun planning for a life in exile, they were in no way adequately prepared for it prior to being banned. Consequently, all the movements had little or no structures or resources in exile with which to receive those who had escaped South Africa. By working together, the formation of the SAUF provided an opportunity for the movements to jointly fundraise, and combine what few resources were available to them. Secondly, it allowed them to campaign on a joint platform. Despite the animosity between the organisations, they were ultimately all striving towards the shared goal of overthrowing apartheid. The result was that the liberation movements could campaign with ‘one voice’, and utilise their scarce resources to isolate South Africa internationally. Thirdly, the exiled members actually got on with each other personally, and according to Tambo, individual relations ‘continue[d] to be more friendly... and by no means bitter’. There was a realisation that despite their ideological differences, working with one another was beneficial for their respective struggles. Tambo recalled that immediately after going into exile he met Mahamo and Molotsi briefly in Dar-es-Salaam, who advocated that ‘we shall have to work together’ to represent ‘the interests of the South African people abroad’. Furthermore, interviews
with PAC activists conducted by Kwandiwe Kondlo reinforce this point, as they valued ‘the tactical benefits that could accrue from the initiative’ in light of the precariousness of the movement’s international position.23 However, the perceived ‘tactical benefits’ of unity was not one that was shared by the majority of the ANC or PAC leadership. As will be discussed later on, internal ideological divisions within both movements, and divergent strategic aims of the external missions in comparison to those that had remained within South Africa meant that external unity between the ANC and PAC was an anathema for many activists.24 An ANC report from October 1961, reiterated this point by arguing that ‘the differences between the organisations in S.A. ... made unity abroad impossible’.25

The final explanation that has been mooted for the formation of the SAUF is that it was encouraged by external pressure from the Ghanaian president, Kwaame Nkrumah. In the limited literature on the SAUF this is a debated point, but the consensus is that Nkrumah played a decisive role in facilitating the coalition.26 Tambo recalled that various leaders, including himself, Molotsi and Mahomo were invited to Ghana, the purpose of which ‘was to put to us the idea of, inter alia, (a) a United Front, (b) establishing the Headquarters of such a Front in Accra, and (c) issuing a public statement ... the principle of forming a united front on some basis was readily agreed to’.27 However, such a decisive role for Nkrumah seems incongruous, especially given that there was considerable antipathy towards the members of Congress Alliance (and their perceived communist sympathies) amongst many African states.28 Furthermore, Nkrumah was the leading light of pan-Africanism which would have made him predisposed towards supporting the interests of the PAC, and therefore highly unlikely to have demanded the inclusion of the ANC. Finally, Nkrumah’s political stance before and during the Commonwealth discussions in March 1961 would serve to undermine any notion of him being a leading figure behind the creation of the SAUF.29 During the Heads of State negotiations, the Ghanaian president initially adopted a conciliatory approach towards the apartheid state, and despite some rhetorical posturing, remained unwilling to lead an Afro-Asian motion against the expulsion of South Africa – a core goal of the SAUF.30 Nkrumah’s lack of decisive action is hardly representative of someone who has been accorded such a prime position in influencing the formation of the United Front.

Following several months of negotiations and planning, the liberation movements met in Addis Ababa in June 1960 at the Second Conference of Independent African States, to establish the SAUF. At the conference, the representatives of the liberation movements formalised their aims, discussed a future programme of action, and created the administrative structures for the organisation.31 The representatives – Oliver Tambo, Tennyson Makiwane, (ANC); Nana Mahomo, Peter Molotsi, and Vusumzi Make (PAC); Yusuf Dadoo (SAIC); Jariretundu Kozonguizi (SWANU); Mburumba Kerina (independent/SWAPO) – agreed that the SAUF, operating initially out of offices in Accra, Cairo, and London (and later New York), would seek to mobilise international opinion and action against South Africa, in order to overthrow apartheid and implement democracy.32 Furthermore, there was a clear emphasis ‘that there was no “leader” of the United Front’ because of the strained relationships between the movements domestically, and ‘it was expressly agreed that no member of the United Front would indulge in attacking, misrepresenting or undermining’ each other.33

The conference proved a useful strategic starting point for the SAUF, as its aims and objectives were discussed and ratified by delegates from across the African continent. One of the main conference resolutions cemented this continental support by publicly denouncing apartheid, and there was even a clause that explicitly criticised South Africa’s continued status within the Commonwealth.34 The
resolution meant that within days of forming, the SAUF had already identified a programme of international mobilisation against apartheid, designed to complement the movements’ domestic resistance activities.

**Activism and political engagement**

Very quickly, the London office became the epicentre of activism for the SAUF from which the majority of its campaign efforts emanated, due to the significant number of solidarity organisations present in Britain. As demonstrated in a range of studies examining anti-apartheid activism by Håkan Thörn, Christabel Gurney, Rob Skinner, and Simon Stevens, Britain had attracted a small, yet politically active number of exiled South Africans during the 1950s, whose efforts were aided by a range of anti-apartheid organisations such as the Africa Bureau, Committee of African Organisations (CAO), and the Boycott Movement that were publicising the plight of the black majority. Individuals affiliated with the Congress Alliance, and the ANC in particular, including Makiwane, Pillay, and Abdul Minty played an important role in forging links with these various groups to promote the South African cause in Britain. For example, the establishment of the Boycott Movement in 1959 (which Makiwane was active in) was in part inspired by ANC President Chief Luthuli’s request for an international boycott of South African products; London activists who had been protesting against colonialism throughout the decade heeded this call. The SAUF was therefore able to build upon these multidimensional anti-apartheid activities and personal networks that had developed in Britain during the 1950s, which provided it with a receptive platform to work from.

The short history of the SAUF is one closely interlinked with the emergence of the nascent AAM, and it is from their joint programmes of action that momentum gathered to mobilise public opinion. From the very beginning of the AAM’s existence, formally established in the aftermath of Sharpeville in April 1960, there had been a South African contingent included in its national committee; Makiwane was made its director, and Dadoo regularly attended meetings. The result was that the AAM ‘national committee then, and later reflected the new influx of South African refuges’. The close connections were clearly demonstrated in August 1960, soon after the SAUF’s creation, when the organisation was invited to have a representative on the AAM’s Executive Committee. The offer was officially rejected by the SAUF, preferring to remain an independent entity, and opted instead for observer status. However, the decision did not change the relationship that much. In reality the two organisations officially shared very similar aims and worked closely together, to the extent their programmes were described as ‘indistinguishable’ from one another. Indeed, the blurring of the official lines between the two organisations, resulted in the SAUF having to clarify its position vis-à-vis the AAM. On 4 November 1960, in a meeting between the PAC’s Mahomo and five members of the AAM Executive Committee, he insisted that the SAUF ‘must be regarded as finally responsible for the international campaign’. The AAM demurred. The Executive Committee responded that it had been formed solely to develop British support for the policies of the liberation movements, and because the SAUF were representative of the South African people, the AAM’s own ‘broad policy would naturally be bound up with the stand taken by the United Front’. This was an important early admission by the AAM of how closely connected it was to the SAUF and its objectives. However, a crucial problem that negated the SAUF’s ‘official’ policy of autonomy from the AAM, was the actions of Makiwane and Dadoo, ANC and SAIC activists respectively, who remained extremely influential within its leadership structures.
Such a conflict of interest did little to foster feelings of unity within the SAUF, and justifiably fuelled PAC suspicions of the ANC’s motivations and intentions.

In September 1960, the SAUF officially announced its first programme of action with the core emphasis on the international isolation of South Africa, and the mobilisation of public and political opposition against apartheid. The programme of action advocated: international efforts to secure support of all UN member states to implement immediate and effective sanctions; an oil embargo against South Africa; a proposal that independent African nations should refuse air and shipping facilities to South African vessels and planes; and a consumer boycott. The SAUF’s press statement set out a number of initiatives to facilitate these over-arching aims, which included: the lobbying of the British government; active support of the AAM’s Penny Pledge Campaign that sought to raise funds and awareness; to hold a mass rally with five British anti-apartheid groups; for Tambo, Mahamo, and Dadoo to attend the TUC Annual Conference; and to conduct a publicity tour of major British cities, organised by the AAM, to spread the message of the SAUF to the general public.

The key problem that the SAUF faced was generating interest for their cause. Despite the condemnation and outrage over Sharpeville, the British public were seemingly disinterested in turning out for events. It would be fair to say that the SAUF struggled to have much of an impact on the political consciousness, particularly outside of London. For example, the publicity tour around Britain, struggled to attract many people, which was a major disappointment for the SAUF and AAM. It did not help that the British media were equally unreceptive to what the SAUF had to say. In November 1960, a press conference was held to draw attention to the Pondo Revolt, which the SAUF explicitly linked to wider political and socio-economic problems across South Africa. However, attendance was very poor, and the press were accused of giving ‘scant attention’ to the issue and looking ‘for something more sensational’ than the events in Pondoland. Tellingly, a report of the press conference indicated that the core aim had been ‘to revive interest in the S.A. question’, a tacit admission that the SAUF’s anti-apartheid message was not getting through.

It is easy to be critical of these initial difficulties, but it must be kept in mind the considerable challenges that the SAUF encountered in the first six months of its existence. Primarily, the individual liberation movements had been totally ill-equipped for exile and lacked the necessary resources to plan or wage comprehensive actions. Furthermore, there were only seven people who actually constituted the SAUF (an eighth if the independent observer, Kerina is taken into account) who were spread over several cities, on different continents. Moreover, it was always going to be difficult for a new organisation, albeit supported by existing anti-apartheid groups, to galvanise public opinion. The history of the ANC is a case in point, as its support and influence during the liberation struggle experienced enormous fluctuations. The SAUF required a hook to capture the public and political imagination, which fortunately came in the form of South Africa’s enforced application to renew its membership within the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth question

In May 1960, shortly after Sharpeville, the ‘South African question’ had arisen during the Meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. The increasingly controversial issue of South Africa’s membership was discussed in an ‘acrimonious debate on apartheid’, in which Malaya was ‘strongly critical’. As
the ‘wind of change’ saw Britain grant independence to a number of its colonies, these new nations joined the Commonwealth, leaving the system of apartheid as an anathema to the increasingly multiracial composition of the organisation. The situation was complicated further, when on 5 October, South Africa held a ‘white’s only’ referendum on whether the country should become a Republic, in which the electorate narrowly voted in favour. As a consequence, Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd was required to reapply for continued membership of the Commonwealth at the next Heads of State Meeting in March 1961.

The SAUF immediately seized upon this campaign opportunity to mobilise international support, implementing a programme of action focusing on the ‘exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth’. In a television interview Mohomo asserted that the SAUF was embarking on the ‘first systematic approach, the first time we’ve attempted to direct our appeal to the international community’, in order to coalesce ‘world opinion directed against South Africa’. To generate increased awareness of the SAUF’s demands, Tambo and Make travelled to New York to advise the Afro-Asian committee at the UN on the situation in South Africa, and while in the city, they also publicly condemned the referendum result outright. However, the main task of the programme of action was to convince ‘other members of the Commonwealth that SA should be excluded from it’.

In order to achieve its stated aims, the SAUF adopted a two pronged approach. The first was to get the Accra office to speak with ‘the President of Ghana and the Federal Prime Minister of Nigeria with the view to getting a categorical declaration from them that they will press for the expulsion of South Africa from the Commonwealth’. The second was to send Dadoo, Make, and Makiwane on a tour of India, Ceylon, Malaya, and Pakistan in February 1961, in order to lobby political parties and governments into taking a definitive stand against apartheid. For example, during the tour of India the group were the guests of the semi-official Indian Council for Africa, at which they addressed several meetings, and were scheduled to have discussions with Jawaharlal Nehru. Meanwhile in Britain, with the assistance of the AAM, the SAUF sought to engage, educate, and rally public opinion against South Africa’s continued membership, through lobbying politicians, talking to the media, and holding protest rallies. The SAUF successfully persuaded the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party in January 1961, to explicitly demand that South Africa should be suspended, and also initiated a Cambridge University petition which gained 1,000 signatures, ‘in accordance with the views of the South African United Front’ which was handed to Malayan Prime Minister Tunku Rahman. These activities certainly generated greater public awareness about apartheid, which the Heads of State were obliged to take account of, but they were far from powerful; the Commonwealth leaders either ignored these demands or remained non-committal as to their course of action.

Dadoo’s grand claims about the SAUF’s decisive role in the exit of South Africa are questionable when the degree of influence they were able to wield over the process appears negligible. Without retracing well-worn ground, studies including those by Ronald Hyam and Peter Henshaw, Richard Wood, and Saul Dubow have all addressed the intricacies and intrigue of South Africa’s decision to depart from the Commonwealth. What is abundantly clear from the archives is that in the months following South Africa’s decision to become a Republic, the British government and the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan expended much time and energy to ensure that it remained part of the Commonwealth, and to convince other leaders of the merits of this position, despite their abhorrence of the apartheid system. The odds were therefore heavily stacked against the SAUF in its efforts to persuade the Commonwealth leaders of the need to expel South Africa. For the SAUF, there was already an
apparent sense of doubt about the possibilities of success even before its representatives embarked upon an international lobbying tour, because ‘politicians easily avoided making pledges or decisions’. Much to their chagrin, the SAUF soon discovered that the Afro-Asian bloc, which would have seemed ‘naturally’ predisposed to opposing South Africa’s readmission, were reticent to commit to any specific action. For example, the Indian, Ghanaian, and Nigerian governments were lobbied hard by SAUF representatives before the conference, but had all refused to be drawn into making definitive statements, choosing to adopt a cautious approach to the discussions, and to wait for other prime ministers to ‘take the lead in excluding South Africa’. There was a mood of such ‘deep pessimism’ amongst the South African exiles about this eventuality that five members of the SAUF had desperately sought last-minute interviews with nine of the prime ministers to convince them otherwise. A successful lobbying campaign would clearly not have been resorting to such measures so late in the day, and indicates the lack of influence they were able to wield over the process.

The initial signs at the Commonwealth conference in March were not positive for the SAUF’s campaign. Macmillan had spent much of the conference seeking to negotiate a compromise and to find a solution to the ‘South African question’; he was very nearly successful, in that all the Heads of State agreed that on a purely constitutional basis, there was an overwhelming case for South Africa to remain within the Commonwealth. However, during the course of the discussions, the tone of the debate changed. Over a series of sessions, vocal opposition to apartheid’s racial policies steadily mounted amongst the delegates, with a number of leaders publicly distancing themselves from South Africa’s readmission. Beyond the conference hall, a widely publicised article penned by Julius Nyerere added further fuel to the debate, by asserting that apartheid made a mockery of the inter-racial composition of the Commonwealth, and summarised his position succinctly by declaring ‘that to vote South Africa in, is to vote us out’. Sensing the tide of opinion was against him, and refusing to accept any compromises or external criticisms of apartheid, Verwoerd chose instead to withdraw South Africa’s application voluntarily.

No matter how South Africa’s exit occurred, the announcement by Verwoerd was a major propaganda coup for the SAUF and the AAM. A statement proclaimed that:

> the enforced withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth is a resounding victory for our people, and marks an historic step forward in our struggle against apartheid... This is a stunning defeat for Verwoerd and a dismal failure for Macmillan... The world is solidly against Verwoerd’s racial policies.

In an article for Fighting Talk, the influence of the SAUF was claimed to have been ‘a spectre at the Premier’s Conference; it was this spectre that Verwoerd fought for the allegiance of the Commonwealth’s premiers. The spectre was the South African United Front, Messers Oliver Tambo, and Yusuf M. Dadoo... [and] the premiers stood with the United Front against Verwoerd’. The Anti-Apartheid Bulletin described the actions as ‘probably the greatest victory yet in the international campaign against apartheid. South Africa was forced out of the commonwealth’. Another article triumphantly asserted that ‘a great part of the credit for the victory must go to the United Front’. The perceived international importance of the event was repeatedly emphasised, and reinforced in a SAUF statement celebrating it as ‘a significant victory for all opponents of Dr Verwoerd’s racist policies. It marks the point beyond which the world will not sit idly looking on while South Africa continues practising inhuman policies... this heralds the beginning of a rapid world movement towards the
complete isolation of South Africa’. South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth had validated the SAUF’s campaign, and provided a much needed boost towards fulfilling its core strategy of mobilising international action against South Africa.

Indeed, for the SAUF, the opportunity to press home the advantage and further isolate South Africa looked within its grasp. The sense of optimism within the SAUF was accentuated by UN Resolution 1598 (XV) in April 1961, which described apartheid ‘as reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity’ and requested member states to take individual and collective action to bring about the end of the racial policies. The UN Assembly adopted this resolution almost unanimously, with only one abstention; even Britain which had previously voted against every resolution on apartheid, voted in favour. The sum of these parts meant that internationally at least, South Africa appeared to be on the ropes. Further activity in May, in close conjunction with the AAM, saw a mass rally held in London and a delegation of SAUF representatives delivering notes and telegrams of protest from across the world to South Africa House. For a short period of time it seemed that international condemnation and pressure might be the catalyst for political and social change in South Africa.

However, the SAUF’s triumphs were fleeting. Shortly afterwards, the basis of the United Front began to crumble as the tentative unity between the ANC and PAC collapsed under the weight of ‘malicious distortion and lies’. Even as the SAUF was publicly celebrating South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth in print, the reality saw the campaign efforts stalling, and the cracks between the ANC and PAC’s domestic and external leaders simply widening. The ever-growing divisions led Tom Lodge to observe that ‘neither the PAC or the ANC had a particularly sincere concern for unity, at least not if this required making concessions to the other’. The disinclination towards unity had serious ramifications for the SAUF. As a consequence very little activity was conducted in the name of the SAUF from April 1961 onwards, and by October 1961, it was reported that it was ‘no longer in existence except in name’.

Finally, in March 1962, the SAUF representatives met in London, and agreed to dissolve the organisation by the 15 March, bringing an end to the coalition.

**Significance and legacies of the SAUF**

The creation of the SAUF in 1960, and its short-lived campaign efforts, ensured the coalition, had according to Tambo ‘a full, vigorous and serviceable life … [that] advanced the cause of African people in South Africa’. The difficulties this small group of exiled representatives of the various liberation movements faced were challenging, yet they managed to overcome some of the initial obstacles. By working together, the exiled individuals demonstrated that ideological rivalries could be subsumed in favour of co-operation. In doing so, the SAUF mounted a series of campaigns in Britain that helped raise public awareness and generate a semblance of active international opposition to apartheid. However, the successes assigned to it do not ring true. The SAUF’s most high-profile ‘success’ concerning South Africa and the Commonwealth holds very little merit under close scrutiny. While it would clearly be wrong to dismiss out-right the SAUF’s contributions in helping to create a public groundswell of anti-apartheid opposition, the evidence demonstrates that it did not have a major role in influencing the Commonwealth Heads of State’s, or ultimately Verwoerd’s decision to withdraw. Indeed, Hyam emphasised that ‘Verwoerd had more than sufficient reasons of his own for not particularly wanting to remain a member any longer’. Therefore the ‘success’ of South Africa withdrawing from the Commonwealth can hardly be accredited to the SAUF.
In fact, South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth did not have the desired long-term impact. For South Africa, exiting the Commonwealth was certainly not portrayed as a defeat. On returning from the conference, Verwoerd was given an ‘uproarious, hero’s welcome’ by a crowd of 15-20,000 people, to whom he sold the departure as a victory for the republic, while insisting that now the ‘friendship with Britain [was] firmer’. The broader reaction amongst whites in South Africa therefore tells its own story. After 1961, the system of apartheid was strengthened domestically, and internationally western nations continued to support South Africa for much of the next thirty years. Verwoerd had gambled correctly that withdrawing from the Commonwealth would not affect South Africa’s links with Britain. For example, almost immediately after the Heads of State conference, the British government was devising ways of maintaining its links; cabinet papers indicate that ‘it was agreed that we should seek to maintain friendly relations on a bilateral basis with South Africa’, although some caution should be exercised, in order ‘to avoid giving the impression that after her withdrawal South Africa was to remain a member of the Commonwealth in all but name’. South Africa’s exit did very little to change the political situation for the oppressed majority. Britain and other western states sought to maintain the status quo, irrespective of protests by anti-apartheid opposition movements such as the SAUF.

For the liberation movements within the SAUF, this brief period of external unity was a minor aberration in what turned out to be a long and bitter rivalry. Clearly, for the small group of exiled South African’s representing the ANC, PAC, and SAIC, co-operation was theoretically far more beneficial than tension and rivalry. However, a key problem for the SAUF was that it was created by these seven exiled individuals, and did not have the wider-support of their respective movements within South Africa. To label the SAUF as ‘representative’ of the ANC or PAC would be something of a misnomer. Tambo later recalled that the SAUF suffered because ‘it was not established as a projection of a set-up which [was] obtained in South Africa, and was therefore not a deliberate creation of the organisations within South Africa’. While unity may have prevailed albeit temporarily, the inherent rivalries proved insurmountable, and the opinions of the PAC’s and ANC’s leaders quashed any reconciliation abroad. ANC grandee Walter Sisulu had been astonished that the exiled leaders had even agreed to co-operate, because how could unity ‘be achieved abroad, when there was no unity at home’? Likewise, the PAC’s fragmented domestic and external leadership could not agree upon its own unified position concerning international co-operation, which in turn, meant that outwith of South Africa, ‘disagreements about the United Front helped engender the first round of the corrosive infighting that would characterize the PAC’s history in exile’. These rivalries and suspicions undermined the effectiveness of the SAUF throughout its short existence.

Perhaps most serious to the long-term prospects of the United Front had been the divergent ideological positions of the liberation movements. The so-called ‘racialist’ positons of the PAC or the ANC’s ‘communist inspired’ agenda ensured that there was an obvious clash over the SAUF’s direction and strategy. The suspicions borne out of the ANC-PAC split in 1959 spilled over into exile, and even if the seven individuals of the SAUF respected one another on a personal level as Tambo had previously claimed, the political relationship was not always warm. Furthermore, individuals associated with the Congress Alliance held positions of influence in multiple anti-apartheid organisations, and as a result the ‘official’ aims of the United Front became closely associated with those of the ANC; this did little to win the trust of the PAC representatives. In turn, each liberation movement increasingly worked towards securing their own specific agendas, rather than those of the SAUF as a whole. A political report had identified that the ‘differences of opinion between the ANC and the PAC are
supposed to be forgotten in the United Front outside South Africa, but in fact each group is on the look-out for possible advantages for itself'. For example, the Cairo office of the United Front, controlled entirely by PAC representatives had adopted ‘a far more militant policy than has been agreed by the United Front as a whole, and this has caused considerable friction within the movement’. Ultimately, the ANC placed fault squarely with the PAC for the SAUF’s demise, asserting that there was ‘no unity whatsoever’, and accused them of constantly undermining the project in favour of their own narrow interests. Such accusations were clearly an attempt by the ANC to apportion blame solely upon the PAC for the Front’s collapse. Yet, the PAC were equally damning of the ANC, accusing it of seeking to dominate the SAUF agenda for its own purposes, which threatened its own independence: the ‘PAC had no choice but to walk out of the Front because it was being swallowed by the ANC’.  

The SAUF coalition and subsequent break-up set the tone for ANC-PAC relations for the duration of the exiled period, with the rivalries persisting as each movement sought external support and alliances, while simultaneously discrediting the other. Moreover, the experience and outcomes from this short-lived experiment made future attempts at unity impossible and hardened the mutual distrust; on several occasions the Organisation of African Unity tried to impose union on the two movements, but the ANC rejected such suggestions out-right.  

Following the dissolution of the SAUF, the AAM retained links with the liberation movements, but was according to Genevieve Klein far from neutral in its approach by promoting ‘the ANC over other liberation movements as the most representative... and as the legitimate leader of the struggle against apartheid’. The early personal links that representatives such as Makiwane had forged with anti-apartheid activists in the 1950s, that had been maintained through his activities within the SAUF and AAM structures, meant that the ANC became the main beneficiaries of such international solidarity after 1961. Elizabeth Williams argues that the AAM’s bias in favour of the ANC was ‘inbuilt from the start’, which according to Gurney meant that the organisation’s ‘first loyalty was to the ANC’, becoming its cheerleader throughout the struggle. Exemplifying the strength of these relations after the United Front had dissolved, the ANC representatives retained observer status on the National Committee. The AAM was wary of associating itself too closely with the ANC, but it was clear that they were its South African liberation movement of choice. Although the PAC was treated cordially by the AAM, there was in reality very little interaction with its representatives after 1962. In fact, the PAC was never able to fully ingratiate itself with the AAM; Lodge has characterised the AAM-PAC relationship as ‘mutually disdainful’, and Fieldhouse believed the PAC’s ‘Africanism was repugnant’ to the British officials. The PAC had already felt they were being side-lined within the SAUF, and this continued after its collapse, with the ANC dominating the agenda in Britain. However, the PAC were far more successful in cultivating links with independent African states in the early to mid-1960s, and were able to persuade many governments that the ANC was communist-inspired and controlled by whites. Therefore in a period where the very survival of the ANC was at stake, the support of international solidarity partners in Britain such as the AAM was not only crucial in sustaining the movement, but also in combating perceptions and suspicions of it around the world. For the duration of the ANC’s exile, the AAM was enormously beneficial and proved to be an enduring international ally, and one that helped galvanise public and moral protests in Britain. The SAUF institutionalised the existing anti-apartheid activities in Britain, and ensured the ANC became the partner of choice.
The AAM undoubtedly benefited from its alliance with the SAUF, and through its participation in the Commonwealth campaign of 1961, helped to cement its own anti-apartheid credentials. When considering the AAM, it is easy to take a historically determinist perspective, and simply see it in terms of the broad-based, popular movement it became by the 1980s. However, during the first few years of the AAM’s existence, the organisation was weak, financially unstable, and lacking in wider public appeal. It must be noted that the AAM emerged out of a plethora of anti-apartheid groups in Britain such as the MCF and CAO, and there were some serious tensions over leadership, funding, and coordination of activities. At play were suspicions, personal jealousies, and various factions regarding the overarching control of activities and ideological orientation of the campaigns which lasted throughout much of 1960. Perhaps indicative of the AAM’s tenuous position in anti-apartheid circles was that following South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth it had seriously considered disbanding and leaving the struggle to other groups. However, the AAM National Committee decided to continue so it could ‘respond to appeals for action through the S.A. United Front and the solidarity which had been created should not be broken’. This statement clearly demonstrates the close connections between the SAUF and the AAM, and more importantly, that the justification for its ongoing existence in May 1961, was premised largely on its relationship with the United Front.

Any self-respecting British anti-apartheid group required the involvement of South African exiles, representative of the domestic struggle, to validate their cause; by successfully allying with the SAUF, the AAM had links to all of the main liberation movements. A key aim of the AAM had been to forge and nurture networks with the incoming exiles to London, and both Skinner and Williams observe that these individuals changed the nature of the organisation, aiding first its survival, and then its rise to prominence. Moreover, it has been argued that such relationships with the exiles became a ‘key component of the movement’s identity – an identity centred upon identification itself’. The joint activities with the SAUF consequently assisted the nascent AAM’s own development in the period 1960-1961 (before the Front essentially stopped functioning in October), through valuable campaign and lobbying experiences that ensured it held a modicum of influence in public life. In the initial stages of the AAM’s life, the association with the SAUF proved extremely beneficial to the organisations standing by strengthening and legitimising its position as the coordinator of anti-apartheid activities in Britain.

**Conclusion**

The article has sought to provide a more detailed picture into the activities and legacies of the SAUF than has previously been afforded. Was the SAUF a success? On face value, not especially. The successes that have been accredited to the SAUF, such as its role in South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth are tenuous. It would be wrong to assert that the SAUF had no impact, because there certainly were instances in early 1961, when the anti-apartheid message became embedded in the British public consciousness. The SAUF, working closely with the AAM, were without doubt important in helping to mobilise this opposition. Furthermore, the SAUF’s core objective of securing South Africa’s exit from the Commonwealth was achieved; a major propaganda coup for the anti-apartheid struggle, the significance of which should not be discounted. Yet, quite clearly, the SAUF had very little to do with this and South Africa’s exit cannot be attributed to its efforts, despite its own
representatives, sympathetic journals, and latterly, some academics claiming otherwise. This ‘victory’ for the SAUF was just one example of the rewriting of the broader liberation narrative, when any action that was deemed to have advanced the struggle was merited to those fighting against it, irrespective of the reality. To make matters worse, South Africa’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth had relatively little effect on the anti-apartheid struggle at home or abroad.

The real significance of the SAUF is frequently not recognised. The legacy of the organisation does not concern issues surrounding the Commonwealth, but rather as a stepping stone in strengthening the mutually beneficial relationships between the ANC and the AAM in Britain. Within the SAUF, the ANC’s representatives in particular played a crucial role in aiding and legitimising the position of the nascent AAM within the international anti-apartheid struggle. The SAUF-AAM alliance was advantageous while it lasted, but its collapse allowed the ANC to fill the void as the organisation’s representative liberation movement at the expense of the PAC. Those early few months of the exiled liberation struggle were crucial in enhancing this relationship, and the SAUF provided a platform for this to happen. The SAUF is often regarded as a footnote in the broader narrative of South Africa’s exiled liberation struggle, but this short-lived coalition deserves greater recognition than is normally afforded to it.

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Notes

1 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.
3 Graham, Crisis, 2.
4 It must be noted that seeking international moral and political support was just one dimension within the wider-strategy for liberation employed by the movements. This period saw both the ANC and PAC utilise violence in their quest for liberation, a ‘turn’ that was not universally popular among activists creating schisms over direction and purpose. However, as the period in exile grew, freedom achieved through a violent liberation struggle increasingly came to dominate the political thinking of these movements.
6 While the SAUF is regularly mentioned in a range of studies such as Ndlovu, Dubow, Lissoni, Fieldhouse, and Skinner, it is a fragmented history that usually only merits several pages at most.
7 ‘South Africa United Front: Minutes of meeting held in Addis Ababa, 19 June 1960, Hotel Guenet’, Mayibuye Archive, University of Western Cape (hereafter UWC), MCH02, Box 1, Item 3.
8 ‘Record of remarks by Dr Verwoerd, 16th March, 1961’, The National Archives (TNA), London, DO161/110.
9 UN Security Resolution 134 (1960), ‘Question relating to the situation in the Union of South Africa’.
10 Lodge, Sharpeville, 169.
11 Callinicos, Tambo, 253.
12 ‘Molotsi interview’, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Gerhart, Gail Interviews and documents, A2422, Box 1.
13 Kondlo, Twilight, 68.
15 The SACP was not formally part of the SAUF, but due to the organisations secretive structure following its banning in 1950, it had representatives who held positions in both the ANC and SAIC.

16 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions, 19 January 1961’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 2.

17 Ridgway, et al., Shooting at the Old Location.

18 The influence of the Namibian movements to the SAUF was limited, with the vast majority of its campaigns almost entirely focusing on South Africa. For the purposes of this article, the campaigns that addressed Namibia / South West Africa will not be examined.


20 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.

21 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations on United Front and After, by Judy Coburn’, 11, Liberation Archives, University of Fort Hare (hereafter UFH), Oliver Tambo Papers, Box 83, Folder, 871.

22 Ibid., 1.

23 Kondlo, Twilight, 113.

24 Sisulu, In our lifetime, 179; Lodge, Sharpeville, 197; Kondlo, Twilight, 112-115.

25 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 1.

26 Karis, and Gerhart, Challenge and Violence, 351; Lissoni, ‘liberation movements in exile’, 92; Lodge, Black Politics, 297; Shubin, View From Moscow, 49; Thomas, Diplomacy of Liberation, 35.


30 The Times, ‘S. Africa’s place safe in Commonwealth’, 10 March 1961;

31 ‘Minutes of meeting held in Addis Ababa, 19 June 1960, Hotel Guenet’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 3.

32 Ibid.

33 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 5.


35 Thörn, Civil Society; Gurney, ‘A Great Cause’; Skinner, Anti-apartheid; Stevens, ‘Strategies’.


38 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 27.


40 Fieldhouse, Anti-Apartheid, 28.


43 Ibid.


45 ‘SAUF Press Statement, 18 November 1960’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 5.


47 See Graham, Crisis, chapters 2 & 3.


49 Kenny, Verwoerd, 238.

50 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 2.


55 ‘South Africa United Front, Decisions and Resolutions’, Mayibuye Archive, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 2.

56 ‘Extract from Delhi: South Africa and the Commonwealth’, TNA, DO161/110.


59 For example see various files in: TNA, DO161/106; TNA, DO161/110; TNA, PREM11/3115; TNA, PREM11/3116; TNA, PREM11/3217; TNA, PREM11/3393.


61 Legum, Pan-Africanism, 144-45.


64 Hyam, ‘Parting’, 166-170.

65 See Nyerere’s various letters to Heads of State before the conference in: TNA, DO161/45; The Observer, ‘South Africa or us’, 12 March 1961.


67 Dadoo, ‘Forced withdrawal’.

68 Bernstein, ‘Break with the commonwealth’, 5.


70 ‘The ides of March’, 2.


72 UN Resolution 1598 (XV), Question of race conflict in South Africa, 15 April 1961.


75 Dadoo, ‘Why the United Front Failed’.

76 Lodge, Black Politics, 232.

77 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the Secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, UWC, Mayibuye Archives, MCH02, Box 1, Item 1.


80 Hyam, ‘Parting’, 172.


82 For a visual representation see: ‘Atlas of Apartheid’s Allies’.


86 Sisulu, In our lifetime, 179.

87 Kondlo, Twilight, 114-115; Lodge, Sharpeville, 197.

88 Tambo, ‘Comments and Observations’, 11.

89 ‘Activities of the South African United Front’, TNA, FCO141/17899.

90 Ibid.

91 ‘Decisions taken at a meeting of the Secretariat of the NEC, 24 October 1961’, Mayibuye Archives, UWC, MCH02, Box 1, Item 1.

92 Kondlo, Twilight, 115.
93 ‘Notes of meeting to discuss OAU Liberation Committee resolution calling for a united front with PAC’, Historical Papers, William Cullen Library, University of Witwatersrand, Oliver Tambo Papers, A5261, C4.46, South African Front / South African United Front; Ibid., The Call for Unity and a United Front.


95 Williams, Politics of Race’, 109; Gurney, ‘1970s’, 472.

96 Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 60.

97 Lodge, Sharpeville, 250; Fieldhouse, Anti-apartheid, 284.

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100 ‘Boycott movement minutes, 30 April Recall Conference 1960’, University of Oxford, Bodleian Library, MSS AAM 2.


18