



University of Dundee

Social Work in a Changing Scotland

Cree, Vivienne E.; Smith, Mark

Publication date:
2018

Document Version
Peer reviewed version

[Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Cree, V. E., & Smith, M. (Eds.) (2018). *Social Work in a Changing Scotland*. Routledge.

General rights

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

Chapter Three (5045 words)

Ethics for Scottish social work

Mark Smith

Introduction

This chapter is about ethics, the branch of moral philosophy concerned, at one level, with what is right and wrong and with what humans ought to do in particular situations. Other perspectives broaden this to consider how human beings might live good and flourishing lives, taking into account their responsibilities towards others. Recent decades have witnessed growing attention to social work ethics. Bisman (2004) and Webb (2006) argue that ethics ought to be the profession's defining characteristic. It is hard to disagree; social workers operate on terrain that is messy and ambiguous, where there are regular dilemmas but few clear answers. In such a scenario, workers cannot just follow pre-ordained procedures or codes but are, inevitably, moral agents engaged in ethical decisions and actions. They, thus, need some moral compass to guide their deliberations.

There are different philosophical traditions and approaches that social workers might look to in negotiating ethical dilemmas. This chapter offers a very brief outline of some of the main ones. It identifies how professions lay claim to ethical standards to legitimise claims for public acceptance and trust and discusses recent trends in social work to seek to codify such standards through codes of practice developed by regulatory bodies. This more general overview provides a platform from which to explore whether there may be particular Scottish ethical traditions and, if so, what insights these might offer in respect of how we conceive of social work. Given such a

broad sweep, coverage of the material is sketchy but also contingent - in considering a specifically Scottish dimension to social work ethics, the chapter opens up new ground, which, to some extent, is speculative. Moreover, ideas rarely respect national boundaries – there is an inevitable cross-fertilisation between Scottish and other philosophical ideas. Nevertheless, scholars such as Broadie (2007) and Davie (1991) identify particular features of a Scottish philosophy. Scholars of education (e.g. MacAlister and Macleod, 2016) have sought to explore how Scottish philosophical ideas have informed that profession. This chapter begins to do likewise for social work.

The Enlightenment

In any consideration of ethics, the period known as The Enlightenment is pivotal. This was the period of scientific and philosophical advance that began across Northern Europe around the latter half of the 17th century and lasted through much of the 18th Century. The Enlightenment heralded what we know as the modern period of human history. Essentially, it held out the promise that the world could be understood through science and reason rather than the superstition and deference to established authority that had characterised the pre- and early modern periods. While a European movement, The Enlightenment assumed particular Scottish aspects, spawning key thinkers, some of whom this chapter touches upon.

An early indication of the Enlightenment's turn to reason might be identified in the French philosopher Rene Descartes' statement 'cogito ergo sum' – 'I think therefore I am'. In this assertion, Descartes asserted the primacy of a thinking 'self' over a feeling one, assuming that human beings could separate these off from one another.

The resultant separation of mind and body has been a powerful driver of intellectual belief since. It has also percolated understandings of professions such as social work, where workers are encouraged to separate their personal from their professional selves. Qualities of detachment and objectivity are encouraged, while emotional involvement with clients can be seen as unprofessional. Such assumptions are problematic, as we go on to see.

Since the Enlightenment, two main ethical theories have dominated: deontology or duty ethics, associated with the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant and consequentialism or utilitarianism, associated with the English philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Kant proclaimed human beings to be rational, autonomous individuals who used reason to determine how they ought to behave. Kant's ethics are founded on the notion of respecting persons for their intrinsic worth, as ends in themselves rather than as means towards an end. His categorical imperative decreed that what was considered right in one situation should apply more universally. Social work ethics have largely developed around Kantian principles, stressing respect for persons, who are deemed to hold particular rights, universality, objectivity, legalism and proceduralism. Utilitarianism, on the other hand, shifts the focus from an action to its consequences. Whether an action is good or bad requires a calculation of whether it achieves the greatest good for the greatest number.

Both deontology and utilitarianism might be considered normative theories in that they seek to set out rules of what one ought to do – deontology, exhorting individuals to act according to a rationally motivated sense of duty and utilitarianism through consideration of the consequences of a particular act. While influential, such theories

are increasingly recognised as inadequate to capture the complexity of moral decision-making and action.

Dissatisfaction with deontology and utilitarianism has led to growing interest in alternative approaches. One such is evident in renewed interest in the work of the ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle. Aristotle's ethics locate morality within the personal characteristics of the actor. A 'good' or virtuous person is likely to do the right thing; as such, Aristotle's ethics are known as virtue ethics. They are oriented towards human flourishing and a conception of 'the good'. At another level, Aristotle's intellectual virtues may offer some pointers to the nature of knowledge in professional disciplines such as social work, a point I return to.

The other ethical theory that has increasing purchase in social work is care (or feminist) ethics, first elaborated by Carol Gilligan (1982). An ethic of care, according to Joan Tronto, an influential proponent, is 'a practice, rather than a set of rules or principles ...' (1993, p.126). It is both an activity and a disposition, which in a social work context, might be understood in terms of practice that is not merely task-focussed in the sense of following procedure or doing one's duty, but is carried out in a manner that conveys a sense of care to the one cared for. Care ethics eschew Kantian universalism, being bound to particular, concrete situations; what is right or wrong depends on context. They also reject a purely rational approach to ethics, recognising the centrality of emotions in ethical deliberation. In that sense, Tronto (1993) identifies a link from care ethics back to some of the central themes of Scottish Enlightenment thinking, a connection I return to.

Professional ethics

Professional ethics reflect the principles and values proclaimed to underpin the accepted attitudes and behaviours of a professional group. In traditional professions such as Law and Medicine, these are set out in codes, appealing to the public good and laying down the responsibilities of members of the profession towards clients. Such professions regulate the standards of practice and behaviours expected of those admitted to the profession.

Social work has long aspired to professional status. It might be argued that this was provided for through the Regulation of Care Act (2001). This established the Scottish Social Services Council (SSSC), one role of which was to develop codes of practice. The SSSC, however, does not represent the profession in the same way that professional bodies represent doctors or lawyers, but was established by government to regulate and, arguably, to control it. So while, in traditional conceptions of professionalism, codes of ethics are internally defined and adopted by members, the codes of practice developed by the SSSC, albeit with input from professional bodies such as the British Association of Social Workers (BASW), are externally imposed and mandate particular modes of conduct; they do not articulate wider beliefs or aspirations for the profession. BASW and the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW) do produce more aspirational codes of ethics, but these have no wider standing beyond BASW members, who are a minority in the social work workforce.

Is there a Scottish approach to ethics?

I now turn to consider whether there may be discernibly Scottish approaches to ethical thought. Checkland (1980) argues that present day Scottish social welfare can be understood as a continuum reaching back to the Reformation of 1560 and, undoubtedly, this event and its aftermath has been influential in Scotland's social and intellectual history. Based on Calvinist theology, the Reformation set out to challenge the authority of the Catholic Church and decreed that individuals ought to be able to access Biblical truths unmediated by the clergy. In order to do so, they had to be able to read. Consequently, a school was built in every parish and an educational ideal became well established in Scottish life. The parish also assumed responsibility for poor relief – welfare provision for the sick, orphans and those who had fallen on hard times, thus bringing together education and social welfare within the one system.

Socially, the kirk could be a repressive force, imposing rigid strictures on moral conduct. At another level, however, the theology of the Reformation and resultant church structures based around the parish system was remarkably democratic and encouraged debate over ideas. It might be argued that these conflicting features of the Reformation, the authoritarian and the democratic, have contributed to what literary and cultural scholars have identified as a split national personality, exemplified perhaps in Stevenson's character of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde. The Reformation certainly leaves a mixed legacy in respect of Scotland's intellectual heritage.

Presbyterianism's puritanical and institutional elements imposed what the psychiatrist, I. D. Suttie identified as a 'taboo on tenderness'. However, that same Presbyterianism also called its adherents to an idea of a godly commonwealth and an obligation to act towards the common good – it was not merely individualistic but brought with it obligations to one's neighbours (see Sharpe, 2016).

The Scottish Enlightenment

While the Enlightenment was a broad European movement, within which Scottish philosophers played an active part, scholars (e.g. Broadie, 2007) increasingly identify particular Scottish features. These might be thought of, loosely, as forming around two pillars: moral sentiment and common sense.

Moral sentiment

Three main figures are associated with developing ideas of moral sentiment, Francis Hutcheson (1694 – 1746), David Hume (1711 – 1776) and Adam Smith (1723 – 1790), whose lives, between them, spanned most of the 18th century. If we reprise the central theme of broader Enlightenment thinking as involving a turn to reason, then Scottish philosophers asked questions of this, a position summed up in Hume's proclamation that reason is but a slave to the passions. In this, he was picking up on earlier work by Hutcheson, who had identified a sort of sixth sense in human beings, which he called benevolence and which existed independently of the human will. This quality of benevolence drew individuals to reach out to one another based, not on reason or self-interest, but on something more intrinsically human.

Hume developed this basic premise to contend that reason alone cannot drive the human will. He went further, arguing that morality is not derived from reason but from feelings of approval and disapproval felt by spectators who contemplate and evaluate a character trait or action. In this, Hume observed a human predilection towards doing and recognising what is good. He noted that virtue brings with it a sense of pleasure and vice a feeling of pain. Our feelings, therefore, can provide a

natural guide for moral conduct – we are more likely to act in such ways that elicit approval or pleasure than in ways others would disapprove of. Hume’s approach to ethics also highlights the importance of a community or collective, rather than a purely individual dimension to what is right and wrong. In matters of morality, people should consult with others to ensure they don’t act out of self-interest.

The third great Scottish Enlightenment thinker in respect of moral sentiment was Adam Smith whose book, *The Wealth of Nations*, is claimed to champion laissez-faire economics. In fact, Smith was first and foremost a moral philosopher rather than an economist and his book, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, addresses key ethical issues. Like Hutcheson, his predecessor as Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow, Smith identified an innate human quality, which he called sympathy.

Sympathy is based on the premise that people are naturally compassionate and moved by the condition of others (Hearn, 2016). While much social work literature talks of empathy as the quality to aspire to, a philosophical perspective would define empathy as participating in another’s feelings. Sympathy on the other hand, is more an awareness of others’ feelings, which does not involve emotional entanglement in them. Indeed, one can react ‘sympathetically’ but not necessarily approvingly to another’s predicaments. Sympathy is the capacity to see a situation from someone else’s point of view, evoking relational and embodied, as much as abstract and overly intellectual, reactions.

Sympathy, however, is not straightforward – we tend to be more sympathetic to those close to us than those further away. This creates the problem of social distance,

whereby a lack of proximity can diminish the sense of moral responsibility we have towards people or situations. Social distance can also be created by bureaucratic systems that get in the way of inter-personal contact. The further one is removed from another human being, either geographically or along a bureaucratic chain, the easier it becomes to take decisions that fall back on procedural rather than relational responses. Moreover, we are more likely to sympathise with those we are drawn to; it can be difficult to reach out to those who are hard to like. These problems with sympathy suggest that it is a central but not, on its own, sufficient guide for social welfare. It needs to be tempered with a just set of laws and policies; emotion and reason both need to inform welfare practice.

Tronto (1993) argues that Scottish Enlightenment thinkers came out on the losing side in eighteenth century intellectual debates, when Kantian ideas became and have, largely, remained dominant. Nevertheless, the centrality of moral sentiment in its relationship to reason is re-emerging as a key theme in ethical thinking, as is evident in the heightened attention given to care ethics across a range of academic and professional disciplines.

The nature of knowledge

Ethical principles do not come out of nowhere but reflect and derive from bigger ideas of how we know and understand the world. The nature of knowledge, or what in philosophical terms is called epistemology, is rarely absolute or clear-cut but requires interpretation and evaluation to separate out what is well-founded from what is irrational or false. So, a commitment to a liberal education, which encouraged debate around ideas, was nurtured in Scotland's medieval universities (Anderson *et al*, 2015)

and survived the Reformation. This ideal was apparent in the second pillar of Scottish Enlightenment thought: a philosophy of ‘common sense’ associated, primarily, with the philosopher, Thomas Reid. This approach was sceptical of the technical and rational basis of the wider European, and particularly English, Enlightenment. Common sense philosophy involved the democratisation of knowledge, recognising a tension between expert knowledge and the instinctive sense of the common man, which encouraged ‘an anti-individualism, almost a kind of socialism’ (Davie, 1991: 62). Conversely, the specialisation of knowledge led to excessive compartmentalisation and atomisation in society. Scotland, to some extent, has resisted such specialisation, maintaining a faith in a generalist education as the best means through which to encourage social improvement.

Modern Scottish philosophers

John Macmurray

Macmurray was Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh from 1944 to 1958, having previously held posts at Oxford and University College London. Macmurray’s work has been drawn upon in the field of educational philosophy (see Fielding, 2012). He did not specifically address social work, but much of what he had to say on education, and more generally, resonates with present day social work concerns.

Like Hume, Macmurray was concerned about the relationship between reason and emotion, arguing that excessive rationality acts to marginalise the role of emotions in the human condition. In a challenge to Kantian ethics, Macmurray conceives of

human beings not as autonomous, rational individuals but as ‘persons in relation’, existing only by virtue of their relationships with others. For Macmurray, educators (and by extension, social workers), must place relationships and care at the heart of all they do. In another challenge to deontological ethics, Macmurray argues that care is not possible in terms of duty and obligation but must emerge as an ethic of love (see McIntosh, 2004).

Key aspects of Macmurray’s work are of relevance to social work. A starting-point might prompt consideration of what Aristotle calls the *telos* or wider purpose of social work (see Green, 2009). Extrapolating from Macmurray’s work on education, one might identify a social work *telos* as extending beyond the managerial or outcome-based measures that currently dominate practice, to encompass a concern for the promotion of social justice and human flourishing. This demands reflection on how we learn to live good lives together, which can only be achieved in the context of reciprocal care. While it might seem radical or even utopian, Macmurray’s quest may afford some philosophical spine to ideas of co-production. It may also animate the Christie proposals, which call for a radical reappraisal of how public services relate to families and communities.

Macmurray also had something to say on the nature of change, a central concern in social work. He sought to encourage ‘the capacity for change itself’, arguing that education is not concerned with immediate results but rather with its lasting effects (Macmurray, 2012). He would reject any notion that change can be brought about through interventions based on the latest programme or through compliance or threat. Instead, he conceived of the kind of authority, through which change might emerge,

as being rooted in attentiveness and responsiveness to the other. In his writings on education, Macmurray (1958) noted that teaching involves establishing personal relations between teacher and pupil, and the success or failure of the teaching depends, largely, on the character and quality of this relation. The same might be said of social work.

Reprising some of the themes of common-sense philosophers, Macmurray also expressed concern about overly technical forms of knowledge and how these can be to the detriment of proper concern about values. He distinguished between what he called 'knowing how' and 'knowing why'. The first, he associated with science and the second with arts. He saw the type of knowledge that is the basis of much social work, psychology or sociology, which offer insights into human beings as objects of study and reflection, as an insufficient basis for practice. He identified a third, more important, kind of knowledge, which is around how human beings become persons, a 'knowledge of community'.

Linked to his suspicion of technical knowledge, Macmurray identified the need for knowledge to change according to context, requiring the capacity to modify opinions, by continuously testing them against changing experience. There is no one way to do things, no algorithm, rule book or abstract 'best practice'. If opinions are to be real, worthwhile and appropriate to circumstance, they must be rooted in the testing ground of real contexts and real issues.

Alasdair MacIntyre

MacIntyre is perhaps the greatest living Scottish philosopher. Philosophically, he draws upon and extends Aristotle's virtue ethics. He recognises the features of Scottish Enlightenment thinking that encouraged the contestation of beliefs and traditions of thought through rational debate. In his lecture, *The Idea of an Educated Public* (1987), MacIntyre argued that debate during the Enlightenment was not restricted to universities but was subject to more widespread public dialogue around what might constitute the common good. Debate over contested ideas, however, was generally cordial and rarely entailed personal conflict, unlike today perhaps when ideological position taking on contentious issues can preclude healthy debate.

A key idea for MacIntyre that has relevance to social work is how he conceives of practice. While MacIntyre has a particular view of practice (see MacAlister, 2016), for the purposes of this chapter, I consider social work to be a practice in the sense that, regardless of setting, it aims to achieve change through face-to-face relationships. Practices are co-operative human activities that have certain internal standards of excellence, what MacIntyre calls 'internal goods'. These are passed on from groups to individuals, who, in turn, sustain and revise the practice of the group. People can develop *virtues* and build character when they pursue a practice to the highest standard. So, a social worker with a sense of vocation, if one might use that term, would pursue their daily work in a way that exemplified a commitment to the *telos* of the profession rather than purely or primarily in pursuit of material gain or through blindly following procedure. 'Internal goods' only become apparent through participating in a practice; they cannot be learned from a book or a manual but demand the capacity to grapple with concrete situations and with ideas. In such a

scenario, ethics are not something that can be plucked from codes to apply to practice – they are integral to and emerge from practice.

Picking up on Macintyre's Aristotelian lineage, his notion of practice might be encapsulated in another Greek term *phronesis* or practical wisdom. The concept of *phronesis* is attracting increasing attention in academic circles. Flyvbjerg (2001) advocates *phronetic* social science, the purpose of which is not to produce objective 'knowledge' but to engage in dialogue and practical activity in the public domain. This, again, might resonate with Scottish Enlightenment ideas of an educated public but also, perhaps, with the kind of possibilities that Christie imagines for communities taking greater control of public services through increased participative democracy.

Where are we now?

In a neoliberal political climate, social work has become focused on the individual rather than the collective. It looks to ever-more technical and (ostensibly) rational approaches to practice, evidenced in the proliferation of programmed interventions and the demand for measurable outcomes from such interventions. Ethics under neoliberalism are reduced to codes, based around an assumption that those who abide by such codes, however superficial and imprecise they may be, might claim to be ethical practitioners. Conversely, those who breach codes are held individually accountable. Legitimate and inevitable ethical dilemmas are subsumed beneath managerial injunctions to get things right or, at least, not to get them wrong.

There are core disjunctions between neoliberal assumptions and the kind of philosophical ideas outlined in this chapter. Specifically, current managerial cultures

reflect a technical rather than a value rationality – they are based in concerns about efficiency rather than values. Both MacIntyre and Macmurray critique an over-emphasis on efficiency, suggesting that this may lack humanity or virtue. Moreover, such a focus enables certain modes of management and institutional bureaucracies to flourish, while undermining human agency and moral responsibility (MacIntyre 1999).

A further, rarely acknowledged implication of neoliberalism, concerns its epistemological base. Being concerned with efficiency over value, it tends to privilege particular ‘hard’ types of knowledge. Thus it looks to the law and to ostensibly scientific disciplines such as psychology, to reach conclusions on ‘best practice’. Context, or human qualities such as sympathy or compassion are dismissed as overly ‘wooly’. This apparent hard-headed knowledge can be attractive to some practitioners, for it holds out the illusion that legitimate and inevitable value conflicts can be reduced to procedural fiat. It is increasingly recognised, however, as inadequate for work in the ‘people professions’ where complexity is the norm (Bondi *et al.*, 2011).

An ethical basis for Scottish social work

This brief overview of Scottish intellectual history highlights a striking continuity of ideas. Across the centuries, philosophers have identified fundamental questions around the balance between reason and sentiment, between the individual and the collective and around the contextual and contingent nature of knowledge. I now attempt to distil such ideas to consider what they might offer social work in this changing Scotland.

A starting point might be, following the lead of Scottish philosophers, to (re)assert a moral impulse, which might be called benevolence, sympathy or community as integral to what it is to be human. We are not Kant's autonomous, rational individuals but are drawn to reach out to one another, not out of a sense of duty or professional obligation but because to do so is part and parcel of what it is to be human. It is not unprofessional to respond at a sympathetic and compassionate level to the plight of those we come face-to-face with – it is that very pull to do so that, largely, motivates people to become and remain social workers. Moreover, it is this primary emotional sense that clients gain of being liked and recognised that will help them achieve change in their lives. An excess of rules and regulations, the accouterments of a particular conception of professionalism, acts to dissipate this original moral impulse.

A basis in human sentiment might lead to an assertion of social work as, essentially, an ethical rather than a technical/rational endeavour – a service, rather than a bureaucratic activity. According to Whan, the primary orientation of the profession is towards an idea of the good: 'When asked to account for what one does, when asked to justify one's actions, it is to an idea of the good that we turn' (1986: 244). The pursuit of the good rather than the merely efficient provides the *telos* or the wider rationale for social work.

This philosophical concern for the good, in a Scottish context, is never merely individualistic but conceives of a common good, or common weal. R.S. Downie, a more recent successor to Hutcheson and Smith as Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, argues that it is society's welfare and not just that of an

individual client that ought to be a social worker's ultimate concern (Downie and Telfer, 1980). Bisman claims that it is 'only by re-emphasising the 'social' aspect of social work and articulating its ethical basis that the profession can survive' (204: 120).

To accommodate a social work profession that responds to individual need but with an eye to the common good requires a knowledge base that is embodied and relational but also critical. Recognising a primary sympathetic response to clients is not to say that social workers become enmeshed in such emotions - they need to employ good thinking and reasoning as well. The epistemological positions of Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and subsequently of Macmurray and MacIntyre are supportive of this pursuit of good thinking, which encourages the contestation and ongoing (re)appraisal of ideas in light of changing circumstances. In a social work context, this process is both oriented towards and derives from practice experience rather than being gleaned from abstracted content knowledge or regulatory codes. Indeed, merely following codes gets social workers off the hook of the kind of moral deliberation required to guide suitably ethical decisions and actions and through which their characters and identities as social workers might emerge. MacAlister (2016) summarises MacIntyre's view of character education as being about helping persons learn how to think for themselves and to act for the common good – a useful motif for social workers!

Conclusion

A central thread running through this book is that Scotland is changing. Social work and public services more generally, also have to change to accommodate major

questions about the relationship of the individual to the state and how services might be co-produced between workers and those who use services. These are major philosophical questions that do not lend themselves to technical or managerial answers. There is a need for new ideas to be brought to bear. A case might be made that social work's knowledge base be broadened beyond its current reliance of (social) scientific disciplines and regulatory frameworks to foreground engagement with the kind of ideas that Scottish philosophers bring to our attention. Bringing this down to an individual level, Downie and Telfer (1980) urge social workers to look less for universal principles of how to do the job but to spend more time analysing the moral ambiguities of their authority, rights and function.

Further reading

Bondi, L., Carr, D., Clark, C. and Clegg, C. (2011) *Towards professional wisdom: practical deliberation in the people professions*, Farnham: Ashgate.

Smith, H. and Smith, M.K. (2008) *The Art of Helping Others: Being Around, Being There, Being Wise*, London: JKP

A special issue of the journal *Ethics and Social Welfare* 10(3) (2016) is devoted to Scottish approaches to social welfare.

References

Anderson, R., Freeman, M., and Paterson, L. (2015) *The Edinburgh history of education in Scotland*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press

Bisman, C. (2004) 'Social Work Values: The Moral Core of the Profession', *British Journal of Social Work* 34: 109-123.

- Broadie, A (2007) *The Scottish Enlightenment* Edinburgh: Birlinn
- Checkland, O. (1980) *Philanthropy in Victorian Scotland: Social Welfare and the Voluntary Principle*. Edinburgh: John Donald.
- Davie, G., (1991) *The Scottish Enlightenment and Other Essays*. Edinburgh: Polygon.
- Downie, R.S. and Telfer, E. (1980) *Caring and Curing: A philosophy of medicine and social work*, London: Methuen
- Fielding, M. (2012) 'Education as if people matter: John Macmurray, community and the struggle for democracy', *Oxford Review of Education*, 38(6): 675-692.
- Flyvbjerg, B. (2001) *Making Social Science Matter: Why social inquiry fails and how it can succeed again*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilligan, C. (1982) *In a different voice: psychological theory and women's development*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hearn, J. (2016) Once more with feeling: the Scottish Enlightenment, sympathy, and social welfare, *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 10(3): 211-223
- MacAlister, J. (2016) 'MacIntyre on Character Education', unpublished conference paper, 4th Annual Jubilee Centre for Character and Virtues conference, Oriel College, Oxford University, Thursday 7th – Saturday 9th January 2016.
- MacAllister, J and Macleod, G. (2016) 'Philosophy in Scotland and Scottish education', *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 10(3): 197-210.
- MacIntyre, A. (1987) 'The Idea of an Educated Public' In *Education and Values: The Richard Peters Lectures*, edited by G. Haydon, 15–36. London: Institute of Education.
- McIntosh, E. (Ed.) (2004) *John Macmurray: Selected Philosophical Writings*, Exeter: Imprint Academic.
- Macmurray, J. (2012) 'Learning to be Human.' *Oxford Review of Education* 38(6): 661–674.

Sharpe, C. (2016) 'From the individual, to the relational and communal: the Kirk's influence on three Scottish thinkers: Ronald Fairbairn, John Macmurray and Ian Suttie' *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 10(3): 224-238

Tronto, J. (1993) *Moral boundaries: a political argument for an ethic of care*, London: Routledge.

Webb, S. (2006) *Social work in a risk society: social and political perspectives*, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

Whan, M. (1986) 'On the nature of practice', *British Journal of Social Work*, 16 (2): 243–50.