Poor youths and ‘pacification’: Dilemmas between discourse and practice from the perspective of young people about policing in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas

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Abstract

This article explores the social representations of youngsters from favelas in Rio de Janeiro on police practices in the context of the implementation of ‘Pacifying Police Units’. Drawing from fieldwork, participant observation and interviews, the authors analyse the narratives and practices which influence relations between young people and the police in the Complexo do Alemão area of the city. The interviewees expressed a demand for further public security and social services. Young people noted some progress in police practices, although these changes appear to be unstable. The permanence of violent practices and prejudice by the police was verified in youngsters’ narratives.
Any change in this scenario should be based on the replacement of the war logic of ‘pacification’ for another logic, that of participation.

**Keywords**

Favelas, ‘Pacifying Police Units’ (UPP), public security, violence, youth

**Introduction**

Over the past decades Rio de Janeiro’s favelas and impoverished neighbourhoods have suffered the consequences of being the territorial domain of armed criminal groups (Silva et al., 2008), whose main activity is the retail market of illicit drugs. These groups – widely named ‘drug traffickers’ – are divided into different factions which fight for the territorial control of these areas. Repression of ‘drug trafficking’ mobilises most policing activities in Rio de Janeiro state. It has the ‘war on drugs’ (Zaluar, 1994, 2014) and the subsequent militarisation of public security (Souza, 2008) as its core. The main targets of this ‘war’ are the retail drug market workers, labelled ‘drug traffickers’. They are typically young, poor, black men with low education, constituting a fraction of the Brazilian ‘hyperprecariat’ (Souza, 2008, 2009) whose everyday life pressures contribute to the search for alternatives for social ascension in illegal activities. One consequence is their early death as part of innumerable confrontations with rival factions and the police.

In this scenario the level of youth homicide in Rio state is extremely high – at least 56.5 per 100,000 inhabitants as of 2012 (4589 deaths) – doubling the homicide rate for the total population (28.3) (Waiselfisz, 2014). This constitutes a serious public health issue that is part of a critical social problem (Souza, 2005).

While there has yet to be a clear accounting for these deaths on the part of the justice system, a consensus exists among specialists who deal with this topic that illegal drug and weapons sales and the strategies utilised by the police to repress these activities are responsible for a very large part of the homicides (Misse, 2011a).

As noted, the main strategy adopted by the public security agents to tackle the power of the *quadrimhas* – armed criminal groups with territorial domains — has been the intensive militarisation of public security (Souza, 2008), which has been underpinned by the criminalisation of favela dwellers, in particular the youth (Fernandes, 2012). As such, youths from favelas are exposed to a dual process of violence. On the one hand, they are exposed to the influence of armed criminal groups, which includes easier access to drugs and fire arms as well as peer violence; on the other hand, they are exposed to police violence and abuse as a result of their socio-symbolic depreciation and increasing criminalisation (Fernandes, 2014).

It is important to highlight that a militarised approach to public security has historically been the one adopted by the Brazilian state to police crime, in particular the criminal activities
geographically located in impoverished and stigmatised neighbourhoods as well as socially related to marginalised populations (Bretas, 1997; Campos, 2005; Silva, 2003).

Over the past years the Rio de Janeiro state government has been trying to employ alternative policing approaches in order to overcome traditional models (Albernaz et al., 2007). One of these alternative projects took place in the Copacabana neighbourhood, where a community policing initiative was implemented in 1994. Another project, started in 2000, was the GPAE (Grupamento de Policiamento em Áreas Especiais/Special Areas Police Force). These initiatives had as a common ground their implementation in favelas located mostly in the southern part of Rio de Janeiro, which is the wealthiest and most touristic area in the city. Both of these projects met institutional resistance and were classified as ‘special initiatives’, not receiving continuous implementation in their respective contexts (Muniz et al., 1997; Novaes and Cunha, 2003).

The most recent attempt by the state government in this field was the implementation of Pacifying Police Units, known as ‘UPPs’. Starting in 2008, in Santa Marta Favela (again in the south of the city), UPPs quickly assumed a central position in the public security debate in Rio. In the short term, the units were conceived as a new model of policing in favelas as a replacement for the historical pattern of targeted police operations to confront local ‘drug dealers’. In the official discourse, UPPs emphasised permanent occupation that had as its core the community policing approach (recently renamed ‘proximity policing’). Also, it was decreed that police officers working in the UPPs had to be new officers who had recently graduated from the Military Police Academy, with the idea that these new recruits would not have yet acquired the same habits of the police officers who had been previously involved in the old fashioned combative approach to policing the favelas (Rodrigues and Siqueira, 2012). The key elements highlighted in the official discourse were the state ‘re-take’ of territorial control of favelas and the subsequent eradication of armed power. This, however, did not mean the elimination of drug trafficking activities.

Indeed, the idea of ‘re-take’ needs to be considered with care. At first glance, it may be understood as a total absence of the state in favelas, which is not true given the existence of public services such as schools, community health centres, etc. In addition, this perspective suggests a warlike approach (a ‘war’ metaphor), which is fundamentally based on the conquest of enemy territory and their utter defeat (Leite, 2000). In this process, the notion of so-called ‘pacification’ – paradoxically derived from the logic of war – revives a perversive and ambiguous association between organised crime and favela inhabitants: they are seen by the police and wider society as both hostages to and supporters (or even accomplices) of drug dealers.

No doubt the expectation that the UPPs were a solution to the violence and insecurity in the city contributed to the celebration by policy-makers, police, sectors of the population and the media
in general at the arrival of this military action in the favelas as a kind of ‘civilising mission’ (Pacheco de Oliveira, 2014). This rhetoric helped to strengthen existing stigmas about these areas of the city, labelled as highly dangerous.

From the beginning, UPPs garnered considerable support from the media and larger budgetary resources than previous initiatives. Added to this, the economic and political context was favourable to their implementation, not least the winning bids to host mega sporting events in the city – the 2014 World Football Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games. These events led the government to propose new measures to reduce the violence in favelas as well as attracting the interest of the private sector in the recovery of areas of economic interest in the real estate market. Thus, the purpose of the UPPs also had the ambition of integrating symbolically and socially ‘pacified’ favelas into the ‘formal’ city through greater provision of public goods and services that would be made possible by the creation of a parallel social programme for police interventions, the UPP Social.

However, little has been done to consolidate a state public policy, to the point that many signal a lack of a programme with clear guidelines that could be generalised to multiple locations. Instead, what such scholars have indicated is the existence of a ‘philosophy’, rather than public policing (Cano et al., 2012). Also, the UPPs are considered to be a set of policing experiences (Muniz, 1999) that develop differently in each location according to the individual profile of the unit’s commanders, whose duties were greatly enhanced in the context of UPPs. In this context, far from being a mere executor of the law, the Military Police began to exert too much control on the daily affairs of the favelas. This fact has generated controversy about the role of the police as the new ‘owners of the hill’ (Cano et al., 2012).

Seven years on, it can be said that the policing model practised by the UPPs raised important questions in the public security landscape in Rio de Janeiro. An important issue is the fact that UPPs are emerging as one of the few alternatives to break the perverse cycle of violence in favelas compared to traditional standards of policing in these areas (Burgos et al., 2011; Cano et al., 2012; Musumeci et al., 2013; Oliveira and Abramovay, 2012).

Despite this, in some occupied favelas the violation of rights, the many injured and killed and the continued corruption of police officers remain in the collective memories of residents. These memories and experiences reveal the problematic relationship of the state with favelas and impoverished neighbourhoods. Repeated episodes of brutality encompass the history of this relationship. From a housing policy forcing removals from the favelas to remote and precarious areas of the city in the 1960–1970s (Zaluar and Alvito, 1998), to the unannounced, unjustified house raids during police operations in their ‘hunt for criminals’, there has been a constant backdrop of traumatic experiences of disrespect and prejudice that are revived through the tensions maintained as standard
in current relations between residents and security forces. The very high homicide rates among people living in favelas during police raids are not treated as police violence. In general, the dead are immediately classified as ‘drug traffickers’ or ‘criminals’ who resisted arrest, which explains the lack of investigation of the facts and punishment of the perpetrators (Misse, 2011b; Ribeiro et al., 2008).

These facts and situations fed and continue to feed resentment and mutual mistrust, creating negative interactions, particularly between police and young people (Corrêa, 2013; Machado da Silva, 2010). In or out of Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, there is an overt surveillance of young people from these neighbourhoods. They become objects of coarse and asymmetric, notoriously racist and criminalising approaches, which symbolically legitimise and authorise the use of excessive force and violence by the police.

Thus, although we do not aim to produce a systematic analysis of UPPs, we are interested in understanding the perceptions of young people in particular, as they are the main target of public security, being typically associated with the image of ‘suspect’ (Ramos and Musumeci, 2005) and ‘the face of crime’ (Fernandes, 2013).

In addition, it is relevant to consider the social, political and symbolical place of youngsters living in stigmatised neighbourhoods, not only in Brazil (Dubet, 1987; Wilson, 1987). According to some youth researchers this configuration is strongly articulated in a neoliberal governance of the ‘disposable’ (Giroux, 2010, 2012; Wacquant, 2007) that appears to be a major force pushing many youngsters into a life of imprisonment, institutional violence and death.

By analysing young people’s perceptions of the occupation of their localities by the so-called ‘pacifying’ forces and the narratives of the events surrounding these occupations, we reflect upon young residents’ frequent complaints about police activities. The narratives from youngsters, however, go beyond their perceptions of changes in the community. They are also related to the youths’ appreciation of policing practices as part of ‘pacification’, and also to the link such practices have with their everyday lives. In this way, we seek to identify the elements that contribute to increasing tensions between the police and local youth in their daily interactions.

The fieldwork and the interviewees

We conducted our research in the Complexo do Alemão, located in the northern part of the city. Officially labelled by the government as a formal neighbourhood, the Complexo do Alemão actually comprises 13 favelas. According to official government data (IBGE Census, 2010), the Complexo do Alemão neighbourhood has one of the highest population densities in the city of Rio de Janeiro (233.5 inhabitants/ha) and has 69,143 people living in a 296 ha area. Of this total, 35,343 are women and 33,800 are men. Their predominantly self-declared colour is ‘pardo’ (48.59%). There is a
concentration of 13,334 people from the 20–29 age group – which is age group closest to the age range on which our study focuses – living in the Complexo do Alemão.

Our research began in 2010 at an extraordinary moment in the favelas’ history, characterised by the occupation of the community by a large number of soldiers. The Complex was occupied by the Brazilian Army’s Pacification Forces. This operation was the result of measures taken by the state government, which brought together the Civil and Military Police, as well as the Army and Navy in order to combat the criminal activities of groups of drug dealers operating in the Penha and Alemão Complexes. The Complexo do Alemão, in particular, was described as an important ‘stronghold’ of Rio’s intricate web of criminal activities involving drugs and weapons (Zaluar, 2008). The whole operation was broadcast by several stations that suggested that the city was experiencing a ‘war’. A striking scene, broadcast by Rede Globo, was of a group of about 200 armed traffickers fleeing the favela through a dirt road used as a short cut to escape the favela. This scene has repeatedly featured in television and printed news, including major international newspapers. Army and Marine soldiers remained in the locality throughout 2011 and during this period, it was almost universally recognised by everyone that the dealers had stopped openly displaying their weapons in the Complexo do Alemão. Normally, they would circulate freely throughout the favela, carrying guns, intimidating residents and the non-dealing youth in the area.

By 2012, four UPPs had been established in the Complexo do Alemão and gun battles were once again occurring in the region in response to incursions made by the Military Police’s Special Operations Battalion (BOPE). On some occasions, young residents and even police were killed and these deaths were covered by the local and international media. Violent police actions were also occurring in other regions of the city (pacified and unpacified) and these were having an effect on the relationship between residents and the UPP police, as well as upon discourses regarding the ‘pacification’ policy.

When our research began, 13 UPPs had been established in Rio’s favelas in localities that had been dominated for three decades by criminal factions involved in the commerce of weapons and drugs and, more recently, by paramilitary militias (Cano and Duarte, 2011; Zaluar, 2008). In general, favela residents are united in their criticisms of both the criminal factions and the government operations that provoked these armed confrontations. They have demanded new practices from the state in order to confront the criminal violence that surrounds them.

During our fieldwork we sought to learn more about the diversity of the youth of the Complexo do Alemão, by accompanying young people during their daily lives in and around the neighbourhood. In this context, an important variable in these youths’ lives was their prior degree of insertion in NGOs and social movements. A large portion of the youth who contacted our researchers
had already been involved in activities promoted by so-called ‘social projects’ (Novaes, 2006). Although only a few of these young people had more than five years of engagement with these projects, we observed that this was a certain youth ‘style’, often adopted in conjunction with political engagement in social movements. We were also able to observe that the more experience youth had with these projects and movements, the more elaborate was their critical stance with regard to police actions.

These youngsters had specifically used social media as a means of spreading the word about possible cases of police abuse and rights violations. Through these networks, they had contacted human rights groups in order to discuss how to better confront the daily problems they faced and gain more security. One striking event undertaken by these youths was the Occupy Alemão at Nine movement that began in 2012. This involved local residents reappropriating their right to public spaces by occupying certain areas of the favela after 9 p.m. (and thus defying UPP imposed curfews). The movement’s name referenced two different phenomena: the ‘occupations’ undertaken by the public security forces that installed the UPPs in Rio’s favelas and the global protest movement known as Occupy (Harvey et al., 2012). Like other protests of the type then occurring around the world, the demonstration was promoted by social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook.

The youngsters we researched who were not engaged with social projects or political movements also criticised police aggression. It was, in fact, this group who spoke the most about police abuses. Among them, there was a certain ambiguity regarding criminal violence. These young people were not inclined to speak openly about the brutalities perpetrated by the ‘dealers’. In particular, we could see how the long domination of the city’s poorer areas by armed groups had impacted upon residents’ subjectivities and particularly upon those of young male residents. The diverse reports that we collected, however, allowed us to better perceive how youth discourses are in permanent dialogue or expressing ways of dealing with the stigma of living in a favela.

The researchers were well received by youths and also by residents, community organisers and NGO directors and members in the Alemão, who were always ready to cooperate with the study. We were also often invited to celebrations and were given ready access to places where we could conduct observations.

**Methodological approach**

Given the questions mentioned above, the researchers decided to concentrate on looking at social representations as a means of better understanding the narratives regarding police actions in the Complexo do Alemão under the auspices of the UPP policy. Representations are here understood as images constructed regarding real phenomena and which are made manifest in words, feelings and behaviours, which are therefore able to be interpreted (Geertz, 1973).
We adopted a socio-anthropological approach, complemented by in-depth semi-structured individual interviews and participant observation (Becker, 1999; Flick, 2009; Whyte, 1981 [1943]). The decision to combine participant observation and in-depth interviews was essential for understanding interviewees’ representations. Some differences could be noted with respect to the data collected through each of these techniques. Participant observation revealed that conversations between young people always emphasised a negative performance on the part of the police, but only during the interview were we able to observe the most thoughtful opinions on police actions, which in some cases offered a positive view of the police role. Likewise, criticism of the practices of armed groups was never spoken about publicly but the issue arose during the individual interviews.

We took advantage of previous contacts established since 1997 and spent close to a year and a half in the field, during which we interviewed 13 male and female young people. Access to the field was facilitated by community activists and people who had taken part in previous research that focused on youth sociability. Our criteria for the selection of candidates for interviews were as follows: the youth had to be residents of the Complexo do Alemão between 18 and 25 years old and had to agree to participate in the research. The choice of youngsters in this age range reflects the fact they are the ones most exposed to violent deaths.

Results and discussion

Our results have been organised along two axes: (1) perceptions about the implementation of the UPPs and consequent changes in daily life and (2) perceptions regarding the Military Police and the UPP officers. It is worth remembering that the UPP programme has in fact been developed by officers from the Military Police of Rio de Janeiro state (PMERJ). However, as young people pointed out some specific characteristics of UPP officers, we decided to use these two categories.

Perceptions on the implementation of the UPPs and consequent changes in daily life

Regarding the impacts that UPPs have on daily life, our data show an emphasis on the following: fewer gun battles, greater regulation of public spaces and an increase in indiscriminate stop-and-search.

A drop in the frequency of armed confrontations between the police and the ‘criminals’ was generally perceived as an important change in the favela’s daily routine following the arrival of the UPPs. Having to deal with the frequent interruptions to one’s daily routine by shootings was a common complaint prior to the implementation of the UPPs. Residents often found themselves caught in crossfire in which they or their friends, relatives and neighbours could be shot, wounded,
or killed. Residents were also upset about loss of property during these exchanges, with TVs, refrigerators, furniture, etc. often being destroyed by gun fire.

This confirms the research undertaken by Cano et al. (2012) in evaluating the impact of the UPPs on Rio de Janeiro. These researchers claim that one of the largest declines in all the statistics that they looked at has to do with the number of deaths registered during police interventions (officially considered self-defence – *autos de resistência* – or deaths caused while resisting an officer), which have dropped to next to nothing in the UPP zones following the units’ installation (Cano et al., 2012). However, as pointed out by other scholars, the reduction in homicide rates and *autos de resistência* has to be viewed with some caution. There was a rise in missing people in the same period, which suggests that some data may have been misreported (Gadelha Cardoso et al., 2015; Misse, 2014).

Some residents expressed approval of how the police were now controlling public spaces under the UPP regime and this was favourably compared to earlier life under the drug dealers’ domain. This approval was very clear, for example, in cases of police intervention to uphold the municipal Noise Prevention Law, which had been practically unenforced prior to the new regime. Another difference that was much emphasised had to do with police mediation of conflicts among residents, which improved markedly under the UPPs.

Although all of our informants mentioned problems created in their life routines by the new policing regime, we also recorded much appreciation of the new situation. One of our interviewees explained that before the UPPs arrived, dealers would openly recruit youths into dealing: this was juxtaposed to the recruiting now done by NGOs involved in work training and educational projects. Comparing the two periods, one young male informant declared that dealing was no longer fashionable in the favela due to the retreat of the dealers from public life in the region (Cecchetto et al., 2015).

Some of the young men who had earlier participated in the drug dealing economy, generally in subordinate positions (referring to themselves as ‘soldiers’ or ‘security guards’), seemed to be afraid of being killed or arrested in the new context and this seems to have discouraged them from continuing to deal, at least temporarily. Some of these young men spontaneously affirmed that they had decided to ‘change their lives’ and stop working in illegal drug commerce. In some of these testimonies, we could see a constant representation of the self (Goffman, 1988 [1963]) as voluntarily retreating from the world of crime, especially in their conversations with people from outside the community (which, of course, included the researchers).

According to these young men, they had needed to *desenrolar* (negotiate) their withdrawal with the *dono do morro* (the ‘owner of the hill’) – the leader of the criminal faction which dominated
the region. However, they represented this withdrawal as *tranquilo* (peaceful), meaning that it did not incur the sort of punishments (including death) that are common to those who *deixam o crime* (‘turn their back’ on crime). It is important to point out in this context (as we observed throughout the research) that these repeated reports of an exit from the drug business without conflict can be understood as a means by which individuals minimise to outsiders the brutality of the sanctions normally applied to those who violate the ‘rules of the game’: a set of strategies utilised by the dealers in order to impose their power on the neighbourhood. We can also suppose that presenting this exit as a direct and personal negotiation with the most powerful man in the local criminal hierarchy allows these young men to exhibit the distinction and ‘respect’ that are icons of virile male pride (Cecchetto, 2004).

The trajectories of youngsters who ‘turn their back’ are often marked by circumstances of great vulnerability and this departure is often a dangerous, long and drawn out affair, as Meirelles and Minayo Gomez (2009) have shown. Social networks of support and protection are of extreme importance in successfully navigating this process.

The new attempts by the police to regulate public spaces have generated discussions and controversy, however. While some of the youths approve these initiatives, the majority criticise them, above all with regard to the authoritarian manner many of the police adopt in carrying them out. In many cases, these ‘novelties’ are, in fact, norms (such as noise violation laws) that have long existed in other regions of the city.

*These are not actually new rules; they are the rules in the city that we have never had here. And then the police come and impose new rights [rules] that are not new to some, but that are for favelas, such as: ‘You [resident] cannot stay with the loud speaker on’. So the police cannot from one day to the next, knock on my door and say ‘you [resident] cannot do it; you have to turn off your sound [speakers]; you have to ask permission [to have a party], authorisation’ but we never had this here. (Male, 24 years old)*

Residents – and in particular young residents – are opposed to the ways in which the police control free circulation throughout the favela and to police repression of local forms of sociability and entertainment, areas which occupy an important space in young people’s routines. As one young woman put it, ‘People can no longer listen to what they want, they can’t stay in the streets until late and they can’t stay out late and come back in the early hours of morning’ (female, 23 years old).

The retreat or repression of certain dealer activities after the ‘occupation’ was something that many of our young informants emphasised. In particular, we heard about changes in what can be called the ‘social welfare policy’ of the dealers: a set of practices and goods offered to residents in
order to help them with their immediate material demands. These could range from distributing gifts on commemorative dates to organising shows and parties which are offered by the ‘owners’ to their ‘friends’. It generated in some a positive expectative of being part of a circle considered prosperous, ludic and close.

However, the rules relating to distribution of these goods included the need to give proof of loyalty to the ‘bosses’. This was found in the conversations we had with young people in which the dualisms of distrust/trust, loyalty/betrayal were frequent, expressing the tensions arising from the interaction with the faction’s logic that prevailed in certain localities. In the new context of UPPs, according to these young people’s accounts, this kind of interaction based on gifts and the consequent creation of loyalty bonds had changed, although the expectations still exist, increasing the tensions and anxiety among many of our informants.

Youngsters also allege that their forms of entertainment and sociability have particularly come under police attack and that some cultural manifestations linked to youth lifestyles have been criminalised and penalised as a result of this. One example was the prohibition of funk parties (bailes funk) by UPP officers based on accusations that these are sponsored by drug traffickers as well as that such parties involved the presence of minors and free alcoholic drinks and drugs. Attempts to deconstruct this criminalised vision of funk parties have been carried out by local social movements in order to reaffirm them as popular culture originating in the favelas.

Several of our respondents reported fear of drug traffickers’ violence against those who fail to comply with imposed rules and codes. They demand complete secrecy and absolute loyalty to maintain the ‘business’ and the underlying power structure that illegal activity requires. However, as we observed in our fieldwork, this factor does not preclude reciprocal elements that are established in daily life between the groups. We are not only talking about a violent sociability in areas dominated by armed men. The so-called despotic power coexists with other drug traffic-related sociability dynamics, setting a symbolic network that can foster a sense of belonging and solidarity in local social relations. With the police presence threats of retaliation by the dealers increased to those who approach or are seen talking to some of the officers. As mentioned earlier, the proximity between residents and police is the source of many tensions and ambiguities that cause dilemmas in developing policing and daily practices in public security policies in favelas. In other words, proximity, the pillar of UPP policing, is considered the aspect that causes the most discomfort to both groups (Musumeci et al., 2013; Rodrigues and Siqueira, 2012).

As Machado da Silva and Leite (2008: 48) have discussed, in those favelas controlled by drug traffickers, ‘there is an adjustment of resident behavior in order to take into consideration a calculation of the risks involved in this forced conviviality’. This adjustment consists of residents
trying to maintain their daily routines in spite of the unpredictable nature of those whom they consider to be agents of violence (i.e. drug traffickers and police) (Machado da Silva and Leite, 2008).

Another common complaint had to do with the growth in crime within the favela. Many residents were indignant regarding the increasing numbers of robberies and muggings, post-‘occupation’.

The ‘police versus dealers’ question became most obvious in the representations regarding the greater or lesser efficiency of state security agents in maintaining ‘order’ within the favela, given that this was usually previously maintained by the dealers – generally through the use of violence. Some residents believe that people who steal within the favela are ‘filthy’ criminals who should be punished ‘according to dealers’ law’. This means physical punishment such as beatings and, in some cases, summary executions. Few people spoke against this sort of brutality openly and those who did were generally ignored. Those who dared to defend the supposed ‘criminals’ were at some risk of dealer retaliation themselves. This prior state of affairs helps us to understand why residents currently avoid talking to the police about security concerns within the favela. According to our informants, simply talking or getting close to a police officer can be enough for a person to be characterised as an ‘X9’ – or police informant. Such a classification is enough to make life within the favela almost impossible.18

Distrust of the police is based on past experiences with the authorities not taking complaints seriously. Furthermore, residents also believe that the current practices of policing are unlikely to be continued in the future and this uncertainty also leads them to avoid going to the police with denunciations or complaints.

The interviewees all complained about frequent police stop-and-search practices, which were largely understood to have a negative impact on residents’ daily lives. The fact that youngsters feel that they are constantly suspects in the eyes of the police also affects their views regarding the UPPs and the latter’s objectives. In general, the young people we interviewed report fearing the police as much as they fear the dealers, but they also emphasise that they feel that they have lost their freedom with the implementation of the pacification programme. ‘I think I lost my liberty when pacification came in’, is an opinion that we constantly heard. With regard to this point, most of the youth ‘connected to projects’ created by social movements talk about how difficult it is to be understood when they criticise the police, given that people from ‘outside’ tend to respond with ‘well, would you prefer the dealers, then?’

Many people have no idea, do not realise the extent of the abuse that we suffer here. I do not prefer traffickers, but I do not want to exchange one [trafficker] for the other
I want to be quiet, but without having the police knocking on my door, breaking … (Female, 23 years old)

One of the ways our informants report dealing with the police is to allow the stop-and-search to occur without openly contesting it. On the one hand, some youth recognise that doing this was one way of meeting police expectations, given that police seem to use stop-and-search in order to assert their authority; on the other hand, young people know that asking for an explanation for these searches would be seen by the police as a challenge or an insult and could result in even greater abuses of power. One interviewee who is a participant in social projects considered that to have to put one’s ‘arms against the wall’ is an extreme form of humiliation in the face of peers and neighbours. In conversations in the field, some young people commented, in very veiled tones, on beatings, killings and kidnappings committed by police that would be going on in more peripheral places in the favela. One hypothesis for this silence regarding police brutality is that these episodes occur more frequently (though not exclusively) to those people who are involved in illegal business circuits or who are related to such people. Such people, socially classified as ‘bandits’, might be reluctant to come forward regarding police abuses and others might be likewise reluctant to report them. In some discussions, however, such as those taking place on local forums organised by social movements, these denunciations occur with greater frequency and in a more aggressive tone of voice, as local activists break with the incriminatory logic that situates all favela residents as ‘criminal’ suspects.

This logic is based on what Misse (2011b), dealing with the concept of stigma proposed by Goffman (1988 [1963]) and labelling theory (Becker, 2008 [1963]; Schur, 1971), calls ‘criminal subjectification’ – to classify a certain population group as guilty beforehand, thus justifying the repressive use of force against them. This means that the criminal subject shares with the deviant the disruption of social relations. But this avoidance is essentially based on their potential danger. The above reflections help to understand how in Rio de Janeiro the social identity of the offender has been represented as the very personification of evil. There is a widespread belief in the irreversibility of this violent criminal condition, which justifies its characterisation as ‘disposable’ (Giroux, 2010, 2012); and, ultimately, to ‘eliminate it’ (Agamben, 2010: 16).

Perceptions regarding the Military Police and the UPP officers

The young people that we interviewed talked about the police as an institution which they distrust and of which they are afraid. In most cases, the youths presented their testimonies as a sort of denunciation towards people who are not from these communities and are considered to be from middle and upper classes, inhabitants from more prestigious neighbourhoods, or pessoal do asfalto (people who do not live in favelas).
It can be said that these discourses reproduce certain current representations of the Military Police that are highly diffused throughout Brazilian society. This is especially the case with regard to the police’s supposed ‘lack of preparation’ and their lack of resources, training and infrastructure, both in terms of state investment in the institution as a whole and in terms of individual officers’ training. According to Muniz (2001), these are the principal accusations levelled by the Brazilian population against the military police in order to explain ‘the arbitrary employment of police power’, which is generally situated as a result of state security agents’ ‘low level of professionalism’. In the case of the UPP police, ‘youth’ is also mobilised as an explanation, referring both to the age of the police officers themselves and to their recent incorporation into the force. Our interviewees thus tend to associate this police force’s ‘lack of preparation’ with inexperience.

It is worth remembering in this context that, since their foundation, the UPPs recruited recently trained police officers. This preference was an attempt both to avoid already ingrained corruption and to develop a ‘new model’ of policing. In this same context, many of our interviewees mentioned that they believed that the UPP officers were ‘obliged’ to work in the favela and were not happy about the situation. In this respect, research carried out with UPP officers revealed that fewer than half of officers were happy to work in the units and that 60% would have preferred to work in another Military Police unit instead of the UPP (Musumeci et al., 2013).

All of these factors combine to produce a discourse that disqualifies police and which conforms to the reference framework that youths employ in order to talk about the Military Police. What seems to be new in this scenario, however, is the recognition that the UPP police have adopted a ‘more cautious’ attitude towards policing in the favela, compared to the police working in the area before the instalment of the new units. If, on the one hand, youths perceive themselves to be the exclusive target of excessive and arbitrary stop-and-search, on the other, they understand that the police have been briefed act more cautiously in the context of ‘pacification’.

... I think the police officer at the UPP uses a bit of caution, mainly here in Alemão. Because if some shit happens here today, tomorrow everyone will be here taking photographs; tomorrow there will be the mass media ‘UPP officer attacks young’. Nowadays within the Alemão we are in this situation. (Male, 22 years old)

It is important to stress that the above statement, as well as much of the material presented in this article, has a specific temporality having been collected at the end of 2012. In 2015 violence in the Complexo do Alemão worsened with increasingly aggressive police operations in the locality, while residents blamed the police for the deaths occurring during confrontations with criminals. This underlines the criticism already made against the UPP pacification policy since its implementation in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. In this process, the hostility in the interactions between residents and
police intensified, and also the intimidation exerted by armed groups in the struggle to ‘re-take’

to ‘re-take’

power and territorial control. In these discourses, the arbitrary acts and rights violations committed

by the ‘police’ (now treated as one and the same by locals whether in reference to the ‘traditional’

Military Police or to the UPP police) are still understood to be present. According to one of the

young adults we interviewed, it would have been impossible to shake the hand of a police officer

back in his day’, but he feels that his daughter might someday be able to do this.

My generation will not shake hands with a police officer, but my daughter will be able
to do so. My generation of the 90s was the one which suffered the most [with
violence]. I am from a youth generation who suffered much, then the police came
with the idea that favelas were bandit factories, that they had to kill everyone. (Male,
24 years old)

Taking these narratives as a whole, they present a constant picture of police treating favela residents

as dealers or criminals. Even the UPP ‘pacification policy’ is understood by residents to be guided by

a ‘stereotyped’, ‘prejudiced’ and even ‘racist’ view of the favela. It is important to note that prejudice

strongly characterises police procedures used in all parts of the world (Álvaro et al., 2015; Barkan

and Cohn, 1998; Gatto et al., 2009; Vrij, 1993). These criticisms also extend to the judicial system

and, more widely, to the state itself. They are often accompanied with accusations of corruption.

Conclusion

Throughout this article, we explored key issues in the narratives of young residents of the Complexo
do Alemão around the dilemmas and tensions with the police in the context of the UPPs. The

narratives about everyday life in the favela being subjected to police intervention were our source for

a socio-anthropological reflection on the landscape of public security policies in the city of Rio de

Janeiro. In this sense, the UPPs offer a chance for further discussion and an opportunity to reflect on

alternative ways of policing the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Our fieldwork allowed us to conclude that

during the initial implementation of Rio’s Police Pacification Units in the Complexo do Alemão,

there was a reduction in the number and severity of armed conflicts between the police and the city’s

criminal groups. This resulted in a general reduction in the climate of fear which had hitherto been

demic in the city.

In contrast, we observed that, if in that context a generalised distrust of police institutions still

existed, nowadays this has increased, due to the persistent pattern of aggressive and disrespectful

behaviour directed towards people from Rio’s poorer strata. Youngsters’ complaints are, above all,

linked to the new regulations that the state has imposed upon the favelas in its bid to maintain order.

The discretionary power that the Brazilian legal system confers onto the police allows security agents

to intervene in those spaces in the community dedicated to celebration and sociability, and residents’
social lives have now become the target of continuous police repression. Youths believe themselves to be constantly under police suspicion, and not the subjects of police protection. This view helps sustain young people’s reluctance to seek out police services, a fact Norman (2009) highlights as a risk factor contributing to greater youth vulnerability.

What the present study demonstrates in this sense is that in spite of a decrease in this unpredictability due to a drop in the number of armed confrontations, youths are still heavily pressured by both dealers and police and continue to feel that they are ‘living in a state of siege’ (Machado da Silva, 2008). The threat of the return of territorial armed criminal groups is also a part of this unstable scenario and has resulted in violent incidents that make the UPPs themselves the targets of symbolic and physical attacks, including the killing of police officers.

The treatment meted out to the marginalised youth, however, still has as its base an authoritarian policing model which must somehow be overcome. This model means that police actions are still based upon imposition, rather than explication or negotiation. According to Bengochea et al. (2004: 126), young people have a need to hear rapid and objective explanations, which the authors call ‘truth criteria for argumentation’, given that what sustain police practices are ‘criteria for authority’. Thus when a young person is stopped by the police, they want to know what for. This attitude can be seen as offensive or, in some cases (and erroneously), as a challenge or threat and this kind of misinterpretation lies at the root of many conflicts between UPP police and favela residents. Policing based on repression instead of negotiation impedes the evolution of more intelligent, democratic and community-based forms of policing (Bengochea et al., 2004).

It is critical to remember that UPPs or any other initiative to reduce violence are crucial to re-establish the state monopoly of law and order in such areas given the existing level of violence and instability resulting from the mixture of territorialisied armed criminal groups and corrupt police officers. However, there is a risk of reinforcing practices of violence that have been historically embedded in the relationship between police and youth – as the testimonies of youngsters illustrated in our study. UPPs, in this instance, will never be an isolated solution. They have to be part of a wider repositioning of the socio-symbolic place of the poor in Brazilian society. What we learn from young people’s voices then, is that respect is not only a matter of being fairly treated by the police, but by the state and society as a whole.

The very use of the notion of ‘pacification’ in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro challenges us to deal with the meanings surrounding the concept of ‘civilisation’ so well explored by Norbert Elias (1993). According to the author, the monopolisation of physical violence by the state in the West was accompanied by the self-discipline that characterises the ‘civilisation process’. Although there is
always a possibility that the process of civilisation (which was never successfully or fully completed) will reverse or go into decline, at least temporarily.

The point here is that changing attitudes is a long-term process, which is predicated upon the domination of the drive to violence and changes in the subjectivity of all the agents involved in the process, such as police officers, poor young people and, of course, broader society. New practices likewise take time to be consolidated and they depend upon the maintenance of a certain self-control. But these new attitudes and practices may rapidly be destroyed if the levels of danger and unpredictability which previously reigned in the favelas return and feelings of security become threatened once again. And unfortunately this seems to be happening now in some poor communities such as the Alemão.

We can say that any permanent change to this scenario should be based on the replacement of the war logic of ‘pacification’ for another logic, that of participation. It implies ensuring that any kind of public security policy should include the demands of favela residents, among them, the young ones.

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**Notes**

1. The participation of young people in these groups happens through their recruitment by the trafficking network. Youngsters’ involvement thus has a central economic aspect, though identity, self-protection and search for visibility and power have been identified as complementary factors (Downdney, 2003; Misse, 1999; Rodriguez, 2013; Silva and Urani, 2002; Silva et al., 2009; Zaluar, 1994, 1997). These groups articulate values of virile culture (Cecchetto, 1997).


3. For Skolnick and Bayley (2006), community policing involves: crime prevention based on the community; the reorientation of patrol activities to emphasise non-emergency services; increasing accountability of local communities and police; and the decentralisation of the police command. It would therefore involve the participation of residents in their own safeguarding. Regarding the change of community policing to proximity policing in UPPs, see Saborio (2014) and Muniz and Mello (2015).

4. Brazilian police forces are divided into Civil, Military and Federal. The first two are subordinated to state governments, and the last one is affiliated to federal authorities. The Military
Police is responsible for maintaining public order and preserving the law, through ostensive policing. It is a ‘militarised’ institution because it is based on military principles, such as: hierarchy, uniform and discipline; and is a backup to the national armed forces. The Civil Police is responsible for criminal law enforcement. It has the function of investigating crimes committed in violation of Brazilian criminal law. The Municipal Guard is an institution that can be created by municipalities to collaborate on public safety. The functions of the municipal guards include acting preventively and permanently for the systemic protection of the population using municipal services and facilities.

5. In Brazil the use of the term ‘pacification’ is not new. ‘Pacification’ went through five centuries of colonial history in Republican Brazil, only used for the indigenous population whose values and behaviour patterns were considered very different from westerners’. The novelty, however, was the reappropriation of this concept in the current urban context, in government public safety initiatives, to be applied to marginalised groups. The contemporary proliferation of the term in Rio de Janeiro has been understood as key to understanding how exclusion and preservation of ideologies operate in Brazilian society (Pacheco de Oliveira, 2014).

6. In 2010 the project received an investment of 20 million Brazilian Reais a year from the business group EBX, owned by Eike Batista. It provided infrastructure and logistics (offices, purchase and donation of equipment and training of police officers especially to act in UPPs). This investment, however, was terminated in 2013, before the financial crisis hit the business group.

7. UPP Social was a programme of social policies set up by the government to pacify the favelas. Its mission was to mobilise and articulate municipal policies and services in the favelas through the UPPs. According to the programme’s website, UPP Social had three main objectives: to contribute to the consolidation of the peace process and the promotion of local citizenship in pacified areas; to promote urban, social and economic development in the localities; and to achieve the full integration of these areas into the city as a whole. Available at: uppsocial.org/programa/ (accessed 1 February 2013).

8. Scholars of public security in Rio de Janeiro show how the various assignments given to officers of the UPP contributed to an extended police officer role that has become more a problem than a solution. In this context, the police encompass other public agency functions responsible for social and urban infrastructure policies (Muniz and Mello, 2015: 54).

9. The first steps of this research were undertaken as part of the ‘Youth, Inequalities and the Future of Rio de Janeiro’ study developed by the Núcleo de Excelência para o Estudo da Juventude (Centre for Excellence in Youth Studies – PRONEX-Juventude), which was undertaken by several teaching and research institutions in Rio. The goal of this project was to evaluate perspectives for the
future and the processes of identity construction and the desires and fears of the young people of the city.

10. ‘Pardo’ is one of the official racial classifications of Brazilian individuals. In this context, it comprises Afro-descendent people, as well as darker skinned individuals (see Fry, 2005; Nogueira, 1985).

11. The Complexo do Alemão is generally believed to be a hiding place for the heads of one of the biggest criminal groups in Rio – the Comando Vermelho. The Complex has been described since the 1980s as one of the most violent places in the city due to the significant amount of weapons and drugs, and of course, men willing to participate in this activity controlling and dominating the territory. This representation can be seen in various ways, such as the epithet by which a group of favelas became known – the ‘Gaza Strip in Rio de Janeiro’, in reference to the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis in the Middle East.

12. This footage can be found at: g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2010/11/policia-entra-na-vila-cruzeiro-e-criminosos-fogem-para-o-alemao.html.

13. In Rio de Janeiro the term militia is linked to illegal practices, usually carried out by armed groups formed in urban marginalised communities. These groups self-declare themselves as capable of preventing the drug trade taking hold in the locality. In exchange, they charge the local inhabitants ‘security’ fees. These groups (composed mainly of former military officers, former police officers or fire department members) also control the distribution of utilities such as gas, internet and cable television and, in some areas, run an illegal transport system of passenger vehicles (Cano and Duarte, 2011; Misse, 2011c).

14. In Brazil social projects are a result of a series of initiatives by NGOs and companies that, during the 1990s, offered alternatives against a lack of public policies to vulnerable populations. For an analysis of the rise of these organisations in Brazil, see Landim (1993).

15. For an analysis of the current intertwined relationships between politics, urban protests and digital networks, see Farias and Gomes (2015).

16. In order to maintain the anonymity of our research participants, their names have been excluded in the text that follows. The project that gave rise to this research was presented to and approved by the Ethics Committee of the National School of Public Health and all subjects of the research were informed about its objectives and invited to sign a consent form that guaranteed their anonymity and the voluntary nature of their participation in the research (CNS resolution 196/96 regarding research undertaken with human beings).

17. The security guards or soldiers protect the chief of the boca (drug selling point). Typically they carry a weapon and fight in the disputes for territory.
18. There is a pattern for the classification of territories in the city of Rio de Janeiro dominated by criminal gangs. For young people living in certain areas, friendly territories are those controlled by the same party that prevails in their neighbourhoods, and ‘enemies’ would be the territory controlled by a rival faction. In this classification, there is also the figure of the ‘German’ (*Alemão*), used to describe the stranger, the mortal enemy – this may be a police officer or a member of a rival faction. See Misse (1999).

References


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Résumé

Dans cet article, nous nous intéressons aux représentations sociales que les jeunes des favelas de Rio de Janeiro ont des pratiques de la police dans le contexte de la mise en place des « Unités de Police Pacificatrice ». En nous appuyant sur des travaux sur le terrain, l’observation participante et des entretiens, nous analysons les récits et les pratiques qui influent sur les rapports entre les jeunes et la police à Complexo do Alemão. Au cours des entretiens, les jeunes interviewés ont réclamé plus de sécurité publique et plus de services sociaux. S’ils ont certes constaté quelques progrès dans les pratiques de la police, ces changements apparaissent instables. Ces jeunes ont ainsi confirmé la permanence de pratiques violentes et de préjugés de la part de la police. Pour que des changements
se produisent, il serait nécessaire de substituer à la logique de guerre de la « pacification » une autre logique : celle de la participation.

**Mots-clés**

Favelas, jeunesse, sécurité publique, Unités de Police Pacificatrice (UPP), violence

**Resumen**

Este artículo explora las representaciones sociales que tienen los jóvenes de las favelas de Río de Janeiro sobre las prácticas de la policía en el contexto de la implementación del programa de ‘Unidades Policiales de Pacificación’. A partir de datos obtenidos a través de trabajo de campo, observación participante y entrevistas, se analizan los discursos y las prácticas que influyen en las relaciones entre los jóvenes y la policía en el Complexo do Alemão. Los entrevistados expresaron una demanda de mayor seguridad pública y servicios sociales. Los jóvenes señalaron que se han producido algunos progresos en las prácticas de la policía, aunque estas mejoras parecen inestables. Estos jóvenes confirmaron también la permanencia de las prácticas violentas y los prejuicios de la policía. Cualquier cambio en este escenario debería estar basado en la sustitución de la lógica de la guerra de la ‘pacificación’ por otra lógica de la participación.

**Palabras clave**

Favelas, juventud, seguridad pública, ‘Unidades Policiales de Pacificación’ (UPP), violencia